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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
George Alogoskoufis and Kevin Featherstone 
 
 
The eight-year adjustment program followed by Greece in the aftermath of the 2010 crisis 
was concluded in the summer of 2018, albeit with ongoing policy constraints. The program 
was associated with the deepest and longest recession in Greece’s post war history. While 
the Greek economy appeared to be on a path to an admittedly weak recovery after 2017, in 
2020 it was hit by another major negative shock, that of Covid-19 which has caused another 
deep recession.  
Many of the issues that confronted Greece before the Covid-19 crisis remain relevant for the 
sustained recovery of the Greek economy after the end of this latest crisis. 
The pre-conditions – economic, political and institutional - for a sustained recovery of the 
Greek economy were examined recently by a number of prominent academics, many of 
whom possess extensive political experience in Greece. A selection of their contributions, first 
presented in a workshop at the London School of Economics, in December 2018, and a 
conference at the Fletcher School of Tufts University in April, is collected in this book.1 
With ramifications for both Greece and the Euro-Area as a whole, the contributions consider 
the constraints that derive from the structural linkages between the domestic and the 
European levels.  While concerned with the core economic agenda, they place it within its 
political, social, and institutional contexts in order to have a more complete assessment.  They 
ask what scope there is for recovery, the priorities that need to be set, and the prospects for 
their attainment. 
 
While written from different perspectives – and adhering to no common view - the chapters, 
nevertheless, cohere around a number of important themes: 
• The historical depth and breadth of the domestic factors that led to the 2010 crisis: 
thus, addressing these will require an unprecedented effort of political will and 
capacity. 
 
1 These events were organised by George Alogoskoufis and Kevin Featherstone. The workshop at LSE took 
place on December 14, 2018 and the conference at Tufts University, on April 12, 2019, with financial support 
from the Onassis foundation, which is gratefully acknowledged. The editors would also like to thank Philipp 
Katsinas (Hellenic Observatory) for superb editorial assistance in the production of this e-book. Finally, George 
Alogoskoufis would like to thank Sheri Callender at the Fletcher School for excellent and cheerful administrative 
and secretarial assistance with the Tufts conference, while Kevin Featherstone would like to thank the team at 





• Amongst the priorities of reform, tackling the endemic problems of under-performing 
institutions will be critical.   
o Indeed, the costs – in terms of lost growth and the delivery of public goods – 
of such under-performance in the past are estimated here. 
o A major weakness has been the lack of effective fiscal institutions and the 
monitoring of fiscal management by the state.  Despite reforms, there remains 
the need to further build-up institutional capacity in this regard. 
o Reforms of the state administration have been extensive, but their depth of 
impact is still found wanting. 
o The crisis adjustment programs spurred the further development of 
independent regulatory agencies, but their performance – across sectors – also 
remains uneven. 
• The Greek economic model needs to be substantively revised going forward: 
o Addressing long-term problems of productive capacity and competitiveness 
will be key. 
o Bank-based financing will remain central, but the resilience and effectiveness 
of the banks will be determinant. 
• The domestic growth path will be impacted by decisions made at the EU-level for the 
reform of euro-zone governance. 
o In the immediate period, this involves most notably the new European 
Recovery and Resilience Fund: its efficiency of resource allocation and its 
setting of funding priorities. 
o More generally, the effects of asymmetric shocks – and the problems inherent 
in managing a heterogeneous currency union – can be best mitigated by 
further moves towards a European fiscal union, allied to financial and labor 
market reforms. 
• The political fall-out of the crisis has been far-reaching and the igniting of a dormant 
populism in Greek politics is likely to be only effectively addressed by a return to long-
term, inclusive economic growth. 
o The mediating role of the US in the crisis of 2015, in particular, has served to 
abate the often-populist attacks made on Washington – helping to re-balance 
Greece’s foreign policy strategy. 
 
The book is organized in four parts. Part I contains overviews of the interactions between 
domestic institutions and policies and economic performance. Part II focuses on aspects of 




administrative reforms, while part IV examines international aspects such as policy 
interdependence, the asymmetries of the euro area and the role of geopolitics.  Here, we 
endeavor to summarize the contributions. 
 
 
1. Institutions and Economic Performance 
Chapter 2 by Lucas Papademos considers the position of Greece in the euro-zone, both in the 
past and the future, in terms of the economic policy challenges.  Specifically, it addresses 
three sets of questions: Firstly, whether the adoption of the euro by Greece was a mistake in 
light of the country's severe and protracted economic crisis, persisting structural weaknesses 
and remaining fiscal problems. Secondly, how Greece can achieve strong, sustained and 
equitable growth within the Eurozone in an environment of global economic transformation, 
rapid technological change and intense competition. After assessing the constraints imposed 
on fiscal policy by the country's heavy debt burden and the implications for economic growth 
of its low international competitiveness, a number of reforms and policies are proposed to 
raise total factor productivity, improve competitiveness and foster stronger, durable and 
inclusive growth. Finally, the chapter assesses the reforms and conditions required for the 
Eurozone to successfully overcome economic and political challenges and establish a genuine 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) against a background of increased populism, 
nationalism and Euroskepticism. The chapter concludes by outlining the likely effects of a 
more integrated EMU on Greece and the actions that should be taken by the country to 
prepare for the completion of the European project.   
Chapter 3, by George Alogoskoufis, analyses the policy and institutional developments that 
led the Greek economy to the crisis of 2010 and the ‘great depression’ of the 2010s.  
The main thesis is that the crisis of the post-2010 period was building up during the previous 
three decades and that its root causes were not merely economic, but social, structural, 
institutional and political. The fiscal imbalances created in the 1980s were not adequately 
addressed by the convergence policies of the 1990s, while the long-standing problem of low 
international competitiveness was further exacerbated by the failure to promote the 
necessary structural reforms.  
Greece's accession to the euro area with major structural and fiscal imbalances and low and 
deteriorating international competitiveness, led to the gradual destabilisation of its external 
position and a steep rise in external indebtedness. The lopsided adjustment and the 
inadequacy of the reforms was due to domestic political and social constraints, both before 
and after euro area entry. 
In view of the institutional weaknesses of the euro area itself, the external imbalances 
ultimately led to the external debt crisis of 2010, the imposition of the economic adjustment 




This chapter also explores the prerequisites for a sustained recovery of the Greek economy 
within the euro area, once the global economic crisis induced by the pandemic is over.  
The author’s conclusion is that the quest for wide ranging institutional and economic reforms 
remains the top priority. 
Chapter 4, by Kevin Featherstone, analyses the economic costs of Greece’s institutional  
weaknesses in relation to Greece’s position within the European Union. The focus is both on 
the recent past and the future.   
Empirical data is analysed to compare the performance of the public administration in 
fulfilling EU policy obligations.  Greece is shown to be one of poorest performers, at a level 
comparable to Bulgaria and Romania.  Further data is collated to compare the ‘quality of 
government’ (QoG) across EU member states.  Again, Greece performs poorly.  It is then 
shown that the two sets of data are statistically related: state institutions lacking ‘impartiality’ 
from wider socio-economic pressures are most likely to underperform in the delivery of EU 
public goods.   
The chapter assesses the implications for Greece’s convergence within the EU and its 
prospects for being able to accommodate increasing demands on its institutions resulting 
from a deepening EU integration process.  There are new challenges here for the EU itself as 
it manages a heterogeneous set of member states.  A ‘tying hands’ strategy of setting rules 
for national governments to follow is likely to be too indirect and superficial to achieve 
convergence in (institutional) performance.   
The author concludes that the EU’s new ‘Recovery and Resilience Fund’ is likely to be a 
revealing systemic test for both Athens and Brussels. 
A related theme, related to the effects of the post-2010 crisis, is taken up in Chapter 5 by 
Nicos Christodoulakis. The most pronounced divergence in economic development in the 
euro area over the last decade took place between Greece and its peers, after a series of 
austerity measures imposed in the aftermath of the global crisis in exchange for a debt 
bailout. At the same time, Greece had suffered from a dramatic deterioration of institutions, 
ranging from severe blows in government effectiveness and political stability to market 
distortions and the weakening of the rule of law. Using the World Bank governance indicators 
as explanatory variables, an empirical growth model is used to calculate the cost of crumbling 
institutions in Greece in terms of per capita GDP foregone and, thus, explain the sharp 
divergence in incomes.  The author concludes that Greece - alongside macroeconomic 
stabilisation - should urgently focus on improving institutions if a convergence process toward 
the more developed nations of the Euro Area is to set off again. 
 
2. Macroeconomic Policy, Finance and Growth 





First, to shed light on some new facts about the depth and duration of the Greek great 
depression over 2008-2016.  
Second, to report some quantitative evidence of the driving forces of the output loss during 
these years. They investigate what explains the Greek great depression, whether things could 
be better and whether things be worse. To this end, they use a dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium model that they have constructed in a previous paper.  
Third, they draw some macroeconomic policy lessons that could be useful following the new 
economic crisis triggered by the Covid-19 pandemic. 
Chapter 7, by Helen Louri and Petros Migiakis, focuses on the financial sector. The authors 
examine the existence of a feedback loop between the resilience of the financial sector and 
Greek economic activity.  
They employ a sequence of structural VARs using data for bank credit, liquidity, capital, asset 
quality and private demand in 2001-2018. They use two data sets: One set of monthly data, 
with which they examine the determinants of credit provision by Greek banks, and a second 
set of quarterly data, with which they examine the finance-growth nexus for the Greek 
economy.  
The authors present three main findings: First, that the deterioration in the quality of Greek 
banks’ balance sheets affected the provision of credit to the economy negatively. Second, 
that central bank liquidity and recapitalisations of Greek banks provided only a partial remedy 
and, third, that the decline in credit significantly weakened economic activity.  
The authors also find that there is a role for market financing of the economy but this cannot 
substitute for the predominantly bank-based financing. Therefore, as the Greek economy 
starts bouncing back Greek banks have an important role to play, first, by solving the problem 
of non-performing loans (NPLs) and by providing the necessary credit and, second, by 
improving the efficiency of capital allocation towards a more sustainable model of growth. 
Chapter 8, by Nikolaos Leounakis and Plutarchos Sakellaris investigate the process of Greek 
economic growth.  The authors decompose Greek economic performance over the last sixty 
years into the contributions of productivity, capital accumulation, and labor growth. They find 
that recent Greek economic history is a succession of long periods of boom with long periods 
of stagnation or depression.  
The decisive factor in either booms or slumps has been total factor productivity (TFP) growth. 
In particular, bad performance of TFP is the main culprit for the fourteen-year recession from 
1980 to 1993, as well as for the post-2008 depression. This suggests that action on reversing 
the shortfall in productivity should be the most important focus for policy makers.  
The authors argue that the crisis has led to permanent losses of output. In projections, they 
show that the economy needs to grow at average rates of about 3.5% over the next five years 




Given that these projections were made before the recent pandemic, the recovery must be 
even more pronounced now. 
The impact of the crisis in terms of income inequality and re-distribution is taken up by Eirini 
Andriopoulou, Eleni Kanavitsa, and Panos Tsakloglou in Chapter 9.  It provides a detailed 
picture of the evolution of the level and the structure of inequality during the period 2007-
2016, in which Greece faced one of the most severe debt crises among developed countries. 
The aim is to examine how changes in overall income distribution affected inequality between 
and within different socioeconomic groups and thus indirectly how the burden of fiscal 
consolidation was shared across population groups. The findings are linked with economic 
developments and policy choices of the period in question. The results show that inequality 
rose at the beginning and the peak of the crisis, but the magnitude of the change varies across 
different indices. The recorded increases are larger when the indices used are relatively more 
sensitive to changes close to the bottom of the income distribution. The increase in 
unemployment played the most substantial role for the decrease in income of a large share 
of the population, in combination with the absence of an adequate safety net. Inequality 
“within population groups” was far more important in shaping aggregate inequality than 
inequality “between population groups”. The contribution of disparities between educational 
groups to aggregate inequality declined while that of disparities between different 
occupational groups rose. 
The final chapter in this section, by Ioannis Laliotis and Vassilis Monastiriotis, examines 
aspects of flexibility in wage determination in Greece after the major labour market reforms 
of the first two Economic Adjustment Programmes of 2010-2015. We find no evidence of a 
wage curve; persistent sectoral wage premia and penalties; and only marginal improvements, 
towards marketisation, in regard to individual wage premia. Although not constituting a 
formal test of the impact of the labour market reforms on wage determination in the country, 
our results suggest that the reforms had limited effect in making wage determination in the 
labour market more flexible and more efficient from an economic point of view. We 
conjecture that further policy effort is needed to enhance labour market efficiency (and wage 
flexibility) in the country, possibly via avenues other than the continuing deregulation of 




3. Politics, Institutions and Administrative Reforms 
Economic strategies and outcomes cannot, of course, be properly separated from political 
conflicts and institutional capacities.  This section widens the perspective to such matters.  
Chapter 11, by Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos, investigates the relation between populism, party 




Among all South European countries, Greece underwent the most severe economic crisis in 
the 2010s which gave rise to dormant populist reactions, which combined with diffuse 
political discourse and the political party system. In contrast to the comparable case of 
Portugal, populism in Greece was reflected in the emergence or strengthening of populist 
parties on the Left and the Right, the adoption of populism as political discourse by an 
otherwise radical left-wing party (Syriza), and its rise to power in 2015 on the wave of social 
reactions to austerity policies.  
According to the author, populism was also manifested in the adoption of populist governing 
policies during Syriza’s government rule, in coalition with the nationalist right-wing ANEL 
party, in 2015-2019.  
The spread of populism and its rise to power in Greece are analysed in the light of the opposite 
experience of Portugal and are attributed to the legacies of democratic practice after the 1974 
transition to democracy, traditions of political culture and the polarisation of the party 
system. In conjunction with the gravity and long duration of the post-2008 economic crisis, 
these political legacies were the catalyst for the sea change in Greek politics in 2011-2019. 
Chapter 12, by Georgia Kaplanoglou, focuses on the lack of effective fiscal institutions and 
the weak monitoring of public finance developments in Greece. According to many, this has 
been among the  major causes of the fiscal crisis of 2009.  
This chapter explores aspects of the weak institutional framework that did not prevent the 
fiscal deterioration even within the context of EU fiscal rules. As a result, the efforts to build 
up institutional capacity on the fiscal front is one of the main challenges ahead.  
The author argues that a deeper understanding of the Greek case, against valuable experience 
on the quality of fiscal institutions and monitoring, particularly in the European Union, is 
crucial in order not only to prevent unsustainable fiscal deficits in the future, but also to 
support a more efficient allocation of resources in the public sector, and to enhance 
accountability and democratic control. 
The concerns of the author become even more relevant following the Covid-19 crisis and the 
fiscal deterioration that it entails. 
In Chapter 13, by Stella Ladi and Manto Lampropoulou, the authors investigate market 
regulation via independent agencies in post-crisis Greece. Their analysis suggests that the 
debt crisis that erupted in 2009 has been a forceful factor for reforming Independent 
Regulatory Agencies (IRAs), but the performance has been uneven.  
With a focus on network industries the authors outline the similarities and differences of IRAs 
regarding their status, powers and operation. The creation and strengthening of IRAs are 
linked with the policy context of market reform, discerning the liberalisation-oriented IRAs 
(pre-crisis) and the privatisation-oriented ones (post-crisis). The performance of the Greek 
IRAs is evaluated based on the indicators of the OECD Performance Assessment Framework 




While similar problems were observed in all IRAs under study, the findings suggest significant 
variation in their role, powers and performance across sectors. The explanatory factors 
accounting for these problems are analysed with reference to the interplay between the 




4. International Interdependence, Euro Area Asymmetries and Geopolitics 
Chapter 14, by Yannis Ioannides, is a qualitative presentation of issues associated with 
macroeconomic policy interdependence with an emphasis on the institutional setting of the 
European Union and of the Euro zone area. It identifies the importance of fiscal multipliers 
and the resulting policy spillovers, and discusses some of the evidence by drawing on recent 
studies.  
It then turns to a qualitative discussion of these key analytical components of Part II, which is 
available in a technical Appendix. The Appendix, which is available separately, is a quantitative 
treatment of key magnitudes characterising economies which can exercise their own national 
fiscal policy while engaging in free trade and maintaining their own currencies or, 
alternatively, sharing a currency. To appreciate these issues, the chapter benchmarks the 
different scenaria to the absence of trade, strictly speaking autarky, while allowing 
progressively fiscal and monetary policy under a monetary union as well as a fiscal union.  
The chapter emphasises the importance of differences in population sizes in a general 
international equilibrium model of a monetary union under alternative scenaria of monetary, 
fiscal, and debt policy coordination. It also considers conditions for participating in a fiscal 
union within a monetary union, a hitherto unexplored question. The analysis allows for 
inefficiencies in tax collection that serve as another difference across countries and examines 
how union-wide coordination of tax and spending policy, typically a nation-specific 
competence, may improve welfare. This is intended to explore the contrast between 
monetary policy decisions that may be determined by deliberations and voting in the central 
bank, given the fiscal policy stance, and national fiscal policy interdependence, given union-
wide monetary policy. It examines the implications of different sizes of the members of the 
union. 
Chapter 15, by George Alogoskoufis and Laurent Jacque, provides a perspective on the euro 
area (EA), focusing on macroeconomic and financial asymmetries among its member states 
and the need for major and fundamental reforms.  
After surveying the evolution of EU macroeconomic and monetary cooperation and 
developments since the creation of the euro, and particularly the euro area crisis, the authors 




In addition to reforms currently discussed, a common EA budget of moderate size would help 
smooth out the asymmetric impact of macroeconomic shocks through the operation of 
automatic fiscal stabilizers. It would also help countries in recession face smaller national 
fiscal and financial consequences of such recessions, and would also partly address labor 
market fragmentation as it could be targeted to euro area wide unemployment insurance. It 
would also help in the avoidance of future crises if the scope of the ECB to act as a lender of 
last resort in times of crisis was expanded and officially recognised. 
The analysis of this chapter is particularly relevant given the asymmetric impact of the Covid-
19 crisis and the adoption of the Recovery and Resilience Fund. 
The final chapter, by Katerina Sokou, focuses on geopolitics. It examines relations between 
Greece and the USA following the debt crisis. 
According to the author, the Greek debt crisis acted as a catalyst for closer bilateral relations. 
Geopolitical considerations started becoming relevant again in 2010, when the Greek debt 
crisis threatened the foundations of the Eurozone, prompting the US to support the IMF 
bailout, the largest in the history of the Fund. The political unrest in Greece following the 
imposition of the austerity program awakened the geopolitical reflexes of U.S. foreign policy 
to help secure Greece’s place in the West. The US administration played a mediating role 
between Greece’s SYRIZA government and Greece’s creditors with the goal of keeping Greece 
in the Eurozone. This stance helped improve perceptions of the US amid the Greek public, as 
American policy on Greece was politically non-controversial for the first time in the postwar 
era.  
The author also stresses the significant uncertainties ahead, as sustained American support 
on the strategic and operational level is required for Greece to continue to be a stabilising 
force in the wider region. 
Collectively, the chapters that follow here are intended as contributions to the public debate 
on setting a new reform agenda for Greece.  The economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic 
seem likely to be severe but mostly limited to the medium-term.  By contrast, the underlying 
structural problems of the economy are deep-rooted and long-term.  The fact that they pre-
date the current emergency and have continued across governments, of different political 
complexions, indicates their endemic, systemic character.  The political will to address them 
has fluctuated.  We hope that the analyses and recommendations contained in this volume 













This chapter examines several issues pertaining to the performance of the Greek economy 
since the launch of the euro and explores the economic policy challenges that will be faced 
by Greece and the Eurozone in the future. Specifically, it addresses three sets of questions: 
Firstly, whether the adoption of the euro by Greece was a mistake in light of the country's 
severe and protracted economic crisis, persisting structural weaknesses and remaining fiscal 
problems. Secondly, how Greece can achieve strong, sustained and equitable growth within 
the Eurozone in an environment of global economic transformation, rapid technological 
change and intense competition. After assessing the constraints imposed on fiscal policy by 
the country's heavy debt burden and the implications for economic growth of its low 
international competitiveness, a number of reforms and policies are proposed to raise total 
factor productivity, improve competitiveness and foster stronger, durable and inclusive 
growth. Finally, the chapter assesses the reforms and conditions required for the Eurozone to 
successfully overcome economic and political challenges and establish a genuine Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) against a background of increased populism, nationalism and 
Euroskepticism. The chapter concludes by outlining the likely effects of a more integrated 
EMU on Greece and the actions that should be taken by the country to prepare for the 
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This is a very special conference taking place at momentous times for Greece, the European 
Union (EU) and the Eurozone, all of which are facing formidable challenges. 
After eight years of extraordinary economic adjustment, which has entailed huge economic 
and social cost, Greece has entered the so-called post (MoU) memorandum phase. The 
transition from a long period when three supervised economic adjustment programs were 
implemented to a policy regime that is less externally constrained justifies a sigh of relief and, 
in a certain sense, is an economic policy milestone. Nevertheless, this transition is not a 
sufficient cause for exuberant celebration. A lot still remains to be done to improve the 
country's economic performance and social welfare: notably, to achieve strong, sustained and 
equitable growth, reduce exceptionally and unacceptably high unemployment, and secure 
the sustainability of public finances over the long run. 
This year marks the 20th anniversary of the launch of the euro. This is an occasion for 
assessing how effectively it has achieved its objectives: to maintain price stability, support 
growth and safeguard financial stability in the Eurozone. Overall, I believe the euro's mission 
has been accomplished. Nevertheless, the euro's 20th birthday is not an occasion for 
unconditional, euphoric celebration. Although the objective of protecting macroeconomic 
and financial stability has been achieved, the European monetary union has experienced 
intense pressures and faced extraordinary policy challenges. At times, its cohesion and 
stability – economic, social and political – were severely tested and the euro's viability was 
questioned. A lot needs to be done to create a genuine Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
that can foster stronger growth in the Eurozone, deal with a potential financial crisis in the 
future more effectively and ensure the euro's viability over the long run. 
So, this conference is very timely and it focuses on many important, pressing and 
interconnected issues for Greece and the euro. As I will argue, the future of the Greek 
economy is intertwined with the future of the European project and the single European 
currency. 
I would like to thank the organizers for inviting me to participate in this event and give the 
opening speech. Both George Alogoskoufis and Kevin Featherstone have been very much 
involved, in various capacities over many years, in policy matters pertaining to the Greek 
economy and the European integration process. They have put together a comprehensive and 
impressive agenda of the key issues for Greece and the euro. I can rationally predict – 
rationally in the sense of the word as defined by John Muth, Robert Lucas, Thomas Sargent et 
al. – that the presentations and debates that will follow mine will be valuable and thought-
provoking.  
In my speech on the general topic of the conference, I thought it would useful to address 
three sets of pertinent questions. 
• Firstly, was the adoption of the euro by Greece a mistake in light of the country's severe 
and protracted economic crisis and in view of persisting structural weaknesses and 




• Secondly, will Greece be able to grow strongly and prosper in a sustained and equitable 
way within the Eurozone in the years to come? How can this objective be achieved in an 
environment of global economic transformation, technological revolution and intense 
competition?  
• Finally, will the EU and the Eurozone successfully overcome current and future economic 
and political challenges and establish a Union that will be more integrated economically, 
financially and politically? How can such a goal be attained in an environment of increased 
populism, nationalism and Euroskepticism?  
These are many and challenging issues. Given the time constraints, I shall have to provide 
relatively concise, though reasonably precise answers. 
 
 
2. The Adoption of the Euro and the Performance of the Greek Economy 
Greece's membership in the Eurozone has been questioned by some academics and 
policymakers considering the country's severe and protracted debt and economic crisis and 
in view of persisting structural weaknesses and remaining fiscal problems.2 
It has been argued, by some, that, overall, Greece has not benefited by joining the Eurozone 
and that the crisis was a consequence of the fact that its economy and institutions were not 
sufficiently prepared to function efficiently and appropriately given the policy constraints 
imposed by the adoption of the euro and the competitive pressures resulting from 
participation in the Single European Market. It has also been argued that the depth and length 
of the recession mainly reflected the high dose of fiscal austerity required by Greece's 
international creditors combined with the unavailability to a Eurozone member state of the 
exchange rate as a policy instrument to support economic activity. Hence, it has been 
suggested that a temporary exit of Greece from the Eurozone and the readoption of the 
drachma would help resolve the debt crisis in a less painful manner, support faster economic 
recovery and promote stronger long-term growth. 
These propositions are generally false, although some of the arguments put forward include 
elements of truth.3 Overall, Greece has benefited significantly by joining the Eurozone. The 
adoption in the mid-1990s of the goal of euro membership acted as a motivating force and a 
catalyst for stabilizing the economy and achieving high rates of uninterrupted growth for 14 
years (1994-2007) following a prolonged period of high inflation, excessive deficits, rising debt 
and mediocre growth. During the eighties (1981-1990), annual inflation averaged 19%, the 
growth rate fluctuated around a mean of 0.7% and the government deficit hovered between 
7.3% and 15.9% of GDP. That was not an admirable economic performance to be nostalgic 
 
2 See, for example, the interview of Wolfgang Shäuble with the Financial Times, March 22, 2019. 
3 This section draws and elaborates on Lucas Papademos “Was it a good idea for Greece to join the eurozone in 





about. In the first half of the nineties, the economic situation had improved to some extent, 
with inflation falling to 9% and growth averaging 1.3%, but fiscal imbalances remained 
excessive and the debt ratio had climbed to 99% in 1995. 
As you know, Greece joined the Eurozone on January 1, 2001. During the previous five years 
(1996-2000), inflation steadily dropped to 3.2% in 2000 and growth averaged 3.7%, while in 
the seven years after euro adoption (2001-2007) annual inflation and growth averaged 2.9% 
and 4%, respectively. Thus, over more than a decade, Greece experienced strong and steady 
growth in an environment of relative price stability, and per capita income rose both in 
absolute terms and in relation to the EU average, from 74% of the former EU-15 average in 
1996 to 83% in 2007. Moreover, important reforms were implemented in several areas, albeit 
rather slowly and to a lesser extent than planned and required. 
The debt crisis which erupted in 2010, was not due to unsustainable public finances and low 
wage and price competitiveness when Greece joined the Eurozone. It was mainly a 
consequence of the policies pursued after the country joined the Eurozone, which were 
incompatible with the fiscal discipline and prudent labor market policies required by Greece's 
participation in the Eurozone and the stability-oriented monetary policy of the European 
Central Bank (ECB). Another important factor contributing to the crisis was that necessary 
reforms to boost productivity, strengthen market completion and improve the effectiveness 
of institutions were delayed or only partly implemented.  
Persistently excessive and partly concealed budget deficits larger than the norms required by 
the Treaty, and wage increases greater than productivity growth led to the accumulation of 
high debt and to a significant erosion of competitiveness. The result was an extraordinary 
widening of the current account deficit and a sharp rise in external public debt that eventually 
could not be financed at reasonable cost and be sustainable. 
The underlying factors accounting for these policy mistakes – some of which were also made 
in other Eurozone countries – included an inadequate understanding, by both policymakers 
and market participants, of the domestic policy constraints imposed by monetary union, 
inherent difficulties in reform implementation, political populism and electoral cycles, as well 
as market euphoria and underestimation of the risks associated with exorbitant debt. 
Warning and recommendations by European institutions and the ECB, as well as by the Greek 
central bank, proved insufficient to influence domestic policy and prevent the crisis.  
The severity and persistence of the Greek crisis were not really due to the unavailability of 
the exchange rate as a policy instrument – as our experience in the 1980s makes clear – or to 
other constraints imposed by Greece's membership in the Eurozone. The unprecedented 
decline of output and employment was the result of the cumulative effects of several factors 
– economic, political and institutional – including some of those that led to the crisis. 
Fiscal and external imbalances in Greece were greater than in other crisis-stricken Eurozone 
countries. Since, in the case of Greece, both government debt and deficits, as well as future 
pension liabilities, were exceptionally high, achieving debt sustainability required substantial 
fiscal adjustment and entailed larger output loss. Importantly, the policy-mix, especially 




support growth. It laid more emphasis than warranted on fiscal consolidation than on 
structural reform. Reforms which would have supported economic activity and employment, 
and would also have facilitated fiscal adjustment, were only partly implemented or postponed 
for various reasons, including insufficient understanding of their importance, pressure from 
vested interests and inadequate administrative capacity. 
The extraordinarily large external imbalances before the crisis reflected the combined effects 
of structural impediments on the supply side, aggregate demand pressures fueled by 
excessive public and private borrowing, and declining competitiveness. Consequently, they 
should have been tackled by addressing at the same time the structural, cost and demand-
related determinants of current account deficits. Through a process of "internal devaluation" 
labor cost competitiveness has been fully restored to its 2001 level, while price 
competitiveness has substantially improved, thereby increasing exports. But structural 
competitiveness has not been sufficiently enhanced, thus preventing a stronger export and 
growth performance. 
Crucially, intense political antagonism, rising populism and extremism made it impossible to 
reach a consensus among political parties and social partners on the economic policies being 
implemented. The toxic political atmosphere that prevailed at times undermined public 
confidence in the policies pursued and increased uncertainty about the economic outlook, 
thus impairing policy effectiveness and dampening aggregate demand and economic activity.  
In sum, it is the cumulative effect and mutually reinforcing interactions of these and certain 
other factors that explain the severity and duration of the crisis and its concomitant influence 
on social welfare and cohesion.  
Indeed, the burden of adjustment was unevenly distributed. Income inequality and various 
measures of poverty and social exclusion increased significantly during the first three years of 
the crisis and then fell only slightly or stabilized. Although pensioners suffered sizable income 
losses, younger people and the population in urban areas were affected to a relatively greater 
extent. 
An exit of Greece from the Eurozone would neither have helped to resolve the crisis faster 
and in a less distressful way nor would it have improved the economy's export performance 
and growth prospects. On the contrary, in all likelihood it would have had devastating effects 
on the economy's stability and prosperity for years to come. It would have also entailed 
serious political and geopolitical risks for Greece and Southeast Europe. A number of reasons 
support this conclusion. 
As almost all debt, both external and domestic, is denominated in euros, the adoption of a 
national currency, presumably devalued substantially against the euro, would lead to a 
generalized default against both external and domestic creditors. External public debt is 
mostly held directly or indirectly by European governments, and the cost of the default would 
have to be borne by the taxpayers of Greece's European partners. The economic and political 
repercussions of such an event would be extremely serious and long lasting. Domestically, the 
banking system would effectively collapse and would have to be recapitalized by the 




by money creation. The implications for economic activity and financial stability would be 
detrimental. 
The competitiveness gains and expected associated beneficial effects on growth, if any at all, 
would be temporary, as Greece's own experience in the 1980s has shown. A substantially 
devalued currency would create inflationary pressures and strong demand for wage 
increases, especially following the sharp decline in real incomes during the crisis, which, under 
the circumstances, would inevitably have to be accommodated by the monetary authority. 
Moreover, the country's default and the strain on its banking system would adversely affect 
exports. Most likely, inflation would rise sharply, while the envisaged positive impact on 
economic activity would be small. In addition, Grexit would have several other unfavourable 
effects on the Greek economy and politics and on society's welfare. Exiting European 
monetary union is a more complex and challenging process – economically, politically and 
technically – than abandoning a fixed exchange rate regime. 
In view of the above, it is not surprising that the Greek people have overwhelmingly been in 
favor of Greece's membership in the Eurozone, even during the darkest days of the crisis, in 
2011-2012 and in 2015, despite the sharp decline in real income and the other sacrifices 
endured. That support reflects the desire for stability that the euro entails, the memory of 
the mediocre performance of the Greek economy in the 1980s, and the concern that 
macroeconomic policy would be less prudent and effective, while the necessary structural 
reforms would be less likely to be implemented outside the Eurozone. More generally, it 
reflects the understanding that participation in the Eurozone is an essential component of the 
large and ambitious project of European integration – a project that the majority of Greek 




3. Can Greece Achieve Strong, Sustained and Equitable Growth within the 
Eurozone in the Future? 
 
Looking ahead, will Greece be able to achieve strong, sustained and equitable growth within 
the Eurozone in the future? The answer to this question largely depends on the policies to be 
implemented and other actions to be taken at the national level. But, it also partly depends 
on the progress to be made at the European level in creating a genuine EMU. Let me first 
focus on what needs to be done at the national level – the reforms to be enacted and the 
broader conditions to be established.   
To begin with, it is important to keep in mind certain facts or constraints, whose importance 
is often overlooked or underestimated. The attainment of the growth objective will have to 
be aimed at and achieved in light of three constraining factors: first, the obvious one: the 
unavailability to a Eurozone member state of the exchange rate as a policy instrument; 
second, the constraints on economic policy imposed by the country's high public debt and the 
associated commitment to maintain sizeable primary surpluses for many years to come, and 




environment, which is characterized by the ongoing global economic transformation, rapid 
technological change and intense competition. 
 
3.1. Fiscal Policy and Reform 
The size of the Greek public debt, despite its restructuring in 2012 and various debt relief 
measures enacted in recent years, continues to be a burden on fiscal policy. It is positive that 
the extension of debt maturities and the grace periods for interest payments, which were 
agreed with creditors, have reduced and smoothened debt-servicing requirements over the 
next 10 years, which are no longer excessive. Nevertheless, although the public debt is 
relatively manageable over the coming decade, it is not considered sustainable over the long 
run, given the current growth projections.4 Moreover, it is susceptible to adverse real and 
financial shocks, including those that may affect future interest rates.  5 
What are the implications of the country’s debt burden for policy? It will be possible to 
improve the debt dynamics and renegotiate the commitments on the necessary primary 
surpluses, but only if there is convincing evidence and a credible policy strategy that growth 
will be significantly higher than previously predicted. At present, however, fiscal policy cannot 
be employed to stimulate aggregate demand significantly and sustainably. Achieving strong 
and viable growth inevitably has to rely mainly on nonfiscal measures, notably on policies and 
actions that will raise total factor productivity growth and foster greater dynamism in the 
Greek economy.6 Fiscal policy and fiscal reforms can be designed and implemented so as to 
promote potential growth – the supply side of the economy – through an efficient and 
competitive tax system and by raising public investment relative to public consumption, while 
they can also contribute to addressing increased income inequality.  
 
3.2. International Competitiveness: Concept, Determinants and Performance  
I will now argue, and I hope that we can all agree on this, that since the Greek economy is 
relatively small and open, the main – indeed the only – way to achieve strong and durable 
growth is to enhance its international competitiveness in the broad sense of the word. A 
 
4 A main reason that long-term debt sustainability remains a concern is that recent debt relief measures agreed 
in 2017 and 2018 contributed to medium-term debt sustainability by (lowering) (reducing) significantly debt-
servicing requirements over the period 2018-2031 and shifting the burden of debt-servicing to the future. The 
nominal amount of debt has not been reduced as was done by the restructuring of Greek public debt with 
private sector involvement (PSI) in 2012, while the agreed extensions of debt maturities have been relatively 
modest.  
5 For recent debt sustainability analyses, see International Monetary Fund, “Greece: First Post-Program 
Monitoring Dszaiscussions”, IMF Country Report No. 19/73, February 2019; European Commission, “Enhanced 
Surveillance Report – Greece”, European Economy, February 2019 and Communication from the Commission, 
Update of the Enhanced Surveillance Report, April 2019. 
6 An original and insightful analysis of the concept and determinants of grassroots economic dynamism and a 
fascinating, thought-provoking assessment of its significance in fostering indigenous innovation and widespread 
prosperity are provided by Edmund S. Phelps, Mass Flourishing: How Grassroots Innovation Created Jobs, 




country's competitiveness is a complex and multidimensional concept, defined by many 
elements. It is determined by the macroeconomic environment, the country's institutions, 
human capital and infrastructure, and, more generally, by all those factors that determine the 
total productivity of the economy. The efficient functioning of markets and institutions, the 
effectiveness of factors of production, which inter alia incorporates the contribution of 
technology and innovation, the development and soundness of the financial system 
determine the cost, the price, the quality and the range of goods and services produced by 
the national economy and, hence, its international competitiveness and long-term economic 
growth.   
At the beginning of the Greek crisis, in 2010, the low degree of competitiveness of Greece 
reflected, among other things, adverse macroeconomic conditions, inefficient market 
structures, and ineffective institution functioning, which combined to result in comparatively 
high production costs and high prices, and a relatively limited range and low quality of goods 
and services. At present, following long and arduous fiscal and structural adjustment over the 
past nine years, the fiscal position of the country has improved significantly, competitiveness 
as measured by relative unit labour costs has been fully restored to its 2001 level, while price 
competitiveness and the quality of produced goods and services have also improved. These 
developments have contributed to the increase in net exports and the recovery of the  
economy.   
Nevertheless, other determinants of competitiveness, such as the availability and cost of 
financing, the cost of energy, the functioning of many institutions, the effectiveness of public 
administration, have not essentially improved. For this reason, Greece's competitiveness in 
the broad sense of the concept has increased only marginally compared to its very low level 
in 2010, as well as relative to the recorded rise in the competitiveness of other Eurozone 
countries, which had implemented programs of economic adjustment, such as Ireland, 
Portugal and Cyprus.   
According to available indices of international competitiveness, Greece's position is very 
unfavorable. The 2018 Global Competitiveness Index developed by the World Economic 
Forum ranks Greece 57th overall globally, with a score of 62.1 out of 100, among the 140 
countries assessed.7 Particularly worrisome is the finding that Greece has the lowest score 
among all the 27 EU member-states and the 19 Eurozone countries, since the growth 
prospects of the Greek economy very much depend on its ability to compete successfully 
within the Eurozone. 
Equally disappointing is the ranking of Greece globally with regard to its innovation capability 
(44th out of 140) and its business dynamism, which is ranked even lower (72nd out of 140). 
Moreover, both these innovation-related rankings are at the lower end in the EU and the 
Eurozone. While the country's innovation capability is relatively good, favourably influenced 
by such determinants as the quality of its research institutions (31st), scientific publications 
(30th) and patent applications (36th), its innovation ecosystem is adversely affected by other 
factors such as workforce diversity (123rd), venture capital availability (129th), financing of 
 




SMEs (137th) and, significantly, by the above-mentioned poor ranking regarding the country’s 
business dynamism, which reflects various barriers to entrepreneurship that also hinder the 
growth of innovative companies. These findings are troublesome because innovation has 
been found to be a major driver of total productivity and long-term output growth.  
The results I have presented are based on the indices of competitiveness and innovation of 
the World Economic Forum, which are well known and influence investment decisions. 
However, other indices of competitiveness and innovation lead to similar conclusions about 
the degree of competitiveness of the Greek economy and the country's capability to 
innovate.8  
There are two other observations relevant to assessing the country’s past performance and 
prospects for improvement. They concern the evolution of Greece's competitiveness over 
time and relative to developments in other Eurozone countries. Over the past ten years or so, 
both the index of competitiveness and the index of innovation capability of Greece remained 
at very low levels, although the innovation index recorded a modest increase.  
Importantly, over the same ten-year period, Greece's competitiveness has remained 
significantly lower than that of other countries (e.g. Ireland and Portugal) that had 
implemented economic adjustment programs, as well as of Spain and Italy. Moreover, the 
cumulative rise in the innovation index recorded in Greece since 2011 was appreciably smaller 
than the corresponding increases in these countries, especially in Ireland. 
The conclusion emerging from these developments is not encouraging. Despite the 
improvement in the macroeconomic environment, as well as in cost and price 
competitiveness, and the enactment of various reforms aimed at enhancing the functioning 
of markets and institutions, overall the competitiveness of Greece has been characterized by 
considerable inertia: the gains have been small during the past ten years and from a very low 
starting level. 
 
3.3 Competitiveness and Growth: Some Empirical Evidence 
I have presented at some length the broader notion of competitiveness, the ranking of Greece 
globally and relative to its European partners, as well as its evolution over time, because I 
have become progressively more convinced that this broader concept of competitiveness is 
of greater relevance and of crucial importance in defining the true competitiveness and 
attractiveness of an economy that will encourage more productive investment, enhance 
export performance substantially and, hence, foster higher long-term growth. 
This conviction is supported by available empirical evidence showing that more competitive 
economies in the broad sense of the word have achieved higher income levels over time, have 
been more resilient to adverse shocks, and have been associated with superior rates of 
 
8 Other pertinent indices of innovation and competitiveness include the Global Innovation Index of the French 
institute INSEAD, the Innovation Union Scoreboard of the European Commission, and the economy rankings in 




growth of human development and inclusive development, that is more equitable growth. Let 
me highlight three results with reference to Greece. 
An interesting empirical observation emerges by comparing the degree of competitiveness of 
countries – both advanced and emerging market economies – in 2007, the year before the 
global financial crisis, with their average rates of economic growth over the following ten 
years.9 The three most competitive economies in 2007 experienced significantly higher 
average growth rates over the decade that followed, while the three least competitive 
countries recorded the lowest average rate of growth. In the case of advanced economies, 
the three countries with the lowest degree of competitiveness, which included Greece and 
Italy, had negative average growth rates.  
Society's welfare is, of course, not determined exclusively by GDP growth. Various indices 
have been developed that provide a broader measure of economic and social progress than 
GDP growth alone, such as an Index for Inclusive Development10 and an Index for Human 
Development used by the United Nations Development Programme.11 These indices comprise 
a host of indicators of social and human development, such as income inequality and poverty 
measures, life-expectance rates, and indicators of education and health, which determine the 
quality of life, the development of human capital and the degree to which an economy and 
society are inclusive. 
An important empirical finding is that there is a close positive relationship between indices of 
inclusive growth and human development for a country, on one hand, and its degree of global 
competitiveness, on the other.12 The unsatisfactory finding for Greece is that in 2017 it had 
the worst inclusive growth as well as competitiveness performance among advanced 
economies. However, over the period 2007-2016 it was characterized on average by an 
appreciably higher level of human development, given the competitiveness of its economy. 
This latter finding is more satisfactory and encouraging. The general conclusion from this 
empirical evidence is that enhancing the competitiveness of a country fosters income growth 
as well as the rates of inclusive growth and human development over the long term.   
The last empirical result I would like to highlight relates to the contribution of innovation to 
output growth, because this is becoming increasingly important in general and for Greece in 
particular in the globalized economy that is being transformed by rapid technological change. 
Modern growth theory and a body of empirical evidence have convincingly demonstrated 
that knowledge and ideas, which lead to the creation of innovative products and the adoption 
 
9 See "The Quest for More and Better Growth" in The Global Competitiveness Report 2017-2018, World 
Economic Forum, Geneva, 2017. 
10 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Bridging the Gap: Inclusive Growth 2017 
Update Report, Paris, OECD, 2017; and World Economic Forum, The Inclusive Growth and Development Report, 
Geneva, 2017. 
11 United Nations Development Programme, The Human Development Report, United Nations, New York, 2019. 
The Human Development Index (HDI) is available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-
index-hdi  
 




of innovative processes in production and management, are key drivers of productivity and 
long-term sustainable growth.  
A noteworthy conclusion of recent empirical studies is that productivity and output growth 
do not depend only on the creation of new ideas and new technologies, which broaden and 
revolutionize the production process in certain sectors or even whole countries. Productivity 
and output growth also depend on the application and diffusion of new technologies by firms 
in other sectors and in other countries by helping to raise their own productivity.13 In other 
words, the application and diffusion of new technologies in sectors or regions beyond those 
that originally adopted them is also important to the development of the economy. 
Unfortunately, Greece continues to be behind other advanced economies with regard to the 
establishment of an effective innovation ecosystem, as well as the application and diffusion 
of innovation and new technologies, despite the progress made in recent years. Although 
there have been several notable actions and initiatives, both by the public and private sectors, 
aimed at fostering innovation activities and technology transfer, they have not proved 
sufficient so far to improve the overall situation. 
There is plenty of scope and urgent need to carry out more research, using various indicators 
and methodologies, to further explore the empirical significance regarding the contribution 
of the various determinants of competitiveness to productivity and employment growth, as 
well as to broader measures of social welfare. The findings of such research would help 
policymakers to design and implement appropriate strategies for growth and prosperity. This 
brings me to the next part of my speech on the reforms, policies and other actions required 
for Greece to achieve strong and durable growth. I will be concise in emphasizing the key 
policies and reforms where priority should be given. 
 
3.4 Policies and Reforms to Improve Competitiveness and Foster Sustained Growth 
As I stressed earlier, the policies and reforms implemented during the previous eight years of 
economic adjustment have definitely contributed to improving significantly certain 
components of competitiveness, notably cost and price competitiveness, but structural 
competitiveness increased only marginally. There is therefore a clear and urgent need to 
introduce deeper and broader reforms to improve the functioning of institutions and markets, 
enhance human capital, and develop an effective innovation ecosystem. Such reforms will 
jointly contribute to the establishment of fundamental conditions for raising productivity, 
encouraging investment, boosting exports and achieving stronger and sustained growth.   
Priority should be given to reforms in areas where major weaknesses and needs for 
improvement have been identified and their positive impact is likely to be greater. Hence, 
priority should be given to the following reforms and policies aimed to: 
 
13 See Benoît Cœuré, "Productivity and Growth: Innovation and Diffusion", Introductory statement at the 
session "Revitalizing the Global Economy", Davos, January 20, 2017; Mario Draghi, "Moving to the Frontier: 
Promoting the Diffusion of Innovation", Speech at the Conference "Fostering Innovation and Entrepreneurship 
in the euro area", March 13, 2017; Veugelers, R., "The European Union's Growing Innovation Divide", Bruegel 




• improve the effectiveness of public administration and, more generally, of the public 
sector, so as to enhance the quality of the services provided and reduce bureaucracy; 
• strengthen the functioning and foster the development of the financial system, so as to 
increase the availability and reduce the cost of bank credit to the private sector, especially 
to the SMEs, and promote alternative forms of financing investment and the activities of 
innovative firms;  
• revamp the tax system, so as to make it simpler, internationally competitive, more 
equitable and growth-friendly;  
• increase the efficiency of the judicial system, so as to speed up the administration of 
justice, which inter alia will encourage investment;  
• improve the quality of the educational system and of vocational training, so as to 
strengthen the knowledge and skills essential for the new technology-driven economy; 
• develop an appropriate institutional, research and entrepreneurial environment – an 
ecosystem – that will support innovation and foster new dynamism in the economy. 
There are, of course, other areas where policy action is necessary in order to remove obstacles 
and bottlenecks to investment and exports, to strengthen total productivity and promote 
economic dynamism. But the reforms I have just highlighted are especially important and 
urgently needed. Some of these reforms can be implemented relatively quickly and can be 
expected to yield positive results over a medium-term horizon. Other reforms will be more 
difficult to implement, for a variety of reasons, which I am sure most of us can appreciate 
though not accept, while their beneficial effects will be realized with fairly long time lags. But 
such reforms, for example those pertaining to the public administration, the judicial system 
and education, are also of fundamental importance. Hence, it is essential to overcome the 
inherent inertia, the pressures of vested interests and the political myopic behavior that have 
prevented their implementation in the past.  
Moreover, as I have emphasized on other occasions, if a number of key reforms and 
associated policies are implemented simultaneously, it is likely that they will have mutually 
reinforcing positive effects on activity and employment through various channels, including 
confidence and expectations, thereby bringing the Greek economy faster to a path of durable 
growth.  
Needless to say, the performance and prospects of the Greek economy, as well as the design 
and effectiveness of its policy strategy and reform agenda will also very much depend on 
future developments in the Eurozone economy and, importantly, on the further steps that 
will be taken – or will not be taken – towards establishing a genuine Economic and Monetary 







4. Reforms and Prerequisites for a Genuine EMU and its Impact on Greece  
Twenty years after the creation of the euro and the establishment of the Economic and 
Monetary Union, it is fair to say that EMU has broadly accomplished its mission, as defined 
by the objectives specified in the Treaty: to maintain price stability, support economic growth, 
and safeguard financial stability. You may think that this assessment is biased because of my 
professional background. This is not the case. The fact is that price stability was definitely 
preserved, economic activity in the Eurozone as a whole was supported effectively, and 
financial stability was safeguarded, during periods of extraordinary turbulence in financial 
markets and stress in banking systems.  
Nevertheless, the euro's 20th birthday is not an occasion for unconditional, joyous 
celebration. Macroeconomic and financial stability was overall protected, but some of the 
implemented policies entailed substantial economic and social cost, particularly in some 
countries, including Greece. Moreover, during the darkest years of the Eurozone crisis, in 
2011-2012, the European monetary union experienced intense pressures and faced 
unprecedented challenges. Its cohesion and stability – economic, social and political – were 
severely tested. And, at times, even the euro's viability was questioned. Ultimately, the crisis 
was overcome and the euro was saved because of (i) the resolute, far-reaching, though 
socially painful, policy actions in some member states, (ii) the extraordinary and often 
unconventional monetary policy measures taken by the ECB, and (iii) the significant reforms 
enacted that improved the institutional architecture and economic governance of EMU.  
Looking ahead, several key issues need to be addressed: 
• Can EMU achieve stronger, sustained and balanced growth? And how? 
• Can the Eurozone deal with another crisis more effectively in the future? 
• Is the euro's viability secure in the long run, especially in a challenging global economic 
environment with a threatening and evolving political landscape of growing populism and 
nationalism? 
I believe that the answers to these three questions are conditional. They will be positive, 3 
"yes", if and only if further meaningful steps are taken towards completing and reinforcing 
the institutional architecture of EMU, by developing its economic pil lar (the E in EMU) and by 
strengthening its political foundations. How can this be done? And will it be done? 
Over the past few years, a number of proposals have been advanced regarding the 
completion and reinforcement of EMU. Among these proposals, especially important are: The 
Report of the Five Presidents of the European Institutions on the Completion of EMU, the 
White Paper of the European Commission on the Future of Europe and the speech of 
President Emmanuel Macron, “Initiative for Europe”, at the Sorbonne University.14 There are 
 
14 The Five Presidents’ Report, “Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union”, Report by Jean -Claude 
Juncker in close collaboration with Donald Tusk, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, Mario Draghi and Martin Schulz, European 
Commission, 22 June 2015; European Commission, On the Future of Europe: Reflections and Scenarios for the 
EU27 by 2025, White Paper, Brussels, March 1, 2017; and M. Emmanuel Macron, “Initiative for Europe”, speech 




also pertinent proposals by the European Commission, academics and special committees. 
Nevertheless, very little progress has been made in implementing most of the 
recommendations, although a lot of preparatory work has been done and some of the 
proposed reforms have been discussed by the Council of Ministers and European leaders. The 
fundamental reason for the delay and procrastination is political, mainly because progress 
towards the establishment of a genuine EMU requires a further transfer of national 
sovereignty to European bodies or institutions and may involve more “burden sharing” 
between member states.   
In my view, it is imperative to enact reforms that are urgently needed to address current and 
potential – indeed likely – future challenges. 
Specifically, reforms to  
(1) improve the growth performance of the Eurozone, 
(2) reduce income inequality within individual countries, 
(3) facilitate economic convergence between member states, and 
(4) protect financial and macroeconomic stability effectively and efficiently, especially in the 
event of major asymmetric shocks. 
To this end, I believe that three steps are essential and should be taken over the medium 
term. 
• The completion of the Banking Union, with the creation of a Single European Deposit 
Insurance Scheme, the strengthening of the Single Resolution Mechanism and the 
improvement of the rules and procedures for the recapitalization of banks by the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM); 
• The deeper and faster integration of capital markets in the Eurozone, so that firms in all 
member states can have better access to sources of funding other than bank credit; 
• The reform of the institutional policy framework in the Eurozone that will make it possible 
to implement certain economic and fiscal policy measures with a European orientation, 
so as to achieve European-wide policy goals. 
It can be reasonably expected that the first two steps will be taken over the medium term, 
during the coming three years. Relevant preparatory work has been carried out and there is 
increasing understanding of the need and political will to move forward. The creation of the 
Banking Union is a major institutional reform of vital importance for the protection of financial 
and macroeconomic stability in the Eurozone. Yet, it remains incomplete because its third 
component, a single European Deposit Insurance Scheme, is still missing, while a common 
fiscal backstop to the Single Resolution Fund has not yet been fully implemented although 




academic fora.15 The underlying reason for those omissions and delays is that a fully-fledged 
banking union requires more cross-border risk sharing and a higher degree of fiscal 
integration in the Eurozone. The completion of the banking union should be a top priority in 
view of potential economic and financial crises in the future. 
The reform of the institutional policy framework is especially important but also politically 
difficult. It will allow to make progress towards a better coordination of national fiscal policies 
and the establishment of some form of fiscal union in the Eurozone. Although this is in my 
view absolutely necessary for attaining the broader goals of EMU and for securing the long-
term viability of the euro, taking that step is a great challenge because fiscal policy measures, 
which involve public spending and its financing, ultimately by the taxation of citizens, require 
decisions that are profoundly political. The creation of some form of fiscal union implies the 
transfer of national sovereignty regarding certain categories of public spending and their 
financing to a European body or institution, which will be responsible for taking the pertinent 
decisions.  
Tackling the political challenges associated with the creation of a fiscal union and, more 
generally, the completion of EMU will require (i) coordinated policy actions on several fronts 
and (ii) the establishment of the appropriate conditions that will support such a fundamental 
change. Let me highlight three such conditions, indeed prerequisites for making progress 
towards a genuine and stronger EMU:  
• It is essential for citizens and governments to have a better understanding of the reasons 
and the need for establishing a form of fiscal union and of the benefits it will entail, so 
that there will be public support and democratic legitimacy for its creation. To that end, 
an effective – a clear and convincing – communications policy is absolutely necessary to 
explain the advantages of completing EMU and the costs of its potential break-up. 
• It is also important that any European-wide policies and reforms are meaningful for its 
citizens and indispensable for tackling problems that cannot be resolved by policy 
measures taken at the national level.  
• It is imperative to give priority to European-wide policy actions that will strengthen 
growth, reduce unemployment and mitigate income inequality.  
If such prerequisites are fulfilled and appropriate economic policies are implemented 
effectively, Euroskepticism and nationalism will decline and European integration will move 
forward.  
What kind of policies and reforms would contribute to that end? Specific policies and reforms, 
which are both necessary and meet the above criteria include:  
 
15 Evaluations of the present state of the European Banking Union and proposals for its completion are provided 
in Lucas Papademos (ed), Monetary Policy, Banking Union and Economic Growth: Challenges for Europe in the 
Wake of the Crisis, Bank of Greece and Academy of Athens, 2017. 




• the setting up of a macroeconomic stabilization mechanism in the Eurozone and, in 
particular, of a European system of unemployment insurance, which would help reduce 
the distributional effects of major asymmetric shocks; 
• the further strengthening of the Juncker program for investments in physical and human 
capital, by increasing the available resources, and by broadening the sources of financing 
investment and the range of eligible activities, so as to meet European-wide objectives; 
• the establishment of a European Monetary Fund; 
• the issuance of Eurobonds for financing pan-European investment projects, common 
public goods or a designated part of public debt of Eurozone member states. 
• the creation of a Eurozone budget 
More generally, a more integrated economic and fiscal policy in the Eurozone and the EU is 
becoming progressively vital for the attainment of broader shared objectives in other areas, 
notably in defence and security, in managing migration-related issues and in establishing 
appropriate conditions to make the EU a world leader in the new knowledge economy and 
the ongoing fourth industrial revolution, which is driven by technology and innovation and is 
currently dominated by products developed and produced in the U.S. and China. 
The geopolitical risks threatening Europe, the evolving position of the U.S. with regard to the 
responsibilities of European countries in NATO, the terrorist attacks and other security threats 
have underscored the importance and the need to strengthen defence and security 
arrangements in the EU on the basis of a closer and structured cooperation of member states, 
with specific activities and the ultimate goal being the establishment of a European Defence 
Union over the coming decade. A common defence policy, which will include a common 
intervention force, will presumably have to be supported to some extent by a common budget 
for financing part of the defence expenditure of member states participating in the European 
Defence Union. 
The prospects for establishing a common defence policy are increasingly favourable and some 
important concrete steps have been taken since 2017 in this respect. It is remarkable that, 
according to recent surveys, the citizens in almost all EU countries include defence and 
security in their top 3 priorities and 3/4 of European citizens approve the principle of a 
common defence and security policy among EU member states.16 
Moreover, migration-related challenges and the likelihood of massive flows of migrants and 
asylum seekers in the future underscore the need for a more effective and coordinated 
control of the external borders of the Union and a strengthening of programs of receiving and 
integrating the migrants, which would have to be addressed in a common framework and be 
 
16 See European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 91: Public Opinion in the European Union, June 2019, 






financed from common resources, since the countries of first entry and final reception cannot 
deal with the associated financial burden without help. 
A conclusion that emerges from the above is that the creation of a genuine EMU and, more 
generally, the completion of the European project, will serve the national interest and can be 
expected to entail significant benefits for Greece by promoting growth, by contributing to 
social welfare and cohesion and by strengthening national security. Hence, Greece should 
support the establishment of a genuine EMU and should endeavour to play a leading role in 
the European integration process. 
However, in order to contribute to the attainment of these goals and thus reap the benefits 
from a more complete and balanced EMU, Greece will have to continue on the path of 
economic recovery and reform, secure fiscal sustainability, strengthen its financial system, 
and improve its international competitiveness. In this way, it will also respond in practice to 
the view emphasized by many in the debate about the future of the euro, that it is essential 
for the success of the European project that the unity and solidarity it entails should be 




5.  Concluding Remarks  
In conclusion, let me make a few final points of a more general nature regarding the outlook 
for Greece and the euro. There is no doubt that both Greece and the Eurozone are at 
crossroads and that the prospects are surrounded by considerable uncertainty and are 
subject to several risks, mainly – but not exclusively – associated with future political 
developments. 
In Greece the implementation of an appropriate growth strategy and a reform agenda will 
succeed in achieving strong and sustainable growth if, in addition to the economic policy 
actions previously mentioned, we reach a broad political and social consensus on the primary 
objectives and the appropriate policy framework for making the Greek economy globally 
competitive. This in turn requires that we develop social values and public institutions that 
will support the introduction of fundamental reforms to improve the country's 
competitiveness and growth performance. Hence, it is essential for achieving strong, 
sustained and equitable growth that we focus not only on the features of the necessary 
reforms and economic policies, but also on creating the social, political and institutional 
environment required for their effective implementation. It has not been possible to create 
such an environment over the last ten years. Looking ahead, I am hopeful that we will learn 
from experience, overcome obstacles and master the will to achieve what has proved 
impossible in the past. 
With regard to the future of the euro, it can be expected that the road leading to the creation 
of a genuine EMU is likely to be long and may be bumpy primarily because the conduct of a 
common economic policy and the establishment of some form of a fiscal union in the 




EMU requires strengthening the political foundations of the single European currency. At the 
same time, historical evidence since the introduction of the euro twenty years ago shows that, 
on the whole, remarkable progress has been made in completing and reinforcing EMU, 
although slowly, step by step, and often under the pressure of extraordinary circumstances, 
e.g. emerging serious threats to the stability and viability of the euro. I will, therefore, 
conclude with an optimistic note. I am reasonably confident that despite the challenges being 
faced, the political difficulties will eventually be overcome and progress will be made towards 
a genuine and better EMU, because the majority of European citizens understand the 
importance and the advantages of a stronger and more integrated Europe. So, 20 years after 
its creation, the euro can look forward to an infinite number of birthdays ahead. The euro is 
forever. And this will be good for stability and prosperity in the Eurozone and the EU. 
 
Postscript 
Since this conference was held, the expectation that further progress would eventually be 
made towards the completion of EMU and a more integrated economic policy framework in 
the European Union has come true to some extent. In response to the public health and 
economic crises brought about by the coronavirus pandemic, in July 2020 the European 
leaders agreed unanimously on an ambitious economic and financial policy package, 
combining a recovery fund and the multi-annual EU budget for 2021-2027. This package, 
totalling an impressive €1,824 billion ($2,087 billion), is aimed at addressing the 
consequences of the pandemic, strengthening the long-term growth and resilience of the EU 
economies, and furthering the process of European integration. The agreement reached is a 
historic milestone because of the size, targets, content and modalities of the policy package. 
Of particular importance are the novel means of financing the recovery fund by the issuance 
of common debt and the way the raised funds will be spent. 
Three features of the recovery fund, which amounts to €750 billion ($858 billion), are 
especially relevant in assessing its significance as a step towards a more integrated economic 
policy in the EU: first, the European Commission is authorized to borrow funds on behalf of 
the Union on the capital market; second, new EU-wide taxes will be introduced for the 
repayment of the common debt issued; and, third, a substantial amount, €390 billion ($446 
billion), of the funds raised will be transferred to member states in the form of grants for 
expenditure and not as loans to be repaid. 
Although the policy measures adopted, including notably the financing of the recovery fund, 
cannot be regarded as Europe's Hamiltonian moment or a quantum leap in fiscal integration, 
they will have significant practical implications for financial markets and the EU budget and 
may turn out to have momentous political consequences for European integration. In 
particular, they may serve as a catalyst for taking further steps towards the mutualization of 
member states' debt and the creation of a fiscal capacity in the Eurozone.17 At present, 
 
17 A fuller assessment of the EU economic policy package and the recovery fund agreed in July 2020 and their 




however, it seems premature to reach a definite conclusion about the prospect of making 
progress in these areas. Nevertheless, the agreement on the recovery fund is an important 
milestone on the road to the completion of EMU. It is a pivotal moment in the process of 
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Chapter 3. Greece Before and After the Euro: Macroeconomics, 




This paper analyses developments in the Greek economy before and after the euro. The main 
thesis is that the imbalances that led to the crisis of the post-2010 period were building up 
during the previous three decades and that their root causes were not merely economic, but 
social, structural, institutional and political. The fiscal imbalances created in the 1980s were 
not adequately addressed by the convergence policies of the 1990s, while the long-standing 
problem of low international competitiveness was further exacerbated by the failure to 
promote the necessary structural reforms. Greece's accession to the euro area with major 
structural and fiscal imbalances and low and deteriorating international competitiveness, led 
to a steep rise in its external indebtedness. The lopsided adjustment and the inadequacy of 
the reforms was due to domestic political and social constraints, both before and after euro 
area entry. In view of the institutional weaknesses of the euro area itself, the external 
imbalances ultimately led to the external debt crisis of 2010, the imposition of the economic 
adjustment programs and the ‘great depression’ of the 2010s. The paper also explores the 
prerequisites for a sustained recovery of the Greek economy within the euro area, once the 
global economic crisis induced by the coronavirus pandemic is over. The quest for wide 
ranging reforms remains Greece’s top priority. 
 
JEL Classification: E6, F45, F6 
Keywords: Greece, euro area, fiscal policy, monetary policy, competitiveness, debt crisis 
* The author is Professor and Head of the Department of Economics, Athens University of Economics and 
Business and a Research Associate of the Hellenic Observatory, London School of Economics. Earlier versions of 
this paper have been presented in seminars at Harvard, MIT, Tufts, AUEB and the April 2019 Tufts/LSE 
conference on “Greece and the Euro: From Crisis to Recovery”. Discussions, comments and suggestions by 
Marios Angeletos, Steve Block, Nikos Christodoulakis, George Chouliarakis, Kevin Featherstone, Yannis 
Ioannides, Laurent Jacque, Michael Klein, Eleni Louri, Athanasios Orphanides, Lucas Papademos, Apostolis 
Philippopoulos, Ploutarchos Sakellaris and Dimitri Sotiropoulos are also gratefully acknowledged.  





The year 2021 marks the 40th anniversary of Greece’s accession to the European Union (then 
the European Economic Community) and the 20th anniversary of its accession to the euro 
area. 
In 2010, just a decade after joining the euro area, the Greek economy faced its most serious 
peacetime economic crisis, which in turn led to the ‘Great Depression’ of the 2010-2016 
period. 
This paper analyses the underlying macroeconomic imbalances and structural weaknesses 
that led the Greek economy to this severe crisis both before and after euro area participation. 
It also aims to explore the potential of the Greek economy to recover while remaining in the 
euro area, once the new global economic crisis due to the coronavirus pandemic is over. 
The main thesis of this paper is that the crisis of 2010 period was building up for at least three 
decades and that its root causes were not merely economic, but social, structural, 
institutional and political. 
Greece's accession to the European Union in 1981 was followed by twenty years of 
stagflation, destabilisation and ineffective economic adjustment. The fiscal imbalances 
created in the 1980s and the perennial structural weaknesses of the economy were not 
adequately addressed by the convergence policy of the 1990s, which was mainly based on a 
restrictive monetary policy. In addition, the problem of low international competitiveness of 
the Greek economy was exacerbated by the weaknesses of the adjustment efforts. 
Greece's accession to the euro area in 2001, with significant structural and fiscal imbalances 
and low and deteriorating international competitiveness, led to the gradual destabilisation of 
its external position. This took the form of large and persistent current account deficits and a 
steep rise in external indebtedness. 
The imbalances became worse during the international financial crisis and the ‘great 
recession’ of 2007-2009. Combined with the institutional weaknesses of the euro area, they 
ultimately led to the 2010 external debt crisis and the imposition of the painful economic 
adjustment programs. 
Unfortunately, the adjustment programs of the decade after the crisis of 2010 were limited 
to the surface of the problems faced by Greece. They did not succeed in addressing the 
underlying structural, social, institutional and political causes of many of the imbalances and 
weaknesses of the Greek economy and the euro area itself. Moreover, due to their exclusive 
reliance on austerity, they contributed decisively to the deepest and longest recession of the 
Greek economy, the ‘great depression’ of 2010-2016. 
The recovery of the Greek economy after 2017 had been weak and in no way sufficient to 
compensate for the large output losses of the long depression period. Even worse, while the 
Greek economy seemed to have entered a mild economic recovery, in 2020 a new major 
international crisis broke out, due to the coronavirus pandemic (Covid-19). This crisis, which 
is still developing at the time of writing, poses major new challenges for the Greek economy 




2. The Crisis of 2010 and the ‘Great Depression’ of the Greek Economy 
The ‘sudden stop’ in international lending and the crisis of 2010 were anything but ‘sudden’ 
for Greece. They took place in the aftermath of the international financial crisis of 2007-09, 
but they were mainly due to the persistent and large macroeconomic and structural 
imbalances of the Greek economy. These imbalances had accumulated during the three 
decades preceding the crisis, due to the inability of Greek policy makers to adopt effective 
policies and reforms for their timely and effective correction. 
Macroeconomic imbalances became even more pronounced after Greece's accession to the 
euro area, due to the constraints and weaknesses of the euro area itself. Before the crisis, 
they manifested themselves mainly as a problem of large persistent current account deficits, 
and, after the international financial crisis of  2007-2009, as a ‘sudden stop’ of external lending 
to Greece. 
The crisis could have happened earlier, postponed, or even avoided in this form and to this 
extent. However, the structural and macroeconomic adjustment of the Greek economy was 
an undeniable necessity, which should have been addressed before Greece joined the euro 
area and lose access to the very important and useful tools of monetary and exchange rate 
policy. 
After entry to the euro area, Greece faced a stark policy dilemma. Because of its low 
international competitiveness, attempts to address the external imbalances through a 
restrictive fiscal policy, would lead to recession. Attempts to avoid a fiscally induced recession, 
led to the persistence of external imbalances. Greece, like other economies in the periphery 
of the euro area, was caught up in a Mundellian trap.18   
The Apparent Causes of the Crisis 
The structural weaknesses of the Greek economy, the contradictions of the economic policy 
adopted by successive Greek governments after the country’s accession to the European 
Union in 1981, and the institutional deterioration that occurred after 1981, under the 
pressure of the social and political dynamics that emerged after the restoration of democracy 
in 1974, were among the key factors that helped destabilise the Greek economy and create 
the conditions that ultimately led to the 2010 crisis. 
Undoubtedly, however, and despite the fact that the imbalances and structural weaknesses 
of the Greek economy and Greek political and administrative institutions played the leading 
role, the Greek crisis was exacerbated by the significant structural and institutional 
weaknesses of the euro area itself. The euro area is far from being an ‘optimal currency area’ 
 
18 I call this situation a Mundellian trap as it essentially the conflict between internal and external balance, first 
analysed by Mundell (1963). In a small  open economy with low international competitiveness, a fixed exchange 
rate under full capital mobility implies the ineffectiveness of monetary policy. Aggregate demand can be 
affected only by fiscal policy, but its use results in a conflict between output and employment and the current 
account. The trap is starker for a small open economy which participates in a monetary union, because in a 
monetary union an economy does not have access to the safety valve of a one-off devaluation, that could be 




and it is no wonder that it proved particularly vulnerable after the international financial crisis 
peaked in September 2008. 
 
The ‘Great Depression’ of the Greek Economy 
With the outbreak of the Greek crisis in early 2010, the euro area authorities hastily put 
together an inter-governmental lending program to ‘rescue’ the Greek economy, through 
official borrowing from the other economies of the European Union. Greece was forced to 
adopt the first of a series of front-loaded macroeconomic adjustment programs designed by 
the so-called ‘troika’ of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Commission 
(EU) and the European Central Bank (ECB). 
These programs, which were enshrined in three successive ‘memoranda’ between Greece 
and its euro area partners, gradually and partially addressed some of the more apparent 
external and fiscal imbalances of the Greek economy. However, due to the bad initial 
conditions and the weaknesses and contradictions of the programs themselves, they also led 
to an extremely deep and long economic depression. A ‘great depression’ of the Greek 
economy that had no precedent in peacetime. 
As demonstrated in Figure 1, after a period of relatively high growth between 1994 and 2007, 
during the Great Depression of 2008-2016 Greece’s real GDP per capita fell by almost a 
quarter. This was a much longer and deeper recession than in the rest of the euro area. 
The unemployment rate, the evolution of which is depicted in Figure 2 quadrupled. It peaked 
at 27.9% of the workforce in July 2013, up from 7.3% in May 2008, and has since declined at 
an extremely slow pace. 
Millions of Greeks faced the spectrum of poverty, as real wages and pensions in Greece were 
cut sharply, horizontally and at a significant percentage. Hundreds of thousands of educated 
and skilled Greeks, mainly the younger generation, immigrated to other EU countries or the 
rest of the world, as finding a suitable and well-paid job in Greece became very difficult, if not 







Yet, as we shall demonstrate in this paper, this was the low point of an economic tragedy that 
had been gradually evolving since at least the early 1980s. 
 
Four Cycles of Destabilisation and Lopsided adjustment 
In the sections that follow, we document that, on the basis of macroeconomic analysis and 
the available data, the crisis of 2010 was building up for at least three decades before its 
outbreak in 2010. We also argue that its root causes were not only economic, but also social, 
institutional and political. 
The paper first traces the cycles of destabilisation and lopsided adjustment of the Greek 
economy since the restoration of democracy in 1974 and the country's accession to the 
European Union in 1981 and, subsequently, its entry into the euro area in 2001. 
 
Figure 1. The Evolution of Real GDP per Capita in Greece, 1974-2019 
(Thousand 2015 euros, logarithmic scale) 
 





It also documents that the adjustment programs of the decade after the outbreak of the 2010 
crisis, focused on a one-sided ‘austerity’ policy that only addressed the surface of the 
country's external and fiscal imbalances, without tackling the structural, social, institutional 
and political roots of many from the weaknesses and imbalances of the Greek economy. 
 
The Deeper Causes of the Crisis 
Documenting and describing developments and problems is only an intermediate goal of the 
analysis of this paper. The ultimate goal is to highlight and analyse both the weaknesses and 
contradictions of the economic policies pursued in Greece after 1981, as well as the deeper 
structural, social, institutional and political causes of these weaknesses and contradictions. 
For this reason the paper addresses both the macroeconomic imbalances and the structural, 
social, institutional and political characteristics of the cycles of the past 45 years. Based on 
the conclusions that emerge, we refer to the economic, institutional and political 
preconditions for a sustainable recovery of the Greek economy, without the weaknesses and 
regressions of the past. 
The paper is based on the modern macroeconomic approach to the analysis economic 
growth, economic fluctuations and economic crises. The description and interpretation of 
Figure 2. The Evolution of the Unemployment Rate in Greece, 1974-2019 
(% of labor force) 
 




developments in Greece and the rest of the euro area is based on the officially available 
statistics published by the European Statistical Service (Eurostat).19 
As the analysis is not limited to the economic dimension of the problems at hand, it adopts a 
new political economy approach into the less visible structural, social, institutional and 
political causes behind the developments and choices that led to the 2010 crisis and the ‘great 
depression’ in Greece. 
For this reason, the structural weaknesses of the Greek economy, as well as the institutional  
weaknesses of the state and the political system, which, to a large extent, determined and 
limited the choices of economic policy, play a central role in the analysis that follows. 
 
 
3. The Greek Economy after EU Accession 
In the 30 years before Greece entered the EU, the real per capita output (GDP) of Greece rose 
almost fivefold, from €2.8 thousand constant euros of 2015 in 1950, to €13.8 thousand in 
1980. The annual growth rate of real per capita output was 5.6%. In the subsequent 30 years, 
after Greece had become a member of the European Union, the real per capita income of 
Greece rose by only 1.4 times. From €13.8 thousand (constant euros of 2015) in 1980, to €19.5 
thousand in 2010. The annual growth rate of real per capita output fell to 1.2%. This slowdown 
was much larger and abrupt than would have been expected on the basis of convergence to 
lower steady state growth. In the ten years since the international crisis of 2008, the real per 
capita income of Greece has displayed even worse trends because of the ‘great depression’.  
In 2016, the last year of the ‘great depression’, it had fallen to €16.2 thousand, almost 25% 
lower than its peak level of 2007. 
One can distinguish between four consecutive ten-year policy cycles after Greece’s accession 
to the EU in 1981. These four cycles are marked clearly in Figure 1 and most of the figures 
that follow. 
While the Greek economy recovered strongly following the first oil shock and the recession 
of 1974, following the second oil shock and accession to the EU, it entered a long period of 
stagflation and fiscal destabilisation. This was the first cycle of four cycles that have 
characterised the 40 years since EU accession. It was followed by a ten year cycle of lopsided 
adjustment, a cycle of ‘euro euphoria’ following euro area entry and, finally, the cycle of the 
‘euro depression’.20 
 
19 Given the problems that have arisen with respect to the credibility of ‘Greek statistics’ in the past, it is 
imperative that any analysis of the Greek economy is based on data officially endorsed by Eurostat, the 
statistical arm of the European Commission. 
20 These cycles are briefly analysed below. For a more extensive analysis and discussion see Alogoskoufis (2019). 
The international literature on the Greek economy has grown exponentially since the sovereign debt crisis of 
2010. See, among others, Krugman (2010), Featherstone (2011), Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2011), Alogoskoufis 
(2012), Ardagna and Caselli (2014), Monastiriotis (2014), Galenianos (2015), Orphanides (2015), Ioannides and 
Pissarides (2015), Roukanas and Sklias (2016), Gourinchas et al. (2017), Meghir et al (2017), Alogoskoufis (2019), 




The first three cycles, despite their differences, made a critical contribution to the emergence 
of the conditions that led to the ‘great depression’ of the Greek economy, and to the 
economic, social, institutional and political problems and dilemmas that still characterise the 
Greek economy today. 
Economic Destabilisation 
The first cycle, a cycle of economic destabilisation, prevailed in the 1980s. It was characterised 
by an excessively expansionary mix of macroeconomic policy. The excessively expansionary 
fiscal, incomes, and monetary policies and the rise in the economic role of the state proved 
destabilising in the medium term but also ineffective in the short-term. This proved to be a 
period of stagflation, fiscal destabilisation and external imbalances. 
The end result was the further weakening of the already distorted and weak productive 
potential of the Greek economy, despite the excessive expansion of aggregate demand. 
The evolution of inflation is depicted in Figure 3. Inflation rose significantly in the aftermath 
of the second oil shock of the 1970s and remained high throughout the1980s, due to the 
expansionary monetary and fiscal policy. 
Immediately after accession to the EU in 1981, there was a major change of government, with 
the election of a PA.SO.K government under Andreas Papandreou. The negative effects of the 
second international oil crisis were still fresh. Yet, the new government adopted a policy mix 
of expansionary income, fiscal and monetary policies and an expansion of the economic role 
of the state. These choices initially led to a decade of fiscal and monetary instability, economic 
stagnation and high inflation, a mixture characteristic of stagflation. In addition, they led to a 
major deterioration in the international competitiveness of the Greek economy and periodic 
balance of payments crises. This cycle of economic destabilisation also resulted in a significant 
rise in the government debt to GDP ratio, unprecedented in peacetime until that period. 
 
Andriopoulou et al (2020). Zettelmeyer et al. (2013) concentrated on the debt restructuring of 2012. Reinhart 







The rise in the government debt to GDP ratio in the 1980s, as well as its subsequent evolution, 
is depicted in Figure 4. The general government debt to GDP ratio grew rapidly throughout 
the 1980s, from 22.7% in 1980 to 72.5% in 1990. 
The average annual GDP growth rate in the 1980s fell to a miserly 0.7%, the average 
unemployment rate more than tripled to 6.4%, whereas the average annual inflation rate 
jumped to 19.5%, from 12.3% in the 1970s, and only 4.3% in the 1950s and the 1960s (Figures 
1,2 and 3). The current account moved from a surplus of 2% of GDP in 1980 to a deficit of 
3.1% of GDP in 1985, prompting the adoption of a short-lived stabilisation program. 
The stabilisation program of the mid-1980s was too little too late, as it was both one-sided 
and temporary. It was one-sided, in that it only concentrated on a devaluation and the 
containment of unit labor costs, but not fiscal adjustment. It was also short lived, as it was 
abandoned after two years in view of the forthcoming general election. A prolonged electoral 
cycle again destabilised the Greek economy in the late 1980s.  
The OECD, in its periodic report on the Greek economy at the end of the 1980s, highlighted 
both the fiscal destabilisation and the reduction in international competitiveness that 
occurred.  
 
Figure 3. The Evolution of Consumer Price Inflation in Greece, 1974-2019 (% per 
annum) 
 





“Since the beginning of the 1980s there has been an unprecedented trend deterioration in 
the financial position of the public sector, witnessed by a rapid increase in borrowing 
requirements and debt.” (OECD (1990), p. 39).  
“Excessively-rising real wages in relation to low productivity growth, and the lack of 
motivation of workers, notably in the public sector, signal problems in the functioning of the 
Greek labour market. There are important aspects of the wage formation process that explain 
why real wage gains do not adequately reflect exogenous productivity developments either 
at the aggregate level or between different skills. Institutional features and labour legislation 
have combined to weaken the responsiveness of employment to labour demand changes.” 
(OECD (1990), p. 62)  
The main social and political feature of this cycle was the accommodating response of the 
government to the pervasive social demand for a redistribution of income and wealth in favor 
of social groups, such as wage and salary earners, pensioners, farmers, the self-employed and 
owners of small and medium-sized enterprises. These social groups felt that they had not 
participated fairly in the benefits of the country's post-war economic development in the 
twenty-five years before the restoration of democracy. 
These social groups were won over by the idiosyncratic ‘third way’ to socialism promised by 
PA.SOK, a party which, after its election in 1981, dominated politically for the next thirty years.  
Figure 4. The Evolution of Government Debt (% of GDP) 
 




In the 1980s, the ‘third way’ proved to be the way of higher state intervention and 
‘macroeconomic populism’, similar to the policies that had been adopted in the 1970s in a 
number of Latin American countries.21 
This cycle eventually led to a first serious economic and political crisis in the late 1980s, which 




The second cycle, a cycle lopsided adjustment, marked the nominal convergence policies of 
the 1990s. The cycle began after the election of a New Democracy government in 1990, but 
continued after the re-election of PA.SO.K at the end of 1993.  
During the 1990s, successive governments, led by Constantine Mitsotakis, Andreas 
Papandreou and Costas Simitis, adopted nominal convergence and adjustment programs in 
order to address the accumulated imbalances of the previous decade and ensure Greece’s 
participation in the process of economic and monetary union (EMU) which was adopted by 
the EU in the early 1990s.23 
The nominal convergence policy of the 1990s, and the accession to the euro area in 2001, 
proved successful in addressing the problem of high inflation (see Figure 3), but not the other 
macroeconomic imbalances and structural deficiencies that plagued the Greek economy.  
The adjustment of the Greek economy had been unbalanced and, for this reason, ineffective. 
It relied mainly on a restrictive monetary and exchange rate policy, with the result that the 
Greek economy joined the euro area without having faced at its core either the major fiscal 
problems that had arisen in the 1980s or the problem of low international competitiveness. 
In fact, the international competitiveness of the Greek economy worsened significantly during 
the convergence period. 
Figure 5 depicts the real effective exchange rate (REER) of Greece, as measured by relative 
unit labor costs vis-a-vis the EU 15, expressed in a common currency. This is one of the most 
reliable measures of Greece’s international competitiveness vis-a-vis its EU partners. A rise in 
the real effective exchange rate signifies a deterioration in international competitiveness. As 
shown in Figure 5, Greece’s international competitiveness deteriorated by almost 25% 
between 1992 and 1999, the year on the basis of which Greece was admitted to the euro 
area. The deterioration relative to 1987, the final year of the short-lived stabilisation program 
of the 1980s, was even higher, at almost 33%. 
 
21 The term macroeconomic populism was coined by Dornbusch and Edwards (1990). It is defined as an 
approach to economic policy that emphasizes the excessive expansion of aggregate demand and income 
redistribution, at the expense of high inflation, deficit financing, external imbalances and adverse reactions by 
investors. See also Dornbusch and Edwards (1991). 
22 For studies of the stagflation of the 1980s in Greece see Alogoskoufis and Christodoulakis (1991), Alogoskoufis 
and Philippopoulos (1992) and Alogoskoufis (1995). 
23 Alogoskoufis (1993) and Papademos (1993) focused on the ways that Greece could adjust effectively in order 




Because of the policy mix of a relatively lax fiscal policy and a relatively tight monetary policy, 
the annual GDP growth rate picked up to an average of 3.3% in the second part of the 1990s. 
The annual inflation rate fell to an average of 6% because of the tightening of monetary and 
exchange rate policy, while the unemployment continued rising modestly as a result of 
relatively high real wage increases. The weak recovery was accompanied by an increase in the 
current account deficit to 5.1% of GDP in the second part of the decade from only 0.9% in the 
first part of the 1990s.  
The government debt to GDP ratio rose in the early 1990s, as unrecorded debts from the 
1980s were incorporated into the official debt figures, but was then stabilised. However, fiscal 
adjustment and the adoption of growth oriented structural reforms was quite slow and 
uneven.  
At the level of political declarations, the main social and political feature of this cycle was 
supposed to be the promotion of macroeconomic adjustment and structural reforms. In 
practice, however, the structural and fiscal reforms that provoked strong social or political 
reactions were usually postponed or abandoned. Even organised minorities, such as powerful 
business groups or trade unions in the wider public sector, could stop useful economic 
reforms they were opposed to, such as privatisations, sometimes through direct interference 
in the political process. 
Figure 5. Real Effective Exchange Rate vis-a-vis the EU-15 
(Relative Unit Labor Costs in a Common Currency) 
 




Due to the reluctance of governments, especially after 1994, to bear the social and political 
costs of the required reforms, fiscal adjustment proved to be incomplete and unbalanced, 
structural reforms innocuous and ineffective, and thus the burden of adjustment fell mainly 
on monetary policy. This mix of policies was one of the main reasons for the deterioration of 
the international competitiveness of the Greek economy during this period. 
The tendency for governments to postpone reforms that entail significant social and political 
costs or provoke strong reactions from politically strong organised minorities, as happened in 
Greece during this period, is one of the central conclusions of the new political economy 
approach. This is an approach that seeks to analyse the motives and behaviour of 
governments and their interaction with the motives and behaviour of the private sector and 
the electorate, as determined through political institutions.24 
If the adoption of specific reforms provokes the reaction of a large part of the electorate or 
even organised minorities with a significant political weight, and if there are no appropriate 
institutional incentives and counterweights, then the political process results in the 
postponement, suspension or only partial adoption of such reforms. This can happen despite 
the fact that the reforms are potentially beneficial for society as a whole. This seems to have 
happened in Greece in the second part of the 1990s, whenever fiscal and structural reforms 
attempted by the government met with strong social and political reactions. Despite the fact 
that apparently almost everyone seemed to want Greece to join the euro area, few social 
groups appeared willing to support the necessary structural and fiscal reforms. 
As a result, the weight of the adjustment fell mainly on monetary policy and falling inflationary 
expectations, because of the reduction of inflation. Structural reforms and adjustment in the 
primary fiscal balance took place mainly until 1994, due to the sense of urgency created by 
the economic and fiscal crisis of 1989-1990. However, the rapid deterioration and of the 
political fortunes of the Mitsotakis government, and its comprehensive defeat in the general 
election of 1993, became a ‘lesson’ for its successors. In the years after 1994, further primary 
fiscal adjustment and structural reforms that entailed significant political costs or provoked 
strong reactions from business interests or the trade unions, were suspended. 
After 1994, the continuation of the reduction of the budget deficit was based almost 
exclusively on the gradual reduction of interest payments on government debt, as a result of 
the reduction of the nominal interest rates that took place due to the decline in inflation and 
inflationary expectations. The fall in inflation was the result of the restrictive monetary policy. 
Monetary adjustment was not abandoned mainly due to the political independence of the 
Bank of Greece, which was strengthened after Greece adopted the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. 
The gradual reduction of inflation and inflationary expectations resulted in declining nominal 
interest rates, declining interest payments on government debt and hence declining budget 
deficits. Thus, the operation of the ‘Fisher equation’, which predicts that nominal interest 
 
24 The new political economy approach to monetary and fiscal policy dates from the mid-1980s. See Alesina 
(1988, 1989), Persson and Svenson (1989), Rogoff (1990), Tabellini and Alesina (1990), Fernadez and Rodrik 
(1991), Alesina and Drazen (1991). For a collection of the most fundamental initial studies see Persson and 





rates fall in accordance with inflationary expectations, was a significant reason behind 
Greece’s accession to the euro area.25  
Part of the reduction in recorded fiscal deficits was also based on the use of ‘creative 
accounting’, which was considered at the time to result in minimal short term political or 
social costs. There was almost no primary fiscal adjustment between 1994 and 1999. In fact, 
the primary surplus that had been created between 1990 and 1994 actually declined. 
The evolution of the general and primary balance of the government is depicted in Figure 6. 
Until Greece’s accession to the EU, deficits of the general government seemed to have been 
under control. However, in the 1980s they reached unprecedented levels for peacetime. As 
can be seen from Figure 6, the fiscal imbalances rose significant throughout the 1980s, but 
mainly during the election years of 1981, 1985 and 1989-90 (marked in a darker shade). These 
electoral spikes in the fiscal deficit, which started in 1981, have since characterised Greek 
fiscal policy.26 
Fiscal adjustment in the 1990s resulted in a fall of the deficit of the general government from 
14.3% of GDP in electoral 1990 to 5.8% of GDP in 1999. This decrease was due to both a 
significant reduction in the primary deficit of the general government, which occurred chiefly 
in the first part of the 1990s, and a fall of interest payments on general government debt, as 
nominal interest rates fell towards the end of the 1990s, following the reduction in inflation.  
 
 
25 For the Fisher equation see Fisher (1911, 1930). Fisher was the first economist who highlighted the one-to-
one relation between inflation, inflationary expectations and nominal interest rates. 
26 See Alogoskoufis (1995, 2013) and Lockwood et al (2001) for economic and econometric investigations of this 






In 1990, the primary deficit, i.e., the deficit excluding interest payments, stood at 5.1% of GDP. 
This deficit declined rapidly in the 1990-94 period, the first part of the decade. By 1994 it had 
already been transformed into a primary surplus of 4.2% of GDP, marking an improvement of 
more than 9 percentage points of GDP. More than three fifths of this improvement in the first 
part of the decade was due to the increase in general government revenues, from 30.9% of 
GDP in 1990 to 36.7% in 1994. The remainder, slightly less than two fifths, was due to a 
reduction in primary expenditure of the general government, from 36.0% of GDP in 1990 to 
32.5% in 1994. Figure 7 depicts the evolution of government expenditure and revenue relative 
to GDP.  
Further adjustment of the primary balance stopped after 1994. As a result, the primary 
balance gradually deteriorated again. In 1999, the primary surplus had declined to only 1.8% 
of GDP, as primary expenditure had crept back up to 38.6% percent of GDP, higher than at 
the start of the decade. Thus, for the decade as a whole, the adjustment of the primary deficit 
was only equal to 6.8 percentage points of GDP, all of it due to increases in government 
revenue, which rose by almost ten percentage points of GDP.  
How did Greece then manage to satisfy the fiscal criteria that were set out in the Maastricht 
Treaty? To the extent that it did satisfy these criteria, this was due to the additional 
contribution made by the reduction of nominal interest rates in the second part of the 
decade. This, as we have already mentioned, was a result of the fall of inflation and 
Figure 6. Total and Primary Balance of the General Government in Greece (% of GDP) 
 




inflationary expectations and the fall of the inflation and devaluation premium on interest 
rates, as euro area entry was approaching.27 
 
High inflationary expectations and expectations of a devaluation had kept nominal interest 
rates on Greek government debt high since the beginnings of the financial liberalisation of 
the economy in the late 1980s. These expectations were reversed towards the end of the 
1990s. As a result, interest payments on Greek government debt fell from 9.2% of GDP in 
1990, to 7.6% in 1999, after having risen to a high of 12.5% of GDP in 1994, in the aftermath 
of the crisis in the European Monetary System. This reduction of nominal interest rates 
contributed significantly to the reduction of the deficit of the general government in the 
second half of the 1990s, and allowed for the deficit of the general government to decline, 
despite the lack of adjustment of the primary deficit.  
This policy mix, of a relatively expansionary fiscal and incomes policy and a relatively 
restrictive monetary policy was one of the main reasons for the significant deterioration in 
international competitiveness depicted in Figure 5.  
As the reduction of price inflation preceded the reduction of wage inflation, the international 
competitiveness of the Greek economy was deteriorating constantly. In addition, there were 
very few structural reforms to help improve labor productivity. 
 
27 Revised data by Eurostat show that the deficit of the general government in 1999 stood at 5.8% of GDP well 
above the 3.0% envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty. 
Figure 7. Expenditure and Revenue of the General Government in Greece (% of GDP) 
 




Greece managed to join the euro area at the end of this cycle, on the basis of the fiscal and 
inflation data presented at the time, but the fiscal problems remained significant, while the 
problems of international competitiveness had worsened. 
 
Euro euphoria 
The third cycle, the cycle of euro euphoria, began at the beginning of the new millennium, 
immediately after the confirmation of Greece’s accession to the euro area. Economically, this 
cycle was characterised by an environment of low inflation and low nominal and real interest 
rates, but also a further easing of fiscal and incomes policy. This relaxation started as early as 
the year 2000, immediately after the EU Council decision approving Greece’s accession to the 
euro area. 
The basis for the euro euphoria was the large and rapid decline in real interest rates, once 
expectations of a sudden devaluation of the currency were eliminated. This period of low real 
interest rates caused an increase in both aggregate investment and consumption.  
 
 
The widening gap between aggregate investment and savings triggered an increase in 
aggregate demand and economic growth, but, on the other hand, led to a large and 
continuous widening of the current account deficit. Note that the current account is by 
definition the difference between aggregate national savings and aggregate domestic 
Figure 8. The Evolution of the Current Account of the Balance of Payments (% of 
GDP) 
 




investment. The rise in investment and the decline in savings caused by the lower real interest 
rates led by definition to a worsening of the current account.28 
The evolution of the current account of the balance of payments in Greece is depicted in 
Figure 8. While Greece experienced current account surpluses in the latter part of the 1970s, 
in the 1980s the current account moved into deficit. The short-lived stabilisation program of 
1986-1987 helped reverse this trend, but the current account started worsening again from 
the second half of the 1990s. As Greece’s accession to the euro area was becoming more of 
a certainty, and nominal and real interest rates declined the current account kept worsening. 
This process was obviously affected by the deteriorating international competitiveness and 
the strong recovery of GDP growth. During the period of euphoria following euro area entry, 
the current account deficit increased even further. The international recession of 2007-2009 
caused an additional increase of the current account deficit, due to the decline in Greece’s 
revenue from exports and tourism. It was only after the crisis of 2010 and the adoption of the 
first adjustment program that these trends were reversed.  
The deterioration of the current account was facilitated by the explosive rise of bank lending 
to the private sector. Because of the fall in nominal and real interest rates and the 
liberalisation of financial markets, demand for loans by the private sector boomed. Greek 
banks were happy to extend new loans, borrowing themselves cheaply from the rest of the 
world. When collateral was needed, they provided government bonds, of which they had 
significant holdings in their portfolios. 
Bank lending as a percentage of GDP is depicted in Figure 9. Total bank credit grew from 81.5% 
of GDP in 1999 to 131.3% of GDP in 2009. For about ten years it was growing 1.6 times faster 
than GDP. Total bank credit to the private sector increased at a rate 3 times higher than 
nominal GDP. It exploded from 34.2% of GDP in 1999 to 105.1% of GDP in 2009. At the same 
time, bank credit to the general government, i.e, government bonds held by banks and other 
loans to the general government, fell from 47.2% of GDP in 1999 to 26.2% of GDP in 2009. 
The fall in real interest rates, coupled with the liberalization of the domestic financial system, 
led to a real boom in private sector borrowing. Household loans for house purchases rose 
fivefold as a percentage of GDP, from 6% in 1999 to 33.1% in 2009. Consumer loans to 
households also rose fivefold relative to GDP, from 2.8% in 1999 to 15.3% in 2009. Total loans 
to households rose from 8.8% of GDP in 1999 to 49.7% of GDP in 2009. Total loans to 
enterprises more than doubled in relation to GDP, from 25.4% in 1999 to 55.4% in 2009. 
 




It is obvious from the evolution of bank credit that Greek financial institutions were using the 
Greek government bonds in their portfolios as collateral, in order to obtain liquidity from 
foreign financial institutions, and thus extend additional credit to the domestic private sector. 
This helped to sustain the rise in the current account deficit, as it facilitated and financed the 
excess of private sector investment over savings. It also resulted in the internationalisation of 
Greek government debt, making Greece particularly vulnerable when the international 
financial crisis deteriorated in 2008. 
In these circumstances, the Mundellian dilemma between internal and external balanced 
played a central role in macroeconomic developments. The only remaining instrument for 
short-term macroeconomic stabilisation was fiscal policy. In conditions of relatively high 
unemployment and an external deficit, an expansionary fiscal policy could reduce 
unemployment only at the expense of a further widening current account deficit. On the 
other hand, a more restrictive fiscal policy could reduce the current account deficit, but at the 
probable expense of a recession and higher unemployment. The option of devaluation, which 
could help address such a dilemma without creating a recession, had been forfeited by the 
decision to adopt the single currency. Greece had lost, through its participation in the euro 
area, the tool of correcting international competitiveness through a devaluation of its 
currency, and could no longer face the major problem of the current account deficit without 
engineering a recession.  
Figure 9. Bank Credit to the Private Sector and the General Government (% of GDP) 
 




This Mundellian dilemma was crucial for the political choices in the first decade after euro 
area entry, especially as the initial adoption of the euro at an  uncompetitive exchange rate 
meant that Greece had locked in a very low level of international competitiveness which was 
feeding the external imbalances. 
In fact, the Mundellian dilemma operated even before Greece entered the euro area. In the 
latter part of the 1990s, the Simitis government chose to not use a more restrictive fiscal and 
incomes policy to address the growing external imbalances, as this would probably lead to a 
recession, with the corresponding social and political costs. It did not proceed to the 
necessary devaluation of the exchange rate of the drachma either, as this would result in a 
rise in inflation, which, although temporary, would possibly lead to a postponement of 
Greece’s accession to the euro area. Thus, the government continued to rely solely on the 
restrictive monetary and exchange rate policy that was proving effective in reducing inflation. 
A small devaluation that took place in early 1998, in advance of the introduction of the 
drachma to the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System, was clearly 
insufficient in correcting Greece’s international competitiveness, and was in any case quickly 
reversed, as the further reduction of inflation had become the overriding short-term priority.  
The endemic political tendency to postpone or suspend necessary but painful reforms was 
reinforced by the economic euphoria created by entry to the euro area. The second Simitis 
government, elected by a narrow majority in March 2000, chose to suspend any further 
reform and adjustment efforts immediately after Greece joined the euro area. Instead, it set 
out to further boost economic euphoria through the expansion of aggregate demand. It 
adopted an expansionary fiscal and incomes policy, which, while increasing aggregate 
demand and economic growth, exacerbated the existing fiscal problems and further 
aggravated the already low international competitiveness. Instead of intensifying structural 
reforms and fiscal adjustment to make up for the lost ground, the second Simitis government 
re-introduced some of the practices of the 1980s, such as an expansionary fiscal policy and 
real wage increases in excess of improvements in labor productivity. 
The New Democracy government of Costas Karamanlis, elected in 2004, proceeded to a fiscal 
audit, in cooperation with Eurostat, which revealed much larger deficits than previously 
recorded. On the basis of these findings, it subsequently adopted a fiscal adjustment program 
at the end of 2004, as part of the euro area’s excessive deficit procedure. This program of 
gradual fiscal and structural adjustment applied until the middle of  2007, when Greece exited 
the excessive deficit procedure.  
Following the elections of September 2007, which were called early in order to continue with 
the process of fiscal adjustment, both the international economy and domestic politics took 
a turn for the worse. The developing international financial crisis and the weak parliamentary 
majority of the second Karamanlis government led to an abandonment of further fiscal 
adjustment during 2018. In the meantime, the fiscal and external deficits were widening, due 
to the onset of the international recession of  2007-2009. 
The culmination of the international financial crisis and recession of 2007-09 and the 




October 2009, in the middle of the second term of the Karamanlis government. This became 
necessary due to the a priori refusal of the PA.SO.K opposition, led by George Papandreou, to 
contribute to the re-election of the President of the Republic, without new parliamentary 
elections.29  
In the elections of October 2009 Karamanlis campaigned on the need for a new austerity 
program, but Papandreou won in a landslide, having campaigned on the basis of a populist 
agenda. 
After the elections, the reluctance of the new Papandreou government to address the 
growing fiscal and external imbalances, which he in fact was quick to blame on the policies of 
his predecessor, led to a crisis of confidence and the ‘sudden stop’ of international borrowing 
to Greece in the first quarter of 2010. 
The crisis of confidence was initially reflected in the sharp rise of the spread of Greek 
Government bonds. Figure 10 depicts the yield of the 10 year Greek bond and that of the 
German Bund of the same duration. Their difference is the so-called spread, reflecting 
differences in their default risk.  
The spread, which had remained extremely small since Greece entered the euro area, had 
started widening since the first stages of the US subprime crisis in mid-2007. It widened 
further in late 2008, following the default of Lehman Brothers.  
After the elections of October 2009, and especially after the budget of the new Papandreou 
government the spread exploded, signifying a rapidly developing crisis of confidence and the 
unwillingness of investors to keep holding Greek bonds. This led to the ‘sudden stop’ of 
international lending to Greece by March 2010.   
 
Euro depression 
The policy reversal imposed on Greece since 2010, after the ‘sudden stop’ in international 
lending, was the trigger of the fourth policy cycle, which can be considered as the cycle of the 
euro depression.  
This last cycle essentially bypassed and short-circuited the domestic political process, as the 
main decisions were made by the authorities of the euro area, whose member-countries had 
undertaken to refinance a large part of Greece’s foreign debt. After 2010, the role of Greek 
 
29 It is ironic that the then President of the Republic was a prominent former minister of the PA.SO.K 
governments of Andreas Papandreou, Karolos Papoulias. Yet, George Papandreou declared that his party would 
not vote for him, unless parliamentary elections were called first. In the event, Papoulias was re-elected to the 




governments was limited to the implementation of the adjustment programs designed by a  
‘troika’, consisting of representatives of the the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
European Commission (EU) and the European Central Bank (ECB). 
In order to address the external imbalances, successive rounds of steep fiscal adjustment and 
nominal and real wage cuts were put in place. Due to the nature of these adjustment 
programs, based on indiscriminate tax hikes and horizontal wage, pension and other public 
expenditure cuts, this cycle caused the longest and deepest recession in the post-war history 
of Greece. An unprecedented ‘great depression’. 
The answer to Mundell’s dilemma was the exact opposite of that of the previous decade. 
Priority was given to the sharp correction of fiscal and external imbalances, through fiscal 
‘austerity’ and recession. After three consecutive adjustment programs which lasted for more 
than eight years, external imbalances were partly addressed at a huge cost in terms of lost 
production and jobs. These developments are depicted in Figures 1 to 10. 
The adjustment programs were officially completed in 2018, but Greece continued to remain 
in a ‘enhanced surveillance’ regime within the euro area. 
There is little doubt that the primary cause of the Greek crisis of 2010 was the macroeconomic 
imbalances and structural weaknesses of the Greek economy. These had developed over the 
previous three decades due to the  ineffective economic policy choices by successive Greek 
governments, due to the social and political costs implied by the necessary adjustments and 
reforms. 
Figure 10. Yield of 10 Year Government Bond in Greece and Germany (% per annum)  
 




Yet, the fourth act of the tragedy, the ‘euro depression’, also bears the hallmark of the 
ineffectiveness of the adjustment programs designed by the ‘troika’, which was responsible 
for planning and monitoring the implementation of the post-2010 adjustment programs. 
 
 
4. Weaknesses and Asymmetries of the Euro Area 
The institutional weaknesses and asymmetries of the euro area itself as well as the 
inefficiency of the European crisis management mechanisms also played an important role in 
the Greek crisis. 
It is well known that the euro area had particular weaknesses as a monetary union, right from 
the start. It was characterised by pronounced economic asymmetries between its Member 
States, especially the ‘core’ economies of Western and Central Europe, and the economies of 
the ‘periphery’, such as Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. In addition, cross-border mobility 
of workers was low, because of cultural, language and institutional reasons. One of the main 
obstacles is the absence of a euro area wide system of income tax and unemployment 
insurance. Furthermore, it was not endowed with a sufficient federal budget that could help 
absorb some of the asymmetric economic and financial shocks affecting its members. Finally, 
the euro area was a monetary but not a banking union, while its central bank, the European 
Central Bank (ECB), does not have the authority to operate as a ‘lender of last resort’ to either 
its member states or its banks in times of crisis. All these considerations made it a particularly 
vulnerable ‘currency area’ that did not satisfy any of the criteria required from an ‘optimum  
currency area’.30 
These weaknesses played an important role in the development, transmission and effects of 
the euro area crisis. The crisis of 2010 did was not confined to Greece. It affected the whole 
euro are, especially the economies of the ‘periphery’, such as Spain, Portugal and Ireland. It 
even affected some of the major economies such as Italy and France.31  
The other economies of the periphery had faced dilemmas and problems similar to the one 
faced by Greece, as they were also characterised by external and financial imbalances, were 
also confronted by Mundell’s dilemma between internal and external balance, due to their 
inability to devalue after having adopted the euro. 
 
30 The question of what constitutes an ‘optimum currency area’ was first posed and partially answered by 
Mundell (1961), who is rightly considered as the originator of the literature on the subject. McKinnon (1963) 
and Kenen (1969) were early major contributors to this literature. The literature was revived in the 1980s, as 
additional considerations were added. A survey of the so called ‘new’ theory of optimum currency areas can be 
found in Tavlas (1993). O’ Rourke and Taylor (2013), among others, have recently argued, that the United States 
is much closer to the optimum currency area criteria than the euro area. 
31 For studies that focus on the wider dimensions of the euro area crisis see, among others, Lane (2012), 
O’Rourke and Taylor (2013), Chen et al (2013), Baldwin and Giavazzi (2015, 2016), Alesina et al (2015), 
Orphanides (2015, 2017 a,b), Brunnenmeier et al (2016), Kang and Shambaugh (2016), Papademos (2016), 
Stiglitz (2016), Wyplosz (2016), Mody (2018), Alesina et al (2019), Alogoskoufis and Jacque (2019) and Ioannides 




However, the fact is that for a long period of time Greece has had deeper and more serious 
macroeconomic imbalances and structural weaknesses than the other economies of the 
‘periphery’ of the euro area. For example, Spain and Ireland, despite their huge financial 
imbalances did not have the fiscal problems of Greece, while Portugal had much smaller fiscal 
and external imbalances in 2009. 
 
 
5. Macroeconomic Imbalances and Structural Deficiencies in Greece 
We are now in a position to summarise our analysis of the macroeconomic imbalances and 
the structural, institutional and political weaknesses of the Greek economy.  
According to our analysis, the crisis of 2010 was the consequence of the persistent and major 
macroeconomic, structural and fiscal imbalances created mainly in the 1980s, the fact that 
Greece entered the euro area with major competitiveness problems and large fiscal 
imbalances and the significant weaknesses and delays of the structural and macroeconomic 
adjustment efforts undertaken since the 1990s. The proximate cause of the crisis was the 
rapid buildup of external imbalances after euro area entry and the trigger was the 
international financial crisis and the international recession of  2007-2009. 
 
Macroeconomic Imbalances 
The fact that Greece was not adequately prepared to join the euro area was perhaps the most 
decisive from an economic point of view. Giving up the freedom to choose its own monetary 
and exchange rate policy, in conditions of deteriorating international competitiveness and 
fiscal imbalance, proved to be perhaps the most crucial element in the creation of the 
conditions that eventually led to the 2010 crisis.  
According to the latest revised data of Eurostat, in 1999, the year on the basis of which the 
question of Greece's accession to the euro area was assessed, the gross debt of the general 
government was at 98.9% of GDP, without a declining trend towards the 60% envisaged in 
the Treaty on European Union. The deficit of the general government was at 5.8% of GDP, 
almost double the 3% envisaged in the treaty.  
Furthemore, the international competitiveness of the Greek economy, based on real relative 
unit labor costs vis-a-vis the EU-15, had declined by 33% compared to 1987 and by 25% 
compared to 1992. 
The significant reduction in real interest rates and the feeling of euphoria created after euro 
area entry, led to a large increase in investment and a reduction in national savings. This 
resulted in an increase in domestic aggregate demand and GDP growth, lower 
unemployment, but also a large expansion of private sector borrowing and the current 
account deficit. This development was reinforced by the almost immediate increase in the 
already high budget deficits after Greece had secured entry to the euro area, the continuous 




upon by the social partners in the midst of euro euphoria, and the excessive increase in 
domestic bank lending to the private sector. 
These are the factors that led to a sustained widening of the gap between aggregate demand 
and the country’s productive capacity. 
Figure 11 depicts the evolution of Greece’s GDP and its potential GDP for the past 45 years. 
For most of the period, especially since the late 1980s, actual GDP was above its potential, 
due to the relatively expansionary aggregate demand policies. Potential GDP was rising since 
the late 1980s, but not by enough to keep up with aggregate demand. For almost twenty 
years before the 2010 crisis the country financed a large part of its consumption, investment 
and economic growth through excessive private and public borrowing from international 
financial markets. International lending was the tool that on the one hand sustained high 
domestic demand and on the other hand facilitated the postponement of the necessary 
reforms.  
Neither the adjustment policy of the 1990s, nor the stabilisation program of 2005-2007 did 
manage to reverse these trends. 
When the international financial crisis and recession of  2007-2009 broke out, leading to a 
deterioration of the existing fiscal and external imbalances and finally the ‘sudden stop’ in 
international borrowing in 2010, the political process that determined economic policy 
choices in the previous thirty years was disrupted, and Greece was forced to adopt a policy 
mix based on a front-loaded increase in national savings and decline in domestic investment. 
Figure 11. Real and Potential GDP in Greece, 1974-2019 (Billion 2015 euros, 
logarithmic scale) 
 




The adjustment programs implemented since then have relied heavily on fiscal ‘austerity’, 
and caused a catastrophic deep and lasting economic downturn. 
After 2010, the ‘euro depression’ resulted in GDP declining below its potential. Yet, because 
of the catastrophic decline in aggregate investment and the fact that the adjustment 
programs did not focus on structural reforms that could, over time, lead to a recovery in 
investment and total factor productivity, there was also a significant decline in Greece’s 
potential GDP. Hence the recovery after 2016 was weak and in no way sufficient to 
compensate for the great losses of the long period of the great crisis.32 
Institutional Weaknesses and Structural Deficiencies 
The low and declining potential GDP suggests that in addition to the macroeconomic 
imbalances, there still exist major institutional weaknesses and structural distortions in the 
Greek economy. These seem to be concentrated in six main areas: 
1. the functioning of the markets for goods and services, 
2. the labor market and collective bargaining, 
3. the financial system, 
4. the operation of the public sector, 
5. the tax and welfare system, and 
6. the education system. 
These are the areas where the main reforms will have to focus from now on. We shall briefly 
refer to all six. 
1. Markets for Goods and Services 
The markets for goods and services in Greece are characterised by a lack of competition and 
an extremely limited range of goods and services produced. Most industries have a strong 
oligopolistic or even quasi-monopolistic structure, which is reinforced by the large size of the 
public sector and the inability of the regulatory agencies to implement an effective 
competition policy. 
According to the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) of the World Economic Forum (WEF), 
the weaknesses of the markets for goods and services in Greece are attributed to the 
existence of distorting taxes and subsidies, to their oligopolistic structure, to the low 
international orientation of production, the low dynamism of companies and to the limited 
possibilities for introducing innovations.33 
 
32 For a recent analysis of trends in Greek economic growth see Leounakis and Sakellaris (2019). 
33 It is significant that with respect to the efficiency of its product markets, Greece is ranked in the 81 place, 
among 141 advanced and less advanced economies. See WEF (2019). This is the worst performance among all 




In addition, due to the almost continuous deterioration of the international competitiveness 
of the Greek economy, the export sectors or the import substitution sectors have been 
shrinking for many years in favor of sectors producing non-tradable goods and services.34 
2. The Labor Market and Collective Bargaining 
The shrinking of the sectors producing internationally tradable goods and services sectors has 
accelerated due to the functioning of the labor market. The institution of free collective 
bargaining in the private sector have failed spectacularly to prevent the continued 
deterioration of the international competitiveness of the Greek economy. 
The relatively small size of the internationally tradable goods industries and their consequent 
low impact in the collective bargaining process, led to wage increases well above the limits 
set by increased labor productivity. In the 1980s, due to the accommodating nature of 
monetary and exchange rate policy, this led to a vicious cycle of wage increases, devaluations 
and inflation. After the adoption of the policy of the ‘hard drachma’ in the 1990s, this led to 
a vicious cycle of continuous deterioration of the international competitiveness of these 
sectors and the Greek economy as a whole, further reducing the size and bargaining power 
of the internationally traded goods sectors. 
This process was exacerbated at critical times, especially during elections, by high wage 
increases in the public sector. Wage increases of government employees have been the result 
of mandatory government incomes policies, and were subject to the same political incentives 
and constraints that affected fiscal policy in general. Moreover, after 1990, salary increases 
in public enterprises and organisations were not directly determined by government incomes 
policies, but were the result of collective bargaining between weak government-appointed 
managers and strong public sector unions. After a 1990 ‘reform’, disputes were referred to 
compulsory arbitration, which usually ended up awarding increases quite near to the 
excessive wage demands of public sector unions. These weaknesses in public sector wage 
setting have often resulted in excessive wage increases, which sooner or later spilled over to 
the private sector. There were also one of the main reasons for the deterioration of the 
general government balance.35 
The system was short-circuited during 2010-2016, through mandatory wage cuts by the 
‘troika’, but it has not been reformed. Thus, there is an increasing risk of a relapse to the 
policies of the past. 
A number of other distortions exist in the Greek labor market. The main other problems are 
the distortions caused by the nature of employee protection legislation, the limited flexibility 
of working hours and the high non-wage costs.36 
 
34 In a recent study, Arkolakis, Doxiadis and Galenianos (2017) attribute primary importance to the distortions of 
the markets of goods and services for the poor export performance of Greece. 
35 One of the persistent characteristics of the Greek labor market is the persistently high wage premium in the 
public sector (Giordano et al 2011). The high wage premia in the public sector were preserved even under the 
wage adjustments brought about by the crisis. As suggested by Christopoulou and Monastiriotis (2016) 
‘Compared with private sector wages, public wages were less affected during the Greek crisis. In result, public 
wage premia increased, especially for the low-paid workers.’ (p. 176). 




According to the Global Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum (WEF) for 
2019, Greece is ranked 111th among 141 developed and less developed countries in terms of 
labor market efficiency. Again, in the worst position with respect to all other EA countries. 
3. The Financial System 
The financial system has also been characterised by major institutional weaknesses. In the 
1980s, and before its liberalisation in the early 1990s, the financial system operated as part 
of the government and the public sector, due to the dominance of large state-owned banks. 
The financial system had contributed significantly to the inflationary financing of large budget 
deficits and to the use of private sector savings to finance ever-increasing public expenditure 
and the deficits of public enterprises and organisations. After the liberalisation of the late 
1980s, and despite the continued presence of large state-owned banks, government control  
eased. 
However, with the liberalisation of the financial system issues of inadequate supervision 
became significant. Weak supervision of both commercial banks and the Athens Stock 
Exchange led, on the one hand, to the 1999 ‘bubble’ of the Athens Stock Exchange, and, on 
the other, to the financial explosion of the period 1998-2008, following the sharp reduction 
in nominal and real interest rates. 
Inadequate supervision and political tolerance, if not encouragement, of the financial boom 
and the stock market ‘bubble’, contributed to the strengthening and widening of the 
macroeconomic imbalances of the Greek economy and in particular the widening of the 
external imbalances and the accumulation of external debt. 
Following the 2010 crisis, and during the implementation of successive adjustment programs, 
commercial banks faced capital adequacy problems for three main reasons. Firstly, because 
of the 'deleveraging' caused by the crisis. Secondly, due to the 'haircut' of the value of 
government bonds in 2012, with the so-called ‘Private Sector Initiative’ (PSI), which further 
weakened the banks’ balance sheets, Thirdly, due to the large and prolonged recession which 
resulted in the dramatic increase in non-performing loans .  
The weaknesses of the financial system exacerbated the macroeconomic and financial 
imbalances during the period of ‘euro euphoria’ and the intensity, duration and high cost of 
the ‘euro recession’. 
The financial sector has exited the crisis in a much weaker position and is in need of 
substantial recapitalisation and reform.37 
4. Public Administration and the Public Sector 
Perhaps the biggest structural weakness for the Greek economy is the inefficiency of the 
public administration in conjunction with the extensive economic role of the state.  
According to the Global Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum for 2019 
Greece is ranked 92nd among 141 countries in terms of public sector efficiency. The two main 
 
37 See Haliassos et al (2017) and Louri and Migiakis (2019) for recent studies of the evolution and the current 




problems identified are the burden of bureaucracy (127th place) and the inefficiency of the 
justice system (131st place). 
This inefficiency has significant negative consequences for the functioning of basic state 
functions, as well as for the tax system, the regulatory role of the state and the efficiency of 
public enterprises and organisations. This inefficiency also creates particular problems for the 
welfare state, social security and the country's education system. 
The problems are low efficiency and productivity and corruption seem to have worsened in 
the thirty years before the 2010 crisis due to the predominance of partisanship over 
meritocracy, among others. The result has been a gigantic but inefficient bureaucracy and 
widespread corruption and tax evasion.  
These problems, even after the implementation of the adjustment programs, continue to be 
major obstacles to the recovery of the Greek economy.38 
5. The Tax and Welfare System 
The tax system is also a major obtacle. Greece is ranked very low internationally in a series of 
relevant indicators of the Global Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum for 
2019. In the index regarding the distortions caused by the tax system for competition, Greece 
is ranked 109th among 141 countries. In the index regarding the tax burden of labor, it is 
ranked in 117th place. In the index regarding social capital, it is ranked 118th.  
An effective tax system must generate sufficient revenue with the fewest possible distortions 
in allocative efficiency, while contributing to a fairer distribution of income and wealth. 
On the other hand, the social welfare system should contribute to a fairer distribution of 
income and wealth, with the least possible costs and the least possible distortions to the 
efficiency of resource allocation. 
The first major distortion concerns income taxes. Instead of a uniform treatment of taxable 
income, different sources of income are treated differently. Indirect taxes, such as Value 
Added Tax (VAT), which is levied on almost all goods and services produced, as well as excise 
duties, also cause major distortions because of the high rates at which they are levied. 
Distortions and injustices are also caused by real estate taxes as well as real estate transfer 
taxes and the taxation of corporate income. 
The tax and welfare system in Greece is so complex and opaque that in addition to the 
distortions it causes for incentives to work, save and invest, it is also characterised by a very 
large extent of tax evasion and avoidance. Both of these forms of non-compliance result in 
costs that are shifted to people with apparent sources of income, such as salaried employees 
in the ‘formal’ economy. Apart from the inequities that it generates, this shift undermines the 
 
38 See Jacobides (2017), Kaplanoglou (2019), Karkatsoulis and Stefopoulou (2017), Lambropoulou and Ladi 
(2020), and Spanou (2019) for recent studies of public administration in Greece, before and after and crisis. 
Sotiropoulos (1993) studies the problem of party-political capture of the administration following elections, 
while Sotiropoulos (2019) studies the evolution of state-society relations after the crisis. Featherstone (2019) 
examines how Greece’s institutional weaknesses affect its ability to benefit from EU participation and to adapt 




social acceptance of the system, with the result that tax evasion and tax avoidance become 
widespread and socially acceptable activities.39 
6. The Educational System 
Despite the high percentage of Greeks completing secondary education, educational 
outcomes in Greece, as measured by the results of the PISA exams in mathematics, science 
and reading, are significantly lower than the EU and OECD average. This difference reflects 
the low efficiency of the Greek education system, and is reflected, among other things, in the 
lower productivity of the average Greek worker compared to the rest of the euro area. 
In addition, participation in vocational education and training (VET) programs remains 
relatively low, while Greek universities also face significant problems due to their attachment 
to the state and insufficient funding.40 
There is significant potential for improving the quality and results of the education system. 
After all, according to the OECD, after adjusting the skill level of young adults for time spent 
in education, Greece is ranked only above Turkey in the countries of the Organisation. 
Additional training in Greece does not increase wages or the likelihood of finding a job as 
much as in most other OECD countries. 
 
 
6. Social Interactions, Institutions and Politics 
From the analysis in the previous sections it is clear that a large number of significant 
structural distortions still exist in Greece. These distortions have a negative impact on total 
factor productivity, the allocation of limited economic resources, the accumulation of physical 
and human capital and technological progress. 
The key question is what stops the reforms that would address these distortions and thus 
allow for a better allocation of resources, higher investment and growth and the elimination 
of macroeconomic imbalances. 
The analysis of the economic role of institutions, social interactions and politics is pertinent 
for the answer to this key questions. 
 
Institutions and Long-Run Growth 
The role of institutions for long-run economic growth was first pointed out by economic 
historians, as they viewed the accumulation of physical and human capital and technological 
progress as expressions of the process of economic growth and not as its fundamental  
determinants. In the view of North and Thomas (1973), North (1990), and in the view of many 
other economic historians, the fundamental explanation for comparative development lies in 
differences in institutions. According to this view, economic and political institutions such as 
 
39 See Flevotomou et al (2017) for an extensive analysis of the tax and welfare system and the need for reforms. 




human, political and property rights, the existence and imperfections of the markets, the 
nature of the political system, etc. are of primary importance for economic performance. 
Economic and political institutions are considered important because they influence the 
structure of incentives. For example, without the protection of property rights, households 
and firms have limited incentives to invest in physical or human capital or to adopt the most 
efficient technologies. 
Economic institutions are also important because they help allocate resources to their most 
efficient uses and determine who benefits from economic activity. When markets are mis-
functioning, the potential benefits of trade are not exploited and resources are not allocated 
efficiently. Societies with economic institutions that facilitate and encourage the 
accumulation of physical and human capital, innovation and the efficient allocation of 
resources prosper, while societies with institutions that hinder them remain stagnant. 
A number of recent studies have examined the effects of the institutional characteristics of 
the Greek economy on its economic performance. This work is mainly based on the World 
Bank Global Governance Indicators. These indicators measure the impact of institutions in 
areas such as 1. the rule of law, 2. the quality of the regulatory framework, 3. the effectiveness 
of governance, 4. the control of corruption, 5. political stability, and 6. representation and 
citizen participation. 
According to the analysis of the impact of these indicators, among the euro area countries, 
Germany is the country with the best quality of institutions and Greece the one with the 
worst. In addition, countries with institutions of better quality appear to have coped better  
with the effects of the global financial crisis and the  2007-2009 economic downturn. In 
addition, based on these indicators, the quality of institutions in Greece seems to have 
deteriorated significantly during the crisis and to have contributed significantly to the ‘great 
depression’ of the Greek economy.41 
Consequently, the quality of the institutions seems to be of great importance for the 
economic performance of Greece in relation to the other countries of the euro area and to 
interact positively with its economic performance. 
 
Institutions, Social Interactions and Politics 
Economists turned their attention to the role of institutions for growth, following the 
pioneering empirical study by Acemoglou, Johnson and Robinson (2001), and the literature 
that was sparked.42 
The key features of this branch of ‘new political economy’ are: 
First, economic institutions are important for economic growth because they shape the 
incentives to invest in physical and human capital and technology, and improve the 
 
41 See Christodoulakis (2019), Featherstone (2019), Christou et al (2020) and Economides et al (2020) for three 
of the most recent studies based on the investigation of the effects of these indicators and their interactions 
with the economic performance of Greece. 




organization of production. Although cultural and geographical factors may also be important 
for economic performance, differences in economic institutions are the main source of cross-
country differences in economic growth and prosperity. Economic institutions not only 
determine the overall economic growth potential of an economy, but also all economic 
outcomes, including the allocation of resources now and in the future. 
Second, in this approach, economic institutions are treated as endogenous. They are 
determined collectively, largely on the basis of their economic consequences. The 
preferences of individuals and social groups for economic institutions differ because different 
economic institutions lead to a different distribution of income and wealth. As a result, there 
will usually be conflicts of interest between different individuals and social groups over the 
choice of economic institutions. These conflicts of interest are resolved through the political 
process. 
Third, the distribution of political power in society is also treated as endogenous in this 
literature. Political institutions, like economic institutions, determine the constraints and 
motivations of key actors in the political system. The functioning of the political system is 
determined both by the legislation in place, but also by the distribution of economic power 
in society. Access to power for certain groups depends on the economic resources at their 
disposal, which determine both their ability to use (or abuse) existing political institutions and 
their ability to prevail politically over other groups. 
There are two sources of slow adjustment in the behaviour of such a system: first, political 
institutions are resilient. A major change in the distribution of political power is usually 
required to bring about change in political institutions. The most typical example of such a 
change is a transition from dictatorship to democracy, as happened in Greece in 1974. 
Second, when one social group is economically stronger than the other, it will increase its de 
facto political power, which will allow it to push for economic and political institutions 
favorable to its interests. This will tend to reproduce the initial relative wealth inequality in 
the future. Despite these trends of inactivity, the framework also highlights the possibilities 
for change. In particular, major disruptions, including changes in technology and the 
international environment, 
One of the reasons that reforms of political and economic institutions are blocked is related 
to the interaction of social and economic groups with politics. 
The various social and economic groups in Greece have secured significant privileges that 
allow them to earn sizeable economic rents at the expense of other groups. While the rents 
are important for each social group, the cost of the privileges that secure these rents is more 
widely disseminated to society as a whole. 
Although no particular social or economic group is politically dominant, as the political system 
is broadly representative and participatory, each social group, from business groups in non-
competitive industries, associations of professionals of various types, trade unions in the 




to their narrow interests and protect the privileges and arrangements that guarantee them 
these rents.43 
Each social and economic group has little to gain from reforms that affect other groups, hence 
it does not support them. Worse, each social and economic group reckons that if it consents 
to reforms harmful to other groups, it may later find itself in the position of defending its own 
privileges. On the other hand, each social and economic group has sufficient motivation and 
political power to be able to prevent reforms that undermine the special privileges it has 
secured.44 
The relentless electoral competition between the main political parties, partisanship and 
corruption in the public administration, the control of a large part of the media by business 
interests, the party-political influence of the trade unions in the wider public sector and the 
indifference, or even the fear, of the wider social majority regarding the promotion of 
beneficial reforms are the key factors behind this situation. Thus, interaction of social groups 
through Greece’s political and economic institutions ultimately leads to inaction on the 
necessary reforms. In this way, Greece is trapped in an inefficient economic and political 
balance, which is far from conducive to reforms that would contribute to economic efficiency 
and economic growth. 
Any attempt at reform, even if it directly affects a small minority, meets with a strong political 
reaction from those directly affected and with the indifference, if not hostility, of the large 
social majority. This is perhaps the main reason why socially beneficial reforms are not moving 
forward. 
Ultimately, however, it is the responsibility of the country's political system to design and 
implement a way out of this ineffective and nationally damaging trap. There is little doubt 
that initiatives to promote the economic, social and institutional reforms required in Greece 
can only be promoted through the country’s political system.  
This is something that the Greek political system has failed to do so far. In fact, the political 
system has the main responsibility for the policy cycles that preceded the 2010 crisis as well 
as joint responsibility for the management of the crisis to this day. 
Behind the initial destabilisation of the economy in the 1980s was the inability of the political 
system to effectively manage the social and political pressures to redistribute income and 
wealth in favour of the large and electorally powerful middle classes, consisting of private and 
public sector employees, retirees, farmers, the self-employed and owners of small and 
medium-sized enterprises. 
Since the 1990s, adjustment efforts have been weak, lopsided and ineffective, mainly due to 
the very weaknesses of the political system to effectively manage social and political 
pressures to protect the living standards of the various social and economic groups from the 
redistributive effects of the necessary reforms. These social pressures, as well as the ability 
 
43 See Olson (1965) for an influential analysis of such a process in democratic societies. 
44 For an attempt to model a pattern of such interactions between social groups and politics in order to explain 
Greece's disappointing economic performance, see Kollintzas, Papageorgiou and Vassilatos (2018) and Kollintzas 




of organised minority interests to thwart reforms that were detrimental to their own narrow 
interests, often led to ineffective choices, postponements and changes of course. 
Greece’s political, social and economic institutions were not able to prevent the continuous 
accumulation of public debt and the continuous deterioration of the international 
competitiveness of the Greek economy. The same happened unfortunately with the fiscal 
restrictions from the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact, which successive 
Greek governments have largely managed to evade. 
Only with the enforcement of the adjustment programs after 2010 did the fiscal adjustment 
and the correction of international competitiveness take place. However, due to the large 
imbalances that had built up by that time, and the design and implementation weaknesses of 
these programs, the cost of the adjustment has been enormous. Moreover, those political 
and institutional reforms that would have made it impossible, or even very difficult, to return 
to the practices of the past were not promoted. 
 
 
7. The Pandemic and its Economic Impact 
In any case, and while the Greek economy seemed to have entered a mild recovery after 2017, 
in 2020 a new major international economic crisis broke out, due to the coronavirus pandemic 
(Covid-19). This crisis, which is still developing, is potentially as serious, if not more serious, 
than the  2007-2009 international financial crisis. 
The pandemic and the restrictive measures it has demanded have deeply disturbed the world 
economy and of course the economy of Greece. As a result of restrictive measures to address 
the pandemic, global demand, global supply chains, labor supply, industrial production, 
commodity prices, foreign trade and capital flows have shrunk significantly. The pandemic hit 
both the European and Greek economies hard at a time when they were still vulnerable to 
new disruptions.  
On the positive side, Greece is not politically isolated, as happened in early 2010. Yet, the 
impact of the crisis and the way it will affect the various Member States will be anything but 
symmetrical. 
The consequences will depend not only on the severity of the pandemic and the duration and 
severity of the measures to contain it, but also on the specific economic side effects and the 
initial conditions of the various Member States, as well as the flexibility of their fiscal policy. 
Once again, as in 2010, the EU and the Euro area are proving relatively unprepared to deal 
effectively with a major international economic crisis. The necessary reforms in the 
functioning of the euro area after the international financial crisis of 2010 had proceeded too 
slowly. However, unlike in 2010, when the cost of adjustment was passed on to the 
economies of the periphery, in 2020 the EU countries finally agreed to set up a significant new 
temporary crisis management mechanism. The agreement on the Recovery and Resilience 




to jointly deal with this latest crisis. This is a positive, albeit limited, initiative in the right 
direction. 
Greece’s economy has already been severely affected by the pandemic, the countermeasures 
taken to limit its spread during 2020 as well as the new global recession. The economic and 
fiscal impact is expected to be large due to the importance of the tourism sector and the small 
size of Greek firms, most of which are concentrated in the service sector, which has proven 
particularly vulnerable. Despite the immediate measures to support the economy, the strong 
contraction in production is expected to eventually affect employment. In addition, both the 
recession and the fiscal cost of crisis response measures will lead to a significant rise in the 
budget deficit and a resurgence of public debt relative to GDP. 
The pandemic crisis is still developing, and forecasts are extremely uncertain. However, the 
immediate and short-term economic outlook appears to be particularly negative. In February 
2021, the EU Commission estimated that GDP has fallen by 10% during 2020 and would 
remain below the 2019 level during both 2021 and 2022. Greece’s government debt to GDP 
ratio was estimated to have risen to 207% of GDP in 2020, from 180.5% in 2019, and that it 
would remain above the 2019 ratio during both 2021 and 2022. 
Increasing public borrowing in order to support the economy in the short term is certainly the 
right solution, both globally and for Greece. However, the increase in borrowing is nothing 
but a partial shift of the problem to the future. As in the aftermath of wars, so in the aftermath 
of major economic downturns, economies have to tackle the problem of debt repayment, or 
at least attempt the reduction of the public debt to GDP ratio. 
So how does one pay for the pandemic? By analogy, the question is similar to the question in 
Keynes’ famous 1939 Times articles on ‘How to Pay for the War’.45 
There are three alternative methods of dealing with the large increase in public debt that is 
taking place after the current crisis. First, is the significant increase in taxation and reduction 
of primary government spending immediately after the crisis, through a policy of ‘austerity’.  
The second is the restructuring or even the partial write-off of the debt. The third is ‘gradual 
adjustment’. In other words, the continuous postponement of debt reduction, with the hope 
that the debt will gradually shrink in relation to GDP through economic growth and inflation. 
Greece experienced austerity mainly in the period between 2010 and 2018. The international 
recession of the period  2007-2009 led to an increase in its public debt, and the austerity of 
the period 2010-2018 led to a dramatic decline in GDP, rising unemployment and rising social 
inequalities. A prolonged ‘great depression’. Due to the deep and long recession, the debt to 
GDP ratio shot up instead of falling. From 103% of GDP in 2007, before the beginning of the 
international recession, and 127% of GDP in 2009, after the international recession, in 2018, 
with the end of the adjustment and austerity programs, public debt had skyrocketed to 186% 
of GDP. Despite the huge costs paid by workers, retirees and the unemployed, the effects of 
austerity on public debt have been disappointing. Figure 12, on how Greece’s debt usually 
 
45 ‘How to Pay for the War’ was the topic, although not the title, of two long articles that Keynes wrote for The 
Times, which appeared 14 and 15 November 1939. They were subsequently amended and published under this 




rises in periods of recession and stagnation and is only stabilised in periods of recovery and 
growth, does not require much additional comment. 
 
 
Greece experienced the second method, the restructuring and partial write-off of its debt, in 
2012. Despite the problems, the results were somewhat better. The cost was paid by holders 
of Greek government bonds and the shareholders of Greek banks, presumably richer than the 
low-paid, the pensioners and the unemployed. In addition, there was even a temporary halt 
to the rising debt and the cost of its servicing was reduced. 
However, it is doubtful whether this can be repeated in the current context. The debt problem 
created by the current crisis is global and does not only affect Greece or the peripheral 
economies of the euro area, as during 2010-2011. It is unlikely that the rich economies will 
risk losing their credibility to current and future investors through debt restructuring or write-
offs, or that the core euro area economies, now experiencing a rising debt themselves, will 
accept again to pay part of the cost of debt restructuring of economies of the periphery such 
as Greece. 
I finally come to the third method, that of ‘gradual adjustment’. This is how the public debt of 
the US, Britain and other European economies fell relative to GDP after World War II. This is 
also the way in which Greece stabilised its debt-to-GDP ratio during 1994-2007. However, this 
solution has an important prerequisite: For a long time the nominal yield of government 
bonds should be lower than the sum of GDP growth and inflation. 









In the first thirty years of the post-war period this was achieved internationally through rapid 
economic growth and ‘financial repression’. The latter required state intervention in financial 
markets and capital controls in order to keep interest rates low. In the case of Greece in the 
period 1994-2007 this was achieved through the reduction of interest rates and the recovery 
caused by the prospect of joining the euro area and then by euro area participation itself.  
The ‘gradual adjustment’ method has proven to be very effective in tackling large increases 
in public debt, usually after wars or major recessions. Britain’s experience after the 
Napoleonic Wars and World War II is a prime example. On the contrary, the austerity after 
World War I or after the Great Recession of  2007-2009 led to further increases in the debt-
to-GDP ratio. 
Can a policy of ‘gradual adjustment’ be repeated in an age of liberalised financial markets and 
capital movements after the current crisis? If it could, a significant part of the cost of the 
adjustment would be passed on to the presumably richest savers, as well as to future 
generations, who would have had the benefit of higher economic growth. The problem is 
whether interest rates can remain low for the long period of time required. This may require 
a policy of controls in financial markets, in addition to the accommodating monetary policy 
of central banks. In addition, this solution carries the risk that economies will remain 
vulnerable for a long time to the risk of a new financial crisis.46 
In conclusion, these are the three options before policymakers in order to deal with the 
increase in debt after the current crisis. In practice, they may have to partly use all three. 
None of the three is painless and each of them has different redistributive effects and involves 
different risks. What is certain is that when the pandemic subsides, all economies will have to 
tackle the debt problem with a combination of the above three methods. 
The collective effort at European level, with the Recovery and Resilience Facility, which entails 
a significant transfer of resources to the Greek economy will certainly help. However, this 
should not give a false sense of security. Other important initiatives and reforms are needed 
at the national level, for a sustained recovery of the Greek economy following the current 
crisis. 
The main question is the same as before, and will arise more starkly because of the economic 
and fiscal consequences of the pandemic. It is the question of whether Greece can change 
course and adopt policies and reforms that will lead to a strong and sustained recovery in 
economic activity, without the macroeconomic imbalances that developed in the decades 
following EU accession. 
 
8. Prerequisites for a Sustained Recovery 
Greece has no choice but to accept that, remaining a member of the euro area, it will have to 
adopt structural and fiscal reforms that would allow its economy to recover without the 
reappearance of fiscal and external imbalances. 
 
46 For a discussion of public debt and low interest rates from the perspective of the large industrial economies 




Unfortunately, this was not achieved before the 2010 crisis, nor during the post-crisis 
adjustment period.  
In order for the Greek economy to be able to complete the transition from the current crisis 
to a sustained recovery, it will have to immediately start promoting reforms that will combine 
the goal of economic recovery with that of maintaining fiscal and external balance. This 
requires a different mix of fiscal and structural economic policy than the ones pursued during 
the previous crisis or the decades before the crisis. 
The challenge for the Greek economy today, even while dealing with the immediate economic 
effects of the Covid-19 pandemic, is the adoption of reforms that will facilitate a sustained 
recovery program that will not be based on excessive borrowing from abroad. It is important 
that the recovery is export-led, so as not to be accompanied by a further widening of the 
external deficit, as happened in the decade after joining the euro area. 
The recovery should be pursued within the euro area, despite the constraints of Greece's 
participation in it. Exiting the euro is not a solution, as it poses great risks of economic collapse 
in the process of transition to a de facto weaker national currency, and, in the medium term, 
the risk of a return to the economic instability in the 1980s. 
The challenge for policymakers, even while dealing with the immediate economic effects of 
the Covid-19 pandemic, remains the adoption of a program of reforms that will facilitate a 
sustained recovery within the euro area, that will not be accompanied by the fiscal and 
external destabilisation of the past. The task is made worse by the economic disruption due 
to the pandemic, but it must remain the top priority for policy makers in Greece. 
The program must be formulated consensually and be endorsed by the widest possible range 
of political forces in the country. Consensus is a necessary condition for continuity, credibility 
and effectiveness of any medium term reform strategy. The same consensus is required for 
putting forward Greek national positions for necessary reforms at the level of the euro area. 
If Greece learns from the political bickering and controversies of the past, which have caused 
so much economic damage, and if a minimal political consensus is formed around some of 
the key issues regarding the necessary reforms, the dynamic recovery of the Greek economy 
after the current crisis is possible. Otherwise, any results will be small and short-lived, and the 
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Chapter 4. Greece’s institutional performance in the EU: the 




Increasing attention has been given to the economic costs of Greece’s institutional 
weaknesses.  Here, the latter are considered in relation to Greece’s position within the 
European Union, both in the recent past and in the future.  Empirical data is analysed to 
compare the performance of the public administration in fulfilling EU policy obligations.  
Greece is shown to be one of poorest performers, at a level comparable to Bulgaria and 
Romania.  Further data is collated to compare the ‘quality of government’ (QoG) across EU 
member states.  Again, Greece performs poorly.  It is then shown that the two sets of data 
are statistically related: state institutions lacking ‘impartiality’ from wider socio-economic 
pressures are most likely to underperform in the delivery of EU public goods.  The paper 
assesses the implications for Greece’s convergence within the EU and its prospects for being 
able to accommodate increasing demands on its institutions resulting from a deepening EU 
integration process.  There are new challenges here for the EU itself as it manages a 
heterogeneous set of member states.  A ‘tying hands’ strategy of setting rules for national 
governments to follow is likely to be too indirect and superficial to achieve convergence in 
(institutional) performance.  The EU’s new ‘Recovery and Resilience Fund’ is likely to be a 



















The recent Greek debt crisis focussed international attention on the institutional capacity of 
Greece to deliver the prescribed reforms.  In addition, the last years have seen an emerging 
European-wide debate on the future of the European Union (EU) and proposals for the 
intensification of its integration process.  The latter frequently prompts consideration of how 
many member states should or can participate in the new initiatives, with metaphors of a 
‘multi-speed’ or inner and outer core Europe as reference points.  There are inherent risks for 
Greece in this regard: of whether it can remain a full and equal member at the centre of the 
EU, given the performance of its domestic institutions. 
This paper recognises that the structural constraints on Greece’s convergence with EU norms 
extend beyond matters of economic policy or of market development to the endemic 
weaknesses of its public institutions, notably the public administration.  These remain despite 
changes of leader and of governments or of a decades-long public debate on the need for 
reform.  The problems have merited attention from across academic disciplines and 
prompted debate on the determinants of Greece’s divergence from wider European norms.  
Here, firstly, we examine distinctive empirical evidence of the performance of Greece’s public 
administration and its comparison to other EU member states. We analyse official data on the 
delivery of EU-mandated policies across different functional areas, as the basis for cross-
national comparison.  Secondly, we follow Rothstein’s (2011) approach to assess the ‘quality 
of government’ (QoG) in Greece in comparison to other EU states.  The data here suggest the 
pressures of socio-political interference: the lack of state autonomy or of the ‘impartiality’ of 
its institutions.  Thirdly, by placing both performance and QoG data together, we find a close 
relationship between them: the delivery of public goods faces a systemic constraint 
emanating from wider socio-political encroachment.  Fourthly, we consider the strategic 
implications that arise from the findings: both for the EU, in managing a heterogeneous set 
of states, and for Greece, in strengthening its convergence.  The Conclusion draws the themes 
and issues discussed together. 
Before examining the empirical data, it is useful to consider the historical context of Greece’s 
external vulnerability and how this may relate to its present situation in Europe. 
 
2. The context 
In a stimulating synopsis, Kalyvas (2015) identifies seven political and “boom, bust, and 
bailout” cycles of modern Greek history.  These were prompted, he argues, by its unrelenting 
focus on the combined goals of modernization and westernization.  The booms were followed 
by catastrophe and, subsequently, international rescue, sustaining the modernization project.  
Indeed, Greece was a lucky state as it was treated benignly as a special case by foreign powers.  
It was seen as a test case for the export of a Western ‘modernity’ as, economically and 
politically, it was the first ‘late-moderniser’, with Kalyvas borrowing Rustow’s terminology.  
The foreign powers had a strong affinity for Greece’s cultural heritage as they appreciated its 




protectors wisely – ending up on the ‘right’ side of history.  Thus, the financial ‘busts’ were 
never as bad as they might have been.  Indeed, Kalyvas contemplates that this pattern may 
recur in the present if Greece’s growth picks up after its recent debt crisis.  
Such a narrative of history contrasts with the received version prevalent during the 
metapolitefsi.  Political leaders and writers have rather seen Greece as a victim of Great 
Power/ Super-Power conflicts and their separate interests.  Such interpretations have held 
sway beyond those on the Left.  Couloumbis (1976) wrote of foreign intervention in Greece 
and of its penetration giving rise to a particular type of state in the international system.  The 
alleged complicity of the US in the 1967 coup of the Greek Colonels and in the 1974 Turkish 
invasion of Cyprus are oft-repeated cases of the outside world being less than benign.  But 
Kalyvas revises this ‘dependency’ theory logic, of writers like Mouzelis (1986), to emphasise 
that the will to intervene was well-motivated and had a positive impact. 
Certainly, at critical points, Greece needed external help.  Kalyvas cites Llewellyn Smith’s 
(1998: xiv) assessment that, ‘The contrast between the greatness of Greece’s ambitions and 
the poverty of her resources put a special premium on outside support’.  The question then 
becomes the nature of that external support and Greece’s adaptation therein.  In the present 
period, it is Greece’s membership of the EU that is most relevant in this regard: the impact of, 
and response to, processes of Europeanization (Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003).   
Using Kalyvas’ terms, the 2010-18 years of the debt crisis shifted the foreign perspective on 
Greece.  The cultural affinity with Greece was overturned: in Germany, Bild argued that 
Greece should sell the Parthenon, for example.  Leadership guile from Athens counted for 
little: George Papandreou faced humiliation at the Cannes G20 in 2011, as did Alexis Tsipras 
in Brussels in July 2015, not to mention the anger that was created by Varoufakis’ 
confrontational negotiating style in the same year.  From start to finish, there was no Greek 
leader that won special favour from Europe. 
Thus, the recent past constitutes an historical break and it serves to focus our attention much 
more on the structural dimension of Greece’s integration within the EU, rather than on 
Kalyvas’ underlying cultural affinities or on leaders as agents, with or without the appropriate 
guile.  The three bailout programmes and the package agreed in August 2018 were seemingly 
a matter of Europe imposing penitence on Greece for the long-term.  The blame was shifted 
to the mistakes of Greek politicians, as fiscal profligates, more than accepting flaws in 
pursuing monetary union without economic union amongst a heterogeneous group of states.  
Under the terms of the August 2018 agreement, Greece was to sustain a government budget 
surplus of 3.5% GDP per annum to 2023, then 2.2% to 2060.  Such terms stemmed directly 
from the euro-zone’s adoption of ordo-liberal precepts: of fiscal responsibility at home.  Few 
economists would see these terms as growth-enhancing (or benign) for Greece. 
The euro-crisis was different in form from earlier ‘rescues’ and the lessons posed for Greece 
were rather more stark.  It is not only a matter of voluntarism at home – the will to reform 
and converge – but of recognising the extent and depth of the structural divergences that 
exist, between Greece and the EU’s median.  It is the latter that, more fundamentally, gauges 




developmental aspirations.  It is a focus on these structural divergences – in particular, 
Greece’s institutional weaknesses - that this paper will adopt, assessing the implications that 
arise both for Greece and the EU.  For there are strategic implications here that extend 
beyond the ‘advantages of tying one’s hand’ (Giavazzi and Pagono, 1988), in which member 
states are constrained by tight (fiscal) rules.  The latter are surface-level, rather than directly 
addressing the imperatives and needs of structural reform. 
This will remain the case in all probable scenarios stemming from the EU’s response to the 
COVID-19 pandemic.  [The likely benign effects of this response are not evidence of Kalyvas’ 
patterns of Greek rescues, as this stems not from the debt crisis but from a separate 
pandemic.]  The EU’s debt crisis regime had been relatively unaccommodating, inflexible and 
punitive, wedded to a singular policy tradition of its anchor economy, Germany.  By contrast, 
the 2020 agreement to establish an EU 'Recovery and Resi lience Facility’ seemed likely to be 
transformative: the EU Commission was to leverage funds on the international markets; 
member states were to receive substantial funding (some €672.5 billion in a mix of loans and 
grants) with only ‘light’ conditionality; and solidarity replaced blame as the main narrative.  
To critics of its earlier debt crisis response, this seemed a decisive Keynesian-turn and placed 
the EU where they felt it should have been earlier.  A Rubicon appeared to have been crossed.  
A future retreat from the new solidarity might be difficult, politically.   
Yet, while very welcome for the Greek economy and with its future impact uncertain, the 
funding flow does not itself address the fundamentals of Greece’s divergence from much of 
the EU, in terms of its institutional weaknesses and poor policy delivery.  These belong to 
another agenda.  The relevance of institutions to state performance was underscored by 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) in their book, ‘Why Nations Fail’.  As a contribution to the 
debates prompted by this series of papers, I proceed below to identify and assess the nature 
of Greece’s institutional under-performance within the EU context.  I follow this with a 




3. Greece’s institutional performance compared 
Some of the key features of Greece’s structural divergences from the EU’s core are well -
established.  In sum, it is a small, peripheral economy that is mostly inward-looking, 
uncompetitive, and attracting limited inward FDI.  In the Global Competitiveness Index of 
2018, Greece ranked 87th out of the 137 countries surveyed.  In parallel, since 1989 a recurring 
focus of its national parliamentary elections has been the modernization or reform of the 
State and its institutions, as citizens and investors bemoan their poor service delivery.  
Criticisms of the dysfunctionalities of public administration are frequent: it is overly 
formalistic and rigid in its operational procedures, rule-following rather than pragmatic; 
hierarchical, ill-coordinated and cumbersome; low-skilled in staff and IT; too non-meritocratic 
and politicised; and suffused with petty corruption (see, for example: Spanou, 2008; 




regulatory agencies, suffer from political interference.  The process of governing has not often 
adapted to modern techniques.  Well into the debt crisis and the surveillance of the ‘Troika’, 
Greece ranked lowest in a survey of OECD countries in terms of regulatory impact assessment, 
as Fig. 1 reports.  Seemingly minor public acts – the appointment of a university lecturer, for 





The consequences of these institutional weaknesses can be gauged.  There is now a 
substantial economics literature on this matter.  In this same series, Alogoskoufis (2021) 
identifies the roots as ‘the institutional deterioration that occurred after 1981’ and sees 
Greece’s institutional weaknesses as central to its long-term economic problems.  He lists six 
priority areas for institutional reform: the functioning of the markets for goods and services; 
the labor market and collective bargaining; the financial system; the operation of the public 
sector; the tax and welfare system; and, the education system.  The extent of Greece’s 
institutional problems is such that few observers would disagree with this list.  In a related 
paper here, Christodoulakis (2021) estimates the economic costs for Greece in terms of lost 
growth.  Similarly, Economides, Papageorgiou and Philippopoulos (2020), using a 
counterfactual simulation, have highlighted the primacy of low ‘institutional quality’ in Greece 




GDP loss is a result of Greece’s institutional quality not remaining at its pre-crisis levels.  Again, 
Christou, Philippopoulos, and Vassilatos (2020) incorporate institutions into a standard 
neoclassical growth model to account for divergences in macro-economic performance across 
12 euro-zone countries since 2001.  They find ‘institutional quality’ shows considerable cross-
country variation and is a ‘fundamental cause’ of the asymmetries in performance.   
Here, I follow a different direction.  My focus is of Greece’s public institutions as a structural 
constraint on the country’s convergence to EU norms and its prospects for being able to 
accommodate increasing expectations of performance in the context of a deepening of the 
integration process in the future.  I begin by examining how the Greek public administration 
performs in implementing its EU policies and obligations.  The analysis covers the state’s 
functions with respect to public procurement; VAT collection; and the absorption of EU 
structural funds.  There is some variation in the availability of data for each indicator. Leaving 
aside absorption, all data runs to 2017, though VAT gap begins in 2004 and public 
procurement efficiency in 2011. 
The selected indicators follow Lowi’s (1972: 300) classic typology of policy types that all 
modern governments perform. In these areas, member states act, in effect, on behalf of the 
EU Commission. Quantitative data in these areas can be difficult to obtain. Following Lowi, 
the data here covers member states’ distributive action (the national absorption rates of EU 
structural funds); their regulative efficiency (applying EU rules on public procurement 
contracting); and their collection of value-added tax (VAT; limitedly re-distributive, from the 
national to the EU level). While VAT collection is far more significant to national revenues 
than it is to the EU budget, its inclusion here is indicative of an important government 
function, and one that may be of increasing general EU relevance in the future.  Overall, the 




How domestic state institutions manage the processes of contracting goods and services from 
the private sector is regulated by the legislation of the single European market with a view to 
providing open competition between providers across member states. It attests to the 
uniformity and accessibility of the single market: the ‘lived’ experience of intra -EU trade.  The 
measure used for public procurement efficiency is a composite measure created from data 
recording the efficiency of the procedure in awarding public contracts between 2011–17, with 
a mean score out of 100 (European Commission, 2017c). The higher the score, the more 
efficient a state is. Efficiency of procedure measures the mean decision period, i.e. the time 
between the deadline for receipt of offers (or requests to participate) and the awarding of 
the contract. To ensure comparability, only notices under the open procedure are considered. 
 
47 The analysis of the policy performance indicators (procurement; VAT; absorption) follows that in Featherstone 




[The missing years have not been covered by an imputation of data, as the missing period is 
relatively extensive]. 
Fig. 2 reports the mean scores across EU member states for the period 2011-17.  Of the 24 
states covered, Greece has the lowest mean score.  Below Italy, it ranks lower than Bulgaria 
and Romania.  The variation amongst member states shows little consistency between ‘new’ 




The funding of the EU budget relies, in part, on the collection by member governments of a 
proportion of revenues generated by the mandatory national application of value added tax 
(VAT).  In reality, how well governments collect this tax revenue varies. The VAT gap is the 
“difference between expected VAT revenues and VAT actually collected, (and) provides an 
estimate of revenue loss due to tax fraud, tax evasion, and tax avoidance, but also due to 
bankruptcies, financial insolvencies or miscalculations”. It is calculated as a percentage of GDP 
for the years 2004–17 (European Commission, 2017d): the lower the score, the smaller the 
VAT gap. It does not refer to the VAT funds transferred to Brussels as part of member state 
budget contributions, but to the efficiency of the tax collection in the first place. A ’deepening’ 
process of EU integration is likely to utilise this function even more. 
Fig. 3 reports the mean scores for the years 2004-17. Of the 24 member states covered by the 
data, Greece ranks 20th, indicating an endemic problem in its tax revenue service.  Moreover, 
there was little variation in its ranking over these years.  The only member states to fare worse 
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that of Greece, Greece’s score is more than three times worse than that of the Nordic states 
and The Netherlands. 
 
 
Absorption of EU structural funds 
The final functional area is how well government institutions claim and process EU financial 
aid, which involves planning, coordination and distributional functions. The EU relies on 
member states to achieve its objectives of addressing regional and social disparities. The 
official absorption rate is the difference between EU budget (earmarked) commitments per 
member state and actual payments made. The absorption rate is defined by the EU 
Commission as the percentage paid to each member state, compared to the available budget 
(European Commission 2017b). The higher the figure, the higher the rate of absorption.  
For this variable, determining the relevant period for analysis requires some caution, 
however. We avoid using data on the first two years of the budget period, when the standard 
deviation across member states is low. We also exclude the two years beyond the official 
budget period (when states can still receive funding). By the end of these ‘extra’ years, the 
standard deviation is minimal (1.8). Instead, we focus on 2009–13, the period with the highest 
degree of heterogeneity across EU states (std 11.25). The states that completed the highest 
percentage of their projects beyond 2013 were Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, 
Latvia, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Greece managed a 34 percentage-point increase in its 
absorption rate in this period, a case that would skew the overall statistical results here if it 
were included. Moreover, payments in this period to member states were not simply for 
managing large-scale infrastructure projects, creating further complexity: delayed funding 
under the European Social Fund (not involving such projects) correlated with that under the 
European Regional Development Fund (comprising such infrastructure projects) (0.65). Thus, 
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Fig. 4 reports the percentage absorption rate across EU member states for the years 2007-13.  
With the UK not included here, Greece ranks 18th out of 23 countries.  Romania, Italy and 
Bulgaria are ranked lower than Greece. 
 





4. Explaining the variation in performance 
The determinants of institutional performance can be, of course, many and varied.  In his 
conceptualisation of the ‘quality of government’ (QoG), Rothstein (2013) suggests an 
approach that resonates with the Greek context.  He argues that the key feature of QoG is the 
impartiality of state institutions in their dealings with wider society (see also Teorell, 2009; 
Rothstein and Teorell, 2012). Rothstein derives the importance of impartiality in the exercise 
of public power from John Rawls’s theory of justice, Brian Barry’s notion of justice as 
impartiality, and the liberal concept of justice in the writings of John Stuart Mill (Rothstein, 
2013). The content of policies—welfare or market regulation, for example—“should not be 
included in the definition of QoG” to distinguish policy content from procedural politics 
(Rothstein, 2011: 15). “What should count as quality of government”, Rothstein argues, is that 
policies have “to be implemented in accordance with the principle of impartiality” (Rothstein, 















2012).  Impartiality is bound up in the idea of the autonomy of public institutions, from wider 
social pressures of, for example, rent-seeking behaviour, clientelism, and corruption.   
We follow Rothstein’s (2011: 31–32) conceptualisation on indicators of (im)partiality.  
Corruption is a negation of impartiality.  But, because of its non-transparent nature, 
corruption is very difficult to measure. By default, analyses typically survey perceptions of 
corruption on the part of those engaged in interactions with the relevant institutions. Here, 
we create a composite scale covering perceptions of corruption and favouritism.  
Using data from the World Bank and the World Economic Forum, we create an ‘impartiality 
index’. The World Bank’s Control of Corruption index draws on multiple sources and covers 
elites’ (business and country experts) “perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests” (World Bank, 2017). A member state’s 
percentile rank indicates its relative position among all countries covered by the aggregate 
indicator, with 0 corresponding to lowest rank, and 100 to highest rank. Percentile ranks have 
been adjusted to correct for changes over time in the composition of the countries covered 
(measured -1 to 3). As the World Bank acknowledges, this data is “useful as a tool for broad 
cross-country comparisons and for evaluating broad trends over time” (World Bank, 2019).   
The World Bank data was complemented by data specifically on favouritism, provided by the 
World Economic Forum (World Economic Forum, 2017). Again, this is an elite survey with the 
question: “In your country, to what extent do government officials show favouritism to well -
connected firms and individuals when deciding upon policies and contracts?” The scale runs 
from “1 = always show favouritism” to “7 = never show favouritism”. The data on favouritism 
does not cover the years 2004–06, so multiple imputation is used to distribute observed data 
in order to estimate a set of plausible values for missing data.  
We normalised the variables used for the impartiality scale along a 0–1 axis (using the 
formula: x - (xmin) = (xmin) - (xmax)) and the composite scale was created by finding the 
average across the original variables. Unweighted, this constitutes the impartiality index: a 
high score indicates state institutions are seen as impartial, a low score the opposite. 
Public trust in state institutions to perform correctly—consistent with the law—is a parallel 
measure of impartiality, gauging how far the state administration acts independently of 
corruption and clientelism. Of course, the link between perceptions and objective conditions 
can be questioned (Apaza, 2009; Kaufman et al, 2007). Given that the earlier data is based on 
elite perceptions, we sought to incorporate public perceptions to offer balance to the 
analysis. Here, we used the data from the Eurobarometer public opinion surveys (European 
Commission, 2017a). The question asked was: “Do you tend to trust, not to trust, or not know 
whether you trust or not, your nation’s public administration?” Currently, the data is ava ilable 
only for the period 2016–17.  
Public trust correlated with our variables (see below): public procurement efficiency 
(2016=0.721; 2017=0.732) and the VAT gap (-0.541; -0.578). With the logic of keeping within 
the one budget period, the total absorption rate for the 2007–13 budget cycle was used as a 




rankings of member states on the impartiality index and the levels of public trust differ, 
though only limitedly (Pearson’s correlation: 0.889). The implication here is that the 





With respect to impartiality, Figure 5 shows the variation between EU member states in terms 
of their mean score for 2004–17 (with imputation for 2004–06 only in terms of favouritism).  
Here Greece ranks just above Bulgaria and Romania and below Slovenia and Slovakia.  Greece 
is well below the EU average.  Moreover, Fig. 6 shows that Greece actually experienced an 
increasing divergence from the EU mean over the 2004-17 period – a concerning widening 
gulf. 
Moreover, the geographical differentiation is not a simple north–south one. Fig. 5 shows that 
Portugal and Spain scored significantly higher than Greece or Italy, suggesting there is not a 
common southern European pattern. Instead, there is a north/south-east Europe contrast 
(see Fig. 8). The three Nordic EU members display the greatest social autonomy, those in the 
south-east, the least. By contrast, only Estonia is ranked in the upper half; those in the lower 
half comprise the remaining central European states, the Balkans (including Greece), and 
Italy.  Geographically, the EU has a south-east problem.  Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Slovenia 
and Italy (alongside Slovakia) have public administrations operating within a socio-political 
setting of relatively high levels of corruption, favouritism, and low public trust in institutions.  
Such ‘rentier’ behaviour gives rise to what Rothstein and Uslaner (2006) describe as a ‘social 
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institutions, in a type of vicious circle.  Breaking-free of such a trap is difficult, requiring 
systemic shifts.   
We now consider the relevance of social autonomy to institutional performance.  When 
comparing the impartiality results with the rankings revealed on the three performance 
indicators – public procurement efficiency, VAT GAP, and EU fund absorption – there is some 
consistency evident.  Of the countries scoring lowest on the impartiality index, four of the 
bottom six appear consistently in the lowest six on each of the three performance indicators.  
These are Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Slovakia.  Italy ranks in the lowest 6 on two of the 
performance indicators. This is indicative of the correlation between a lack of state autonomy 
from wider socio-political pressures (low impartiality) and a problematic administrative 
performance in delivering public goods.  The former distorts the latter. 
The causal relationship is analysed further in Featherstone and Cottakis (2019).  A regression 
analysis compared the relative significance of impartiality (as defined here) with a range of 
alternative variables.  These were institutional capacity (measured as the size of the civil 
service; government expenditure; GDP per capita; separately also the ‘Oxford International 
Civil Service Effectiveness Index’ [InCISE] on staff skills levels); the length of a country’s 
membership of the EU (to gauge learning effects); the level of statism (measured in terms of 
the regulatory burden); the type of welfare state regime; and, democratic political culture 
(the latter two to assess separate impacts on public attitudes towards state institutions).  For 
the VAT gap, impartiality had the highest level of significance (10% level) consistently relative 
to all other variables.  For public procurement and funding absorption, impartiality again had 
the highest levels of significance (at the 1, 5 and 10% levels), until welfare state type was 
added to the regression, when other variables became significant, though these differed 
between procurement and absorption.  Apart from welfare state type, none of the other 
variables had significant impact across the performance measures.   
That the impartiality index proved to be more statistically significant than the measures of 
institutional capacity for the delivery of EU policies is a particularly noteworthy result. When 
the InCISE index was used in an OLS regression, again no significance was shown for ‘capacity’.  
The results suggest important implications for how an EU member state may ‘escape’ from 
poor institutional performance and for the strategy of the EU in the face of such performance.  
More important than resources or skills is the socio-political setting and extent to which the 
latter does not intrude into the operation of the public administration.  In short, keeping 
political pressures (corruption; favouritism) at bay matters for the effective operation of 
public administration.  These considerations will be discussed further below. 
Further evidence of problematic performance comes from the World Bank’s ‘Government 
Effectiveness’ data, based on a mix of surveys including both domestic and external.  By 
‘government effectiveness’ is meant the ‘perceptions of the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the 
quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies’ (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Documents  
).  Relevant results are shown in Fig. 7.  A key point here is that it is the ‘perceptions’ of 




composite scale.  Yet, in the aggregate, the results have value – they reflect the assessments 
of those having contact with the Greek public administration.   
The graph shows a steady downward performance for Greece for the 2004-2017 period, such 
that it converges with Bulgaria.  [For 2019, Greece maintains a marginally better performance 
than Bulgaria].  As a benchmark for the EU’s core, the trend line for Germany is relatively 
stable across these years.  This composite variable – based on data from a range of sources – 
reinforces the picture of Greece’s public institutions veering away from the EU’s inner core 
and converging with other Balkan states.  It parallels the trend evident in the impartiality 
index.  There is, to a degree, an overlap in the meanings of both variables – the independence 
from political pressure, for example – but this serves to offer some validation of a syndrome 
linking lack of impartiality and poor institutional performance. 
 
 






































Figure 7. Perceptions of Government Effectiveness 2004-2017 [World Bank: WGI] 
 
 
























5.  he implications of Greece’s institutional di ergence from the EU’s core  
Some readers may be prone to set aside this evidence with a claim that a change of political 
leadership in Greece has or can remedy the issues stemming from Greece’s divergence in 
performance from the EU’s inner core.  That would be to give primacy to the role of agency 
in changing the historical path.  Individual leaders can change the situation, as Kalyvas notes 
in his interpretation that previous prime ministers have shown guile.  The argument advanced 
here does not rest on a proposition that Greece’s predicament is irredeemable.  The future 
course is, indeed, still to be made. 
Rather, the purpose of this paper is to evidence the strength and depth of the structural 
problem that Greece faces in bringing the performance of its institutions (the delivery of 
public goods) into line with EU expectations and norms.  The structural problem defines a 
setting that constrains political action, impacting on priorities and their feasibility.  Navigating 
the constraints to successful remedies will be a daunting task and unlikely to be achieved in a 
short time-horizon.   
It is also relevant to note apparent changes of the public mood.  In the 1990s, Simitis and his 
allies could call for ‘modernisation’ in the name of Europe – Greece had to meet the challenge 
of converging with the EU to secure its own future – and this had ready appeal amongst 
voters.  It animated and restructured political opinion.  In the present period, the situation 
has changed.  It is not so clear that leveraging domestic reform based on a European narrative 
would have the same impact.  According to the Eurobaromter opinion surveys, since 2010 
Greece has had the biggest fall in public support for the EU ever recorded in any country.  In 
the autumn of 2010, some 55% of Greek voters said they had a ‘positive image’ of the EU.  
Less than two years later, the proportion was lower than 20%.  By 2018, this had recovered 
to 25%, but it was 17 percentage points lower than even the UK, which had previously voted 
for ‘BREXIT’.  By spring 2019, those with a positive image had risen to 33%, well below the EU 
average of 45% or even the UK figure of 38%.  In the most recent Eurobarometer survey, in 
summer 2020, two-thirds of Greeks ‘tended not to trust the EU’, a figure only slightly down 
on the year before and the third lowest figure recorded in the EU.  True, in summer 2020, 
Eurobarometer reported 75% of Greeks supported the ‘euro’ single currency, the mean score 
for the EU27.  But the juxtaposition of this support against a dramatic fall in those having a 
positive image of the EU and the two-thirds not trusting the EU suggests a much more 
instrumentalist (or materialistic) view of the EU than previously.  Voters like the EU less, but 
fear the economic consequences of not having its single currency.  The 2010 debt crisis and 
the austerity measures imposed on Greece by the EU have clearly had their toll on public 
attitudes towards Europe in Greece.  In sum, it is by no means clear that a discourse of 
domestic reform legitimated by reference to ‘Europe’ would shift much opinion in Greece, at 
least in the short-term.   
If the EU does proceed to ‘deepen’ its integration in critical policy areas, this poses a set of 
strategic issues.  Living with the EU’s core member states may become more costly for Greece 
– in how far it can keep in synchronisation with the demands of the new integrating policies 
– while the option of being outside the deepening process may prove even more costly, in 




and how far the process may extend beyond the new European Recovery and Resilience Fund 
(ERRF).  The costs may be difficult to quantify, involving intangibles such as reputations, 
images, and attitudes.  Plausibly, exclusion could impact on private investment flows (inwards 
and outwards), public investment projects, and pan-EU collaborative networks.  Conversely, 
the intensification of EU integration may pose significant challenges for domestic reform in 
Greece, involving unprecedented demands for the efficiency and effectiveness of public 
institutions. 
The expected flow of funding to Greece from the ERRF from 2021 onwards may not directly 
address the endemic problems of the country’s public institutions.  Indeed, they may expose 
them further.  The strategy of bail-out conditionality imposed on Greece from 2010 onwards 
was predicated on the external assumption that her institutions could not be relied upon to 
deliver the necessary structural economic adjustments.  Even if Chancellor Merkel had 
allowed greater funding to flow into Athens, not many Greeks either would have been 
confident that the money would have been spent wisely, I suspect.  This is a problem that 
combines both political choices and the institutional capacity to deliver public goods.  The 
ERRF will likely have ‘light’ conditions attached and ensuring its effective impact will be a test 
for the Greek system.  It may be that the previous bailout experience will help in securing the 
appropriate allocations. 
The future political landscape of the EU is uncertain – in the medium term, the departure of 
Angela Merkel, as German Chancellor, is expected and perhaps the tenure of President 
Emmanuel Macron may prove not to be secure.  The leadership and direction of Europe 
thereafter is a matter of speculation.  But there is a reasonable prospect of the intensification 
of euro-zone policies – whether more in the vein of Merkel or Macron -  with concomitant 
demands on public institutions to deliver the goods.  With existing EU concerns about 
corruption and the misuse of funds in central and south-eastern Europe, it is not in Greece’s 
strategic interest to be seen alongside the likes of Bulgaria, Romania and others.  With a 
deepening of EU integration, the core EU members may become increasingly selective of 
those they wish to include in new forms of collaboration. 
A further strategic dimension here is the relevance of an external constraint – a ‘vincolo 
esterno’ approach of national leaders’ hands ‘being tied’ by international commitments 
towards a path of reform, overcoming domestic constraints (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999).  
The notion stems not only from Giavazzi and Pagono (1988) narrowly, but also more broadly 
from Guido Carli – former Governor of the Banca d’Italia and Finance Minister – in his 
reflections on his long career in Italian public life.  Carli argued that the most significant 
economic advances in post-war Italy had stemmed directly from the short-termism and 
sectional interests of domestic politicians being overcome by Italy being obliged to live with 
major international constraints, such as the Truman Plan and the European Payments Union 
to the latter day European Monetary System (Carli, 1993).  In parallel, the proposition is also 
relevant in the Greek case.  Both the prospect and reality of accession to the European 
Community in 1981 unleashed wide and substantive pressures for adaptation in Greece, 
unleashing plentiful studies of its ‘Europeanisation’ (Ioakimides, 1996 ).  Similarly, Simitis’ 




with the Maastricht Treaty’s convergence criteria for entry into the euro-zone.  Such an 
imperative, in recent decades, may be a better-defined and more salient force than the 
‘rescues’ identified by Kalyvas.  
To the extent that Greece is – in the performance of many of its public institutions – a ‘misfit’ 
with the EU, optimising its future performance may rest on its inclusion within a closer EU 
process.  In more recent times, evidence to support the proposition comes with the OECD’s 
comparative data on the adjustment and reform performance across countries, reported in 
Fig. 9.  Amongst 14 EU member states for the 2011-14 period, Greece is placed ‘top of the 
class’.  Its score is almost double that of the euro-zone.  Of course, while the reform progress 
being benchmarked here was a broad one, the context was of the impact of two successive 
debt bailouts and their associated reform conditionality.  The governments in Athens in this 
period responded and produced hitherto unprecedented reforms.  Extensive reforms were 
also continued after Greece’s Third Adjustment Programme in 2015.  The question is not so 
much whether the reforms were ‘enough’, but the likelihood of them occurring without the 
constraints of the debt bail-out programmes and the reforms they mandated, usually very 
precisely. 
 
Figure 9. OECD Adjustment Progress Indicator and Reform Responsiveness, 2011-14. 
 
 
The external constraint boosted reform:
Country Av. Reform Responsiveness score 0 -1














E   erage  .4 





The challenge for the EU is how to support the adaptation of its divergent member states; 
that is, if it opts for a strategy inclusivity alongside its deepening integration.  Greece’s bail -
out programmes brought forth the ‘EU Taskforce’ of the EU Commission to provide technical 
assistance on reform in key areas, complementing many bilateral support schemes for 
Athens.  If the ‘Troika’ was the ‘bad cop’ of tightening constraints, the latter were the ‘soft 
cop’ of encouragement and support.  Latterly, the Commission has developed a full-blown 
‘Directorate General for Structural Reform Support’, as from January 2020.  It,  
‘coordinates and provides tailor-made technical support to EU countries, in 
cooperation with the relevant Commission services. The support is notably provided 
through the Structural Reform Support Programme (SRSP). The objective is to help EU 
countries build more effective institutions, stronger governance frameworks and 
efficient public administrations. Such support reinforces the capacity of EU countries 
to design and implement policies to support job creation and sustainable growth. [See: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/departments/structural-reform-
support_en#responsibilities].  
There are, inevitably, capacity, quality of service, and political sensitivity issues inherent in 
the Commission providing such support.  It is a new terrain for the Commission.   
This type of external support may prove especially valuable for Greece.  The new DG has its 
own office in Athens.  It may overcome the limitations of a strategy of ‘tying hands’ of 
governments to fiscal rules alone, as in the August 2018 agreement Greece signed with the 
EU.  It can also be seen as an improvement on the often-clumsy conditionality of the previous 
bail-out programmes, that set targets that had been ill-thought out within time frames that 
were unrealistic to meet in any substantive manner.  It is not merely a matter of balancing 
the ‘sticks’ and the ‘carrots’, but of directing reform to make long -lasting gains.  Leading by 
the hand, perhaps, more than tying hands together.  The effectiveness of such support in the 
face of robust domestic forces of inertia will be a matter to be determined. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper set out to offer an assessment of how well Greece’s public institutions – in 
particular, the state administration – perform in comparison to those of other EU member 
states.  A distinctive empirical focus, in this regard, was on the fulfilment of a set of policy 
obligations mandated by the EU itself.  These obligations ranged across core government 
functions.  They involved different EU policy areas: public procurement rules of the single 
market; the collection of VAT revenues; and, the absorption of EU structural funding.  With 
these as the policy indicators, Greece was found wanting – with its performance consistently 
amongst the EU’s poorest and, seemingly, part of a south-east Europe syndrome. 
A broader assessment of Greece’s ‘quality of government’ was made, following the Rothstein 
approach on the social autonomy of the state.  This directly addressed matters of corruption, 




notion of a ‘social trap’.  Institutions and publics fed on each other in attitudes and practices 
that undermined institutional impartiality in public administration. 
Significantly, the measures of impartiality were found to be closely related to those of policy 
delivery: the socio-political intrusion on public institutions undermined their functionality.  
This was more than issues of institutional capacity: rectifying performance necessitates 
shifting wider social norms.  The relationship here was reinforced by the World Bank’s data 
on government effectiveness. 
In the context of these indicators, Greece is placed in the ‘wrong’ company – alongside 
Bulgaria and Romania, most notably.  There is no simple geographical pattern, but that 
highlighting the divergence of south-east Europe from the rest of the EU is the more striking.   
Domestic reform in Greece has often benefitted from an EU imperative – from accession, to 
euro-currency entry, even to bail-out conditionality.  But effective, high-quality reform is most 
likely to result from an EU embrace that is supportive and long-term.  This is a new territory 
for the EU to manage and a challenging one, given its internal heterogeneity.   
Looking to the future – beyond the current pandemic agenda – there is a significant 
probability that the EU’s core member states, led by Germany and France, will seek to extend 
and deepen EU integration.  It is very much in Greece’s interests – economically, politically, 
geo-strategically – that it participates fully in these new endeavours.  But such ambitions are 
placed at risk by the low quality and performance of its domestic public institutions.  This is a 
structural divergence of Greece from the EU’s core that goes beyond matters of leadership 
and voluntarism.  Changing political leaders is, in these terms, the easy part.  What will tell 
more are the substantive improvements in institutional performance.  With the probability of 
EU deepening, Greece faces a fresh European challenge with the outcome uncertain.  The 
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Chapter 5. From the twin deficits to new deficiencies: How weak 




After the 2008 global credit crunch and the subsequent debt crisis in the Euro Area, a 
series of tough austerity measures were imposed on Greece in exchange for a bailout 
to avoid an outright default.  Although it caused a huge divergence between Greece and 
its peers in terms of economic developments, a more toxic effect was the collapse of 
public and economic institutions, ranging from Government effectiveness and political 
stability to market regulatory quality and the rule of law. Using the World Bank 
governance indicators as explanatory variables, an empirical growth model is used to 
calculate the cost of crumbling institutions in Greece in terms of per capita GDP 
foregone and, thus, explain the sharp divergence in income levels. Alongside 
macroeconomic stabilization, Greece should urgently focus on improving institutions if 
a convergence process toward the more developed nations of the Euro Area is to set off 
again. 
Keywords: Euro Area, Growth, Institutions. 
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Almost all the economies of the Euro Area (EA) suffered severe losses in households' incomes 
after the global crisis in 2008, though in a highly asymmetric pattern.  For the peripheral 
economies with large external and/or fiscal deficits – such as Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain 
and Cyprus the hit was much more devastating than the rest. Having suffered a sudden stop 
in credit financing, they were bailed out by the European Union (EU), the European Central 
Bank (ECB) and the IMF in exchange of harsh programs of fiscal consolidation.49  
 
Since the adjustment relied mostly on front-loaded measures, the inevitable consequence 
was that bailout countries experienced a deep and prolonged recession, thus their prospects 
of converging toward their EA peers in per capita income severely weakened, while for some 
it was altogether reversed; see Christodoulakis (2020) for a detailed account. This had a 
shattering effect on the ‘real convergence’ process, once considered as the twin pillar of the 
European project along with the so called ‘nominal convergence’ among the countries 
participating in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU); see EC (1992).  
 
Among the crisis-ridden economies, Greece was by far the most severe case with the twin 
deficits in Government finances and the external balance rising to record levels as ratios to 
GDP.50 Consequently, the size of both the requested bail and the required fiscal correction 
were of unprecedented proportions too, leading to a deep and prolonged recession. Growth 
was serially collapsing throughout 2008-2015 and since then remained at levels much below 
the pre-crisis trajectory.  
 
The fall in per capita income was so devastating that the country not only lost the dynamics 
of convergence to its EA peers but also seems now as completely disconnected from the 
group of the initial group of EMU members. As depicted in Fig. 1, it rather comes closer to the 
new accession countries of Eastern Europe that joined the EMU much later but have since 
then grown much faster. In contrast, the Greek economy seems to lack any similar dynamism 
and future growth projections are anemic, as acknowledged, for example, by IMF (2019) 
noting that ‘[o]ver the medium term, growth prospects are weighed down by adverse 







49. Spain sought a similar arrangement but without the involvement of the IMF. 
50 As noted by Barrios et al. (2009), the explosion of sovereign spreads that sparked the European periphery 
crises took place in countries with large external deficits even if their fiscal position looked healthy. For a 




Figure 1. Per capita GDP paths in Greece and Euro Area subgroups 
 
 
Note: Subgroup EA10 consists of the initial EA members, except Greece and Luxemburg. The New7 include those 
joined EU in 2004 and the EA later. Source: Ameco database  
 
 
Obviously, behind the diversified dynamics of per capita incomes lie asymmetric patterns in 
GDP growth rates, depicted in Fig. 2. Before the crisis, the new accession countries were 
growing faster than the older EA members, while Greece kept a rate between the two groups, 
steadily converging to the most developed economies. In the aftermath of the crisis, both the 
old and the new groups experienced a temporary fall in GDP growth but quickly recovered 
afterwards, albeit at a lower rate than before. Greece did not follow the rebound.  
 
Hence, it is worth exploring which particular factors have caused Greece's unprecedented fall 
in GDP growth as compared to the much milder effects the same crisis exerted on other EA 
economies. The economic analysis typically points to differences in one or more of the 
following areas: 
 
(a) the fiscal position of each country that determines the cost of borrowing,  
(b) the patterns of competitiveness that affect external balances,  
(c) the types and volumes of investment activity that shape the accumulation of capital 
and influence future growth.  
 
Developments in each of these fronts had been particularly adverse for Greece and 
contributed to the post-crisis collapse and prevented the economy to bounce back on a steady 
growth path. However, the persistence of recession suggests that some other explanatory 



























































A possible candidate to explain the growth discrepancies is the gap in the quality and 
effectiveness of institutions operating in the EA group in general, and in Greece in particular. 
 
Figure 2. GDP growth rates in Greece and Euro Area subgroups 
 
 
Note: As in Fig. 1. Source: Ameco database 
 
 
Since the founding of the EMU, the expectation was that by removing institutional rigidities 
and impediments to the efficient use and allocation of production factors would enhance the 
economic structures of a country, thus facilitating growth. The implementation and 
functioning of EMU did streamline some key macroeconomic policies and institutions, notably 
in the monetary and financial sectors to ensure ‘nominal convergence’ and enhance the 
credibility of the common currency. 
However, in other sectors – such as the labour markets, the tax system or the regulation of 
markets – progress lagged far behind. Evidence by Diaz et al. (2017) suggests that after 2010 
the divergence concerning institutional quality increased. A possible reason is that some 
degree of a 'reform fatigue' prevailed in several EMU countries after the circulation of the 
new currency and either delayed - or altogether prevented - further adjustments toward 
more competitiveness and growth.   
The erosion of institutions in Greece has been noticed as a potential explanation of the delay 
to implement the required fiscal adjustment, and also the reason for the size of the distortions 
it caused in the economy. For example, Galanos et al (2017) pointed to a number of structural 
and institutional weaknesses that at best limit – if not altogether undermine - the outcome 































































the lack of productive investment and the large size of the moonlight economy. Others claim 
that inferior institutions in Greece lie behind the fact that its economy is lagging so much 
behind the other members in the Euro Area, even after three successive reform programs. 
Pagoulatos (2018) finds that the Greek economy “…continues to suffer a weak public 
administration, slow functioning justice system, low savings, high consumption, small average 
business size, and a still weak export sector”. 
In its country report on the occasion of concluding the Third Memorandum of adjustment, 
OECD (2018) noted that weak and uncertain institutions have systematically undermined 
economic recovery since the debt crisis in 2010. Social unrest and political upheavals against 
the bailout programs played a crucial role in making several institutions unworkable and 
Greece to be drifting apart its Euro Area peers.  In turn, this thwarted foreign investment and 
made market reforms even more confrontational, thus increasing country risk and further 
undermining economic recovery. 
 
Sometimes, the ineffectiveness of institutions in Greece instead of becoming a centerpiece of 
policy attention was conveniently targeted to deflect responsibility for program failures. 
Though the erosion of institutions was noticeable well before the debt crisis in 2010 and – in 
fact – contributed to making it uncontrollable, the consolidation programs concentrated only 
on a front-loaded battery of fiscal adjustments, disregarding the risk of institutional 
malfunctions or reform resistance.  
With undue optimism mixed with political naiveté, the surveillance authorities were 
expecting a short period of recession followed by uninterrupted growth thereafter. The IMF 
report (2010) predicted that “[g]rowth is expected to follow a V-shaped pattern: the 
frontloaded fiscal contraction in 2010–11 will suppress domestic demand in the short run; but 
from 2012 onward, confidence effects, regained market access, and comprehensive structural 
reforms are expected to lead to a growth recovery.” Sooner rather than later, such views 
proved no more than a growth-chimaera as recession deepened and market access was 
denied to Greece for several more years. Most crucially, public confidence collapsed leading 
to short-term governments and successive elections. The effectiveness of institutions was 
badly tarnished, causing further delays in implementing growth-oriented reforms and making 
Greece to pay a high price for neglecting their importance in shaping economic policy.  
Eventually, Blanchard and Leigh (2013) officially withdrew the above simplistic views on 
behalf of the Fund. Naturally, the next step should then be to include institutional reforms in 
subsequent programs, as a means to avoid the disappointments of the first one to appear 
again. However, as the Chief of the IMF mission in Greece openly admitted in a posterior 
account of the programs, ‘the deeper-than-expected recession [of the first program] forced 
significant additional fiscal measures from 2011’; see Thomsen (2019). But rather than 
admitting that the main culprit was the intensity of consolidation and the neglect of improving 
the relevant mechanisms in decision-making, he solely blamed ‘the fundamental weaknesses 




interests’, (ibid). No surprise then that a vicious cycle of recession and austerity took off and 
continued for several years. 
Hence, the assumption investigated in this paper is that by including developments in key 
institutions in Greece in the post-EMU era might help to more adequately explain the abysmal 
fall in economic growth after the crisis and the inability to take off again.  In GDP terms, the 
cost inflicted on the economy turns to be so high that improving institutions and raising 
efficiency in the decision-making process becomes a major policy priority, if the convergence 
process between Greece and its EA peers is to return. 
 
The rest of the paper reads as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the role of institutions on 
economic growth. Section 3 describes the data measuring their quality and effectiveness in 
various countries. It also highlights the most popular criticism in using institutional data and 
suggests ways to mitigate their shortcomings. Section 4 discusses multiple episodes in crisis-
ridden Greece that might explain the deterioration of institutions and its inability to accelerate 
recovery. Employing an econometric model estimated for the Euro Area countries without 
Greece, Section 5 describes a counterfactual scenario by assuming no deterioration in Greek 
institutions. This offers a measure in GDP terms of the cost caused by the crumbling 
institutions, while Section 6 discusses the main conclusions.  
 
 
 . Growth and institutions  
 
The hypothesis that institutions play a vital role in explaining economic developments in a 
particular country, as well as cross-country differences in economic performance, goes back 
in history to the origin of economics; for a concise examination see Acemog lou et al. (2005), 
with extensive empirical research over different countries and historical periods.  An 
extensive analysis in the Euro Area was recently conducted by Masuch et al. (2018). All studies 
agree that low-quality or malfunctioning institutions may cause a significant loss of social 
welfare, in the short or the longer run. Most common channels through which growth is 
eroded are considered to be the following: 
 
 (a). Inefficient institutions create opportunities for rent-seeking activities by pressure 
groups at the expense of competitive markets and consumers;  
 
 (b). Lengthy and cumbersome procedures in socioeconomic institutions raise 
transaction costs, fuel uncertainty, and increase risks. This may jeopardize investment 
projects and infrastructures, and thus lowers the provision of public goods and services. 
 
  (c). Higher transaction costs distort the intertemporal allocation of resources between 





Therefore, by adopting a quantitative measure of institutions' quality and efficiency, one 
could empirically estimate the effect they exert on economic growth. A crucial issue in the 
empirical applications is the availability of appropriate and sufficient data for the quality of 
institutions and their measurable interactions with economic performance. In several cases, 
the problem intensifies by the difficulty of disentangling their causal effects in cross-country 
estimations with few observations.  
 
The systematic compilation of Governance indicators by the World Bank (WB) since 1996 has 
led to a plethora of quantitative research examining if and how institutions affect economic 
performance in various countries and country groups. For example, in an IMF study on 
developing countries, MacFarlan et al. (2013) find that institutions measured by the World 
Bank index significantly affect per capita GDP. Hence, they conclude that the effort of 
improving functionality and quality of institutions pays off quickly and should become a 
priority in growth-promoting policies.   
Institutions may also affect economic performance in a more general way as their adequacy 
and credibility may play a crucial role in a country’s assessment and rating by foreign 
investors. To that effect, Fournier and Bétin (2018) establish that the measure of Government 
Effectiveness as recorded by the World Bank is a critical determinant of ascribing sovereign 
default probabilities in third-world countries, on top of more traditional indicators of 
indebtedness and deficits. The main argument behind such reasoning is that Governments 
that are more effective tend to be more credible in their commitments to international 
lenders. Investors are eager to view such governments as more likely to spur growth and 
regularly repay debt, thus reducing the default risk compared with other similarly indebted 
countries with an inferior institutional framework.  
Studies based on the same WB data series have also tried to explain the discrepancies in the 
European economies' growth in the context of the recent debt crisis. In a study conducted by 
the ECB, Masuch et al. (2016) find that initial conditions of institutions and the level of public 
debt can help to explain the different patterns average real GDP growth in Europe during the 
last 20 years, which, in turn, are responsible for the real convergence lagging so far behind.  
 
 
3. Data and shortcomings  
3.1. Data series 
The World Bank publishes six governance indicators (WBGI, for short) at an annual frequency. 
According to Kaufmann et al. (2011), the first two indicators qualify the process by which 
governments are selected and monitored. The next two measure the capacity of governments 




citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions. The 
indicators are the following:  
1. Voice and accountability (VACC, in short) – capturing perceptions of the extent to 
which a country's citizens can participate in selecting and assessing their Government and 
freedom of expression, association, and press media.  
2. Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (PSAV) – capturing perceptions 
of the likelihood that the political system will survive in the face of fragile governments, 
partisan challenges, an eventual power vacuum or extensive protests, including politically 
motivated violence and terrorism.  
3. Government effectiveness (GEFF) – capturing perceptions about the quality of 
public goods and services, the readiness of civil service and the degree of its independence 
from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the 
credibility of Government's commitment to such policies. 
4. Regulatory quality (REGQ) – capturing perceptions of the Government's ability to 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private 
sector activities and developments.  
5. The rule of law (RLAW) – capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in, and abide by, the legal provisions of the society and, in particular, the quality 
of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, the functioning of courts, as well as the 
frequency and intensity of crime and violence.  
6. Control of corruption (CCOR) – encompassing perceptions of how effectively 
malpractices, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, are checked and avoid the 
'capturing’ of the state by elites and private interests. 
 
3.2. Criticism 
The six WBGI indicators take values in the interval [-2, +2], determined by each country's 
position relative to the others. As Kaufmann et al. (2011) note, a key feature of such a choice 
of units is that the world average remains the same in each year. The implication is that 
indicators are meaningfully to compare countries’ relative positions in a given year and 
relative positions over time but not informed about trends. However, by reviewing the 
original time series over the several past updates of the WGI, there is very little evidence of 
trends in global averages of the underlying data sources. Moreover, fixing the global mean to 
equal zero does not prevent the analysis of trends in regional or other group averages of 
countries. In addition, it does not seem unreasonable to keep the global mean constant, since 
changes in countries’ relative positions are unlikely to be very different from changes over 
time in countries’ absolute positions.  
Nevertheless, the WB indicators are not immune from caution regarding their completeness 
and suitability in assessing the quality of institutions. The most popular criticisms are 





(i) Subjectivity: All the WB indicators are compiled through a combination of 
perceptions based on measurable performance and judgemental values. 
Information on the former may not be complete, and judgments may be 
preoccupied with previous developments.    
(ii) Observability: An actual development in improving individual institutions may 
not be promptly taken into account by those expressing their perceptions in 
the WB surveys.   
(iii) Completeness: The WB indicators may only partially reflect the quality or cover 
the institutions' scope relevant to growth. Other international organizations, 
such as the OECD, the World Economic Forum, the Euro-Barometer, etc., 
produce indicators that might be used. 
(iv) Cross-correlation: The six WB indicators are not independent of each other but 
somewhat mutually influenced. This is reasonable since high standards in one 
area of state functions are likely to affect other institutions in a similar way. As 
shown in Table 1, all cross-correlations among the six WBGI data series for the 
Euro Area are high and positive.  
(v) Causality: Another shortcoming in using WB indicators as explanatory variables 
for growth is the direction of causality between them. The central assumption 
is that better (worse) institutions improve (reduce) per capita GDP in each 
country. Still, it may also be the case that institutions get better or deteriorate 
according to the overall economic performance. 
 
 
Table 1.  Cross-correlations of WB governance indicators 
 
 PSAV CCOR RLAW VACC GEFF REGQ 
PSAV 1      
CCOR 0.67 1     
RLAW 0.67 0.95 1    
VACC 0.72 0.89 0.87 1   
GEFF 0.64 0.92 0.91 0.84 1  
REGQ 0.66 0.89 0.89 0.87 0.83 1 







3 3  Response 
The reason for preferring the WB indicators to alternatives is that they are used widely in the 
literature, making the results comparable with other studies. By spanning a reasonably long 
period from 1996 to date, they allow panel estimations to be meaningful  by avoiding the 
problem of causal effects as mentioned by Docquier (2014) for cross-country studies each 
with few observations. To simplify the calculations and also avoid cross-correlation of the 
separate indicators, a weighted average is constructed through principal component analysis.  
 
The rest of the criticism is partly alleviated by comparing WBGI data with other direct 
measurements of institutional practices and checking that they are mutually compatible. For 
example, an improvement in the Rule of Law is detected alongside an actual fall of the crime 
rate. Similarly, a deterioration of PSAV is recorded after a prolonged period of weak 
governability, due – for example – to successive elections or disagreements on government 
formation, and so on.  
 
 
Figure 3. Quality of institutions in Greece and Euro Area subgroups 
 
 




4. The crumbling of institutions in Greece 
 
Focusing on the role of institutions in explaining the path of economic growth looks 
particularly relevant for Greece. Fig. 3 shows how the WBGI indicators evolved on average 
during the last twenty years in the older EA members (excluding Greece) and the new 
accession countries. It is remarkable how markedly the latter group improved institutions, 
















Area peers both before and after the global crisis. In contrast, post-crisis Greece appears to 
have suffered the most pronounced deterioration in institutional capacity compared with 
either group in the Euro Area. Although the decline in certain socioeconomic and political 
developments was noticeable before 2008, it further intensified since the crisis. There have 
been severe consequences on the functioning of the economy and, ultimately, its capacity to 
recover.  
 
No wonder that institutional failure in Greece coincided with a collapse in investment activity 
and an explosive rise in indebtedness, both of them eroding GDP growth. However, a more 
systematic analysis of the facts that led to the demise of institutions might prove cumbersome 
or outright impossible, given the perceptional nature of WBGI indicators and the lack of 
knowledge on how they are compiled.   
 
The crumbling of both the economic growth and trust in institutions was painfully experienced 
during the crisis, although not always recognised and by the surveillance authorities. Making 
the improvement of institutions a policy priority started to enter the policy agenda after the 
Greek economy appeared to be lagging behind the other bail-out countries in restoring 
growth and exiting the adjustment programs. The quality of institutions became a central 
reference in the public debate. For example,  a corporate report by PWC (2015) argued that 
deterioration of both during the last decade Greece had reached such a crucial point, where 
any further weakening of institutions may lead to large and substantial loss of wealth and 
prosperity. In a sequel, PWC (2017) repeated that building trust in political processes and 
institutions is the cornerstone of economic growth.  
 
Of course, an analytic account of how the socioeconomic process influences institutions' 
perceptions is not possible. A substitute is perhaps the vast anecdotal evidence of Greece's 
institutional failures and the consequences they had on growth collapsing. A non-exhaustive 
list of institutional drawbacks in Greece in the course of the crisis is shown in Table 2 and 
briefly described below: 
 
(i). Perhaps the most critical development was the post-crisis erosion of political 
stability (indicator PSAV).  As successive governments were trying to enact the austerity 
measures dictated by the bailout agreements, they faced internal political revolts to an 
unprecedented extent and in open disagreement with their pre-electoral pledges. Schmidt 
(2015) noted that the citizens’ response to such perceived disenfranchisement has been to 
punish the ruling parties with ‘blows of growing frequency and intensity’, leading to shorter 
life cycles of incumbent governments. Due to the continuous social and partisan protests all 
over Greece, the two mainstream political parties shrank dramatically after decades of 
occupying more than 80% of the electorate.  Soon, anti-systemic movements and new party 





A discussion of disintegration dynamics in Greek politics is found in, among others, 
Vasilopoulou (2018) for the rise of Eurosceptic politics; Roumanias et al. (2020) for the far-
right formations; Milios (2016) for the political consolidation of the radical left. Party 
disintegration led to more frequent elections and government reshuffles, thus complicating 
decision making and raising the political risk. To indicate how remarkable the change was, it 
suffices to say that in the period 2008-2017, there have been seven prime ministers and ten 
ministers of finance, as opposed to two and three respectively the decade before. According 
to a country risk analysis, Greece in 2017 scored the highest degree of political uncertainty at 
5.0 points versus an EU average of 1.6 points.51  
 
Table 2.  Key areas of institutional deterioration in Greece 
Areas of concern (and affected WBGI) Pre-crisis Post-crisis Compare 
    
(a) Property crime  
      RLAW, GEFF 
1998-2008 2009-2017  
Burglaries 51,062 79,581 +56% 
Car thefts 20,188 28,694 +42% 
Armed robberies 2,219 5,051 +128% 
(b) Serving special interests 
      RLAW, CCOR, VACC 
2002-2008 2009-2015  
Number of transitional provisions 150 232 +55% 
Number of amendments, % Laws 15% 17% + 2 p.u. 
 (c ) Litigious civil & commercial disputes 
REGQ 
2010 2016  
Time to settle cases 190 days 640 days +237% 
(d) Non-Performing Loans,  
       GEFF, REGQ 
2010 2017  
As % of total Gross Loans, Greece 9.12% 45.57% +36.5 pu 
Euro area 5.60% 3.20% -2.4 pu 
(e) Strikes 
     PSAV, VACC 
2010 2011-2014  
   General actions 2 10 +8 
   Industry level 0 28 +28 
(f) Political stability  
      PSAV, GEFF 
1998-2008 2009-2017  
  Number of general elections 3 5 +2 
   Number of Finance ministers  3 10 +7 
   Number  of  Prime ministers 2 6 +4 
Note: Periods before and after the crisis may differ.  
 




Sources: (a) Greek Police, ELAS (2018). Aggregate crime data, various years.  
(b) Sotiropoulos and Christopoulos (2016).  
(c) The 2018 EU Justice Scoreboard: Quantitative Data. Brussels, May.  
(d) World Bank, 2018.  
(e) Katsikas et al. (2018).  
(f) Incl. caretaker Governments, Wikipedia.  
 
 
(ii). Concurrent to the front-loaded implementation of austerity measures was a rise 
in public disputes that deeply tarnished the perception of equity in applying the rule of law, 
(indicator RLAW). For example, households' inability to meet financial obligations multiplied 
disputes with banks and other public agencies and led to massive payment refusals and 
litigations. This caused long delays in dispute resolution and led to an overwhelming feeling 
that the arbitration system or even the judiciary is inefficient. As documented in EC (2018, 
Fig. 4), Greece is now the country among the EU with the most prolonged interval for a 
litigation case to conclude. Furthermore, it is the only one where the length of time to 
complete increased sharply since 2010. At the beginning of the crisis, on average, 190 days 
were required to settle civil or commercial litigations. Nevertheless, in 2016, the period 
required rose to 670 days, nearly three times longer in comparison with the average of 236 
days in the other Euro Area countries.52 Regarding the economy as a whole, the 
enforcement of contracts remains weak, and the relevant indicator in Greece is now the 
lowest among the developed countries, as documented in a recent report by OECD (2018, 
Fig. 42).  
 
The lack of a quick resolution process in financial disputes exerts a definite cost in the 
economy's functioning, mainly in the banking sector. In combination with ineffective 
Government regulations and other bank governance problems, it has led Non-Performing-
Loans (NPL) to reach dangerous levels, currently occupying nearly half of total credit in the 
economy. Loan restructuring and foreclosure proceedings are unusually slow compared to 
most OECD countries, despite the fact the legal regime has somewhat improved since 2010; 
(OECD, 2018). Compared with the Euro Area record, the pre-crisis Greek NPL burden was less 
than twofold of the EA ratio to total credit but then rose to more than 14-fold, asphyxiating 
the credit system, hurting Banks’ solvency, and tying the economy on a low-growth path.  
 
An even worse deterioration concerns the provision of social services, as extensive spending 
cuts in the public sector, led to inadequate infrastructure and shorter working schedules, 
including policing and public safety. Hence, the crime rate against property rose sharply, 
feeding a broader disappointment on the state's functioning when it is most needed. The far 
right was quick enough to exploit the vacuum by organizing vigilante groups in the more 
 




impoverished areas of big cities, thus provoking further clashes and violence with other 
activist groups.  
(iii). Regarding economic efficiency, the regulatory quality markedly diminished during 
the crisis (indicator REGQ). Although a critical condition for post-crisis Greece to resume 
growth was to implement extensive market reforms, affected groups confronted most 
initiatives with such resistance, which made several of them turn down. As a result, Greece's 
product markets continue to have the most sclerotic regulation among the OECD countries, 
as described by Katsoulacos et al. (2015). In explaining the inability of the bailout program to 
mobilize the business sector and spurn growth, Christodoulakis (2017) has argued that the 
lack of institutional credibility prevents the realization of reforms and deters foreign investors.  
(iv). Government effectiveness was severely criticized on the issue of equally 
distributing the burden sharing of fiscal adjustment (indicator GEFF). Taking advantage of their 
success in resisting reforms as discussed above, stakes in various sectors managed to alleviate 
part of their own cost and shift the burden elsewhere. An IMF Mission (2016) noted that, in 
the absence of product-market reform implementation, the cost of adjustment in Greece had 
been borne mainly by wage earners. In turn, this sparked a wave of resistance to wage-cuts 
and labour market reforms, leading to a sharp rise of industrial action against the 
implementation of consolidation programs, after many years in dormant. Katsikas et al. (2018, 
p. 147) report that in 2013 there have been 16 general strikes and 51 industry-level picketing 
against a total of only two in 2010.  
A collateral damage of wage cuts and diminished work incentives was the decline in the 
quality of public management. In some cases, civil services became so demoralized that 
performance deteriorated, no matter how adequately a department was equipped at a 
technical level. A case in point is the lack of effectiveness in combating wildfires, bleakly 
confirmed by the high human toll in the Attiki fires in July 2018. A study by PWC (2018) 
revealed that Greece suffers a far more extensive area burnt on average compared to other 
Southern European countries with similar distributions of wildfires. Given that fire-fighting 
equipment and personnel training are at the same state-of-the-art, the unfortunate outcome 
should be mainly attributed to coordination failures and lack of effectiveness. 
(v). Control of corruption (indicator CCOR) is positively associated with the capacity to 
innovate and retain talent in a country (OECD, 2018). The index is perceived to deteriorate 
since the crisis's outbreak, and this might have been detrimental for long-term economic 
growth. A definite reason for a fall in CCOR was that the exposure of several financial scandals 
of the past made the public opinion to suspect that sleazy practices dominate Greek politics 
to an extent much more extensive than previously imagined.  
 
Another reason was that citizens and economic players were increasingly disturbed by 
discovering that rules enforced in the name of the bailout agreements frequently bend in 




the consolidation program. However, instead of being diminished, special-groups and 
clientelistic arrangements were multiplied after the crisis. Transitional and case-specific 
provisions in law-making increased from 150 per year during 2002-2008 to 232 per year in 
the post-crisis period 2009-2015, as documented by Sotiropoulos and Christopoulos (2016). 
A likely explanation is that Governments tried to protect their most favourite groups from the 
consequences of fiscal consolidation, hoping that their impact on their falling popularity 
would be softer. Ordinary citizens felt marginalized and exploited by the pressure groups, and 
this created a profound disappointment for the lack of transparency and equity of laws, raising 
the relevant index.53  
 
The enormous rise in taxation provided further motivation for evasion.  As the burden was 
ever-rising to ensure the high primary surplus required by the bailout program, several 
households and firms panicked for not meeting obligations in time. To avoid further political 
backlash, Greek governments introduced various schemes of payment facilitation to reduce 
pressure on the lowest-income households and firms. But as the system operates on a means-
tested basis, it opens up opportunities for corruption through false income statements and 
tax avoidance, increasing distortions in the economy.  The state's inefficient management of 
economic affairs amounted to a corruption-like tax on all firms operating in the formal sector.  
Nobel-Prize winner Paul Romer (2018) argues that this had been especially troublesome for 
start-ups and foreign firms that would like to invest in Greece.  
(vi). There have been some severe blows in the voice and accountability record, in the 
course of implementing the bailout programs (indicator VACC).  In passing the extensive and 
complicated bailout legislation, governments frequently had to enact laws without prior 
consultation with competent and independent authorities. Often, they bypassed the 
parliamentary procedure altogether and ruled through legislative fiats. Various groups further 
exploited the resulting ambiguities and lack of formalism in law making in their plans to block 
or challenge government decisions.  
Massive litigations on salary and pension cuts by now have become a frequent judicial 
practice, undertaken either directly by individuals or as a class action. In several cases, the 
incomes policy crafted in the annual Budget for the public sector is overturned by court 
decisions, mostly retroactively. Other disputes may range from the calculation of pensions to 
the pricing of public utilities, and from investment subsidies to building permissions. Greece 
has become a country with the highest rate of disputes vs. the state among the EU. In 2016, 
there were 22 pending administrative disputes per 1,000 inhabitants in Greece compared to 
an average of 3.7 in the rest of the Euro Area; see EC (2018, Fig. 17). In several cases, such 
practices led higher courts to th cancel legislation, eventually setting in motion a vicious circle 
of law-enactment and counter-challenges.   
 
53. Ancient Greek orator and philosopher Isocrates, speaking on malpractices in public life during the fourth 
century BCE, had warned that ‘a multitude of case-specific laws … is a sign that the state is badly governed’, in 




5. Calculating the cost  
5 1  The empirica   ro th mo e  
With all the caveats described in Section 3, an empirical growth model has been estimated in 
a framework similar to that developed by Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1995, Ch. 12). Intrinsically, 
their model is a production function for output based on capital stock, employment and 
technology. The growth rate of per capita GDP is regressed on a set of variables that are 
expected to influence the accumulation of the relevant production factors. Explanatory 
variables range from the fiscal stance to competitiveness indicators and from quality indices 
of human capital to institutional factors, such as political stability. The choice includes the 
following explanatory variables: 
 
• The growth rate of the global economy outside the Euro Area. 
• Net fixed capital formation as a percent of GDP. 
• General Government primary balance, as a percent of GDP. 
• Index of unit labour cost in constant prices (set equal to 100 in 2000). 
• A weighted average of World Bank Governance Indicators 
 
The model is estimated across the 18 EA countries, excluding Greece’s data from the Euro 
Area group so as to avoid outlier effects; econometric details are available at Christodoulakis 
(2019).  
 
A weighted index of WBGI is found to exert a significant and positive impact, again in both 
the short and the long run. The EA average value of the WBGI is 1.20; thus, a 10% 
improvement corresponds to a rise by 0.12 units in absolute terms. This would augment the 
annual growth rate by 0.63% in the short run and by 0.39% in the long run. Thus, the economic 
impact of failed institutions in Greece is then measured by constructing a counterfactual 
scenario for the growth path in the hypothetical case of no erosion in institutional 
effectiveness after the 2010 crisis.  
 
5.2. Assessing the impact of institutions in Greece 
To assess the loss due to the erosion of institutional capacity after 2009, one has to assume 
that the World Bank indicators for Greece freeze at the level of that year,  i.e., 𝑤𝑏𝑔𝑖𝐺𝑅(𝑡) =
𝑤𝑏𝑔𝑖𝐺𝑅(2008),𝑡 = 2009 … 2017, as shown in Fig. 4. The other explanatory variables enter 









Figure 4. Actual and hypothetical path of WBGI in Greece 
 
 
Note: The WBGI adjusted to base index 100 in 1996. 
 
 
The benefit from keeping institutions stable is expressed by the difference between the 
hypothetical and the dynamically forecasted trajectory of per capita GDP for the period 2010-
2017, as shown by the shaded area in Fig. 5. The following remarks are made: 
 
(i) In 2017, GDP per head would have been €1,435 or 8.2% above the actual level. 
The gap will keep widening in the coming years. 
(ii) Total GDP would have reached €192 billion, a rise by €15 billion higher than the 
level it had in 2017.  
(iii) The cumulative loss in present value for the period 2009-2017 is obtained by 
setting the discount rate at 5% per year. Cumulative output losses for 2010-2018 are at the 
tune of €44 billion in 2010 prices or around 18% of 2009 GDP. 
 
For comparison, the per capita GDP of other peripheral EA countries is also included.  In the 
case of no-erosion in institutions, the pattern of Greek GDP recovery would have looked 
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Figure 5. Path of per capita GDP in peripheral EA economies 
 
 




After the financial crisis, the convergence process of per capita GDP between Greece and its 
Euro Area peers had been sharply reversed into divergence. The paper finds that – besides 
the deterioration of relevant macroeconomic variables – there has been an extensive 
malfunction of institutions that further slowed growth and undermined economic recovery. 
Greece appears as a country simultaneously experiencing the most severe recession after the 
global crisis and the most pronounced fall in all World Bank Governance Indicators. The 
crumbling of institutions accelerated at the advent of the crisis. It may partly explain the 
inability of the consolidation programs to implement reforms and speed the exit from 
recession.  
 
To assess the cost of weak institutions in terms of economic growth, a counterfactual path of 
per capita GDP is calculated for Greece on the hypothetical assumption that institutions had 
avoided any deterioration after the 2010 crisis. The comparison shows that in 2017, GDP per 
head would have been €1,435 higher than or 8% above the actual level, and the gap widens 

























These findings should enter the policy debate regarding economic recovery in Greece. With 
growth lagging behind its Euro Area peers, the need to address the effectiveness of 
institutions becomes all the more critical in the post-bailout era. Otherwise, Greece will 
further diverge in the future. To that effect, the bailout lenders have issued a series of 
warnings. In a recent statement, the IMF (2018) foresees that Greece's growth rate will drop 
sharply after a short-lived rebound as “risks are tilted to the downside." In the same tune, the 
EU attributes the slowness of Greece's growth to the resistance in implementing reforms and 
suggests “delays for several specific reform commitments … to be addressed with urgency to 
ensure that all are completed as soon as possible". 
 
 The following examples give a tentative and non-exhaustive list of actions that are capable of 
improving each particular indicator: 
 
The Rule of Law requires higher judicial effectiveness, law rationalization and simplification, 
and better enforcement. Political stability and avoidance of violence would benefit from  a 
stabler electoral system producing clear governing majorities and favouring consensual 
politics.  To cancel the obligation of going to the polls after the parliament fails to secure an 
enhanced quorum, choosing a new President of the Republic through a simple majority should 
be drafted in the Constitution.  
 
Achieving a higher regulatory quality requires that governments have to enact market 
reforms, strengthen competition authorities, and make regulations binding for all participants. 
Voice and accountability improve by regularly publishing policy assessments, easing public 
inquiries and auditing on controversial policy issues, and facilitating citizens’ feedback on the 
consequences of law enactment. Controls of corruption strengthen if governments follow 
stable rules on procurement, raise transparency in public contracts, and impose effective 
sanctions on offenders. Reform of corporate governance is also necessary to respond to the 
rising frequency of private-sector scandals and malpractices. Overall effectiveness improves 
by the Government and public agencies adopting a lean structure with fewer decision layers 
while following best practices to the maximum extent possible. 
Future research will address the problem of how institutional convergence should be 
implemented and monitored within the framework of the other two policy directives, namely 
those of the Fiscal Compact and the Next Generation EU currently underway in the Euro Area 
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The aim of this non-technical paper is threefold. We first shed light on some data that have 
not received enough attention by the literature but, we believe, are crucial to the 
understanding of the Greek great depression over 2009-2016. Second, borrowing results from 
Economides et al. (2020), we identify the driving forces of the output loss during those years, 
as well as the role of various EU institutions, including the ECB, in the financial assistance 
program. Third, we draw some macroeconomic policy lessons that could be useful in the new 
crisis triggered by the covid-19 pandemic. 
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Between 2009 and 2016, Greece lost more than one fourth of its GDP experiencing a typical 
great depression.54 It also had to rely on a number of official and unofficial programs of 
international financial assistance provided in various forms by EU institutions (ESM, ECB, etc.) 
and the IMF; as a result of these bailout programs, around 70% of Greek public debt is 
nowadays owned by these public institutions. Although GDP growth managed to rebound in 
2017, the recovery was fragile (driven mainly by net exports and private consumption) even 
before the eruption of the new economic crisis triggered by the covid-19 pandemic in early 
2020. 
The aim of this non-technical paper is threefold.55 First, we shed light on some data that have 
not received enough attention by the literature, but we believe are crucial to the 
understanding of the depth and duration of the Greek sovereign debt crisis and the associated 
great depression. Second, borrowing results from Economides et al (2020), we discuss the 
driving forces of the output loss during 2009-2016. What explains the Greek great depression? 
Could things be better? Could things be worse? What was the role of EU institutions and the 
ECB in particular? Third, we draw some macroeconomic policy lessons that could be useful in 
the new economic crisis triggered by the covid-19 pandemic. 
Let us start with a brief history of the crisis. The Greek sovereign debt crisis had all the 
symptoms of a typical international crisis. Greece was already in imbalance when the global 
financial crisis erupted in 2007-8. From the late 1990s to 2008, the country enjoyed an 
exceptional economic boom. But most of the euphoria was driven by a big rise in private 
demand and pro-cyclical fiscal policies, both of which were financed by borrowing from 
optimistic banks in Greece and Northern Europe. The demand-driven boom led to 
accumulation of large (private, public and external) debts. It also led to rises in unit labor costs 
and hence to losses in competitiveness. In addition, Greece displayed a big asymmetry in core 
institutional fundamentals relative to its EU partners.56 Then, in 2009, amid an unfavorable 
national and international environment (e.g. the "sudden" recognition of the above 
imbalances, unpleasant news about the country's public finances, big riots in Athens in 
December 2008 combined with political polarization, the release of reports by the European 
Commission and rating agencies expressing fears of sovereign insolvency, and of course the 
adverse effects of the global financial crisis), confidence was undermined, the real economic 
activity collapsed, debts-to-GDP exploded, and all this became a vicious cycle. Greece, along 
 
54 For great depressions, see Kehoe and Prescott (2002). 
55 For the Greek tragedy, see e.g. Ioannides and Pissarides (2015), De Grauwe (2016), Alesina et al (2019, chapter 
8), Brunnermeier and Reis (2019), Alogoskoufis (2019) and Tavlas (2019). See also the papers in the volumes 
edited by Meghir et al (2017) and Bournakis et al (2017). Micro-founded macroeconomic models include Arellano 
and Bai (2016), Gourinchas et al (2017), Papageorgiou and Vourvachaki (2017), Dellas et al (2017), Economides et 
al (2017, 2020), Glomm et al (2018) and Chodorow-Reich et al (2019). For econometric studies, see e.g. Gibson 
et al (2016, 2019) and Moessner (2018). 
56 In Greece, weak institutions are captured by various indices measuring the poor enforcement of the law, an 
inefficient public administration, a labyrinth of bureaucracy, a slow judicial system, a poor environment for doing 
business, laws and regulations that limit market competition, tax evasion, poor education (PISA) scores, vandalism 
and violence, etc. For institutional quality in Greece relative to other EU countries, see e.g. Masuch et al (2018), 




with Ireland and Portugal, was shut out from private capital markets and the Greek 
government had to resort to its first official fiscal bailout provided by the EU and the IMF in 
early 2010. But, the fear of default rose again, insolvency was admitted and, in 2012, the 
Greek government defaulted on its debt held by private creditors. But, again this was not 
enough. Greece had to receive two more official fiscal rescue loans provided by other EU 
states, EU fiscal institutions (EFSF, EFSM, ESM) and the IMF in 2012 and 2015. At the same 
time, and this has been since the very beginning of the global financial crisis, the ECB kept 
providing a plethora of supportive quantitative monetary policies: intervention in the 
secondary market for Greek government bonds; support of private banks through a full 
allotment lending policy, relaxation of collateral requirements and provision of ELA; issuance 
of cross-border liquidity that compensated for abrupt private capital inflows and recorded as 
TARGET2 liabilities in the financial statements of the Greek National Central Bank; etc. This 
complex fiscal and monetary assistance program was conditioned on a severe fiscal austerity 
program monitored by the EC, the ECB and the IMF (the so-called Troika). Although the real 
motives behind the financial assistance program, as well as the rationale of severe fiscal 
austerity in the middle of a deep economic downturn, have been extensively criticized (see 
e.g. Alesina et al. (2019, chapter 8)), this so-called Economic Adjustment Program, combining 
austerity (stick) and assistance (carrot), enabled Greece to remain in the euro area. However, 
fiscal austerity and economic depression, fuelled by political polarization and populism, were 
associated with a further worsening of institutional quality; all indices measuring institutional 
quality show a sharp deterioration during the sovereign debt crisis years. Finally, after a 
difficult decade, in August 2018, Greece exited its Economic Adjustment Program but, as said 
above, its moderate recovery path that started in 2017 has been abruptly disrupted by the 
pandemic shock in early 2020. Section 2 will provide data supporting the above narrative. 
In a companion paper, Economides et al (2020) have constructed a medium-scale 
macroeconomic model that embeds most of the above facts. Their numerical simulations, 
some of which are also reported in section 3, imply the following: 
First, had we assumed that fiscal policy, etc., remained as they were in the pre-2010 period, 
the model could not deliver a solution. In other words, the situation was not sustainable and 
some kind of reform was unavoidable in the aftermath of the 2008 global crisis. 
Second, the Economic Adjustment Program (namely, the fiscal austerity mix combined with 
the official fiscal bailouts and the various types of monetary accommodation provided by the 
ES), jointly with adverse developments in institutional quality (specifically, the deterioration 
of protection of property rights), can account for most of the cumulative loss in GDP between 
2009 and 2016. In particular, departing from 2008, and feeding this model with the Economic 
Adjustment Program and an index of property rights, both as recorded in the data, the model 
- via its various propagation mechanisms - produces around 23% fall in GDP between 2009 
and 2016 as compared to around 26% in the data. The Economic Adjustment Program 
accounts for 13% and the deterioration in property rights adds another 10%. Reversing the 
latter finding, the output loss during 2009 and 2016 could have been around 13% only, if 
institutional quality had not deteriorated since 2008 but had simply remained at its pre-crisis 




Third, counter-factual scenarios show that things could have been much worse. Despite the 
conflicting views about the content of the bail-out program, especially regarding its fiscal 
austerity conditions, numerical simulations imply that the financial assistance from EU 
institutions has helped the Greek economy to avoid the worst. For example, if the fiscal needs 
were financed by, say, higher income taxes rather than by the three official fiscal bailouts, the 
loss in output would have been tremendous, other things equal. Besides, when we make the 
counterfactual assumption that the ECB did not follow an accommodative quantitative policy 
towards Greece, especially when we switch off the Greek NCB's cross-border TARGET2 
liabilities to the rest of the ES, the model ceases to exhibit a solution implying that this 
scenario would not be feasible to the extent that the country continued to remain in the 
eurozone. 
The rest is organized as follows. Section 2 presents data. Quantitative results are in section 3. 
Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2. Some (relatively unnoticed) data 
In this section, we shed light on three distinct characteristics of the Greek economy during its 
sovereign debt crisis in the 2010s: financial assistance from EU institutions, fiscal austerity 
and the deterioration in core institutional fundamentals. 
 
2.1. Financial assistance from EU institutions 
We will first consider fiscal and in turn monetary policy although the boundaries between 
these two macroeconomic policies have been quite blurred especially since the 2008 global 
crisis. 
 
2.1.1 Official fiscal rescue programs 
In the case of Greece, over the years of the sovereign debt crisis, official fiscal rescue 
operations have been expressed by three bailouts.57 The first took place in 2010-11 through 
the Greek Loan Facility, the second in 2012-2015 through the EFSF and the third in 2015-2018 
through the ESM.58 These programs were completed in August 2018 so the country is no 
longer reliant on ongoing official rescue loans. The total amount of loans received from these 
three official fiscal rescue operations was around 290 billion euros which is the largest 
 
57 For fiscal and public finance policies at national and EU level during the crisis years, see e.g. "Public Finances in 
EMU" published annually by the European Commission. For criticism from both sides, see e.g. Sinn (2014), De 
Grauwe (2016) and Alesina et al (2019). 
58 See the report of ESM (2018) for details. Note that the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was 
established in 2010 and was later replaced by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) which was established in 
2011 as a permanent rescue fund. In general, these rescue institutions have been financed by endowments 
provided by EU states and the issuance of bonds, while, their revenues have been used for loans to EU countries 
in need after the latter sign a memorandum of understanding on a reform agenda. See Sinn (2014) and De Grauwe 




financial assistance package in history. Most of this money was used for public debt servicing 
payments (the payment of the principal of government bonds at maturity and interest 
payment obligations) and the financing of primary budget deficits (there was no market for 
new Greek bonds between 2010 and 2018).59  
Table 1. Greek public debt to GDP and its main holders 
 
Year 
Total public debt 
(% of GDP) 
λeu 
(% of total public debt) 
λg 
(% of total public debt) 
2008 109.4 0 75 
2009 126.7 0 75 
2010 146.2 9.3 46.3 
2011 172.1 19.9 24.7 
2012 159.6 59.9 20.3 
2013 177.4 66.3 18.2 
2014 178.9 67.2 16.9 
2015 175.9 68.6 16.1 
2016 178.5 69.8 16.0 
2017 176.2 70.9 16.0 
2018 181.2 70.9 16.0 
2019 176.7 70.9 16.0 
Source: Public Debt Management Agency and Greek Ministry of Finance. 
As a result of these rescue operations, today, close to 70% of Greek public debt is owned by 
EU public institutions (member states of the euro area, EFSF, ESM, etc). Data for Greek public 
debt as share of GDP, as well as the fractions of it held by EU public institutions (λeu) and 
foreign private investors/banks (λg) over time are reported in Table 1, while the rest is in the 
hands of domestic private investors/banks.60 
 
2.1.2 Monetary support and the role played by the ECB 
Regarding monetary policy of the ECB,61 "conventional" responses included a sharp reduction 
of policy interest rates, while "unconventional" or quantitative responses included a fixed rate 
 
59 Most of the rest of the bailout money has been used to finance the cost of the haircut in March 2012 (this is 
the so-called private sector involvement (PSI), according to which privately held governments bonds took a 53.5% 
cut of their face value, which corresponds to 107 billion euros reduction, although, with an exchan ge of EFSF 
bonds, the overall debt burden decreased by 52 billion euros only) and the cost of private banks recapitalization 
(a large fraction of the second bailout loan was used for their recapitalization (around 50 billion, although 11 
billion of it were returned to the ESM in early 2015 as no needed). See e.g. Bortz (2015), Rocholl and Stahmer  
(2016) and ESM (2017, 2018) for a detailed decomposition, that is, how the loans were used by Greece in the 
three official bailout programs. 
60 The Greek National Central Bank or the ECB purchase government bonds in the secondary market. Thus, the 
numbers in Table 1 can be thought of as purchases in the primary market. See below for monetary policies.  
61 For the ECB's response to the crisis, see ECB (2011), Hartmann and Smets (2018), Rostagno et al (2019) and 
Brunnermeir and Reis (2019). For criticism from both sides, see e.g. Sinn (2014) and De Grauwe (2016). For the 
effects of ECB's policies on asset prices and/or the macro economy, see e.g. Gibson et al (2016, 2019) , Gambetti  





full allotment loan policy to private banks (via MROs, LTROs, etc) subject to relaxed collateral 
standards,62 the extension of maturity of liquidity provision, the issuance of Emergency 
Liquidity Assistance (ELA) credit under the guarantee of the country's NCB to help private 
banks overcome liquidity crises and probably insolvency problems, and the limited purchase 
of collateral themselves, like government bonds, in the secondary market (e.g. the Securities 
Market Programme (SMP) during 2010 and 2012 and the Covered Bond Purchase Programme 
(CBPP) during 2009 and 2012) to support their market price and keep their interest rates 
relatively low.63 Furthermore, when uncertainty got worse in the summer of 2012, the ECB 
announced that it would buy an unlimited amount of government bonds in the secondary 
market if that would become necessary (this is the Outright Monetary Transactions ( OMT) 
program), under the condition that the ECB is actively involved, as part of the so-called Troika 
meaning the EC, the IMF and the ECB, in the monitoring of budgetary policies in the countries 
in need (see e.g. De Grauwe (2016)). Eventually, in early 2015, after hesitation, the ECB 
decided to start officially its large-scale asset-purchasing program encompassing private and 
government sector securities64 although this did not apply to Greece being under a 
memorandum of understanding at that time (as said, the latter ended in August 2018).  
In addition to the above measures, there has been a big rise in TARGET2 liabilities in Greece 
since the very early days of the global financial crisis of 2008. Before we present the relevant 
data, we need to clarify how the balance sheet of a NCB participating in the ES is related to 
the consolidated balance sheet of the ES focusing on the role of TARGET2 balances. 
 
The Eurosystem (ES), the European Central Bank (ECB) and National Central Banks (NCBs)   
The consolidated balance sheet, and the associated budget constraint of the ES, are not 
different from those of a standardized central bank.65 In other words, as is typically the case 
with central banks (see e.g. Walsh (2017, chapters 4 and 11), Reis (2013, 2017) and Whelan 
(2014, section 2.1)), the assets side of the balance sheet of the ES consists mainly of foreign 
currency, loans to credit institutions66 and securities.67 The liabilities side, on the other hand, 
consists mainly of banknotes in circulation (held by the non-bank public), reserves which are 
 
62 To the extent that collaterals, used for this credit, consist of government bonds, these measures effectively 
constitute an indirect government financing through the ECB (see e.g. Sinn (2014) and De Grauwe (2016)).  This 
did not apply to Greece however which was under a memorandum of understanding.  
63 In the case of Greece, by the end of these early programs in 2012, the Greek NCB or the ECB (the ES in short) 
had bought Greek government bonds of around 40 billion euros or around 18% of GDP in the secondary market 
(see Bank of Greece and Sinn (2014, chapter 8)). After that, this stock declined as some of these bonds matured 
or were resold back in the secondary market. Specifically, as a share of GDP, Greek bonds held by the ES were 
15% in 2013, 11% in 2014, 8% in 2015, 7% in 2016, 5% in 2017, 4% in 2018 and less than 2% in 2019.  
64 For details, see "Asset purchase programmes" available at the site of the ECB. 
65 See e.g. "Annual consolidated balance sheet of the ES" and "User guide on the ES consolidated weekly financial 
statement" available at the site of the ECB. 
66 In the case of the ES, this includes main refinancing operations (MROs), longer-term refinancing operations 
(LTROs), marginal lending facilities, etc. It also includes emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) to private banks with 
severe liquidity problems. 
67 In the case of the ES, this includes the three covered bond purchase programmes (CBPPs), the securities market 




also called current accounts (held by private banks at the central bank) and government 
deposits; these are also the main items of the monetary base in the ES. 
However, the consolidated balance sheet of the ES shows assets and liabilities of the NCBs 
and the ECB vis-à-vis third parties only. In other words, it does not include credits and debits 
between NCBs and the ECB which cancel out at ES level. An example of such transactions is 
what is known as Intra-Eurosystem claims and liabilities and recorded respectively as 
TARGET2 assets and TARGET2 liabilities in the financial statements of the NCBs and the ECB. 
As first pointed out by Sinn and Wollmershauser (2012) and Sinn (2014) and further studied 
by e.g. Cecchetti and McCauley (2012), Whelan (2014, 2017), Perotti (2020) and many others, 
these are net bilateral positions vis-à-vis the ES, which means that the NCB of a member 
country transferring money abroad records a TARGET2 liability to the rest of the ES, while the 
NCB of a member country receiving the money from abroad records a TARGET2 asset. As said 
above, these TARGET2 balances cancel each other out at aggregate ES level (this is by 
construction) and therefore do not appear in the consolidated balance sheet of the ES.68 
However, they do appear in the balance sheets of the individual NCBs, or the ECB itself, in the 
sense that they enter as an extra item of liabilities for a country with Intra-Eurosystem 
liabilities like Greece (see e.g. Whelan, 2014, Table 2) or as an extra item of assets for a 
country with Intra-Eurosystem claims like Germany (see e.g. Whelan, 2014, Table 3). 
During the sovereign debt crisis, the NCBs of the countries hit by the crisis increased loans to 
their private sector and this was financed by higher liabilities to the ES. In other words, for a 
country like Greece, TARGET2 liabilities have become part of the monetary base created by 
its NCB in accordance with the rules of the ES. To the extent that this extra liquidity is used to 
finance a flight to safety and/or imports, it can work like international credit replacing private 
capital inflows (see Sinn (2014)).  
As is well known, there has been an explosion of TARGET2 balances since 2008.69 For the ES 
as a whole, TARGET2 balances were very small prior to the global financial crisis but have 
increased substantially since then. They were 186 billion euros in May 2008, 416 billions in 
July 2011, 1.09 trillion in August 2012 and 1.24 trillion in September 2017 (see Whelan (2017, 
Figure 1)). 
 
The case of the Greek NCB  
Tables 2a and 2b present the main items in the balance sheets of the Bank of Greece. As can 
be seen in Table 2a, TARGET2 balances accounted for the lion's share of liabilities, and hence 
of the monetary base, in every year between 2008 and 2017. For instance, TARGET2 liabilities 
were 105 billion euros in 2011, which translated in 62% of the total liabilities of the Greek 
NCB or 51% of GDP, and 94 billion euros in 2015, which translated in 58% of the total liabilities 
 
68 See e.g. Whelan (2014) for details on the mechanics of the TARGET2 system and how assets and liabilities of 
both private banks and NCBs change in response to various changes like moving money from a bank account in 
country A to a bank account in country B (see especially Whelan's Tables 4 and 5). 
69 For TARGET2 data across euro area countries, see e.g. Whelan (2014, 2017). See also e.g. "Target balances of 
participating NCBs" and "The ECB's asset purchase programme and TARGET balances: monetary policy 




of the Greek NCB or 53% of GDP.70 On the assets side in Table 2b, loans to private banks were 
the biggest item in every year between 2008 and 2016. It is interesting to notice that both 
TARGET2 liabilities and loans to private banks peaked (almost on a one-to-one basis) during 
the politically turbulent years of 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2015.  
 
Table 2a. Bank of Greece's main liabilities (billions of euros, end of year) 
Year Banknotes TARGET2 Reserves Government deposits Total liabilitites 
2007 16 10 7 1 42 
2008 18 35 8 1 71 
2009 21 49 8 1 86 
2010 22 87 10 2 138 
2011 23 105 5 5 168 
2012 23 98 2 7 160 
2013 25 51 2 8 109 
2014 27 49 3 5 103 
2015 29 94 1 5 163 
2016 30 72 1 9 142 
2017 31 59 2 12 125 
2018 33 29 7 25 109 
2019 30 26 9 27 109 
Source: Bank of Greece.  
Note: "Banknotes" is item 1 in the Bank of Greece's balance sheets, "TARGET2" is item 9.3, "Reserves" is the 
sum of items 2 and 3 and "Government deposits" is item 4. 
 
 
Table 2b. Bank of Greece's main assets (billions of euros, end of year) 
Year Lending to banks Securities Total assets 
2007 9 10 42 
2008 38 14 71 
2009 50 21 86 
2010 98 24 13 
2011 128 21 168 
2012 121 21 160 
2013 73 21 109 
2014 56 31 103 
2015 107 40 163 
2016 67 57 142 
2017 34 74 125 
2018 11 76 109 
2019 8 75 109 
Source: Bank of Greece.  
 
70 As the data show (e.g. Whelan (2014, 2017)), the same happened in other periphery countries of the EZ. For 








On the role of TARGET2 balances  
Since the publication of the seminal paper by Sinn and Wollmershauser (2012), there has been 
a heated debate over the economic role of these assets and liabilities. Opinions have ranged 
from TARGET2 being an innocent and mechanical protocol of the ES to being a hidden bailout 
of the periphery EZ countries in trouble. Today, to the best of our understanding, there is a 
kind of consensus, in the sense that the enormous increase of TARGET2 balances during the 
years of the European sovereign debt crisis: (a) was closely related to fears of default and a 
euro break up (b) was closely related to loans to private banks and the QE policy of the ECB 
in general (c) facilitated a capital flight from the periphery to the core and (d) was not clearly 
timed to current account deficits in the periphery (see e.g. Whelan (2014, 2017)).  
More formally, Economides et al. (2020) have shown that the issuance of TARGET2 liabilities 
by a NCB in the ES, to the extent that this issuance is in excess of liquidity needs for 
transactions within the NCB's national jurisdiction, constitutes a transfer of real resources to 
this member country (i.e. it works like foreign aid), in the sense that this excess liquidity 
remains an an item in the country's balance of payments. The latter can be used, at least in 
principle, to finance imported goods, to pay foreign debt obligations or to finance investment 
abroad (this formal criterion seems to support Sinn's general view on the redistributive role 
played by TARGET2 balances in the ES during the European sovereign debt crisis years, 
although these balances were mainly used to facilitate a flight to safety rather than to finance 
current account deficits).   
 
Summing up  
The issuance of TARGET2 balances and the distribution of ECB's dividends can allow for a 
direct redistribution of real resources across member countries in the EZ, while, indirect ways 
include the purchase of governments bonds of member countries under fiscal stress (for the 
fiscal redistribution of ECB's policies, see also Reis (2017, section 10)).71 In general, our view 
is that it is hard to believe that no cross-country redistribution has been taking place through 
the ECB's quantitative monetary policies since 2008. This is natural to happen in a currency 
union, like the EZ, where a single central bank, the ECB, serves 19 different fiscal authorities. 
It is worth pointing out that all this is on top of the effects that quantitative monetary policies 
can have even in a closed economy. The latter are possible in the presence of financial 
 
71 Reis (2017, section 10) distinguishes fiscal redistribution via the distribution of dividends and via 
assets/liabilities. Our discussion above has focused on the latter (bank loans, asset purchases, TARGET2, etc). This 
does not mean that the distribution of the ECB's dividends to individuals NCBs of the ES cannot have redistributive 
implications but, to the extent that we read the data correctly, the numbers are small. Note that this distribution 
works as follows: the ECB collects all profits (the so-called monetary income) made out of NCBs in the ES and then 
redistributes them back to each NCB so as each NCB ends up with a share of the total monetary income that is 




frictions like borrowing constraints, portfolio adjustment costs, moral hazard problems, etc, 
that provide the channels through which quantitative monetary policies affect asset prices 
and in turn the real economy thereby breaking Wallace's (1981) irrelevance result (see Walsh 
(2017, chapter 11.5) for a review of this literature). 
 
2.2. The stick: fiscal austerity and structural reforms 
The above complex mix of financial (fiscal and monetary) assistance was provided under the 
condition in the memorandum of understanding that Greece undertakes a severe fiscal 
austerity plan (a description of the Greek austerity plan is in e.g. Alesina et al (2019, chapter 
8) and Alogoskoufis (2019)). Irrespectively of the arguments for and against it,72 the fact is 
that Greece did adopt a comprehensive fiscal consolidation plan including a high tax burden 
and cuts in various items of public spending. Data for the evolution of total government 
revenue and expenditure over time are reported in Table 3a, while data for the main tax rates 
(the effective income tax rate, τy, and the effective consumption tax rate, τc) and the main 
categories of public spending as shares of GDP (public investment, s i, public spending on 
private goods, sg, public transfers, str, and public wages, sw) are reported in Table 3b.The fiscal 
consolidation is clear although this was not reflected in a fall in the public debt to GDP ratio 
due to the deep economic downturn. 
 
Table 3a. Total government revenue and expenditure to GDP 
Variable (% of GDP) 2008 2010 2011 2014 2016 2018 2019 
Revenue 40 41 44 47 49 48 47 
Expenditure 50 53 54 51 49 48 46 
Source: European Commission (Report on Public Finances in EMU). 
 
It should be said here that, in addition to the fiscal austerity measures, Greece adopted the 
commitment to maintain a primary surplus of 3.5% of GDP until 2022 and around 2% in the 
following years (however, this has now been postponed until the end of the new covid-19 
pandemic crisis). It has also promised to implement structural (non-fiscal) reforms in labor 
and product markets, as well as in the functioning of its public sector (see e.g. ESM, 2018). 
Such much-needed reforms however still lag behind (see e.g. Rocholl and Stahmer (2016) and 
Masuch et al (2018)), despite the optimism expressed by the European Commission (see e.g. 





72 For fiscal austerity and its macro effects, see e.g. Alesina et al (2019). A general lesson is that the effects of 
public debt stabilization depend crucially on the fiscal policy mix both during the early period of fiscal pain (when 
the debt is brought down by spending cuts and/or tax rises) and the later period of fiscal gain (when some fiscal 
instruments are expected to take advantage of the fiscal space created once public debt has been brought down). 




Table 3b. Government spending to GDP and tax rates 










2008 9.1 11.6 5.8 18.9 27.3 16.8 
2009 10.2 13.1 5.7 20.6 27.1 15.2 
2010 9.8 12.4 3.7 20.9 27.6 17.6 
2011 9.1 12.6 2.5 22.9 29.8 19.0 
2012 9.0 12.8 2.5 23.2 33.6 18.5 
2013 8.4 12.1 3.4 21.4 32.3 18.7 
2014 8.2 12.2 3.7 21.8 33.4 19.1 
2015 8.2 12.1 3.8 22.0 34.4 19.4 
2016 8.1 12.1 3.5 22.1 35. 21.5 
2017 8.2 11.9 4.4 21.3 36.0 21.3 
2018 7.3 11.8 3.0 20.7 35.4 22.5 
2019 7.7 11.7 2.2 20.7 NA NA 
Source: Eurostat and own calculations.  




2.3. Institutional quality 
We close this section with data on core institutional fundamentals and, in particular, on 
property rights.73 Figure 1a presents an index of property rights in Greece. This index has been 
constructed by us as the simple average of three sub-indices provided by the World Bank: 
"the rule of law", "regulatory quality" and "political stability and absence of 
violence/terrorism", which are three variables commonly used for the construction of a 
measure of property rights protection in the related literature. These data have been rescaled 
from 0 to 1. 
The same three sub-indices, now in various EZ countries including Greece, are shown in 
Figures 1b, 1c and 1d. As can be seen, Greece, not only has always been a country with poor 
institutional quality, but, to make it worse, it experienced a sharp deterioration after 2008, as 
has been pointed out by e.g. Micossi (2016), Papaioannou (2016), Masuch et al (2018), 







73 For the key importance of property rights among other measures of core institutional quality, see e.g. Acemoglu 




Figure 1a. Property rights in Greece  
 
Source: World Governance Indicators. 
 
 
Figure 1b. Rule of law, comparison to other countries  
 





Figure 1c. Regulatory quality, comparison to other countries 
   




Figure 1d. Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, comparison to other countries  
 






3. Some illustrative quantitative results 
In this section, in order to provide a quantitative measure of the above developments, we 
borrow some results from Economides et al (2020). The way we have worked in that paper is 
as follows. First, as already said, we have constructed a medium-scale microfounded 
macroeconomic model that embeds the main features of the Greek economy during the euro 
period. Then, departing from the 2008 solution, we have fed the model with the time paths 
of policy variables and the index of property rights as they are in the data. In doing so, we 
have assumed that after 2019 the values of these variables remain unchanged as in 2019 
which is the last year before the pandemic crisis. 
 
3.1. Facts 
The baseline simulation for GDP, as well as its actual path in the data, are illustrated in Graph 
1, where the numbers indicate the percentage change in output relative to the baseline 2008 
solution. As can be seen, the model solution can mimic quite well the actual behaviour of GDP 
over the crisis years. For example, in 2016, the output loss generated by the model is 22.7% 
(namely, 100-77.3=22.7), while it is 26.2% (namely, 100-73.8=26.2) in the data, both relative 
to the baseline year of 2008. 
 
Graph 1. Output loss and data 
 
Data source: Eurostat 
 
 
In Graph 2, the simulated output loss is decomposed into its main drivers. As the graph 
reveals, about 13% of the loss is due to the economic adjustment package adopted (where 
the latter includes fiscal austerity, structural reforms and the various forms of international 





























institutional quality since 2008. The role of the latter is striking. Reversing the argument, the 
output loss could have been much smaller (around 10 percentage points lower), had 
institutional quality simply remained at its pre-crisis level. 
 





3.2. ... but it could have been worse without financial assistance 
One of the most important hypothetical questions is what would have happened if EU states 
and institutions had not stepped in to repay debt obligations and practically purchase the 
Greek sovereign debt when the country was shut out of the bond market and trust was lost. 
Say, for example, that the Greek government, instead of receiving the three official fiscal 
bailouts, would have to increase income taxes to make up for the loss in public revenue 
required to meet its obligations. This counter-factual case is illustrated in Graph 3. As can be 
seen, in this case, the depression would be much deeper and, most probably, would have 
triggered a social unrest.  
We finally report that we have also attempted to switch off TARGET2 balances, which, as we 
have argued, has been one of the main forms of monetary policy aid from the ECB to Greece. 
This is to mimic the counter-factual case in which the ES, via the Greek NCB, had not followed 
an accommodative monetary policy towards Greece. In this case, we report that the model 
cannot exhibit dynamic stability. In simple words, we cannot get a solution. This - according 






































4. Lessons for the new pandemic crisis 
In this note, borrowing simulations from Economides et al (2020), we provided an anatomy 
of the Greek sovereign debt crisis and the associated great depression by pointing out some 
key (and relatively unnoticed) features of the Greek economy. The focus was, not only on the 
role of fiscal austerity as in most of the literature, but also on the roles of European financial 
assistance and the deterioration in institutional quality, both of which have been closely 
associated with the fiscal austerity measures taken. 
The lessons learnt from the sovereign debt crisis of 2009-2016 can be useful for the new 
economic crisis triggered by the covid-19 pandemic (for the new crisis and reaction by the EU, 
see European Commission (2020a, 2020b)). Policies that (a) enhance institutional quality and 
social capital (b) design a more growth-enhancing tax-spending policy mix and (c) make an 
efficient use of national public financing by European Union institutions (e.g. by the newly 
established Recovery Fund and the ECB) could help the Greek economy to overcome the 
pandemic crisis at the minimum cost (see Economides et al (2021) for alternative policy 
scenaria). If these conditions are not met, there is the danger of a new deep and long-lasting 
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Chapter 7. Economic activity and sources of finance in Greece: The 
predominant role of banks 
Helen Louri74 and Petros Migiakis75 
 
Abstract 
We examine the existence of a feedback loop between the resilience of the financial sector 
and Greek economic activity. A sequence of structural VARs is employed using data for bank 
credit, liquidity, capital, asset quality and private demand in 2001-2018 in two data sets: one 
in monthly frequency with which we examine the determinants of credit provision by Greek 
banks, and another in quarterly frequency with which we examine the finance-growth nexus 
for the Greek economy. We find that (a) the deterioration in the quality of Greek banks’ 
balance sheets affected negatively the provision of credit to the economy, (b) central bank 
liquidity and recapitalizations of Greek banks provided only a partial remedy and (c) the 
decline in credit significantly weakened economic activity. Also, we find that there is a role 
for market financing of the economy but this cannot substitute for the predominantly bank-
based financing. Therefore, as the Greek economy starts to recover, Greek banks have an 
important role to play, first by solving the problem of a high stock of non-performing loans 
(NPLs) and providing the necessary credit and second by improving the efficiency of capital 
allocation towards a sustainable growth model.  
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The Schumpeterian view that the financial system may promote economic growth was 
neglected in the standard econometric modeling, but also in the policy-making setup before 
the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Analytical tools used for providing input to economic policy 
all but ignored the role of finance for the economy. For instance, the Taylor rule dictates that 
interest rates should be determined by a neutral real rate, a target for the inflation rate, the 
output gap and the deviation of inflation from the target, with error-correction properties; 
no role for bank credit or market financing. Likewise, financial variables were not 
incorporated in economic activity models. At best, as is the case of New-Keynesian DSGE 
models which dominated the toolboxes of central banks and other policy-making institutions, 
standard modeling practices allowed for financial effects on economic activity to be 
accommodated just as constraints or accelerators, termed ‘financial frictions’, of established 
macroeconomic relationships (Bernanke et al. 1999; Iacoviello 2005).  
All in all, mainstream theory paid no attention to views arguing for an important role of 
finance for the economy, nor was it adjusted according to pre-GFC empirical evidence 
provided by several studies about the existence of a ‘finance-growth nexus’ (Beck et al. 2000; 
Caldéron and Liu, 2003; Beck and Levine, 2004). Then came the crisis and finance made its 
way into macroeconomic modeling with a burst. It was the burst of the subprime mortgage 
market that set off the crisis in the US. After that, the slowdown in the American economy 
intensified to a degree that could not be explained by standard macroeconomic models, even 
if they were adjusted to capture global spillover effects. 
In the wake of the GFC empirical evidence started building up doubts on fundamental 
assumptions of macroeconomic analysis. Thus, the usefulness of a Taylor rule without 
financial variables has been questioned (BIS, 2016, pp. 78-79). Likewise, the working of the 
Philips curve (among others, Farmer and Nicolò, 2018), the concept of a potential level of 
output (Williams, 2017) and even the tool used for anticipating that the economy will adjust 
to its trend (Hamilton, 2018) they have all been questioned and put under scrutiny. On the 
other hand, using financial variables for forecasting economic ones has started to be 
considered a standard practice (Espinoza et al., 2012), while the DSGE modeling framework 
has been adjusted for effects (more important than simple frictions) stemming from finance 
to the economy (Galvao et al., 2016, Christiano et al.,2014, Clerc et al. 2015). So, the concept 
that financial variables are significantly related to economic activity by preceding or even 
causing growth has been one of the net gainers of the GFC.  
At present, empirical research focuses on assessing the impact of financial variables on 
economic activity, but also on revealing the mechanism(s) through which economic activity is 
affected. Borio (2014) provides evidence on the effects of finance on the economy: 
fluctuations in economic activity may either be smoothed down by anti-cyclical financial flows 
or be intensified, if a slowdown in the economy is coupled with a deceleration of funding or 
even a burst of financial imbalances. In the same context, credit-to-GDP is also found to have 
a significant cyclical component which is attributed to financial cycles that are found to exceed 




contraction and a slowdown of economic activity has already been documented in the 
empirical literature following the GFC (Bofondi et al. 2018). 
In the light of the recent reconsideration of the link between finance and growth we attempt 
in this study to examine the role of financing for economic activity in Greece. We deal mainly 
with two questions: (a) whether and by how much the resilience of banks determines credit 
provision to the economy and (b) how net inflows/outflows of bank credit or market financing 
weigh on economic activity. We examine these questions with regard to the Greek economy 
before and after the GFC aiming to draw conclusions, which could be useful to policy makers, 
especially with respect to achieving objectives such as the restructuring of the Greek economy 
towards a higher value added and extrovert production model.  
We rely on reduced form vector autoregressions (VARs) with structural characteristics, i.e. we 
form a sequence of structural VAR (SVAR) models for addressing our questions. In a nutshell, 
we show that the bank-dominated Greek economy has indeed been impaired by the lack of 
bank credit along with impairments brought about by the crisis on banks’ balance sheets. In 
particular, we find that (a) the hike in non-performing loans dampened credit provision, while 
the central bank partially cured this negative effect with the provision of ample liquidity and 
(b) bank credit positively affects private demand and its effect on investment is even more 
pronounced. Moreover, we find that market financing is a weak remedy for the lack of bank 
credit. As a result, our evidence supports policy proposals for an effective and fast treatment 
of the problem of the high stock of NPLs in Greek banks’ balance sheets through the creation 
of asset management companies or asset protection schemes (Bank of Greece, 2019; 2021). 
Such policy actions may contribute to a permanent positive shock on Greek GDP. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines milestones as well as 
important details regarding developments in the Greek financial sector since 2001, the time 
Greece joined the euro area. Section 3 presents results from an empirical examination of the 
relationship between the quality of banks’ balance sheets and bank credit.  Section 4 presents 
empirical evidence on the relationship between bank credit, market financing and economic 
activity. Section 5 outlines the policy implications of our findings and concludes.  
 
2. The Greek banking sector: some stylized facts 
2 1 Greek banks’ ba ance sheets be ore an  a ter the G oba  Financia  Crisis  
Greece experienced by far the most intensive domestic crisis in the aftermath of the GFC. 
Although the Greek crisis followed the GFC it was not a result of the same causes. The Greek 
financial sector was resilient, whereas the position of the Greek public sector, and in particular 
the outlook of refinancing the Greek public debt, worsened initially along with other 
sovereigns and then deteriorated much more. In particular, the GFC sparked a re-pricing of 
risks worldwide (Malliaropulos and Migiakis 2018) which found the Greek state with high 
fiscal deficits and high public debt within an environment of pessimistic self-fulfilling 




With the Greek economy being predominantly bank-based the banking sector was, by and 
large, considered a national champion. Greek banks in 2008-2009, had a wide enough deposit 
base (more than €245 bn in deposits, i.e. around 100% of the GDP at that time), which was 
transformed to longer-term assets, such as houses and equipment, via credit provision to the 
economy and a healthy stream of income (net interest income at 4.4% of the risk-weighted 
assets or around 3% of total assets). Also, they were among the best capitalized banks in 
Europe with a capital adequacy ratio of around 12% (Table 1), while they were not exposed 
to credit derivatives, such as CDOs, and securitizations to the same degree as the average 
European bank. Moreover, they had differentiated their operations and earnings sources by 
expanding their activities to South Eastern European countries while in 2008 private debt-to-
GDP at around 100% was significantly lower than the EU average (150%). So, at the onset of 
the GFC Greek banks looked healthy and resilient.76 
 
















2001 66.7 8.5 - 3.5 - - 2.3 1.4 56.6 - 
2007 67.7 6.1 11.3 3.3 6.0 3.9 3.2 1.0 82.2 47.9 
2009 69.2 5.0 11.9 2.7 8.1 2.4 2.5 0.3 81.6 47.9 
2012 79.5 3.8 6.5 8.0 24.9 2.7 1.8 -2.6 118.6 85.0 
2015 95.2 8.4 11.1 17.5 44.6 4.2 1.8 -0.3 117.5 40.5 
2018 97 11.1 16 21.6 46.7 4.8 2.3 -0.03 114.4 25.3 
 
Note: ‘CR(5)’ is the concentration ratio estimated based on the market shares of total assets of the 5 largest 
banks; ‘CtA’ refers to the ratio of capital to total assets (broad definition); ‘CAR’ refers to the group capital 
adequacy ratio; ‘Provisions’ is the ratio of provisions for bad debts as percentage of the loans to the non-financial 
sector; ‘NPLs’ is non-performing loans as a ratio of total loans; ‘Margin’ refers to the difference between accrued 
interest in loans to the non-financial sector and the accrued interest in deposits of the non-financial sector; ‘NII’ 
refers to the net interest income as percentage of total assets; ‘RoA’ refers to the return on assets based on 
earnings, without one-off operations; ‘LtD’ is the loans-to-deposits ratio of the non-financial private sector; 
‘Liquidity coverage’ refers to the ratio of liquid assets (broad definition) to short-term liabilities.  
Source: Bank of Greece. 
 
 
While the fundamentals of Greek banks remained resilient during the GFC, the Greek banking 
sector was eventually impaired by the Greek public debt crisis. In particular, the crisis that hit 
the Greek banks initially was a result mainly of the wide re-pricing of risks and the sovereign-
bank negative feedback loop.77 These factors were enough to freeze interbank money market 
 
76However, between 1999 and 2009 the debt-to-GDP ratio was increasing at a rate almost double the euro area 
average (ECB, 2017). 
77Gennaioli et al. (2018) document the functioning of the sovereign-bank nexus for 191 countries and 20 cases of 





activity (Engler and Steffen, 2015) even for the largest and most creditworthy banks globally. 
At the same time uncertainty over the future of Greece in the euro area increased the 
‘redenomination risk’ as perceived by depositors who started withdrawing deposits from 
Greek banks. Between 2009 and 2012 banks lost almost 40% of their deposits (around €90 
bn) mostly to banks outside Greece. 
However, what followed was not in line with developments in other euro area or developed 
economies. On top of the weaknesses in interbank lending, the outbreak of the Greek public 
debt crisis provided the ground for a series of rating downgrades that drifted downwards both 
the ratings of assets provided as collateral by Greek banks in ECB’s monetary policy operations 
and the banks’ own ratings, due to ‘country ceiling’ limits. Therefore, the public debt crisis 
that unfolded in Greece led to credit rating downgrades of both the Greek state and Greek 
banks. On the other hand, as shown in Figure 1, due to the good fundamentals of Greek banks 
their ratings became higher than the ratings of the Greek state between 2010 and 2013. This 
unusual development indicates that, at least at the initial phase of the Greek crisis, Greek 
banks’ rating downgrades were mostly the result of the lower country ceiling due to the high 
country-specific risk rather than due to a worsening of idiosyncratic, i.e. bank-specific or 
sector-specific factors.   
 
Figure 1. Ratings of Greece and Greek banks, 2001-2018 
 
Note: The chart shows the development of the rating of Greece and the cross-section average of ratings of the 
four systemic Greek banks (NBG, Alpha, Eurobank and Piraeus Bank). Each line represents the average of ratings 
assigned by S&P’s, Moody’s and Fitch, at the end of the year.   
Source: Refinitiv.  
 
In 2011-2012 the effect of the Greek public debt crisis became even more intensive as 
uncertainty about the viability of Greece’s membership in the euro area accumulated and 




restructuring.78 Although the PSI and PSI+ eventually helped alleviate the pressure on Greek 
sovereign bond yields79 the total losses reported on Greek banks’ balance sheets were severe 
(around €45bn). For instance, as shown in Table 1 above, the return-on-assets of Greek banks 
stood at -2.6% for the fiscal year 2012, while their capital adequacy was undermined, as 
capital-to-total assets fell on average by more than 50% in 2012. 
 
2.2 Official support: recapitalization and central bank liquidity provision  
The restructuring of the Greek public debt undermined the capital adequacy of Greek banks. 
Therefore, they had to be recapitalized by using the funds foreseen in the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) for the 2nd Economic Adjustment Programme of Greece, which was 
agreed between the Greek government and the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) in 
March 2012. An amount of €50 bn had been earmarked to support the Greek banking sector. 
The recapitalization (using half of the total foreseen amount together with some private 
funds) resulted in bringing the capital ratios of Greek banks back to among the highest in the 
euro area. Another €18 bn were used for the resolution of capital-deprived, non-systemic 
banks. 
However, what was not possible at the time to be adequately considered in the funding 
agreement between the Greek government and its lenders was the continuation of the 
deterioration of the quality of assets held by Greek banks. Non-performing loans rose during 
the crisis and almost doubled between 2012 and 2018.80 That meant that the legacy of the 
crisis, the ensuing deep recession and the political uncertainty together with the 
opportunistic behavior of strategic defaulters eroded further the capital base of Greek banks. 
Thus, while in February 2015 €11 bn were returned to the EFSF, as they were deemed 
unnecessary for the purpose of recapitalizing Greek banks, €10 bn were eventually 
‘earmarked’ again in the European Stability Mechanism Programme of August 2015 (3rd 
Programme) and used for another recapitalization.81 
Although deposits, which were the main source of liquidity for Greek banks since 2001 were 
flying away from the Greek banking system and despite the systemic hurdles in the money 
market across the globe, Greek banks remained active as borrowers in the interbank money 
market during the GFC. Eventually, since the Greek debt crisis erupted interbank lending to 
Greek banks followed an almost uninterrupted downward trend, to stabilize only as of mid-
2016 (Figure 2).  
 
78The initial announcement of the intension to make private investors pay for holding Greek sovereign debt was 
officially made in spring 2011, while the debt restructuring was realized in two phases: the first, in February to 
April 2012, with the PSI (private sector involvement) in the restructuring of GGBs and the second with the buyback 
(PSI+) of December 2012. 
79 For instance, 10-year GGB yields declined from 16.4% in January 2012 to 6.2% in January 2013. 
80For the issue of NPLs in the euro area interested readers may refer to Anastasiou et al. (2019) and Karadima and 
Louri (2020; 2021), while for the issue of strategic default in Greece, see Asimakopoulos et al. (2016). 
81 On 29 August 2018, the amount that had been used for the purpose of bank recapitalization stood at €5.4 bn 




Figure 2. Interbank liquidity borrowed by Greek banks 2001-2018 
 
Source: Bank of Greece. 
Under these conditions, a potential lack of liquidity could build up to a full -scaled bank run as 
demands for deposit withdrawals escalated, especially in periods of increased uncertainty 
about the country’s participation in the euro area (fear of Grexit). In this context, Greek banks 
resorted heavily to borrowing liquidity from the central bank. As shown in Figure 3 the 
provision of central bank liquidity was mainly used to cover the reduction of the deposit base 
of Greek banks and has been a crucial factor for avoiding the escalation of instability. Deposit 
withdrawals stabilized to a large extent following the implementation of capital controls in 
June 2015. Since then, the provision of liquidity by the ECB to Greek banks has been 
downsized and in 2018 fallen to the lowest level since Greece joined the euro area. 
 
Figure 3. The deposit flight and central bank liquidity provision to Greek banks 2009-2018 
 




The provision of liquidity to the Greek banking system by the ECB (through monetary policy 
operations) and the Bank of Greece (through emergency liquidity assistance) has been a 
crucial factor for avoiding the intensification of the banking crisis. What has not been 
documented yet is that there was also a negative feedback loop from the crisis to the ability 
of Greek banks to borrow from the Eurosystem.  
 
Figure 4. Eurosystem liquidity provision to Greek banks 2009-2018 
 
Source: Bank of Greece, monthly financial statements. 
 
In particular, the Greek public debt crisis and the ensuing recession undermined the quality 
of assets held by the Greek banks. This development was directly worsening the prospect of 
Greek banks to resort to central bank liquidity. The reason was that the deterioration in 
quality and the decrease in market value of assets held by Greek banks also meant that both 
the quality and the value of the respective collateral, which was used for borrowing in the 
Eurosystem monetary policy operations, suffered likewise. This is shown by the blue bars in 
the bottom panel of Figure 4.  
The effect of market developments on Greek banks’ ability to absorb central bank liquidity 
through monetary policy operations intensified with the restructuring of the Greek public 
debt. The PSI eroded not only the capital base of Greek banks as we have already mentioned, 
but also the value of Greek government bonds that could be used as collateral to cover 
monetary policy operations. As a result, loans to the private non-financial sector comprised 
the main pool of assets that remained in Greek banks’ balance sheets to be pledged for 
liquidity absorption by the central bank. However, according to the standing rules for 
collateral in monetary policy operations these assets did not meet various thresholds, apart 




ECB.82 So, Greek banks rapidly increased their resort to the more expensive emergency 
liquidity assistance (ELA) from the Bank of Greece. 
 
Figure 5. Provision of ELA liquidity from the Bank of Greece to the Greek banks 2012-2018 
 
Source: Bank of Greece, monthly financial statements. 
 
Figure 5 shows that ELA liquidity was first used by Greek banks in early 2012, i.e. during the 
Greek public debt restructuring. Then, the Bank of Greece accepted collateral that could not 
be used in monetary policy operations to provide funding to Greek banks that had seen their 
capital being wiped out by the PSI. Note that the recapitalization of Greek banks for the losses 
incurred by the PSI began after the restructuring but was done in phases and was completed 
in mid-2013.83 So, during this period the supply of ELA from the Bank of Greece played a 
crucial role as it bought time for Greek banks to proceed to capital increases in an 
environment of much less volatility and higher stock market valuations than that of the first 
half of 2012. Thus, in a sense the ELA provision during that period had all the characteristics 
of bridge financing and was not associated with a stigma for Greek banks. 
After the end of 2012 and the completion of transfers of European Financial Stability Fund 
(EFSF) bonds from the official sector, i.e. by the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (HFSF) acting 
on behalf of the EFSF, ELA liquidity borrowed by Greek banks started to fall until it became 
zero in May 2014. Still, this did not mean that Greek banks had turned a page. The second 
phase of the Greek crisis, i.e. the phase after the elections of January 2015, saw ELA liquidity 
 
82 Assets used as collateral must meet minimum value thresholds, originate from specific types of borrowers and 
be of specific categories of assets (see, ECB 2015). 
83 At first, the HFSF provided EFSF notes to Greek banks (HFSF 2013a) in April 2012 and December 2012. Eventually 




skyrocketing as soon as the waiver of collateral quality threshold that had been extended by 
the ECB at the end of 2012 was pooled back.84 
Combined with the intensified concerns about the prospects of the country as a member of 
the euro area, it resulted in a complete loss of investor and depositor confidence towards 
Greek banks. Eventually, to avert the prospect of a run on banks’ deposits, the government 
had to impose controls on capital outflows in late-June 2015. The banks had already lost 
another €40 bn of deposits between January and June 2015 and deposits were close to €120 
bn almost half of their value in 2009. With respect to liquidity needs this time marks the 
darkest hour of the Greek banking system, as Greek banks found themselves owing vast 
amounts of money to the central bank. But this time there was no more official support that 
could ensure the continuation of liquidity provision. In fact, the banks had hit their ELA ceiling. 
No further liquidity could be available. 
In August 2015 the new government agreed to continue on a fiscally prudent path under the 
3rd Economic Adjustment Programme. Since then the liquidity and capital base of Greek banks 
were strengthening although capital controls were in place until 2019. What is clear, though, 
is how the official sector interventions have provided support in the form of liquidity and 
capital to safeguard deposits and other banking operations in Greece.  
2.3 NPLs and effects on credit provision and on the Greek economy 
Despite official interventions the performance of Greek banks’ assets could not improve. The 
return on assets (RoA) of Greek banks remained negative as the stock of non-performing loans 
was (and continues to be) the highest in Europe. Non-performing loans are the most 
important problem for Greek banks and a challenge for the authorities as they weaken 
lending to the economy. 
The origins of this problem may be traced back to the period preceding the GFC. In particular, 
from January 2001 to October 2008, the credit expansion in Greece mostly involved loans to 
households for housing purposes and consumer loans: the total amount of mortgage loans 
rose fivefold, as did the total amount of consumer loans. On the other hand, in the same 
period loans to private non-financial corporations (NFCs) were only 1.7 times higher. It is 
worth noting that these developments took place against a GDP expansion, in real terms, of 
about 30%.  
As Figure 6 shows the main recipients of lending from Greek banks before the crisis erupted 
were Greek households, as housing and consumer loans increased more than twofold (about 
2½ times) relatively to NFC loans, in the period from January 2001 to mid-2007. Although the 
wealth effects of this kind of funding are not to be underestimated, it did not boost a 
technological upgrade of production or an expansion of the production capacity of the Greek 
economy. As Beck et al. (2012) argue credit to enterprises is positively associated to economic 
growth whereas household credit is not.  
 
84In October 2012, the ECB waived the quality threshold for accepting Greek government bonds as collateral. This 




Figure 6. Composition of bank lending to the private sector of the Greek economy 
 
Note: The chart depicts the ratio of household loans to NFC loans for the Greek banking system. Household loans 
are calculated as the sum of mortgage and consumer loans, while NFC loans are loans to private sector 
enterprises; only domestic sectors are considered. 
Source: Bank of Greece; authors’ calculations. 
 
So, Greek banks’ credit policies before the GFC did not allocate funding efficiently with respect 
to real economic growth. If funding had been allocated in a way to favor investments in 
productive functions through supporting NFCs production, both the capacity of the Greek 
economy and its resilience to external shocks would have been stronger. Thus, the credit 
expansion strategy before the GFC possibly served the goal of myopic profitabil ity of Greek 
banks, but it was procyclical and leaning towards expanding consumption more than 
upgrading the production base of the Greek economy. This would have been the case if credit 
was linked to investments in production and exports (e.g. upgrades of machinery, 
investments in expansion of activities abroad and investments in R&D and new technology).  
Also, the sources of funding of the private sector of the Greek economy were not diversified. 
If households were to be affected by a credit contraction, as their only source of finance is 
bank credit, this is not equally true for companies. NFCs can borrow from the corporate bond 
market as well. However, as shown in Figure 7, the funding of NFCs was also relying 
predominantly on bank lending in the period before the GFC. The sum of lending to NFCs had 
reached around €115 bn at the onset of the Greek debt crisis in 2010, whereas debt securities 
rose to a little less than €21 bn. Note, however, that even in the case of debt securities credit 
was provided again by domestic banks, due to the clauses governing the domestic ‘bond -
loans’85 and only a very small part, of this amount corresponds to eventual market financing 
in the form of corporate bond issuance. 
 
 
85I.e. securities issued on a bilateral basis between a lender and a borrower, without the obligation of being 




Figure 7. Credit provision to Greek non-financial corporations (NFCs) 2001-2018 
 
Note: The figure illustrates the total sum of flows of credit to NFCs in Greece, in the form of either bank loans or 
debt securities since 2001. In order to estimate the level implied by flows of new credit, during this period, we 
have taken the level of loans and debt securities outstanding in January 2001 and added the net flows of new 
loans or the net issues of new debt securities respectively.  
Source: Bank of Greece. 
 
In this context, we examine the following two questions: (a) how have liquidity, capital and 
asset quality contributed to bank credit towards the Greek economy and (b) what has been 
the impact of both bank credit and market financing on economic activity in Greece.  
 
Figure 8. Loans and deposits of the Greek private sector 2001-2019 
 




On the one hand, the capacity of Greek banks to lend to the Greek economy during the crisis 
was undermined by shortages in liquid assets. As discussed in the previous section, this led 
Greek banks to resort to central bank emergency liquidity amid an environment of collateral 
constraints. At the same time the bank credit provision to the Greek economy became 
negative in net terms. This is reflected in the decline of the loans to the private sector, which 
by and large was the result of both the weak capital position of Greek banks and scarce 
liquidity (Figure 8). 
Therefore, we argue that there may be a chain of causal effects linking liquidity shortages 
with lower credit resulting in weaker economic activity: 
↓ Liquidity ⇒ ↓ Bank credit ⇒ ↓ Economic activity        
At the same time weak economic growth rates did not permit the healthy expansion of the 
asset side of the balance sheets of Greek banks. Figure 9 shows that the evolution of non-
performing loans is strongly correlated to the growth rate of GDP, while the lead-lag 
relationship seems to run from GDP growth rates to NPLs.  
 
Figure 9 Changes in non-performing loans and GDP growth rates 2003-2018 
 
Source: Bank of Greece and Datastream; authors’ calculations. 
 
A channel, through which the worsening of the banks’ balance sheets due to the high NPL 
ratios results in lower bank credit (and then to lower economic activity), could be stricter 
credit standards. In particular, the NPL ratio of euro area banks has been shown to be 
positively associated to stricter credit standards for new loans (ECB 2019). Therefore, we 
examine whether the high NPLs of Greek banks result in credit contraction with the probable 
causality being channeled through stricter credit standards. Then credit contraction may 





↓ Economic activity ⇒↑ NPLs ⇒↑ Credit Standards⇒ ↓ Bank credit ⇒ 
↓ Economic activity 
 
Finally, weaker capital base of banks, may lead to reduced credit provision due to regulatory 
restrictions but also due to a more cautious stance from the side of the banks. This, in turn, is 
expected to have a negative effect on economic activity: 
↓ Capital ⇒ ↓ Bank credit ⇒ ↓ Economic activity        
 
3. Bank soundness and credit provision 
3.1 The empirical setup 
The main objective of the present section is to examine the effects exercised by variables 
associated with Greek banks’ soundness on the supply of credit to the Greek economy. More 
specifically, we ask whether and by how much the provision of credit to the Greek economy 
has been affected by liquidity, capital and credit risk of the loan portfolio of Greek banks.  
 
Figure 10. Provisions for loans vis-à-vis non-performing loans of Greek banks 2002-2018 
 
Note: The figure above presents the evolution of non-performing loans and provisions as ratios to total assets 
of Greek banks. The correlation coefficient is the simple Pearson correlation.  
Source: Bank of Greece; authors’ calculations. 
 
The data we use in this section involve financial ratios and credit provision and the series in 
our sample are in monthly frequency for the period from January 2001 to January2018. For 
measuring credit provision we take into account only net flows of credit. The annual change 




reflects the credit expansion or contraction better than a gross measure of credit that would 
contain a roll-over and re-classifications of past loans. Financial ratios reflect capital, liquidity 
and credit risk of the entire Greek banking sector. Capital is measured by the ratio of capital 
to total assets, liquidity by the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to short-term liabilities and 
asset quality or credit risk in Greek banks’ balance sheets is measured by the ratio of 
provisions to total assets. Note that this measure is very closely related to the evolution of 
NPLs as shown in Figure 10, above. 
In order to examine the effects of the three soundness indicators on bank credit we form a 
vector autoregressive model (Sims 1980) in which all variables are endogenous. This model 
allows us to examine whether the data indeed confirm the relationship of bank credit with 
liquidity, capital and asset quality of Greek banks as described in the previous section. By 
including lags of the dependent variables as well as by taking into account their variance-
covariance, it has been shown (Stock and Watson 2001) that VARs capture the properties of 
the data accurately and provide robust estimations. Therefore, this setup will provide 
evidence related to the first sequence of the feedback loops that were described earlier. The 
model is denoted by the reduced form equation: 
    𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴0 + 𝐴𝑗(𝐿) ∙ 𝑌𝑡−𝑙 + 𝑢𝑗𝑡    (1) 
𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑢𝑗𝑡~𝑖𝑖𝑑(0,𝛴) 
In the above setup Yj (Yjt= y1t, y2t, …, yjt) stands for the vector of the endogenous variables j, 
A(L) stands for the vectors of the coefficients of the autoregressive and explanatory variables 
and Σ is the variance-covariance matrix. The number of lags appropriate for a robust 
estimation is chosen based on a combination of the Akaike (AIC), the Bayesian (SC) and the 
Hannan-Quinn (HQ) information criteria. If there is no unanimous agreement in the number 
of lags, we choose the lag structure dictated by two out of the three criteria. 
VAR models are purely empirical setups that make use of data properties with the only 
restriction being that of a covariance stationary process. They are seen as superior for 
extracting forecasts of the expected path of the variables in question, but disadvantageous in 
the sense that they are not based on structural forms of relationships between the variables, 
so their results pose interpretation difficulties in the policy making process. On the one hand, 
this is the main reason for using Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models for 
inferring the effects of policies on economic variables. On the other hand, these formulations 
are also subject to criticism for being stylized and over-restrictive. Interestingly however, a 
balance between theory and empirical results is proposed, as it has been shown that DSGE 
models can have finite VAR representation when several conditions are met (Ravenna, 2007; 
Morris, 2016).  
To proceed we form a structure of relationships by introducing restrictions in our variables. 
In this way we produce structural shocks by transforming the reduced form VAR to a VAR with 
a specific structure. So, the representation of the innovations from this setup is 
𝐵(𝐿)𝑦𝑡 = 𝑒𝑡 , 𝐸𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑡
′ = 𝛴  and 𝐸𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑡+𝑠
′ = 0, ∀𝑠 ≠ 0, 
Where𝐵(𝐿)𝑦𝑡 = 𝐴0





The structural VAR model must be either exactly identified or over-identified to be estimated. 
A precondition for exact identification is the existence of an identical number of parameters 
in A0 as there are in Σ, i.e. the covariance matrix from the reduced form. The reason is that 
this allows for recovering the structural parameters from the reduced form model. Finally, we 
assume that the model satisfies the rank condition based on Hamilton (1994). On this account, 
we incorporate the following structural restrictions for the estimation of the impulse 
response functions:  
u1 = C(1)*e1+ C(2)*e2+ C(3)*e3 + C(4)*e4 
u2 = C(4)*e1 + C(5)*e2 
u3 = C(6)*e1 + C(7)*e3+C(8)*e4 
u4 = C(9)*e1 + C(10)* e3+C(11)*e4 
With the following notations for the residuals estimated by the VAR in equation (1): 
e1, for Δ(bank credit),  
e2, for Δ(liquidity),  
e3, for Δ(credit risk), 
e4, for Δ(capital), 
Thus, in the 1st shock we assume that banks decide to provide credit based on a ‘full 
information’ scheme, i.e. taking into account developments in liquidity, asset quality and 
capital with the autoregressive factor reflecting all other factors that affect credit. The 2 nd 
shock stems from liquidity, which we assume to be affected by credit and from its own lags, 
which again reflect all other factors. The 3rd shock reflects developments related to credit risk 
(provisions) of Greek banks and relates to credit and capital as well as to its autoregressive 
structure. Finally, we assume that developments related to capital adequacy, on top of the 
factors captured by own lags, relate also to the asset quality of Greek banks, i.e. the ratio of 
provisions to total assets, and to credit. The former affects the numerator and the latter the 
denominator of the ratio of capital-to-total assets.  
3.2 Findings 
First, we specify the number of lags that are necessary in our estimation. For this purpose, we 
make use of the information criteria (AIC, SC and HQ). The values of the criteria are reported 
in Table A1 in the Appendix. From these criteria we conclude that the optimal number of lags 
lies between 1 and 3, depending on which of the criteria is used. So, we choose to specify a 
VAR(2), i.e. a vector autoregression with variables being lagged twice. Also, the stability of the 
VAR is indeed confirmed as no roots lie outside the unit circle, as shown in Figure A1 in the 
Appendix. Figure 11, below, illustrates the impulse response functions (IRFs), which are used 
for quantifying the effects a shock in each of the variables will have on the rest of the variables 




We begin with the variable of interest, i.e. changes in credit. Our results show that all ratios 
considered have the anticipated results on credit. In particular, the most profound effect on 
credit contraction is exercised by credit risk as measured by the ratio of provisions-to-total 
assets. We find that (a) the relationship between developments in credit risk and credit is 
negative, (b) the effect of credit risk passes-through changes in credit fast and (c) it has long-
lasting effects as innovations produced at a given time (t) continue to exercise statistically 
significant effects even 25 months later (t+25). So, this finding suggests that the sharp 
deterioration of the quality of Greek banks’ balance sheets as captured by the sharp rise in 
provisions explains a significant proportion of the credit contraction witnessed post-crisis.  
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Autoregressive effects of capital
 
Note: The figures above show the accumulated response of each variable (Δcredit, Δliquidity, Δcredit risk, 
Δcapital), in a horizon of 50 months, to shocks stemming from the rest of the variables in the system. Shocks are 
defined as equal to one standard deviation of the variables and the impulse response functions are based on the 
estimation of the structural VAR between credit and financial ratios of Greek banks as described in section 3.1. 
 
Provisions for bad loans during our sample period have a standard deviation of 1.45 
percentage points (p.p.) annually. This is estimated to result in a drop in the annual rate of 
change of credit by 2 p.p., at a 4-year horizon. These findings suggest that the large rise of 
non-performing loans, which led to rises in provisions for bad loans in the balance sheets of 
Greek banks, is a significant and sizeable factor explaining credit deterioration towards the 




On the other hand, liquidity and capital counterbalance the negative pressure exercised by 
risk on credit. A positive shock in liquidity or in capital is found to exercise positive effects on 
the rate of change of credit. So, both the ample liquidity provision by the central bank and 
the capital injections mainly by the official sector that helped recapitalize Greek banks have 
provided a relief for the reduction in credit due to the deterioration of their assets.  
However, the size of the effects exercised by liquidity and capital as well as their term 
structure lead to the conclusion that this remedy for the problem of bad loans was only 
partially effective. In particular, a one standard deviation shock in liquidity (i.e. an annual rise 
of 2.69 p.p. in the ratio of cash and cash-equivalent assets to short-term liabilities) is found to 
lead to a rise in credit of 0.67 p.p. in a 2-year horizon. After that point the effects of liquidity 
become non-significant. So, even though a rise in the supply of liquidity towards Greek banks 
results in credit expansion, its effects are much weaker than the pressure incurred from bad 
loans and last only for a short-to-medium term horizon (1 to 2 years).  
Strengthening of the capital base of Greek banks has both stronger and longer-lasting effects 
on credit. More specifically, we find that a one standard deviation (i.e. 1.85 p.p.) rise in the 
ratio of capital-to-total assets, leads to a rise of credit by 1.15 p.p.in a 4-year horizon. On the 
other hand, capital injections (a) take a long time to become effective with respect to credit 
provision and (b) while they have larger effects than liquidity on credit, they cannot fully 
counterbalance the strain on credit exercised by the problem of bad loans.  
The historical decomposition of the effects exercised on credit by the three financial ratios 
examined reveal certain interesting findings. Figure 12 shows the impact of the rise in bad 
loans during the crisis period on credit. Increases in credit risk (i.e. provisions for bad loans) 
which are negatively associated to changes in credit, explain most of the negative change in 
credit supply to the Greek economy. On the other hand, a lack of liquidity during 2011-2012 
(i.e. the PSI period) is also found to have dampened credit but this has only been temporary 
and limited, while capital rises during the crisis period have had a positive but limited effect 
due to the recurrent deterioration of the capital base.  
 























































































Finally, although our main focus is on effects exercised on credit by liquidity, capital and asset 
quality, some interesting results are for the first time reported by our empirical framework. 




significant feedback loop exists between (a) credit risk and liquidity and (b) credit risk and 
capital. Thus, we find first that liquidity exercises a short-term dampening effect on credit 
risk, while credit risk has a sizeable and lasting negative effect on liquidity. This finding 
supports the anecdotal evidence that the deterioration of the quality of assets used as 
collateral in liquidity-provision operations by the central bank exercised a downward push on 
liquidity available to Greek banks. At the same time, liquidity had a constraining, albeit 
limited, effect on the further deterioration of the quality of assets. This could be the case if 
banks rolled over loans of Greek NFCs that would otherwise become non-performing taking 
advantage of the liquidity provided by the central bank. 
Also, we find that strengthening the capital base of Greek banks provided a partial backstop 
for avoiding further deterioration in the quality of their loans, whereas at the same time the 
deterioration in the quality of assets of Greek banks led to impairments of their capital base. 
This is a well-anticipated chain of effects. Greek banks’ capital was impaired by the high level 
of NPLs, while recapitalization of Greek banks provided some remedy for curing the low 
quality of assets by raising the proportion of good loans with new credit. 
3.3 Out-of-sample: The Covid-19 shock 
Forwarding these results to the Covid-19 period can serve as an out-of-sample exercise. But 
as the situation is still evolving, we may only provide rough calculations based on provisional 
figures and estimations published in official statistics. So, taking into account this disclaimer, 
we assume that NPLS, caused by the Covid-19 recession will rise to 8-10 bn euros, as is the 
January 2021 expectation of the Bank of Greece (2021). This equals to a shock of around 10% 
of performing loans (see Table III.3 in Bank of Greece 2021, p. 30), i.e. a rise of 14%-15% if we 
compare this figure with the total outstanding NPLs before the pandemic. Based on our 
results this shock would imply a contractionary effect on bank credit to the non-financial 
sector of around 11%-13%, during a 4-year horizon.  
On the other hand, the fact that Greek banks have benefitted from the emergency 
programmes of the ECB (and in particular the Pandemic Emergency Long-Term Refinancing 
Operations-PELTROs) provides comfort, that this time the immediate effect of the rise of NPLs 
will be remedied to a large extent by the liquidity support offered by the ECB (ECB, 2020). In 
fact, by December 2020 Greek banks had absorbed €41 bn in central bank liquidity, which 
compares to €7 bn in December 2019. Additionally, bank deposits from the non-financial 
private sector of the Greek economy had increased by around 11 bn in the same period. This 
means that a positive liquidity shock of around 21% must be considered in order to estimate 
the total effect of the Covid shock on credit supplied by Greek banks to the economy. This 
liquidity increase may be transformed to a 5% rise in bank credit to the Greek economy in a 
period of 2 years.  
As shown in Figure 11, the effects of NPLs on credit are roughly equally distributed across a 
4-year horizon. The time dimension of our estimated IRFs shows that in the first 2 years 
liquidity absorbed by Greek banks from the central bank may almost entirely counterbalance 
the negative effects that the expected rise in NPLs will have on bank credit. What remains 




estimations presented earlier, will remain active until 4 years after the shock (i.e. the rise in 
NPLs). This longer-term effect underlines the importance of a permanent solution to the NPL 
problem. This is the purpose of the solution proposed by the Bank of Greece (2020), which 
supports the creation of an asset management company to work in parallel to the already 
established asset protection scheme (also known as ‘Hercules’). Similar solutions (national 
‘bad banks’ are starting to be discussed also at the European level as a similar NPL problem is 
of concern to several euro-area economies.86    
 
4. Bank credit, market financing and growth 
4.1 The empirical setup 
The quantification of interactions between financial and economic activity should be done 
carefully avoiding mixing stocks with flows. Biggs et al. (2010) argue that the statistical 
evidence on the link between credit and growth is weak due to the use of stocks data (credit) 
to explain flows (GDP), which also is the reason for finding that the financial cycle lasts longer 
than the business cycle. Thus, they propose to use the annual change in flows of bank credit 
to the private sector as a ratio to GDP in order to predict GDP growth, instead of the usually 
employed changes of outstanding credit or the credit-to-GDP measure for financial cycles. 
They support this claim (a) by noting that GDP is a flow variable, so its changes (i.e. GDP 
growth rates) are the first derivative of a flow variable, which is equivalent to the partial 
derivative of GDP related to flows of credit and (b) by providing evidence that fluctuations in 
the credit impulse around zero lead to fluctuations in GDP growth around its trend (Biggs and 
Mayers, 2009).  
Distilling from these works, we may draw some conclusions useful both for the theoretical 
priors and for the empirical setup: credit is expected to contribute to economic activity and 
this relationship should involve credit flows in order to avoid measurement biases in our 
estimation. Following Biggs et al. (2010) we focus (a) on private demand for assessing 
economic activity and (b) on credit impulse for examining the effects of credit to NFCs on 
private demand. In particular, 
  Private demand = private investment + private consumption (2) 
As shown in Table 2, private demand, i.e. consumption and investments by the private sector, 
in Greece represents the largest proportion of economic activity, ranging from a little more 
than 82% of the 2011 GDP to 78% of the 2019 GDP. Also, Table 2 indicates that while 
consumption has partially resumed, by 2019, compared to the level of 2011, gross fixed 





86 See, Andrea Enria “Bank asset quality: this time we need to do better” (retrieved by ECB’s website on 15 




Table 2. GDP, private consumption and fixed capital formation in Greece (2011-2019)  
 
Aggregates (in Eur mln.)  2011 2015 2019 
A: GDP 201,377 182,500 190,268 
B: Private consumption 137,677 122,501 129,734 
C: GFCF 27,698 19,642 19,348 
(B+C)/D: Priv. dem. (%GDP) 82.12% 77.88% 78.35% 
Note: The figures above are in constant prices (chained linked volumes, series) in annual frequency, for the end 
of each year denoted in the first line of the table. Private consumption is the final consumption excluding general 




Starting from (2) we may observe the growth rate of private demand by taking annual changes 
in investment and consumption. Thus, for private investment we take the annual percentage 
change of the gross fixed capital formation and for private consumption the annual 
percentage change of the private consumption expenditure (PCE). Figure 13 shows the two 
components of private demand, for Greece. 
 
Figure 13. Components of private demand 1996-2018 (annual changes) 
 
Note: The series depicted are in real values. Source: Datastream; authors’ calculations. 
 
So, changes on private demand may be approximated as shown below: 
%Δyoy(Private demand) = k%Δyoy(GFCF) + (1-k)%Δyoy(PCE)  (3) 
Where, k is the ratio of GFCF to total private demand and (1-k) is the ratio of private 
consumption to total private demand. In a similar concept, we only consider financial flows 
to the non-financial sector of the Greek economy. We do so by taking into account net flows 




Credit impulse = %y-o-yΔ(Net flows of bank credit)/Private Demand (4) 
We examine the effects of bank and market financing both on the percentage annual growth 
rate of private demand and, separately, on its investment component. This is an issue of 
particular interest to the Greek economy, as investment expenditure is a significant 
contributor to GDP growth and has multiplier effects on long-term growth, as it leads to 
permanent rises of the production capacity.  
Also, in a similar way, we construct the market financing variable of interest, which we call 
‘market impulse’, with which we examine the effects of equity and debt securities both 
combined and separately: 
Market impulse = %y-o-yΔ(Net issuance of securities)/Private Demand (5) 
The series in our sample are in quarterly frequency for the period 2001Q1 to 2018Q1. As 
indicators of economic activity, we have collected data for gross fixed capital formation, 
private consumption and GDP from Datastream. Financial activity reflects flows of Greek 
banks’ credit to NFCs as well as issuances of new equity and debt securities by Greek NFCs. 
All financial variables are net of redemptions.  
 
Figure 14. Economic activity in Greece 1996-2018 
 
Note: The series depicted are in real values. Source: Datastream; authors’ calculations. 
 
As shown in Figure 14, our measure of economic activity in Greece closely follows the real 
GDP growth rate. The deviation between the two relates mostly to the public sector’s 
contribution to economic activity. As the focus of our research is the private sector this 
deviation is not a problem. On the contrary, it provides a considerable degree of comfort as 
we do not deal with the direct effects of the Greek sovereign debt crisis, nor have we to touch 




Our basic model examines the effects of bank and market financing to changes in private 
demand and its components. Again, we form a vector autoregressive model (VAR) in which 
we treat all variables as endogenous taking into consideration in our empirical setup 
structural features. In particular, a known limitation of VARs is that they provide weak 
structural inference and, thus, make it difficult to assess the effects of policy interventions. 
Incorporating structural features in vector autoregressive models is both robust in its 
estimation and policy-relevant (Sims and Zha, 1995). Therefore, we use a SVAR model to 
examine the effects of bank credit and market financing on private economic activity in 
Greece. More specifically, we impose a structure on the model’s relationships based on 
assumptions related to the sequence of effects expected between our variables (Dimelis et 
al., 2017). First, we assume that market financing is exogenous to bank financing as it depends 
on broader market conditions. Second, we assume that bank credit is exogenous to domestic 
economic activity. Third, we make domestic economic activity dependent on both market and 
bank financing.  
In order to produce structural shocks, we transform the unrestricted VAR model by 
conditioning the responses of private demand and its components to the endogenous 
factorization of the rest of the variables. To describe the structural factorization consider the 
following: let 𝐴(𝐿)𝑦𝑡 = 𝑢𝑡, denote the reduced-form VAR setup from the previous section for 
each endogenous variable examined. Then, the innovations from this setup are: 
𝐵(𝐿)𝑦𝑡 = 𝑒𝑡 , 𝐸𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑡
′ = 𝛴  and 𝐸𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑡+𝑠
′ = 0, ∀𝑠 ≠ 0 
Where 𝐵(𝐿)𝑦𝑡 = 𝐴0
−1 𝐴(𝐿)and 𝑒𝑡 = 𝐴0
−1𝑢𝑡. 
For the estimation of the impulse response functions we incorporate the following structural 
restrictions:  
u1 = C(1)*e1+ C(2)*e3 
u2 = C(3)*e2 + C(4)*e3 
u3 = C(5)*e1 + C(6)*e2 + C(7)*e3 
We use the following notations for the residuals estimated by the VAR: 
e1, for bank credit (credit impulse),  
e2, for market financing (market impulse), 
e3, for economic activity (%yoyΔ(private demand), %yoyΔ (GFCF), %yoyΔ(PCE)) 
Thus, the first shock stems from bank credit and describes the feedback from economic 
activity to credit on top of the latter’s autoregressive effects. Similarly, in the second shock 
we assume that investors’ decisions shaping market financing while reflecting domestic 
economic activity are exogenous based on broader market conditions. Finally, in the third 
shock a broader structure is anticipated to be reflected by economic activity, as it relates to 






The first relationship we explore is the one between financing (bank and market) sources and 
changes in private demand. So, we first choose the lag structure of our model relying on 
information criteria such as the Akaike (AIC), Bayesian (SIC) and Hannan-Quinn (HQ). As our 
data are in quarterly frequency the finding that inserting two lags in each equation provides 
sufficient information is reasonable. This implies that movements of the variables of our 
model exercise effects on each dependent variable within a horizon of one semester.  
We rely on the output of the impulse response functions (IRFs) to draw evidence for and 
quantify the effects of bank and market financing on economic activity (private demand). 
These IRFs are shown in Figure 15 and measure the accumulated impact of a shock in one of 
the system’s variables on each dependent variable for a period of 16 quarters, i.e. four 
calendar years. 
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Autoregressive effects of private demand
 
Note: The figures show the accumulated response of each variable in a horizon of 16 quarters (i.e. four calendar 
years) to a one standard deviation shock stemming from the rest of the variables in the system.  
 
We find that both (a) bank credit, measured as the change in credit flows of one quarter vis-
à-vis the respective quarter of the previous year as a ratio to private demand and (b) market 
financing measured in a similar fashion, are positively and significantly related to changes in 
private demand.87 In particular, a shock on credit impulse equal to one standard deviation 
(i.e. a 2.7 p.p. annual change in net flows of credit as a ratio to total private demand) results 
to a rise of 10.5 p.p. in private demand, aggregated during a horizon of four years after the 
 
87Note that we have also employed the definition of credit and market impulses, as ratios to GDP; the results of 




shock. That means that the reduction of credit has had sizeable effects on private demand. 
Although translating the development in net credit flows into total credit provision is not 
straightforward, this result indicates that the credit contraction since 2010 weakened private 
demand and, as a consequence, deepened the recession.  
A similar weakening of economic activity is found to have resulted from the lack of market 
financing for Greek NFCs. Specifically, market financing is found to exercise effects on private 
demand which are comparable to those exercised by bank credit, i.e. a one standard deviation 
shock (equal to 0.89 p.p.) on market financing produces a 5.1p.p. change in private demand 
after four years, although with reduced statistical significance. But as the Greek economy has 
been predominantly bank-based with respect to its funding sources, the historical effects of 
market financing on economic activity have been less pronounced than those of bank credit.  
Additionally, we find that there is a feedback loop between economic activity and bank credit. 
The pass-through of the change of net bank credit flows, as captured by the credit impulse, 
to a change in private demand is found to be almost one-to-one after two quarters. This 
means that banks take into account the direction of economic activity when they supply credit 
to the economy. A positive/negative change in private demand results to an equally sized 
positive/negative effect on flows of bank credit as a ratio to private demand.  
Therefore, credit contraction led to a deepening of the recession during the crisis period, 
whereas this also fed into credit provision by further weakening credit. As a result, a self -
feeding chain of interactions between bank credit and economic activity has worked in the 
direction of intensifying the economic conditions underlying the Greek crisis. At the same 
time market financing could not provide a remedy to this vicious circle as it has been much 
smaller in volume than bank credit.  
However, a restriction to our results in relation to market financing is that we have taken into 
account only the domestic bond issuance. Large Greek NFCs, mainly industrial companies with 
export orientation, have managed to tap the international bond market for more than €8.5 
bn since 2013. These amounts have been used mainly for paying back expensive bank loans, 
as the bond issuance came at a gradually decreasing yield benefitting from the overall trends 
in the European corporate bond market. Therefore, the effects of market financing may 
eventually be amplified for the Greek economy, should this trend continue. There is scope to 
wait for such a development if we consider (a) the ongoing initiative about establishing a true 
Capital Market Union in the EU and (b) the support provided by ECB’s quantitative easing.    
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Note: The figures above show the accumulated response of private investment to a one standard deviation 
shock in market financing and bank credit within a horizon of 16 quarters (i.e. 4 calendar years). 
 
In order to explore further the mechanism of the effects exercised by financing on economic 
activity in Greece, we have examined separately the effects exercised by bank credit and 
market funding to private sector investment. The variable used for capturing investment is 
the year-on-year change of gross fixed capital formation in real terms. Therefore, we have 
formed a separate VAR to examine the effects exercised on private investment by bank credit 
and market financing. Figure 16 illustrates the IRFs estimated from this VAR.  
Overall, these findings indicate that the effects of bank credit and market financing on private 
investment are more pronounced than the ones exercised on private demand. Recalling that 
the latter contains an investment and a consumption component, we may provide a possible 
interpretation of the mechanism through which finance affects Greek economic activity: 
mainly through investment. As expected, our results show that the weakening of bank credit 
during the crisis intensified the recession by reducing investment.   
The historical decomposition of the stochastic component of private investment, i.e. y-o-y 
%Δ(GFCF) illustrated in Figure 17, confirms this intuitive result. Especially, during the periods 
2009Q1-2010Q1, 2013Q4-2014Q1 and in 2016Q4 negative bank credit flows are shown to 
explain the contraction in investment. On top of this effect, the negative flow of market 
financing provides an additional explanation to the contraction of investment in 2008Q4-
2009Q3 and 2011Q1-2011Q3. Another interesting aspect of this finding is that bank credit 
and market financing, if directed towards productive investment, would not only impact 
significantly the growth of the Greek economy but also the desired structural quality.  
 































































































4.3 Out-of-sample: The Covid-19 shock 
Based on the estimations presented in Section 3.3, we form anticipations for the effect the 
Covid shock may have on economic activity, as channeled by bank credit and measured by 
private demand. So, if we expect a contraction of bank credit by 5%, due to new NPLs net of 
the effect of increased bank liquidity, this will result to a contractionary effect on private 




will remain, as percentage of GDP, close to the level of 2019 (78%), the credit contraction may 
lead, ceteris paribus, to a contraction of around 8% of GDP, distributed across 4 years.  
On the other hand, the Covid period has some particularities. Several countries around the 
world have proceeded with government support measures, that aim to provide an official 
channel of funding to the private sector of the economy. In Greece, this role has been played 
by liquidity provision, in the form of ‘repayable advances’ and guarantees to corporates and 
self-employed professionals, affected by the pandemic. These measures are estimated to be 
around €7.5 bn, or around 4% of the anticipated GDP figure for 2020.88 Therefore, if this 
funding to the Greek private sector has the same consequences on economic activity, as bank 
credit, then it could almost entirely offset the negative consequences the rise in NPLs will 
have on bank credit, taking into account the increased bank liquidity (i.e. liquidity by the 
central bank and deposits).  
However, the horizon of the measures plays a very important role. Indeed, they may have a 
very important effect in the short run, but, due to the fact the rise in NPLs has a more 
persistent effect on bank credit, these measures should last for at least the horizon needed 
for bank credit to be able to support economic activity.  
Finally, a note of caution: as the above results are based on some basic assumptions, such as 
the structure of economic activity, before the eruption of the pandemic, changes in the 
structure of the economy could affect them. Thus, a risk related to these results comes from 
potential structural effects of the pandemic on the Greek private sector; for example, a surge 
in defaults following the end of moratoria on loan repayment (ESRB, 2021) that will affect the 
structure of the Greek economy.      
 
5. Concluding remarks and policy implications 
Greece entered the global financial crisis with a large reliance on public sector borrowing and 
spending. After all, the Greek public debt was the main origin of the Greek crisis, which was 
triggered by the broad re-pricing of risks across the globe. Although Greek banks (the most 
crucial source of financing for the Greek economy) were initially considered to be resilient to 
shocks as their fundamentals were in good shape, eventually they did not escape the crisis, 
which was exacerbated by their lending policies. The direct impairments of their balance 
sheets as a result of the sovereign debt crisis and the ensuing deterioration in the quality of 
their loans were disastrous. During the crisis period both the official sector and the central 
bank provided backstops to the capital and liquidity problems of Greek banks. According to 
our findings this valuable support only partially counteracted the effects of the high NPLs to 
the Greek banks’ ability to fund the economy.   
We have documented the existence of feedback loops between primarily bank credit and 
secondarily market financing with private demand and even more importantly investment, 
thus uncovering the nexus between financing and economic activity in Greece. In brief our 
 




findings indicate that while in the pre-crisis period financing of the economy (mainly in the 
form of bank credit) resulted in lifting real growth rates, in the post-crisis period the lack of 
credit accentuated the recession.  
At present, the main problem of the Greek banking sector is dealing with NPLs (30% of total 
loans vs. 3% in the euro area in 2020). The problem is expected to be exacerbated by the 
COVID-19 crisis. Our results indicate that the resolution of NPLs is important for curing the 
balance sheets of Greek banks and making them more resilient to potential shocks. Only then 
will banks be able to finance economic activity again and contribute to a more sustainable 
growth model, especially if they improve the allocation of funds between production and 
consumption. 
Several lessons can be learnt from the crisis. 
First, as Greece relies predominantly on bank credit, direct market financing has a long way 
to go before it can replace the banking sector as the primary source of funding for the 
economy. Several European initiatives, with that of the Capital Market Union being the most 
important, are under way in order to enlarge and deepen market financing of the real 
economy. At present market financing has benefitted greatly by the asset purchase 
programmes of the ECB, but this should be considered as a temporary and not a structural 
condition. During the Covid-19 economic turbulence, the role of central banks’ balance sheet 
policies has proven very important, in order to reverse the freeze of market financing of low-
rated non-financial corporations; still, this incidence underlines that market financing is 
subject to abrupt changes. For all the above reasons, the policy maker can expect that the 
Greek economy in the medium-term will continue to rely predominantly on bank credit for 
financing economic activity and should aim for a broadening of the funding sources in the 
long term, along with initiatives for rendering market financing more resilient to shocks. In 
this respect the partial return of deposits has been beneficial. Hence, the completion of the 
European Banking Union with a European Deposit Insurance Scheme together with the 
recently established confidence in the market would be further reassuring. 
Second, banks should address the debilitating problem of bad loans to be able to provide a 
healthy stream of funding to the Greek economy. As we have documented, the deterioration 
in the quality of assets of Greek banks is a significant factor that reduces credit availability. 
Our results suggest that solving the NPL problem is a precondition for banks to start providing 
new credit and, thus, contribute to future economic growth. Currently a partial solution 
provided by the Ministry of Finance (the ‘Hercules’ Asset Protection Scheme) is already 
functioning, but the problem remains. Moreover, initiatives for resolving the legacy NPLs of 
the Greek banking system should not be of a ‘one-off’ form. The anticipation that a new 
generation of NPLs will be brewed by the Covid-19 shock, puts weight on establishing a more 
permanent tool to tackle the problem. To this end, recently the Bank of Greece proposed the 
establishment of an asset management company, which could also take into account the 
weak capital position (due to deferred tax credit) of Greek banks. Actually, a related solution 




Third, as the Greek banking sector cannot be immune to the fundamental conditions faced 
either as part of the Greek economic landscape or as part of the broader global financial 
system, it should follow more long-sighted credit policies. In particular, providing credit to the 
economy through lending mainly to households may have been the most important 
development in Greek banks’ balance sheets before the crisis, but at the same time it did not 
strengthen the resilience of the Greek economy. If a healthier and more sustainable 
productive and export-oriented economic model is to be promoted in the future by an 
appropriate allocation of funds, banks should expand credit to productive investments rather 
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Chapter 8. Greek Economic Growth: Past and Future 
Nikolaos Leounakis89 and Plutarchos Sakellaris90* 
 
Abstract 
We decompose Greek economic performance over the last sixty years into the contributions 
of productivity, capital accumulation, and labor growth. Recent Greek economic history is a 
succession of long periods of boom with long periods of stagnation or depression. The 
decisive factor in either booms or slumps has been total factor productivity (TFP) growth. In 
particular, bad performance of TFP is the main culprit for the fourteen-year recession from 
1980 to 1993 as well as for the recent depression. This suggests that action on reversing the 
shortfall in productivity should be the most important focus for policy makers now. We argue 
that the crisis has led to permanent loss of output. In projections, we show that the economy 
needs to grow at average rates of about 3.5% over the next five years to be able to recover in 
2026 the standard of living enjoyed in 2007, its peak historical level. 
JEL classification: E32, N10, O40 
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Economic performance in Greece since 2008 has been dismal. As Figure 1 shows, the drop in 
economic activity is comparable in magnitude to that of the Great Depression in the USA, yet 
lasting much longer. This period is unique when compared to anything that happened in the 
Greek economy all the way back to 1960. However, as Figure 2 aptly shows, it may be 
considered a dramatic episode of economic depression in a 50- year history of very volatile 
growth. This history is a succession of long periods of boom with long periods of stagnation 
or depression. This highly volatile macroeconomic environment has been generated by 
unsustainable policies that led to two boom-bust cycles since 1960. 
 
 
In this paper, we aim at five goals. First, we provide consistent annual data on Greek economic 
growth and its decomposition into the contributions of capital, labor and Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP) for the years 1960 to 2017. We employ the standard growth accounting 
framework using capital stocks and total hours worked as the capital and labor factors 
respectively. Second, we augment our analysis using capital and labor services as productive 
inputs. This framework is theoretically more appropriate. However, data limitations confine 
the analysis to the years 1997 to 2017. Third, we contrast the two methodologies to uncover 
any differences in the implied decomposition of growth. Fourth, we include capacity 
utilization in our analysis in order to account for any procyclical effects that a variable 
utilization rate might have on our TFP estimates. Fifth, we classify different periods of 









Figure 1. Real GDP Growth in Crisis (from peak to first recovery year)
Source: IMF, Angus Maddison Historical Statistics of the World Economy, Authors’ calculations  
The figure compares the contraction in Greek GDP during the crisis with contractions experienced 







Starting with the fifth goal, our statistical tests indicate two structural breaks in the time series 
for GDP per Capita: 1974 and 2008. Visual inspection of the time series, however, indicates 
that 1994 may be considered a third break point. Given the (relatively) short time series and 
the power of the statistical test, we argue for considering four separate episodes in Greek 
economic growth since 1960: 1) the Great Expansion (1960 – 1973), 2) the Long Stagnation 
(1974 – 1993), 3) the Recovery (1994 – 2007), and 4) the Great Depression (2008-2017). 
Regarding the “Long Stagnation” period, one might subdivide it further into a) the Moderate 
Expansion (1974 – 1979) and b) the Great Recession (1980 – 1993)91. 
How does this economic performance decompose into the contributions of TFP, capital stock 
and total hours worked? We find that the stunning average GDP growth rate of 8.87% over 
the period 1960-1973 was due to TFP and capital input contributing by 7.38% and 2.32% 
respectively. The “Great Expansion” was mostly a phenomenon of rapid catch-up in economic 
efficiency and secondarily of unusually high capital accumulation. Of course, the latter was to 
a large extent driven by the former92. 
From 1974 to 1979 GDP growth slowed down to 3.28%, a good performance compared to 
later periods but markedly worse than the preceding fourteen years and a prelude to the 
future. This was a result of TFP growing at the lower pace of 0.44%, 6.94 percentage points 
lower than in the “Great Expansion” period. Despite the dramatic drop in TFP growth, capital 
accumulation continued surprisingly strong. In both of these periods, labor input’s influence 
was practically minimal (-0.71% and 0.36%). Over the period 1980-1993 the Greek economy 
sank into a fourteen-year-long recession, as the GDP rate of change plunged to 0.75%. Capital 
accumulation slowed down dramatically, now contributing 0.84% to GDP growth while TFP 
 
91 Gogos et al (2014) also provide evidence of a slowdown after 1974 and a great recession until 
1994, followed by a recovery. They do not test statistically for breaks.  They rely on a dynamic general equilibrium 
model and find that TFP is crucial in accounting for growth patterns.                                                                                             
92 For an insightful analysis of the political and economic forces behind the periods of “Great Expansion” and 
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Figure 2. GDP per Capita
Source: Authors’ calculations  





subtracted from growth (-0.58%). The situation was partially offset by an improvement in 
labor input (0.50%).  
During the period 1994-2007 the economy recovered partially. The growth rate of output 
averaged 3.62% as all three inputs improved (0.71%, 1.21% and 1.71% for labor, capital and 
TFP respectively). Beginning in 2008, the combined effect of financial and sovereign crises 
took its toll on the Greek economy. During the “Great Depression” of 2008-2017, GDP 
dropped at an annual rate of 2.82% on average. This was due to labor input decreases (-1.26% 
per annum) and TFP decreases (-1.56% per annum), while net capital formation dropped to 
the lowest average level of all periods since 1960 (+0.00% per annum). 
Our results indicate that the decisive factor of influence on economic growth during the last 
fifty-seven years has been TFP. Its contribution to growth in output varies from 18% to 83% 
over the periods 1961-1973, 1974-1979 and 1994-2007. Furthermore, the performance of 
TFP proves to have been the main culprit for the fourteen-year recession from 1980 to1993 
as well as for the current depression. Contrary to widespread belief that the credit boom in 
the eurozone periphery was used to finance unproductive sectors and investments, we show 
that TFP growth was very healthy before the crisis that started in 2008. During 1997 to 2007, 
annual TFP growth averaged 1.80% (standard methodology) or 1.71% (alternative 
methodology mentioned in the following paragraph). Annual results are contained in 
Appendix A.  
We repeated the growth accounting exercise using capital and labor services as productive 
inputs instead. This methodology is theoretically superior to the one using stocks. As a result 
of accounting for changes in the quality of labor and capital, TFP growth is now measured to 
be slower. The empirical results point to some differences but not large ones. Depending on 
the period, TFP growth differs by 7%-16% when quality changes are accounted for. The 
qualitative conclusions do not change. 
As a final attempt to refine our results further, we repeated the growth accounting 
decomposition including variable capacity utilization as a growth factor. As expected, capacity 
utilization displays a pattern of procyclical variability, so that its inclusion makes TFP slightly 
less procyclical than before but without materially affecting our conclusions. 
In section 3, we focus on the period of the Greek Depression from 2008 to 2017. The financial 
crisis has had lasting effects on output. We ask the question: which parts of the productive 
process have been impaired the most? Knowing the answer is important for designing and 
implementing policies for eventual recovery. Using Solow’s growth accounting methodology, 
as did Hall (2014), we find that output in 2017 is almost 50% below its counterfactual trend. 
This counterfactual trend in output and its components of total factor productivity, capital, 
capacity utilization and labor is calculated by projecting forward the historical growth 
experience of 1974 to 2007. The shortfall in productivity growth is the biggest culprit, 
accounting for 32% of the observed deficit. The next two most influential components are 
employment and the contribution of capital accounting respectively for 23% and 19% of the 




seems necessary to implement policies to boost productivity growth in the medium term and, 
in parallel, to promote employment and investment. 
In section 4, we turn to a discussion about future economic growth and the potential for 
growth of the Greek economy. First, we establish that the loss in output due to the crisis is 
permanent. We follow the literature that tests for the existence of unit root in historical 
output time series (Nelson and Plosser, 1982; Campbell and Mankiw, 1987; Cerra and Saxena, 
2005a, 2005b and 2008). Indeed, we find evidence for the existence of unit root in the (log) 
level of Greek output. This implies that output lost should be forgotten. The policy effort now 
should be to grow as fast as possible from a new, and lower, base level. The best-case scenario 
is for the Greek economy to reach average growth rates of Average Labor Productivity (ALP) 
equal to those it attained during the 1974 to 2007 period. This period includes both a boom 
and a slump in economic activity and excludes the “growth miracle” of the 1960s and the 
“Great Depression” of the last 10 years, both extreme economic episodes. During the thirty-
three-year period of 1973 to 2007, ALP grew on average at 1.38% per annum (p.a.). We deem 
that this growth rate may be attainable in the future under a program of ambitious and 
focused economic reform.93 The task is not easy. To give an indication, income per capita 
would have to grow to an average annual rate of 3.5 % from 2019 to 2024 for standards of 
living to recuperate in 2026 the peak that they had attained in 2007. Such growth rates 
currently look unlikely unless there is a drastic and effective shift in the mix of policy towards 
growth. 
The paper contains several appendices. 
 
 
2. The sources of growth: 1960 to 2017  
Figure 2 depicts the evolution of GDP per capita since 1960. One can discern four distinct 
periods of growth. A period of explosive growth spans the years 1960-1973, during which GDP 
per capita grew at an average rate of 8.42%. We call this the “Long Expansion”. Then came 
the period of the “Long Stagnation,” when GDP per capita grew at 0.70%. This period lasted 
from 1974 to 1993. Beginning in 1994 the economy recovered, and until 2007 per capita GDP 
grew at 3.22% annually. This was a “Recovery” period. Finally, in 2008, Greece entered a 
“Great Depression” period during which per capita GDP declined at a dramatic rate of -2.56%. 
We use Solow’s growth accounting framework to decompose the rate of change of output 









Table 1. Growth Decomposition with Capital Stocks and Total Hours Worked 












1961-1973 8.87% -0.71% -0.38% -0.33% 2.32% 7.38% 
1974-1979 3.28% 0.36% 0.32% 0.03% 2.48% 0.44% 
1980-1993 0.75% 0.50% 0.49% 0.00% 0.84% -0.58% 
1994-2007 3.62% 0.71% 0.78% -0.07% 1.21% 1.71% 
2008-2017 -2.82% -1.26% -1.18% -0.08% 0.00% -1.56% 
 
During the 1960s and until 1973 GDP growth averaged 8.87% annually thanks to strong TFP 
growth and capital accumulation. A period of tapered growth started after the first oil shock 
and lasted for 6 years, during which growth slowed down to 3.28%.The main culprit was the 
drastic reduction in TFP growth (averaging 0.44% annually). In 1980, Greece entered a 
prolonged slump that lasted for fourteen years. Capital accumulation rates fell dramatically 
to 0.84% on average, and TFP was substantially lower at the end of the period than in the 
beginning. The situation was partially offset by an improvement in labor input, whose growth 
has a positive, though small, contribution of 0.49% to GDP growth. During the period 1994-
2007 the economy recovered as GDP grew at 3.62% per year. All three inputs contributed to 
this recovery and TFP grew annually at a rate of 1.71%, the highest rate since 1973. Finally, in 
2008, after 14 consecutive years of growth, the Greek economy went into a long downward 
slide as a result of the global financial crisis and its own sovereign debt and banking crisis. 
GDP fell by an average of 2.82% annually until 2017. Unemployment rose and total 
employment and TFP fell dramatically. Appendix A.2 contains the growth decomposition 
analysis using capital and labor services; the two methodologies give substantially similar 
results. 
Figure 3 tells the same story from a different perspective. It contains the decomposition of 
labor productivity into the contributions of capital deepening94 and TFP, the results of which 
are included in Table 2. It is clear that TFP growth in 1961-1973 is what sustained the rapid 
growth of labor productivity at 9.79%, while on the other hand, the slowdown that followed 
 
94  Labor productivity is computed as the ratio of total product to total hours worked.  Capital deepening is the 
ratio of capital stock to total hours worked. 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
The calculations are based on Solow’s growth accounting formula: 
?̇?
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 , according to 
which the growth in GDP is decomposed into the contributions of TFP, capital input and labor input respectively. 
See appendix A1 for more information. 




during 1974-1979 can be ascribed to a dramatic slowdown of TFP growth, as it dropped from 
7.26% to 0.44%.  
The 14-year slump that ensued saw labor productivity decline at 0.13% on average per year 
as a result of TFP and capital deepening contributing by -0.58% and 0.45% respectively. During 
the recovery period that started in 1994, labor productivity rose at 2.38% as capital deepening 
and TFP improved (0.67% and 1.71% respectively). Finally, from 2008 to 2017 labor 
productivity declined at a rate of -0.77% and TFP plunged at the rate of -1.56%. Capital, 
however, deepened as a result of total hours worked decreasing. 
 
 
Table 2. Labor Productivity Decomposition 
  1961-1973 1974-1979 1980-1993 1994-2007 2008-2017 
Labor Productivity 9.79% 2.58% -0.13% 2.38% -0.77% 
Capital Deepening 2.52% 2.13% 0.45% 0.67% 0.79% 
TFP 7.26% 0.44% -0.58% 1.71% -1.56% 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Our breakdown of the data into separate growth periods was motivated by casual inspection 
of the figures and results presented before. Using a formal statistical test of break points in 
the time series of growth rates of GDP per capita, we arrive at a similar classification. We use 
procedures developed by Bai and Perron in a series of papers (1998, 2000, 2003) to determine 
the number and dates of possible structural breaks. Their methodology has the advantage of 
allowing multiple break points to be determined endogenously. The Bai-Perron test 
determined two breakpoints for the growth rate of GDP per capita: in 1974 and 2008. Table 
3 contains the results of the same test for the growth rates of labor productivity and TFP. We 






1960-1973 1974-1979 1980-1993 1994-2007 2008-2017
Figure 3. Contributions to Labor Productivity Growth
TFP Capital Deepening Labor Productivity
Source: Authors’ calculations 
The calculations are based on the formula:  𝚫𝐋𝐧
𝐘𝐭
𝐋𝐭
= 𝐠𝐭 + 𝐒𝐊,𝐭 ∗ 𝚫𝐋𝐧
𝐊𝐭
𝐋𝐭
, according to which the 




and unit root tests that allow for the possibility of a structural break (Perron, 1997). For more 
details on these tests, see Appendix Β. 
Table 3. Breakpoint Tests 
  ADF Test 
Unit Root 
with Break Bai-Perron 
      sequential global information criteria 




break in 1974 
break in 2008 
rejects the null of 
no breaks, global 
optimizers for two 
breaks: 1974, 2008 
break in 1974 
break in 2008 
Labor Productivity  Stationarity 
stationarity 
with break 
in 1973 break in 1974 
rejects the null of 
no breaks, global 
optimizers for one 




in 1974 break in 1972 
rejects the null of 
no breaks, global 
optimizers for one 
break: 1972 break in 1972 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
We note that the Bai-Perron tests identify breaks in 1974 and 2008 for GDP per capita; in 
1974 and 2008 for Labor Productivity; and slightly earlier in 1972 for TFP. Based on these 
results, figures 3, 4, 5 and 6 depict labor productivity (levels and growth rates) and TFP growth 
rates, each with the structural breaks and corresponding trend lines. 
We repeated the growth accounting exercise using capital and labor services as productive 
inputs instead. This methodology is theoretically superior to the one using stocks. As a result 
of accounting for changes in the quality of labor and capital, TFP growth is now measured to 
be slower. The empirical results point to some differences but not large ones. Depending on 
the period, TFP growth differs by 7%-16% when quality changes are accounted for. The 
qualitative conclusions do not change. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations 
It is sensible to claim that an important part of the variability in TFP is measurement error 
due to lack of correction for capacity utilization. We therefore extend our model following 
King and Rebelo (1999) to account for the effects of variable utilization in the capital input. 
The results in Table 4 indicate that utilization helped output growth with a small, positive 
contribution during 1961-1973 and 1994-2007, while it also added to the slowdown during 
the other periods with similarly small but negative rates of change. Accordingly, the 
procyclicality of TFP, and thus its effect on growth, is now slightly dampened; however, TFP 
remains the main explanatory factor of changes in output growth under all periods. Table 5 
extends the results of Table 2 accounting for variable utilization, and leads to the same 
conclusions. The analysis in the rest of the paper will be based on the results of the 
decomposition with capital stocks and total hours worked, also taking into account the 
correction for capacity utilization. 
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Table 4. Growth Decomposition with Capital Stocks, Total Hours Worked, and Capacity 
Utilization 
 














1961-1973 8.87% -0.71% -0.38% -0.33% 2.32% 0.19% 7.07% 
1974-1979 3.28% 0.36% 0.32% 0.03% 2.48% -0.63% 1.07% 
1980-1993 0.75% 0.50% 0.49% 0.00% 0.84% -0.35% -0.23% 
1994-2007 3.62% 0.71% 0.78% -0.07% 1.21% 0.22% 1.49% 
2008-2017 -2.82% -1.26% -1.18% -0.08% 0.00% -0.70% -0.86% 
Source: Authors’ calculations 



















) , where the last term expresses capacity 
utilization and ξ is the elasticity of the marginal depreciation rate of capital with respect to the level of utilization. 
See appendix A1 for more information. 
 
 
Table 5. Labor Productivity Decomposition 
  1961-1973 1974-1979 1980-1993 1994-2007 2008-2017 
Labor Productivity 9.79% 2.58% -0.13% 2.38% -0.77% 
Capital Deepening 2.52% 2.13% 0.45% 0.67% 0.79% 
Capacity Utilization 0.19% -0.63% -0.35% 0.22% -0.70% 
TFP 7.07% 1.07% -0.23% 1.49% -0.86% 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
We have seen in this section that the decisive factor of influence on economic growth during 
the last fifty-seven years has been TFP. Most importantly, high output growth was 
accompanied by high TFP growth and similarly for periods of low growth. In particular, the 
performance of TFP proves to have been the main culprit for the fourteen-year recession from 
1980 to1993 as well as for the recent depression. Contrary to widespread belief that the credit 
boom in the eurozone periphery was used to finance unproductive sectors and investments, 
we show that TFP growth was very healthy before the crisis that started in 2008; during 1997 
to 2007, annual TFP growth averaged 1.49% (standard methodology) or 1.71% (alternative 








3. The Greek Depression: Shortfall of Output 
In this section, we focus on the period of the Greek Depression, running from 2008 to 2017. 
We investigate the lasting effects of the financial crisis on several macroeconomic variables. 
We ask the question: which parts of the productive process have been impaired the most? 
Knowing the answer is important for designing and implementing policies for eventual 
recovery.  
We follow Hall (2014) and decompose output growth into the contributions of TFP, capital 
and labor input and capacity utilization using Solow’s growth accounting formula. Labor input 
(H), measured as total hours annually worked, is further decomposed into the effects of 
population (P) growth, labor force (LF) participation, employment (E) rate and average hours 
worked: 










Working with growth rates, we calculate actual contributions to GDP growth and then 
counterfactual contributions by assuming that the variables grow under two scenarios. In the 
first scenario, the trend growth rate for each variable is maintained at their 1974-2007 
average rate, whereas in the second scenario it is maintained at their 1994-2007 average rate. 
We subtract actual from counterfactual values to obtain the shortfall in growth for the output 
as well as for each productive factor. Tables 6 and 7, and the corresponding Figures 7 and 8, 
contain the results of the analysis.  
 
Table 6. Components of the Shortfall of Output Two, Five and Ten Years into the Depression 
(1974-2007 trend) 
 
















rate           +
Hours per 
week     +
Labor 
quality
2008 2.4 1.8 -0.4 1.1 0.0 0.2 -0.5 0.2 0.0
2009 6.4 3.1 0.2 1.7 0.1 -0.2 1.2 0.4 0.0
2010 7.6 2.8 0.7 1.5 0.1 0.5 2.1 -0.1 0.0
2011 11.2 2.8 1.1 2.1 0.3 1.3 3.8 -0.1 -0.2
2012 9.4 0.4 1.5 1.5 0.6 0.4 5.2 0.1 -0.3
2013 5.3 0.0 1.6 0.4 0.7 0.3 2.4 -0.1 -0.1
2014 1.4 0.0 1.7 -0.6 0.6 0.2 -0.9 0.3 0.0
2015 2.5 2.2 1.7 -0.3 0.6 -0.2 -1.4 -0.1 0.0
2016 2.4 2.1 1.6 -0.3 0.4 0.0 -1.1 -0.3 0.0
2017 0.6 0.5 1.5 -0.7 0.3 0.4 -1.7 0.3 0.0
2007 through 2010 16.4 7.7 0.5 4.3 0.2 0.5 2.8 0.5 0.0
2007 through 2013 42.3 11.0 4.6 8.3 1.8 2.5 14.3 0.4 -0.6







Source: Authors’ calculations 
The shortfall for each factor is first calculated yearly as the counterfactual % change based on the 1974 -2007 
trend minus the actual % change. For the chart, we aggregate the previous results up to a given year in order to 
obtain the cumulative shortfall for that year. For example, 2011 figures show the cumulative shortfall over 2008, 

























rate           +
Hours per 
week     +
Labor 
quality
2008 3.5 2.6 -0.4 1.2 0.0 0.3 -0.4 0.2 0.0
2009 7.4 3.9 0.2 1.8 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.4 0.0
2010 8.6 3.5 0.7 1.7 0.1 0.6 2.2 -0.1 0.0
2011 12.2 3.6 1.1 2.3 0.2 1.4 3.9 -0.1 -0.2
2012 10.4 1.2 1.5 1.6 0.5 0.6 5.3 0.0 -0.3
2013 6.4 0.8 1.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 2.5 -0.1 -0.1
2014 2.4 0.8 1.7 -0.5 0.5 0.4 -0.8 0.3 0.0
2015 3.6 2.9 1.7 -0.2 0.5 0.0 -1.3 -0.1 0.0
2016 3.4 2.8 1.6 -0.2 0.3 0.1 -1.1 -0.3 0.0
2017 1.6 1.3 1.5 -0.5 0.3 0.5 -1.6 0.2 0.0
2007 through 2010 19.5 10.0 0.4 4.7 0.0 0.9 3.1 0.4 0.0
2007 through 2013 48.4 15.7 4.6 9.2 1.3 3.3 14.7 0.2 -0.5









For each year, the Tables provide the incremental shortfall of output and each of its 
components relative to the respective counterfactual trend. The last three lines show the 
cumulative shortfall for output and each of its components over two, five and ten years into 
the Greek Depression. The 1994-2007 period saw higher growth rates for most of the 
variables, so that the shortfall in Table 7 is higher than that in Table 6 over the same periods. 
Both Tables show that in the first three years (2007 to 2010), the shortfall in output (16.4% 
below the 1974-2007 trend or 19.5% below the 1994-2007 trend), was mostly driven by bad 
performance of productivity. The second most important factor was capacity utilization and 
the third was the employment rate (mirroring the increase in the unemployment rate). The 
shortfall in capital accumulation, labor force participation rate, and average hours worked 
was marginal.  
In the following three years, the shortfall in output grew much worse, to 42.3% or 48.4% when 
cumulated from 2007 to 2013. This period contains the two worst years of the Greek 
Depression in terms of growth: 2011 and 2012. Productivity continued to be the most 
important element of the shortfall (11% and 15.7%). The dramatic increase in the 
unemployment rate between 2010 and 2013 raised the contribution of the employment rate 
in the shortfall (to 14.3% and 14.7%). During these three years capacity utilization continued 
to worsen, while capital stock accumulation fell substantially leading to a rising, though still 
small, contribution of capital in the shortfall.  
When the next four years (2014 to 2017) are taken into account, output shortfall grows only 
by a smaller amount (to 49.2% and 59.4%). This was because GDP growth showed signs of 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
The shortfall for each factor is first calculated yearly as the counterfactual % change 
based on the 1994-2007 trend minus the actual % change. For the chart, we aggregate  
the previous results up to a given year in order to obtain the cumulative shortfall for 
that year. For example, 2011 figures show the cumulative shortfall over 2008, 2009, 




improvement in 2014 and again in 2017. Note that these two years productivity growth also 
improved. In addition, the employment rate grew higher than its historical trend, so its 
contribution to the shortfall decreased (to 9.2% and 10%). The contribution of capacity 
utilization to the shortfall also decreased as, starting in 2014, it grew at a small but positive 
rate. Labor quality too had a small role in reducing the shortfall. Capital stock continued to 
deteriorate, being 11.1% lower than its historical trends, while population also decreased thus 
adding to the widening gap.  
Overall, for the 10-year period of the Greek Depression, we can say that productivity was the 
biggest driver of the poor output performance, accounting for more than one third of the 
total shortfall. It was followed by the capital stock, employment rate and capacity utilization, 
all of which performed badly. Except for labor quality, all other factors played a small, 
negative role. Attempting to give an answer to the question we posed at the beginning of this 
section, it is clear that policy action on improving productivity should be the most important 




4. The Future 
In this section, we consider possible permanent effects of the financial crisis on Greek 
standards of living. Several authors (e.g. Nelson and Plosser, 1982; Campbell  and Mankiw, 
1987) have provided evidence for the USA that deviations from trend output growth are 
permanent. This means that a demand or other shock causing a decline in output does not 
tend to be followed by a rebound during the recovery phase that brings output back on its 
initial, long-term track. Technically, there is a unit root in the time series of output, so that 
the latter is not mean reverting, pointing to the importance of real stochastic innovations in 
understanding long-term movements in output. More recent work by Cerra and Saxena 
(2005a, 2005b and 2008) has shown how financial and political crises in different countries 
have led to permanent losses of output.  
To test the unit-root hypothesis for the case of Greece, we performed a series of Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron unit root tests on the log of quarterly, seasonally 
adjusted, real GDP series beginning in 1960. Furthermore, to account for the possibility of 
having a false unit root on account of a structural break, we test for non-stationarity while 
taking into account the possibility of a break in the series. All tests indicate that the null 
hypothesis of a unit root in the log levels of real output cannot be rejected at the 5% 






Source: Authors’ calculations 
Quarterly, seasonally adjusted, real GDP data are obtained from the OECD. The figure shows long oscillations 
around a linear trend 
 
Having established that the loss in output due to the crisis is permanent. we turn to a 
discussion about future economic growth and the potential for growth of the Greek economy. 
We project forward the path of GDP per capita for two scenarios: a Great Recovery and a No 






















 is GDP per capita, 
𝑌
𝐻
 is labor productivity,  
𝐻
𝐸
 are average hours worked,  
𝐸
𝐿
 is the 
employment rate,  
𝐿
𝑊𝐴𝑃
 is the labor force participation rate and  
𝑊𝐴𝑃
𝑁
 is the proportion of 
working age to total population. We employ OECD’s forecasts of population and working age 
population (15-74 years) to 2030. We assume that average hours worked and labor force 
participation rate remain constant. 
The No Crisis scenario is a counterfactual that indicates what the level of standards of living 
in Greece might have been had there been no crisis. The key driving variable here is average 
labor productivity, which is assumed to grow at 1.38% p.a. (its average rate between 1974 
and 2007). These assumptions are applied from 2008 forward. In the No Crisis scenario, 
starting from 2007, the unemployment rate is held constant to its 2007 level of 8%.  
Alas, the performance of the Greek economy in the ten years after 2007 has not been as in 
the No Crisis scenario. We move on to the task of projecting forward from the standpoint of 
where the economy stood in 2017. The best-case scenario is for the Greek economy to reach 
average growth rates of Average Labor Productivity (ALP) equal to those it attained during 
the 1974 to 2007 period. This period includes both a boom and a slump in economic activity 

























































































years, both extreme economic episodes. During the thirty-three-year period of 1973 to 2007, 
ALP grew on average at 1.38% per annum (p.a.). We deem that this growth rate may be 
attainable in the future under a program of ambitious and focused economic reform. In the 
Great Recovery scenario, the unemployment rate is assumed to go down to 8% (its 2007 level) 
from its current level by 2027 starting in 2019. After that, it remains constant. We use OECD’s 
forecast for 2018 Real GDP and unemployment rate (€ 190,610 million and 0.20 respectively). 
As may be seen in Figure 10, the task of growth for the Greek economy ahead is not easy. To 
give an indication, income per capita would have to grow at an average annual rate of 3.5 % 
between 2019 and 2024 for standards of living to recuperate in 2026 the peak that they had 
attained in 2007. Such growth rates currently look unlikely unless there is a drastic and 
effective shift in the mix of policy towards growth. 
 
 
Source: OECD, own calculations 
For both scenarios, ALP growth assumed at 1.38% (its 1974 to 2007 average). Great Recovery: Reduction of 
unemployment rate to 8% from current level by 2027 starting in 2019. No Crisis: unemployment rate is held 
constant to 2007 level of 8%.  We use OECD’s forecast for 2018 Real GDP and unemployment rate (€ 190,610 
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Figure 10. GDP per Capita Projection
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A1. Methodology and Data 
Growth accounting decomposes the growth of gross domestic product into components 
related to the accumulation of productive inputs and a residual term called Total Factor 
Productivity or Solow residual, in honor of Nobel laureate Robert Solow, who developed this 
idea (1957). Growth accounting decomposition does not explain but can help in 
understanding the forces that drive growth, such as institutions, the rule of law, and sound 
policies. The framework employs a standard neoclassical production function: 
                                                   𝒀 = 𝑭(𝑨,𝑲, 𝑳)                                                                           (1) 
where aggregate output Y is a function of capital input K, labor input L and total factor 
productivity, A. Differentiating with respect to time and then dividing by Y we get the growth 
rate of total output as: 
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is the Solow residual. This is the part of economic growth that cannot be explained by the 
contributions of production inputs, and is interpreted as growth of total factor productivity. 
Assuming perfect competition in output and factor markets, the price of capital (UK) is equal 
to the marginal product of capital and the wage (W) is equal to that of labor. It then follows 
that:  SK = 
𝑈𝐾∗𝐾
𝑌
 and SL = 
𝑊∗𝐿
𝑌
 are the respective shares of each factor’s remuneration in total 
product. The growth of output then equals the weighted sum of the growth rates of 
production inputs and that of the Solow residual:        











                                (3) 
The data we use was drawn mainly from the OECD and Eurostat. Detailed sources are 
provided at the end of this document in Appendix C. We note that 2010 was chosen as the 
base year and our calculations and results are in year-average prices. 
Series on total investment were taken from the OECD and were available from 1960 onwards. 
Data on GDP were also available from 1960 and we extended it back to 1951 using data from 
the Penn World Table. Assuming that the flow of investment is equally distributed over the 
period, we calculate net capital stock and consumption of fixed capital in base-year average 
prices using the following equations: 
Net Capital Stock (end of period):      𝑺𝒕𝒐𝒄𝒌𝒆𝒏𝒅
𝒕 = 𝑺𝒕𝒐𝒄𝒌𝒃𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒏




)   
(4) 









In equation (4) we apply the perpetual inventory method, which denotes that at the end of 
the period, the net capital stock equals the stock at the beginning of that period plus 
investment minus the consumption of fixed capital. The aggregate depreciation rate (δ) was 
assumed to be constant and chosen to match the capital and labor services analysis95. 
The input of labor is measured by total hours worked, i.e. total employment times average 
hours actually worked in a year. As for the labor share we used the compensation of labor 
divided by gross value added, after accounting for the income of self-employed. The share of 
capital is computed as 1 minus that of labor. 
 
 
 A2. Decomposition Using Capital and Labor Services 
From a theoretical point of view, capital and labor services are considered more appropriate 
for productivity analysis as they take into account compositional changes in employment and 
stock of capital. In this section we perform the growth accounting exercise using capital and 
labor services as inputs. Eurostat and the OECD provide us with enough data to perform such 
a task for the years 1997-201796. This is, admittedly, a very limited time period. Still, 
comparing the results from the two methods during the years 1997-2017 is a good check of 
robustness.  
Capital stock is not considered the best proxy to account for the contribution of the existing 
capital assets to aggregate production. There are three main problems with using the (net) 
capital stock as the capital input. The first problem is that, as a stock, it is inconsistent with 
other variables, such as total hours worked, that enter the production function as flows. 
Another problem when using capital stock is that it does not account for heterogeneity in 
capital assets. The third problem is that capital stock does not capture correctly the 
contribution of more productive assets which may have short asset lives and low price, since 
assets are weighted by their market value when computing the capital stock and therefore 
expensive assets with longer service lives are assumed to contribute more. One should keep 
in mind that the problem of heterogeneity of labor inputs arises also when measuring labor 
input by total hours. Specifically, using total hours worked as the labor input does not take 
into account important compositional changes, such as those in education level and the 
participation of women. 
The modern approach is to consider the flow of productive services which originate from the 
stock of physical assets in a given time period. These are considered more appropriate to 
enter the production function as capital input. The same holds for labor services. The theory 
of measuring capital services was developed by Dale Jorgenson (1963, 1967, 1969 etc.) and 
other authors in the 1960s and since then, the literature has grown, and detailed guidelines 
 
95 Details are provided in section 4. 




have been published. The methodology we follow and that we describe in detail in Appendix 
A is the one outlined by the OECD (2009). 
Table 8 contains the results split in two separate periods: 1997-2007 (which is a subset of the 
“Recovery”) and 2008-2017. Looking at this new data we can observe that, over both 
examined periods, compositional changes in the number of total hours worked have had a 
small, positive influence on growth (0.19% and 0.21%). Quality changes in the productive 
capital stock seem to have had a similarly small effect (0.07% and -0.20%). As a result, when 
we compare these findings with those in Table 1 (which, for convenience, are also given in 
Table 9 below, averaged over corresponding periods) we notice that, moving from capital and 
labor services to capital stocks and total hours worked overestimates the contribution of TFP 
by 24.14% in the first period and underestimates it by 8.24% in the second period. In other 
words, the two methodologies do not result in substantially different decompositions. 
 
Table 8 
















    







1997-2007 3.99% 0.99% 0.89% -0.09% 0.19% 1.54% 1.47% 0.07% 1.45% 




Growth Decomposition with Capital Stocks and Total Hours Worked 








Hours  Net Capital Stock TFP 
1997-2007 3.99% 0.80% 0.89% -0.09% 1.38% 1.80% 





A3. Estimation of Capital and Labor services 
We present here the basic methodology followed for decomposing economic growth. First, 
we discuss the theory that underlies our calculations and then we provide annual results.  
Labour Input breaks into: 
Labour Input breaks into: Capital Services break into: 
Source: Authors’ calculations 




A3.1 Capital Stocks 
Our estimation begins by computing the gross fixed capital stock. This is the accumulated 
stock of past investments corrected for retirement using an age-retirement pattern. It is called 
gross because consumption of fixed capital has not yet been deducted, thus ignoring asset 
decay. Once the gross fixed capital stock is computed, we can estimate the net fixed capital 
stock by applying an age-price profile that depicts an asset’s loss in value over time. So the 
net capital stock is the stock of assets surviving from past periods that is corrected for 
depreciation, i.e. consumption of fixed capital. When a geometric age-price profile is used, 
i.e. a constant rate of depreciation is assumed, it can be shown that this can act as a good 
approximation to a combined age-price/retirement profile (OECD 2009). What this means is 
that we can derive the net capital stock without first having to estimate the gross capital stock.  
We saw that equation (4) is the perpetual inventory identity which allows us to construct time 
series on net capital stock. However, in the absence of full time series of investment, we need 
to estimate the initial capital stock in year 1951. We do so by following a methodology similar 
to that of Kehoe and Prescott (2007). According to that, the initial value of the capital stock 
𝐾1951  must satisfy that: 










𝐭=𝟏𝟗𝟓𝟐              ,                                                           
(6) 
where Yt is the value of real output in time t, so the ratio of capital stock to the initial product 
should equal the average of that ratio over the next fifteen years97. It is important to note 
that our investment series from the OECD go as back as 1960 only, so for the years 1951-1959 
we assume that investment grew at the rate of real GDP. 
Before moving on to calculating capital services, we make one final remark: the stock series 
generated by equation 4 is expressed in units of new assets. This means that the capital stock 
is measured in new asset prices that are observable in the market. This is important when 
calculating the rate of change of the stock of capital: with investment series by type of asset, 
it can be shown that the rate of change of total capital stock equals the sum of rates of change 
of all asset stocks, each weighted with relative market prices. This is different from the 
aggregation scheme that we use for the rate of change of capital services, in which relative 
rental prices are required instead. We will see that this also makes a difference for the shares 
of capital input in total product used in equation (3), when these are calculated in the case of 




97 Various methods exist in the literature, like for example the steady-state approach. In general, each method 
comes with advantages and disadvantages, but choosing one over  the other becomes less important when the 
initial year is chosen to be as far back in time as possible. It can then be shown that the resulting series from all 
methods over the examined period converge. This is the reason why we chose 1951 as our initial year, which is 




A3.2 Capital Services 
We proceed by identifying 6 groups of assets. These are: dwellings, other buildings and 
structures, transport equipment, other machinery and equipment, intangible fixed assets and 
cultivated assets. The intermediate step towards calculating the flow of capital services from 
these assets is the estimation of the productive stock. This is derived similarly to the net 
capital stock, when one applies an age-efficiency profile in the place of the age-price profile 
described earlier. The age-efficiency profile depicts an asset’s loss in productive efficiency 
over time and thus the productive stock is the stock of assets surviving from past periods that 
is corrected for its loss in productive efficiency. The flow of capital services for a group of 
assets is considered to be proportional to the productive stock of that group of assets. Again, 
in the case of geometric rates the age-efficiency profile can be used as an approximation to a 
combined age-efficiency/retirement profile. Using geometric rates also comes with the 
advantage that the age-efficiency and age-price profiles are identical and as a result the 
productive stock is the same as the net capital stock. We can therefore use equations 4, 5 and 
6 to calculate the end-of-period, net capital stock for each asset group and this will also be 
equal to that asset’s productive stock. 
The depreciation rates for each type of asset are collected from the EUKLEMS (Timmer et al, 
2007), which in turn bases its calculations to BEA depreciation rates by Fraumeni (1997). 
Across all industries, EUKLEMS uses a range of depreciation rates for each type of asset. We 
made sure that the rates we used did not exceed those ranges. The aggregate depreciation 
rate used in the case of capital stocks earlier was derived using the formula: 
                         𝛅 =
∑ 𝛅𝐭𝐭
𝐭
        , where:           𝛅𝐭 =









                           (7) 
As explained in footnote 5, we want the generated stock series to depend as little as possible 
on the initial capital stock and, consequently, on the method with which that was calculated. 
This is the reason why we did not take into account the first few observations generated by 
equation 4. However, skipping years like that is not possible in the present case due to limited 
data. We therefore decided to choose the depreciation rates so that the total initial capital 
stock in 1995 is as close as possible to the 1995 capital stock calculated in section 2 where the 
aggregate depreciation rate was used. So, although capital stock series from 1997 onwards 
remain highly dependent on the value of the initial stock, we can be sure that the target value 
we set for the 1995 capital stock is “correct” given the depreciation rates and the analysis 
with capital stocks discussed above. 
The next step is to calculate the price of capital services or rental price. This is done using 
information on the real rate of return to capital, the depreciation rate and the rate of 
revaluation. We opted for the endogenous, ex post approach with regard to the real rate of 
return. According to that, internal rates of return are computed by imposing the condition 
that the estimated value of capital services exactly corresponds to gross operating surplus 
plus the capital element of gross mixed income. The total user costs for a particular asset type 




Assuming that the flow of capital services from capital asset i moves in proportion with the 
corresponding, mid-year productive stock, we can compute the rate of change of capital 
services ΔLnBt as a Törnqvist index: 
                                              𝛥𝐋𝐧𝐁𝐭 = ∑ ?̅?𝒊,𝒕 ∗ 𝚫𝐋𝐧𝐊𝐢,𝐭
𝟔
𝐢=𝟏      ,                                                     (8) 
where  
                             ?̅?𝒊,𝒕 =
𝐬𝐢,𝐭+𝐬𝐢,𝐭−𝟏
𝟐






We use Ui,t to denote the rental price of asset type i in time t and Ki,t is the corresponding 
productive stock, so that Ui,t * Ki,t are the user costs for that asset. Equation (8) tells us that 
the rate of change of capital services equals the weighted sum of rates of change of the 
productive stocks for each asset group, where the weights are the shares in user costs.  
 
A3.3 Labor Services 
Labor input should take into account changes in total employment and average hours actually 
worked as well as compositional changes, such as those in education level and participation 
of women. For the period 1997-2016, we divide total employment by gender and three levels 
of educational attainment: a) pre-primary, primary and lower secondary education (levels 0-
2 according to ISCED), b) upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education (levels 
3 and 4) and c) first and second stage of tertiary education (levels 5 and 6). That gives us a 
total of 6 groups of workers and our input will be the total hours worked by each group. 
Aggregating across hours worked by each group to get a measure of labor input change is 
similar to aggregating across assets like we did in the previous section. Assigning weights, 
however, should be somewhat easier since the price of labor is observable in the market in 
the form of wages, unlike rental price of capital which we had to compute. Similarly as in 
equation (6), the rate of change labor input is given by: 
                                               𝚫𝐋𝐧𝐋𝐭 = ∑ 𝐬𝐣,𝐭̅̅ ̅̅
𝟔
𝐣=𝟏 ∗ 𝚫𝐋𝐧𝐇𝐣,𝐭                                                         (9) 
where: 
                           ?̅?𝐣,𝐭 =
𝐬𝐣,𝐭+𝐬𝐣,𝐭−𝟏
𝟐










   
We express mean hourly earnings of workers’ group j in time t relative to the average earnings 
for each gender in time t with 
𝑤𝑗,𝑡
?̅?𝑡
  and total hours worked by the same group with 𝐻𝑗,𝑡. Due 
to data limitations we use relative wages which are assumed constant over periods of time98. 
This doesn’t change that 𝑤𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑗,𝑡  expresses the compensation of workers’ group j in time t 
so that equation (7) denotes that the rate of change of total labor input is given by the 
 
98 This kind of assumption is not new. See Scarpetta et al. (2000) and Schreyer et al (2003) who also hold earnings 





weighted sum of the rates of change of total hours worked by each group, with shares in total 
labor compensation acting as weights. 
Regarding the data needed to construct labor services, we resorted to Eurostat. However, no 
data of hours worked by educational attainment was available, so we had to cross-classify 
between data on full-time/part-time employment by educational attainment and sex and 
data on average number of weekly hours actually worked by full-time/part-time type of 
employment and sex. In essence, this type of “concordance” makes the simplifying 
assumption that, on average, all persons working part-time (full-time respectively) worked 
the same number of hours regardless of their educational level. This enables us to acquire 
series of total weekly hours worked by men and women of different educational level (which 
in this exercise is a proxy for skill). Finally, EUROSTAT time series on average working hours 
begin in 1983, so for the years 1970-1982 we complement with data from the OECD database. 
The rate of change for the total, skill-adjusted number of weekly hours worked that serves as 
our labor input is constructed through the weighting scheme of equation (9). The required 
data on earnings by sex and educational attainment is provided by Eurostat for the years 2006 
and 2010. 
 
A3.4 Input Shares 
We saw in equation (3) that when perfect competition is assumed, then each factor is paid 
with its marginal product. So, the marginal product of labor will be equal to the labor wage 
and the marginal product of capital will be equal to the rental price of capital. We can then 
calculate the respective shares of labor and capital in time t as: 










𝐰𝐭−𝟏∗𝐋𝐭−𝟏 +∑ 𝐔𝐢,𝐭−𝟏 ∗𝐊𝐢,𝐭−𝟏
𝟔
𝐢=𝟏
)                         (10) 
            














𝐰𝐭−𝟏 ∗𝐋𝐭−𝟏 +∑ 𝐔𝐢,𝐭−𝟏 ∗𝐊𝐢,𝐭−𝟏
𝟔
𝐢=𝟏
)  ,                     
(11) 
where wt ∗ Lt is the total remuneration of labor in time t, which includes the compensation 
of both employees and self-employed) and wt−1 ∗ Lt−1  are the total user costs of capital in 






99 The reader is reminded that the endogenous, ex-post rate of return for every period was computed by equating 




A4 Capacity Utilization 
We have seen how our estimated productivity is procyclical and can explain a large part of 
the observed variation in GDP over time. Basu and Kimbal (1997) have argued that such a 
procyclicality may also result from measurement error. In particular, they argue that if other 
procyclical inputs are systematically mismeasured or omitted, this will translate into a 
biased estimate for TFP. To account for variable capital utilization, we implement the 
decomposition of King and Rebelo (1999) and incorporate capital utilization in a Cobb-
Douglas production function as follows: 
 
𝒀 = 𝑭(𝑨,𝑲, 𝑳) =  𝐀𝐭 ∗ 𝑭(𝐳𝐭 ∗ 𝐊𝐭, 𝐋𝐭) 𝐋𝐭 = 𝐀𝐭 ∗ 𝑭(𝐳𝐭 ∗ 𝐊𝐭,𝐋𝐭) 𝐋𝐭 = 𝐀𝐭 ∗ (𝐳𝐭 ∗ 𝐊𝐭)
𝟏−𝒂 ∗ 𝐋𝐭
𝒂   
(12) 
Where 𝐳𝐭 denotes the rate of utilization. We also assume that a variable utilization of capital 
affects the formation of capital through the relation: 
 
      𝑺𝒕𝒐𝒄𝒌𝒆𝒏𝒅
𝒕 = 𝑺𝒕𝒐𝒄𝒌𝒃𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒏




)          
(13) 
Where 𝜹 is a convex, increasing function of the utilization rate. Profit maximization with 
optimal utilization rate implies that the representative firm equates the marginal benefit of 























)             
(14) 
Where the last term expresses capacity utilization and ξ is the elasticity of the marginal 
depreciation rate of capital with respect to the level of utilization:  
 
      𝝃 = 𝒛∗𝜹′′(𝒛)
𝜹′(𝒛)
> 𝟎           
Most studies use a ξ between 0 and 2, mostly based on Basu and Kimball (1997) who found 
a 95% confidence interval between these values. With a higher value for ξ the effects of 
capital utilization diminish and TFP becomes more procyclical, as shown below. For our 











TFP estimates for different values of ξ 





1961-1973 7.00% 7.07% 7.12% 7.15% 7.17% 7.26% 
1974-1979 1.30% 1.07% 0.91% 0.82% 0.76% 0.44% 
1980-1993 -0.11% -0.23% -0.32% -0.37% -0.41% -0.58% 
1994-2007 1.41% 1.49% 1.54% 1.56% 1.60% 1.71% 








 GDP  Labour Input Total Employment Average Hours Net Capital Stock
Capacity 
Utilization TFP
1961 14.44% -0.04% 0.33% -0.37% 1.13% 0.81% 12.53%
1962 5.08% -1.17% -0.81% -0.36% 1.22% -0.18% 5.21%
1963 13.07% -1.47% -1.11% -0.35% 1.16% 1.00% 12.38%
1964 2.86% -1.34% -1.00% -0.34% 1.43% -0.51% 3.29%
1965 15.29% -0.86% -0.53% -0.34% 1.84% 1.27% 13.04%
1966 2.42% -1.00% -0.67% -0.33% 1.86% -0.83% 2.39%
1967 7.96% -1.24% -0.90% -0.33% 1.48% 0.33% 7.39%
1968 8.79% -1.25% -0.91% -0.34% 1.84% 0.18% 8.03%
1969 6.26% -0.56% -0.23% -0.33% 2.31% -0.48% 5.00%
1970 13.06% -1.31% -0.06% -1.24% 2.63% 1.41% 10.34%
1971 11.05% 0.19% 0.16% 0.02% 3.80% 0.89% 6.17%
1972 7.45% 0.30% 0.26% 0.04% 4.79% -0.82% 3.18%
1973 7.63% 0.53% 0.50% 0.03% 4.67% -0.55% 2.98%
1974 -7.00% 0.08% 0.05% 0.03% 2.13% -3.87% -5.35%
1975 5.28% 0.08% 0.05% 0.03% 2.37% 0.23% 2.60%
1976 6.64% 0.63% 0.60% 0.03% 2.43% 0.60% 2.97%
1977 5.77% 0.45% 0.42% 0.03% 2.63% 0.10% 2.59%
1978 5.08% 0.26% 0.22% 0.04% 2.68% -0.24% 2.39%
1979 3.89% 0.65% 0.61% 0.04% 2.60% -0.58% 1.22%
1980 1.22% 0.78% 0.76% 0.02% 1.72% -0.78% -0.50%
1981 -1.52% 2.83% 2.83% 0.00% 1.26% -1.30% -4.31%
1982 -1.29% -0.61% -0.60% -0.01% 1.03% -1.06% -0.64%
1983 -0.78% 0.21% 0.28% -0.07% 1.10% -0.95% -1.14%
1984 1.85% -0.14% -0.13% -0.01% 0.56% 0.14% 1.29%
1985 2.56% 1.43% 1.46% -0.03% 0.75% 0.22% 0.16%
1986 0.55% 0.21% 0.20% 0.01% 0.72% -0.32% -0.05%
1987 -2.25% 0.01% -0.05% 0.06% 0.56% -1.04% -1.78%
1988 4.06% 0.85% 0.93% -0.07% 0.59% 0.81% 1.81%
1989 3.82% 0.27% 0.21% 0.06% 0.68% 0.64% 2.23%
1990 0.11% 0.84% 0.77% 0.06% 0.72% -0.45% -0.99%
1991 2.92% -0.98% -1.02% 0.03% 0.80% 0.29% 2.82%
1992 0.74% 0.81% 0.81% 0.00% 0.69% -0.24% -0.52%
1993 -1.48% 0.44% 0.46% -0.02% 0.57% -0.82% -1.66%
1994 1.94% 0.98% 1.03% -0.05% 0.46% 0.27% 0.22%
1995 2.15% 0.52% 0.50% 0.01% 0.52% 0.28% 0.83%
1996 2.82% -0.36% -0.32% -0.03% 0.70% 0.35% 2.12%
1997 4.54% -0.21% -0.18% -0.04% 0.74% 0.82% 3.19%
1998 3.79% 2.52% 2.54% -0.03% 1.25% 0.25% -0.22%
1999 3.16% 0.96% 0.26% 0.70% 1.37% -0.02% 0.85%
2000 3.87% 0.58% 0.85% -0.27% 1.36% 0.19% 1.73%
2001 4.11% 1.95% 1.74% 0.21% 1.46% 0.22% 0.48%
2002 4.03% 0.45% 0.76% -0.31% 1.32% 0.27% 1.98%
2003 5.72% 1.31% 1.15% 0.16% 1.63% 0.50% 2.28%
2004 5.09% 0.45% 0.58% -0.13% 1.63% 0.35% 2.66%
2005 0.60% 0.24% 0.47% -0.23% 1.07% -0.55% -0.16%
2006 5.69% 0.53% 1.13% -0.61% 1.47% 0.50% 3.18%
2007 3.24% 0.07% 0.48% -0.41% 1.88% -0.39% 1.68%
2008 -0.30% 0.37% 0.59% -0.22% 1.60% -1.15% -1.12%
2009 -4.31% -1.12% -0.72% -0.39% 0.92% -1.72% -2.39%
2010 -5.51% -2.21% -2.32% 0.10% 0.35% -1.59% -2.06%
2011 -9.13% -4.77% -4.85% 0.09% -0.05% -2.19% -2.12%
2012 -7.30% -5.63% -5.54% -0.09% -0.40% -1.54% 0.27%
2013 -3.24% -2.95% -3.00% 0.05% -0.51% -0.49% 0.71%
2014 0.74% 0.04% 0.35% -0.31% -0.56% 0.57% 0.69%
2015 -0.40% 1.33% 1.27% 0.06% -0.54% 0.25% -1.45%
2016 -0.23% 1.34% 1.09% 0.25% -0.47% 0.26% -1.35%
2017 1.51% 1.00% 1.29% -0.29% -0.35% 0.64% 0.22%
Labour Input breaks into:
Table 11 






We note at this point that in Table 7 we decompose the rate of change of labor input into the 
rate of change of total hours and that of labor composition (ΔLnFt) using: 
                                               𝚫𝐋𝐧𝐅𝐭 = 𝚫𝐋𝐧𝐋𝐭 − 𝚫𝐋𝐧𝐇𝐭                                                           (15) 
Equation 15 tells us that the rate of change of labor composition equals the rate of change of 
labor input minus that of total hours worked. In the same way, we decompose the growth of 
capital services into the growth of productive stock (which in our case is the same as net 
capital stock) and that of quality of capital (Q): 
                                               𝚫𝐋𝐧𝐐𝐭 = 𝚫𝐋𝐧𝐁𝐭 − 𝚫𝐋𝐧𝐊𝐭                                                          (16) 
 
 
B1. Unit Root Tests 
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test constructs a parametric correction for higher than first 
order lag correlation by assuming that the series follows an AR(p) process and adding lagged 
p difference terms of the dependent variable y to the right-hand side of the test regression: 




capital Stock Quality Effect
1997 4.54% -0.09% -0.18% -0.04% 0.12% 0.31% 0.93% -0.62% 4.32%
1998 3.79% 2.86% 2.54% -0.03% 0.35% 1.03% 1.23% -0.20% -0.10%
1999 3.16% 1.09% 0.26% 0.70% 0.13% 1.66% 1.56% 0.10% 0.41%
2000 3.87% 0.59% 0.85% -0.27% 0.01% 1.70% 1.59% 0.11% 1.59%
2001 4.11% 2.04% 1.74% 0.21% 0.08% 1.75% 1.62% 0.13% 0.33%
2002 4.03% 0.69% 0.76% -0.31% 0.24% 1.83% 1.54% 0.29% 1.51%
2003 5.72% 1.46% 1.15% 0.16% 0.14% 1.90% 1.58% 0.32% 2.37%
2004 5.09% 1.17% 0.58% -0.13% 0.72% 1.89% 1.73% 0.15% 2.03%
2005 0.60% 0.21% 0.47% -0.23% -0.03% 1.32% 1.37% -0.05% -0.93%
2006 5.69% 0.70% 1.13% -0.61% 0.18% 1.38% 1.32% 0.07% 3.61%
2007 3.24% 0.19% 0.48% -0.41% 0.12% 2.23% 1.77% 0.46% 0.83%
2008 -0.30% 0.53% 0.59% -0.22% 0.16% 2.13% 1.70% 0.43% -2.96%
2009 -4.31% -1.14% -0.72% -0.39% -0.02% 1.24% 1.13% 0.11% -4.41%
2010 -5.51% -1.97% -2.32% 0.10% 0.25% 0.45% 0.54% -0.09% -3.99%
2011 -9.13% -4.43% -4.85% 0.09% 0.34% -0.22% 0.09% -0.30% -4.48%
2012 -7.30% -5.33% -5.52% -0.09% 0.27% -0.90% -0.27% -0.63% -1.07%
2013 -3.24% -2.46% -2.99% 0.05% 0.48% -1.12% -0.45% -0.66% 0.33%
2014 0.74% 0.01% 0.35% -0.31% -0.02% -0.89% -0.47% -0.42% 1.61%
2015 -0.40% 1.42% 1.27% 0.06% 0.09% -0.64% -0.44% -0.20% -1.18%
2016 -0.23% 1.80% 1.09% 0.32% 0.38% -0.52% -0.37% -0.16% -1.50%
2017 1.51% 1.25% 1.29% -0.23% 0.19% -0.35% -0.25% -0.10% 0.61%
Table 7








Labour Input breaks into: Capital Services break into:
Table 12 




We tested three different versions of the above specification, namely an equation that 
includes a) a constant, b) a constant and a linear time trend, and c) one that has neither. The 
optimal number of lags was chosen based on the Schwarz Info criterion. 
Phillips and Perron (1988) propose an alternative method of controlling for serial correlation 
when testing for a unit root. Their method estimates a non-augmented AR(1) Dickey-Fuller 
equation and modifies the t-statistic of the a  coefficient so that serial correlation does not 
affect the asymptotic distribution of the test statistic. The Phillips-Perron test is based on the 
statistic: 











             
(18) 
where 𝑎 is the estimate, and 𝑡𝑎  the t-statistic of a, 𝑠𝑒(𝑎) is the coefficient standard error, and 
s is the standard error of the test regression. In addition, 𝛾0  is a consistent estimate of the 
error variance in the simple Dickey-Fuller equation, and 𝑓0  is an estimator of the residual 
spectrum at frequency zero. 




B2. Unit Root Tests with a break 
Structural change occurs in many time series for any number of reasons, including economic 
crises, changes in institutional arrangements, policy changes and regime shifts. Perron (1989) 
points out that conventional unit root tests are biased toward a false unit root null when the 
data are trend stationary with a structural break. Accordingly, we want to test for non-
stationarity while taking into account the possibility of a break in the series. Two models exist 
in the literature which differ in their treatment of the break dynamics: the innovational outlier 
(IO) model assumes that the break occurs gradually, with the breaks following the same 
dynamic path as the innovations; and the additive outlier (AO) model assumes the breaks 
occur immediately. The tests based on these models evaluate the null hypothesis that the 
series follow a unit root process, possibly with a break, against a trend stationary with break 
alternative. For the IO model, we consider the following general null hypothesis: 
𝒚𝒕 = 𝒚𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷 + 𝝍(𝑳) ∗ (𝜽 ∗ 𝑫𝒕(𝑻𝒃) + 𝜸𝑫𝑼𝒕(𝑻𝒃) + 𝜺𝒕)           
(19) 
 
where: - 𝐷𝑈𝑡(𝑇𝑏) is an intercept break variable that takes the value of 0 for all dates prior to 
the break, and 1 thereafter: 𝐷𝑈𝑡(𝑇𝑏) = 1 (𝑡 ≥ 𝑇𝑏), 
- 𝐷𝑇𝑡(𝑇𝑏) is a one-time break dummy variable which takes the value of 1 only on the 




- 𝜀𝑡  are i.i.d. innovations,  
- and 𝜓(𝐿) is a lag polynomial representing the dynamics of the stationary and 
invertible ARMA error process.   
 
The break variables enter the model with the same dynamics as the  innovations. For the AO 
model, 𝜓(𝐿) is excluded so that the full impact of the break variables occurs immediately. For 
our alternative hypothesis, we assume a trend stationary model with breaks in the intercept 
and trend: 
𝒚𝒕 = 𝒚𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝒕 + 𝝍(𝑳) ∗ (𝜽 ∗ 𝑫𝑼𝒕(𝑻𝒃) + 𝜸𝑫𝑻𝒕(𝑻𝒃) + 𝜺𝒕)      
(20) 
 
where: 𝐷𝑇𝑡(𝑇𝑏) is a trend break variable that takes the value of 0 for all dates prior to the 
break, and is a break date re-based trend for all subsequent dates: 𝐷𝑡(𝑇𝑏) =  1 (𝑡 ≥ 𝑇𝑏) ∗
(𝑡 −  𝑇𝑏 + 1). The breaks again follow the innovation dynamics.  
 
We consider different specifications that control for: a) an intercept break, b) an intercept 
and trend break, and c) only a change in trend. The break date is endogenously determined 
by minimizing the Dickey-Fuller t-statistic. The idea is to select the date providing the most 




B3. Structural Break Tests 
As our primary tool to detect breaks we use procedures developed by Bai and Perron. Their 
methodology has the advantage of allowing multiple break points to be determined 
endogenously, however it “precludes integrated variables (with an auto-regressive unit root)” 
(2000, p.10). Consequently, we look for a break in growth rates of variables that are found to 
be stationary. We carry out the following three procedures: i) a sequential test of L+1 breaks 
vs the alternative of L breaks, ii) a test of globally optimized breaks against the null of no 
breaks and iii) global information criteria to select the number of breaks. 
 
 
C. Robustness checks for capital services   
In this section we examine the robustness of our constructed measure of capital services by 




We begin by examining the effect on the growth rates of capital services by an increase in 
initial capital stocks. We raise the initial stocks of all assets by 50% and the results are depicted 
in the following figure: 
 
 
Raising the capital stocks of all assets results in a decrease in capital services growth rates by 
1.44% on average in comparison with our initial findings. The distance between the two 
curves is larger at the beginning and narrows towards the end of the period we examine. 
Next, we consider the effects of a 25% decrease on the depreciation rates of all assets. The 
results are shown in the next figure: 
 
 
The decreased depreciation rates cause our estimates to deviate by 0.77% on average. 
We will now present the results of estimating capital services when different approaches in 







1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Figure 11









1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Figure 12
Capital services rate of change before and after a 25% decrease in all 
depreciation rates 
after before
Source: Authors’ calculations 




assumption of the endogenous, ex post approach that we followed. We now consider two 
more: the endogenous, simplified approach and the exogenous, ex ante approach. The 
endogenous, simplified approach rests on the assumption that real holding gains or losses are 
zero for each type of asset. Such an assumption will be reasonable if the asset price changes 
are not too far from general price changes. According to the exogenous, ex-ante approach 
the rate of return is chosen from financial market data so as best to express economic agents’ 
expectations about the required return from investment. In this case equality between the 
value of capital services and gross operating surplus plus the capital element of gross mixed 
is not expected. Following the methodology of the Conference Board, the exogenous rate of 
return is computed as the maximum between the Central Bank’s Discount Window, the 
Government Bond Yield and the Lending Rate. Series on the last two components are 
collected from the Bank of Greece Statistical Database, while for the Discount Window we 






D. Calculations of output shortfall in the Greek Depression 
The calculations in Tables 6 and 7 and Figures 7 and 8 embody the basic identity: 
Output growth = productivity growth + capital contribution + labor contribution. 
In turn, capital contribution = capital share × change in log per capita input  
and labor contribution = labor share × change in log labor input. 
Finally, 
Change in log labor input = change in log population + change in log participation rate  
             + change in log employment rate + change in log hours 
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Tornqvist Indices
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Figures 7 and 8 in the main text show the cumulative contribution of each component to total 
output shortfall by year. 
 
 
E. Data Sources 
Code Variable 
A1 Gross domestic product (nominal) 
A2 GDP deflator 
A3 Gross operating surplus and gross mixed 
income 
A4 Consumer price index 
A5 Total dependent employment 
A6 Total self-employed 
A7 Total employment, Full-time, Part-time 
employment 
A8 Earnings 
A9 Compensation of employees 
A10 Gross value added  
A11 Other taxes less other subsidies on 
production  
 
A12 Gross fixed capital formation by type of 
asset 
A13 Gross fixed capital formation, deflators 
A14 Average Hours Actually Worked 
 
The data was collected from: 
A1, Α2, Α3, Α9, A10, A11, A12, A13 : http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/ ➔  Statistics ➔ Databases 
➔ OECD National Accounts Statistics ➔ Aggregate National Accounts ➔ Gross Domestic 
Product  
A5, A6, A7: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/ ➔  Statistics ➔ Databases ➔ OECD Economic 
Outlook: Statistics and Projections ➔ OECD Economic Outlook No.102  
A4: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/ ➔  Statistics ➔ Databases ➔ OECD Factbook Statistics ➔ 
OECD Factbook  
 
A8:  http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/ ➔Statistics 
Database ➔ 






A7:  http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/ ➔Statistics 
Database ➔ 
Population and Social  Conditions ➔Labor Market ➔ Employment and Unemployment ➔ 
LFS series - Detailed annual survey results ➔ Full-time and part-time employment - LFS series 
➔ Full-time and part-time employment by sex, age and highest level of education attained 
 
A14:  http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/ ➔Statistics 
Database ➔ Population and Social  Conditions ➔ Labor Market ➔ LFS series - Detailed 
annual survey results ➔Working time - LFS series ➔ Average number of actual weekly hours 



























Chapter 9. Income inequality and re-distribution: from crisis to 
recovery 
Eirini Andriopoulou100, Eleni Kanavitsa101 and Panos Tsakloglou102 
 
Abstract 
This chapter provides a detailed picture of the evolution of the level and the structure of 
inequality during the period 2007-2016, in which Greece faced one of the most severe debt 
crises among developed countries. The aim is to examine how changes in overall income 
distribution affected inequality between and within different socioeconomic groups and thus 
indirectly how the burden of fiscal consolidation was shared across population groups. The 
findings are linked with economic developments and policy choices of the period in question. 
The results show that inequality rose at the beginning and the peak of the crisis, but the 
magnitude of the change varies across different indices. The recorded increases are larger 
when the indices used are relatively more sensitive to changes close to the bottom of the 
income distribution. The increase in unemployment played the most substantial role for the 
decrease in income of a large share of the population, in combination with the absence of an 
adequate safety net. Inequality “within population groups” was far more important in 
shaping aggregate inequality than inequality “between population groups”. The contribution 
of disparities between educational groups to aggregate inequality decl ined while that of 
disparities between different occupational groups rose.  
JEL Numbers: D31, I31 
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Greece was hit severely by the financial crisis of 2008, suffering a cumulative GDP per capita 
decline of 26% from 2007 to 2013103. The extremely high public debt and deficit of 2009 put 
the country into a defaulting financial position that led to the first fiscal adjustment program, 
as financial assistance provided by the European Commission, the International Monetary 
Union and the European Central Bank. Along with the great decrease in GDP per capita, 
Greece faced the largest decline in mean equivalized household income between 2007-2013 
compared to the other countries that also received financial support104, as shown in Graph 1. 
 
Graph 1. Mean equivalized net income in PPS, 2007-2016 
 
 
Data source: EUROSTAT, EU-SILC 2008-2017 (Incomes 2007-2016). 
Note: The values of EU avg refer to EU avg 27(2007-2013) for the years 2007-2009 and to EU avg 28 for the 
years 2010-2016 expressed in Euros. 
 
Cingano (2014) points out that despite the increase of average real household income in all 
countries for the last 20 years before the onset of the crisis, the post-crisis picture altered a 
lot; the average real household income remained unchanged or fell in most countries, with 
Spain, Ireland, Iceland and Greece having the greatest decrease by more than 3.5% per year. 
Cumulatively the disposable income in Greece felt by 42% between 2009 and 2014 and 
therefore the drop was much larger than the fall in GDP per capita, although the decline 
started with a two-year lag (Andriopoulou et al. 2019).  
The decline in household income is mainly attributed to the decrease of labor income caused 
by the high rate of job losses. Unemployment rate in Greece was very close to the EU average 
in 2007 (7.7% vs. 6.8%), while the first three years of the crisis, the unemployment rate 
 
103 See http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco/user/serie/ResultSerie.cfm  




















increased in almost all EU countries. However, in Greece, the increase was enormous (20 
percentage point) reaching 27.5% in 2013, as shown in Graph 2. The unemployment rate in 
Greece exceeded the already highest unemployment rate of Spain and remained the highest 
among programme countries since then. However, after 2013, unemployment rate in Greece 
started declining, following the trend in the rest of EU countries. Both features, the increase 
of unemployment rate and decrease of household income are very often being the main 
drivers of rising income inequality (OECD 2011; Eurofound 2017; Ridao-Cano and Bodewig 
2018).  
 
Graph 2. Unemployment rate (in %), 2007-2016 
  
 
Data source: EUROSTAT, LFS 2007-2016. 
 
As Graph 3 indicates, the trend of the Gini coefficient105 has been positive for all countries 
that implemented consolidation measures, with Greece experiencing an increase in income 
inequality within the first three years of the crisis and then being stabilized, while Cyprus 
faced the greatest increase between 2011 and 2015, when it started being reduced.  
The positive relationship between inequality and fiscal consolidation is verified by the 
literature and particularly for expenditure-based consolidation episodes with causality going 
to both ways. Brinca et al. (2021) find that countries with higher income inequality experience 
significant stronger declines in output following decreases in government consumption. 
Agnello and Sousa (2014) prove that income inequality significantly rises during periods of 
fiscal consolidation, while fiscal policy that is driven by spending cuts seems to have more 
severe impact for income distribution. Heimberger (2020) also identifies a strong positive link 
between the size and duration of the austerity and the effects on inequality. On the contrary, 
 
105 The Gini coefficient is one of the most commonly used inequality indices taking values from 0 to 1,  while the 


















Fabrizio and Flamini (2015) support that the progressivity of consolidation efforts depends on 
the specific composition and design of measures. Moreover, Furceri et al. (2015) underline 
that the benefits of fiscal adjustments should be weighed against their likely distributional 
impact as they find that typical fiscal consolidations lead to an increase in income inequality 
on the order of 0.2–1.0 units (corresponding to a Gini index point) in the short and medium 
term. 
 
Graph 3. Gini Index, 2007-2016 
 
Data source: EUROSTAT, EU-SILC 2008-2017 (Incomes 2007-2016). 
Note: The values of EU avg refer to EU avg 27(2007-2013) for the years 2007-2009 and to EU avg 28 for the 
years 2010-2016. 
 
There is a number of empirical studies that examine the distributional impacts of the 
consolidation measures in Greece, using several data sources such as the Household Budget 
Survey and focusing only the short-term impacts of the consolidation measures mainly due 
to the time lag in data access. They conclude that some policies were progressive, but other 
have caused regressive effects in the income distribution. 
Matsaganis and Leventi (2013) demonstrate that changes in inequality were less severe at the 
beginning of the crisis and that some austerity policies appear to have had a progressive 
effect, despite the fact that in relative terms, the poor seem to have contributed more to the 
government’s fiscal consolidation effort than the rich. These early findings suggest that 
income inequality did not change in 2010-2011 but it increased significantly in 2012, and got 
worsen as the recession deepened, driven primarily by the steep rise in unemployment. In a 
later study, comparing the distributional implications of the crisis in Greece, Spain, Italy and 
Portugal from 2009 to 2013, the authors indicate that poverty and inequality in Greece have 
risen to alarming levels compared to the other countries (Matsaganis and Leventi 2014a). 
Despite the fact that the main driver of growing inequality is the recession, especially rising 



















automatic stabilizers in place seem to fail in addressing the increasing poverty and inequality 
trends (Matsaganis and Leventi 2014b; Andriopoulou et al. 2018).  
Another aspect of inequality in this period is studied by Kaplanoglou and Rapanos (2018) using 
consumption data. They identify the weakening of the middle class as the driving factor of the 
increasing inequality consumption trend and alert that families with children massively 
moved to the lower-end of the welfare distribution. Moreover, they underline that the 
indirect tax hikes exacerbated consumption inequality. The fact that the crisis did not impact 
uniformly the whole population and often worsened the situation for the population sub-
groups that were more vulnerable to poverty and inequality even before the crisis (such as 
the unemployed, temporary and part-time workers, single parent families and non-EU 
migrants) has been verified by many studies, as well as the emergence of new risk groups 
(households with more than one unemployed, persistent unemployed, working poor and the 
youth) (Mitrakos 2015; Andriopoulou et al. 2018; Giannitsis and Zografakis 2018). 
The purpose of this study is to examine the evolution of the level and the structure of 
inequality in Greece for a larger period than the previous studies, in the decade 2007-2016, 
and also link the findings with economic developments and policies. In addition, we are 
particularly interested in examining the changes in inequality across and between different 
population groups, therefore we split the population using five different criteria: a) the 
occupational status of household head, b) the presence of at least one unemployed member 
in the household, c) to the age of the population member, d) the household type and e) the 
educational status of household head. In periods of rapid changes, as the one under 
examination, apart from incomes, the composition of population also changes, therefore we 
first present the changes in different population shares and the relative mean income of the 
above-mentioned groups (section 3.1). In section 3.2.1, we analyze the evolution of inequality 
in the total population using four different inequality indices, while then using only one of 
them, we examine the evolution of inequality in each population group. Subsequently, we 
measure the inequality “between” and “within” groups and then we focus only on the 
“between” groups component of inequality (section 3.2.2). Finally, we perform a trend 
decomposition analysis (section 3.2.3), in which we try to examine to what extent changes in 
aggregate inequality can be attributed to changes in inequality within group, to changes in 
the population share or to changes in the relative mean income.  
 
 
2. Data and Methods 
The data used in the analysis come from the Greek data set of the Survey of Income and Living 
Conditions (SILC) of the Hellenic Statistical Authority for the period 2008-2017 (corresponding 
to incomes with one-year time lag, thus 2007-2016). The official poverty and inequality 




national longitudinal survey that runs in all European Member-States. It is a truly rich data set 
providing detailed information on income, employment, health, education, housing, 
migration, social transfers and social participation, as well as socio-demographic 
characteristics of the participating households and their members. 
Our analysis is based on the “disposable monetary household income”, which is the sum of 
monetary incomes of all household members (members living under the same roof) from all 
income sources after the subtraction of direct taxes and social insurance contributions. The 
economies of scales and the differences in needs of households with differences in size and 
composition should be taken into consideration. Thus, household incomes are standardized 
using the household equivalence scales used by OECD106 and Eurostat. These scales assign a 
weight of 1.0 to the household head, 0.3 to each household member aged below 14 and 0.5 
to the remaining household members107. 
Changes in the level of aggregate inequality are measured using four indices. The Gini index, 
the Mean Log Deviation (MLD, also known as the Second Theil index) and two members of 
the Atkinson family of inequality indices for inequality aversion parameters 0.25 and 0.75 
(ATK0,25 and ATK0.75, respectively). Each index of inequality corresponds to a different Social 
Welfare Function and is relatively more sensitive to changes in different parts of the income 
distribution108. The Gini index is the most popular index and is relatively more sensitive to 
changes in the middle of the income distribution, the ATK0.25 is more sensitive to changes 
close to the top of the distribution, while the ATK0.75 and the MLD are more sensitive to 
changes close to the bottom of the distribution (Lambert 2002; Cowell 2011). This practically 
means that when a decrease in income occurs to an individual that is “poor”, i.e., close to the 
bottom of the income distribution, the ATK0.25 and the MLD register a greater increase in 
inequality than the Gini and ATK0.25 indices. Further, MLD is “strictly additively 
decomposable”; that is, when the population is partitioned in non-overlapping and 
exhausting groups using a particular criterion (demographic, occupational, etc.), it allows the 
identification of the contribution of each population group to aggregate inequality as well as 
the identification of the contribution of disparities between population groups to aggregate 
inequality (Shorrocks 1980; Anand 1983; Tsakloglou 1993). Hence, MLD is used for the 
analysis of the structure of inequality and trend decomposition that we present in Section 
3.2. The trend decomposition analysis or the “shift-share analysis of inequality” (Tsakloglou 
1993) tries to explain how much of the overall change in inequality is attributed to changes in 
 
106 See http://www.oecd.org/economy/growth/OECD-Note-EquivalenceScales.pdf  
107 For example, if a family with two children under 14 has an income of 21,000 euros per year, this income 
corresponds to 21,000/2.1=10,000 equivalized disposable income, where 2.1 is the equivalent scale of the 
household (1+0.5+2*0.3). In practice this means that each one of the four household members has an income 
equivalent to a person that lives alone and earns 10,000 euros. 
108 All indices satisfy the standard axioms of inequality measurement (symmetry, mean independence, 




inequality within population groups, in changes in population shares and in relative mean 
incomes between two periods.  
Following the practice of the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) database, we applied “top and 
bottom coding” to our samples removing households with equivalized incomes less than 1% 
and more than ten times the mean equivalized income of the corresponding distribution. 
Almost all the observations removed - less than 1% of the sample in most years – were located 




3.1 Changes in population shares and relative mean income 
In order to identify potential driving forces of inequality changes is important to discuss 
changes in population shares as well as in relative incomes of several population groups 
during the period of examination. As mentioned earlier, we decompose aggregate inequality 
by non-overlapping and exhausting groups using five criteria. The first group consists of eight 
categories identifying the occupational status of household head. Those eight categories 
include employers (i.e., self-employed with employees), self-employed without employees in 
the agricultural sector, self-employed without employees outside agriculture, private sector 
employees, public sector employees, unemployed, pensioners and “other” (i.e., inactive 
individuals like domestic careers, students, persons in military service etc.). However, due to 
the sharp increase in unemployment that may affect not only the household head but any 
other member, we create the second examined population group which is based on the 
existence of unemployed members in the household. This population group consists of two 
sub-groups, those individuals living in households with no unemployed members and those 
living in households with at least one (irrespective of whether the unemployed is the 
household head or not). The third partitioned criterion we apply is based on the age of 
population members. Three categories are formed: “youth” being persons up to 17 years of 
age, working-age persons (18-65) and elderly (65 or over). Given the demographic issue that 
Greece faces with, according to Eurostat, a negative population growth of 2.3%109 during the 
decade we examine, inequality levels for different age groups may have changed over time. 
According to ELSTAT, the decline in population is probably consequent of population ag eing 
along with the high number of net emigrants that occurred during the crisis. The great 
majority of the emigrants were working age individuals, mainly young and relatively well 
educated. The changes in the household composition are also taken into consideration by 
splitting the population into seven different household types: one-person households or 
couples with both members aged below 65, one-person households and couples with at least 
 




one member aged 65 or above, couples with “one or two” and “three or more” dependent 
children and no other household members, mono-parental households and other household 
types “with” or “without” dependent children. The last criterion we apply is according to the 
educational level of household head. We generate seven sub-groups based on whether the 
household head has or has not completed primary education, has attained either low-, upper- 
or post-secondary education and then whether she has tertiary education completed. 
The set of Graphs 4i-4v represents the evolution of changes in population shares and relative 
mean incomes according to each partitioned criterion. Starting with the occupational status 
of household head (Graph 4i), we see the sharp increase by 6% in the share of individuals 
living in households with unemployed head between 2009-2010 reaching its highest point in 
2013 (13%), when also the unemployment rate got its highest values since the beginning of 
the crisis. This shift is also in line with the decrease in the share of persons living in households 
with head being working in private or public sector between 2007 and 2013. Yet, the share 
increased substantially between 2013 and 2016 for the private sector employees (reaching 
19.9% in 2016), and slightly for public sector employees (11.5%), in line with the negative 
trend of the aggregate unemployment rate, as discussed in Section 1.  
On the other hand, several people who were close to retirement chose to exist the labor 
market and take early retirement during the crisis, rising even more the already high share of 
individuals living in households headed by pensioners from 24.5% in 2007 to 30% in 2012 and 
then to be marginally reduced to 28% in 2016. Unlike what is often publicly discussed, the 





Graph 4i. Population share and relative mean income according to the occupational status of household head 
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As illustrated in Graph 4ii, while the share of people who were living in households with 
unemployed members was relatively low in 2007 (12%), this percent almost tripled in 2013, with 
one out of three individuals in Greece living in households with at least one unemployed member 
(33%) and declined to 29.2% in 2016. In addition, the relative income position of this group 
worsened from 78% in 2007 to 75% in 2013 and further to 71% of the average national income 
in 2015 and 2016.  
The decline in working age population discussed above is confirmed when we look at the share 
of population aged 18-64 showing a decreasing trend throughout the examination period (Graph 
4iii). On the other hand, the share of elderly is getting increased, while the share of youth is stable 
at quite low levels (around 16%) throughout the decade. Interestingly, the aforementioned 
increase in the relative income position of pensioners is even more remarkable when we look at 
their position compared to the other age groups. In 2007, on average the elderly had incomes 
12% lower than the population mean, while since 2011 their incomes are continuously around 
the national average income level (+/-1%). On contrary, the relative income position of young is 
constantly below the national average despite the relatively high fluctuation.  
In overall, the population share of the different household types did not change considerably 
between 2007-2011 (Graph 4iv). Between 2011-2013, there was a significant decline in 
households with one or two dependent children and an increase in larger families with more than 
three dependent children. However, after 2013, the population shares are again being almost 
stabilized. In accordance with earlier findings, the relative income position of the elderly 
individuals living alone improved substantially. On the other hand, the relatively small but 
vulnerable groups of mono-parental households and, especially, those having more than three 
children appear being affected relatively more by the crisis, since their relative income position 
deteriorates, possibly due to a disproportional effect of unemployment on these household 
types.  
As shown in Graph 4v, most individuals in Greece live in households whose head has attained the 
upper-secondary education with this share being risen from 29.4% in 2007 to 32.6% in 2016. It is 
encouraging that the share of those living in households with highly educated head is getting 
higher throughout the period, while at the same time, the corresponding percentage of those 
living in households with head who has completed the primary education has declined by 8% 
between 2007 to 2016. Despite the high share of individuals living in households whose head has 
attained the upper-secondary education, their relative income position has been constantly 
below the national mean. As may be expected, the incomes of persons whose household head 
has tertiary education completed were 50% higher in the pre-crisis period, however this percent 




Graph 4iii. Population share and relative mean income according to the age of population member  
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3.2 Evolution of Inequality trends and structure  
In the first part of this section, we discuss the evolution of the four inequality indices used in this 
study, as mentioned in section 2. The results are illustrated in Graph 5.  The four indices are 
standardized to 100 for the base year (2007) for comparison purposes. During the first years of  
the examined period (2007-2010), the changes in the indices were relatively small but not 
uniform. It seems that the implementation of the first fiscal adjustment program in 2010 has 
resulted a decline in all indices, with ATK0.25 performing the biggest change. Since this index is 
sensitive to changes that happen at the top of the income distribution, the increase in taxation 
may affected rapidly the top incomes compared to the decline in the incomes of the rest of the 
population. This picture changed completely in the next year (2012) when all indices indicate a 
sharp increase in inequality probably because of the sharp increase in unemployment and the 
lack of an adequate social safety net. The following year, all indices continue displaying an 
increasing trend apart from MLD that registered a very marginal decline. Between 2013 and 2014, 
all indices declined probably as a result of a slight reduction in unemployment in 2014 along with 
well-targeted policies towards the low-income families (a lump sum one-off “social dividend” to 
the poorest segment of the population, means-tested child benefits). Another jump in all indices 
occurred between 2014-2015, probably related with the unstable financial situation that the 
country faced once more, when capital controls in payments and income transfers were imposed. 
However, the year after, all inequality indices recorded a substantial drop up to 10 percentage 
points – except the Gini coefficient, for which the decline was modest. Concluding, looking at the 
whole period of examination (2007-2016), almost all examined inequality indices have returned 
to their pre-crisis level, while ATK0.25 is even lower than its pre-crisis value. Only MLD remains 
high but it has been reduced to its 2010’s level. 
 
Graph 5. Inequality trends, 2007-2016 (normalized to 2007) 
 



















3.2.1 Inequality evolution by population groups  
The evolution of MLD for each one of the categories that population has been partitioned is 
presented in the set of Graphs 6i-6v. In other words, these trend lines represent the level of 
inequality existing within each category compared also to the evolution of the aggregate level 
(black-dash line). In Graph 6i, the evolution among households with different occupational status 
of head is displayed. The inequality among employers seems to decline considerably in the first 
years of the crisis, especially between 2009-2010, when its trend started being again positive. 
The very low coverage rate of unemployed benefits is probably the reason why the inequality 
among households with unemployed head increased significantly between 2011-2012, when the 
expansion of the long-term unemployment benefit was introduced110. The already high inequality 
level among self-employed in agricultural sector increased even more the first years of the crisis, 
before returning almost to the pre-crisis level in 2016. Between 2007-2011, inequality among 
workers, irrespective of their employment sector (private vs. public), was relatively low and 
stable. However, after 2011, inequality among private sector employees increased marginally, 
while among public sector employees decreased. On the one hand, the increase in 
unemployment has affected mainly the private sector employees while, on the other hand, the 
cuts in public spending implemented under the fiscal consolidation programme have worked 
probably as equalizer in the wage distribution of public sector employees. 
 




110 This is the unemployment assistance for older workers, which is paid to long-term unemployed aged 45-65, as 
eligibility for contributory unemployment insurance expires after 12 months. There is no general unemployment 
assistance scheme. The annual income threshold in 2009-11 was €5,000 plus €587 for every child. Since 2012, the 



























Focusing on the number of unemployed members in households as shown in Graph 6ii, the sharp 
increase in unemployment clearly determined the positive trend of overall inequality. As 
discussed earlier, the inequality among households with unemployed members increased about 
7%, between 2009-2012 indicating the lack of an effective safety net for the unemployed based 
either on social insurance or assistance. 
 
Graph 6ii. Inequality level according to number of unemployed household members - MLD 
 
 
When the population is grouped based on their years of age (Graph 6iii), it is apparent that 
inequality in minor children increased sharply by 10% within the first three years of the crisis 
(2009-2012). Further analysis shows that this is due to the job losses of one or both income 
earners of a large share of households with children. Due to pension cuts implemented in 2010, 
the inequality among elderly declined by more than 2% between 2010-2011, then it was 
stabilized between 2011-2012 remaining at this low value since then, with the exception of 2012-




























The picture is not so straightforward when the different household composition is being 
analyzing in Graph 6iv. Despite the various fluctuations in inequality within almost all different 
household types throughout the decade, the main points of interests are focused on families with 
or without children, especially between 2010-2013. The introduction of means-tested family 
benefits in 2013, replacing the previous non-means tested scheme contributed to the reversal of 
the increasing inequality trends among households with children in the previous period. 
Relatively younger single-member households or couples without children experienced also 
quite high levels of inequality during the examined period with an exception of inequality 
reduction between 2010-2011.  
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Looking at the inequality when the population is split according to the educational level of 
household head (Graph 6v), our results confirm what the recent literature also finds; the most 
affected educational group is the secondary level graduates (Filinis et al. 2018). Households 
whose head has completed any secondary educational lever, either lower-, upper or even post- 
secondary level, faced the highest increase in inequality since the onset of the crisis up to 2015. 
Between 2015-2016, inequality within all groups declined with the exception of those households 
whose head has either primary education completed or not completed at all.  
 
Graph 6v. Inequality level of according to the educational level of household head – MLD 
 
Data source: ELSTAT, SILC 2008-2017 (Incomes 2007-2016). 
 
3 2 2  Ineq a ity “bet een” an  “ ithin”  ro ps 
After decomposing aggregate inequality into inequality of each group over time, in this section 
we present the evolution of the “between” and “within”  groups components of aggregate 
inequality (MLD). The “within” groups inequality is equal to the sum of group inequality estimates 
multiplied by the population share of the corresponding group, while the “between” groups 
inequality is the value of the inequality index if every population member has income equal to 
his/her group mean income. As the set of Graphs 7i-7iv indicates, regardless of the population 
group examined, the “within” groups inequality contributes the most in shaping the aggregate 
level, with some cases exceeding 90% of the overall level. Only when the applied partitioned 
criterion is the educational level of household head, the “within” groups inequality has a 
relatively less contribution to the aggregate level; however, it still contributes more than the 

























Graph 7i. "Within" and "between" groups inequality according to the 
occupational status of household head 
Graph 7ii. "Within" and "Between" groups inequality according to the 
number of unemployed household members 
  
  
Graph 7iii. "Within" and between" groups inequality according to 
different household types 
Graph 7iv. "Within" and "between" groups inequality according to the 
educational level of household head 
  
Data source: ELSTAT, SILC 2008-2017 (Incomes 2007-2016).  











































Despite the fact that aggregate inequality emanates primarily from differences “within groups”, 
it is interesting to elaborate further the evolution of the “between” groups when also the 
population is grouped into smaller very homogenous groups111. In other words, we compute the 
percentage contribution of the “between” groups inequality to the aggregate inequality change, 
as it is shown in Graph 8. Even when the population is further grouped into 60 categories, the 
main result still holds; i.e., the contribution of the “between” groups inequality declines in time 
especially after the starting of the crisis. This is mainly resulted because one of the groups that 
consist the multivariate analysis is the educational level of household head that has shown the 
most remarkable change.  
 
Graph 8. Share of inequality “Between Groups” in aggregate inequality (MLD)  
 
Data source: ELSTAT, SILC 2008-2017 (Incomes 2007-2016). 
Note: The “Populations groups” corresponds to a variable that consists of the three more affected partitioned 
population groups being according to the occupational status and the educational level of household head as well 
as the different household types.  
 
 
111 This type of decomposition is known as “multivariate decomposition” when the categories of two or more groups 
are combined in order to provide a more detailed analysis. In our case, the multivariate decomposition takes into 
account the different occupational status and educational level of household head as well as the different household 
type. Assuming that the educational level of household head consists of three categories (primary, secondary and 
tertiary), the occupational status of household head of five categories (self-employed, private sector employees, 
public sector employees, pensioner and other) and the household type of four categories (single adult <65 or couple 
<65 years of age and childless, single adult >65 or couple >65 years of age and childless, other household type with 
no children and household with at least 1 child), we compute the “within” and “between” groups inequality among 
























The “between” groups inequality for the different educational level of household head has been 
reducing in importance since 2010. This means that the high unemployment rate occurred during 
the crisis, regardless the educational level attained, may have worked as equalizer among the 
different categories of educational status that household head has attained. This is in accordance 
with other studies focusing on unemployment during the Greek crisis, which identify that while 
highly educated individuals experienced substantially lower unemployment rates than the other 
groups, their contribution to unemployment in 2016 was roughly on par with those with low 
educational credentials, while the group mostly hit by unemployment was that of middle 
educational attainment (Filinis et al. 2018). Due to the structure of the Greek economy, it seems 
that low skilled jobs located primarily to low–added value sectors of the economy were not that 
severely hit from the crisis, while the demand for middle and high-skilled individuals decreased 
because of the disinvestment in the economy. 
On the other hand, when the number of unemployed members in household is considered, the 
importance of the “between” groups inequality is constantly increasing throughout the 
examination period. The same trend is also followed by the contribution of the “between” groups 
inequality when the partitioned criterion is the different occupational status of household head, 
which is highly affected by the evolution of the “unemployed” category, which shares increased 
significantly.  
 
3.2.3 Trend decomposition analysis 
In this section, we present a decomposition of the trend in aggregate inequality. Applying a “shift 
share” analysis of inequality (Tsakloglou, 1993), we examine to what extent the overall changes 
in aggregate inequality can be attributed (i) to changes in the values of inequality within 
population groups, (ii) to changes in the population shares of the corresponding groups and (iii) 
to changes in the relative mean incomes of those various groups. The results are reported in 
Table 1 analyzing the changes of the MLD between 2007-2013, 2013-2016 and then the whole 













Table 1. Inequality trend decomposition – MLD (2007-2016) 
Characteristic of HH 





Contribution (%) to changes in inequality due 
to changes in… 
inequality 






of household head 
2007-2013 17.9 11.2 28.7 -22.0 
  2013-2016 -10.8 -7.4 -3.6 0.2 




2007-2013 17.9 7.5 43.8 -33.4 
  2013-2016 -10.8 -11.0 -9.7 9.9 
  2007-2016 5.1 -6.7 38.0 -26.2 
Age of population 
members 
2007-2013 17.9 19.9 0.3 -2.3 
  2013-2016 -10.8 -10.4 -0.4 0.0 
  2007-2016 5.1 7.3 0.3 -2.5 
Household Type 2007-2013 17.9 16.9 5.9 -4.9 
  2013-2016 -10.8 -9.0 1.6 -3.5 
  2007-2016 5.1 6.3 6.2 -7.3 
Educational level of 
household head 
2007-2013 17.9 17.5 -18.6 19.1 
  2013-2016 -10.8 -5.6 -6.9 1.8 
  2007-2016 5.1 11.2 -26.3 20.3 
 
Data source: ELSTAT, SILC 2008-2017 (Incomes 2007-2016). 
 
 
Regardless of the partitioning criterion used to determine the various population groups, as 
already discussed, the highest increase in aggregate inequality was reported between 2007 and 
2013 (17.9%), when also both the unemployment rate increased sharply and the GDP per capita 
reduced considerably. On the opposite side, the aggregate inequality reduced by 10.9% during 
the period of 2013-2016, when the household disposable income started to increase. Finally, the 
aggregate inequality in 2016 was 5.1% higher than it was before the onset of the crisis in 2007.  
Now, when the population is partitioned according to the occupational status of household head, 
in the first sub-period, the increased inequality level can be mainly attributed to changes in 




the aggregate level too. However, it is worthy to point out that the negative contribution of the 
reduction in relative mean incomes for this group is not less important for this period being a bit 
more than 20%. On the other hand, in the second sub-period, the decline in overall inequality 
was almost entirely resulted by the decrease in “within” groups inequality. Changes in population 
shares were strongly inequality-enhancing in the overall period under examination, whereas 
changes in relative mean incomes of groups played a strong negative role, resulting the modest 
increase in aggregate inequality reported of around 5%.  
When we focus on the number of unemployed members in household, the aforementioned 
results are even more pronounced. In the first sub-period, the share of households with 
unemployed members increased dramatically causing further increase in overall inequality. At 
the same time, the high share of job losses that resulted significant reduction in relative mean 
incomes contributed negatively in the overall percentage change of inequality. Reversely, the 
decline in aggregate inequality observed in the second sub-period is mainly attributed to the 
reduction in the “within” groups inequality together with the negative contribution from changes 
in population shares. The decline in the relative mean incomes and in the “within” groups 
inequality that happened in the period 2007-2016 was not large enough to cancel out the great 
increase in the overall inequality that occurred due to the positive change in population shares 
of these groups concluding to the final increase in overall inequality. 
Looking at the different age groups, we observe that regardless of the examining period, the 
change, being either positive or negative, is almost entirely attributed to changes in the “within” 
groups inequality. The picture is similar when the partitioned criterion applied is based on the 
different household types. The “within” groups inequality appears to be the main contributor to 
the change of the aggregate inequality level.  
Last but not least, when the population is grouped according to the educational level of 
household head, in the first years of examination, the whole positive change of inequality is 
attributed to the increase in the “within” groups inequality; however, not because the other two 
possible factors play a less important role but because their changes are almost equal but at the 
same time with opposite directions. In the second sub-period though, the negative change in 
aggregate inequality is resulted by the negative change in both “within” groups inequality and in 
population shares. On the other hand, despite the significant negative contribution of changes in 
population shares observed in the entire examination period by 26%, the positive percentage 
contribution of the changes in “within” groups inequality and in relative mean incomes 







4. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
In the period under examination, inequality did not follow a uniform pattern, as depicted by all 
indices employed in our analysis. The implementation of the first fiscal adjustment program 
resulted in a decline in inequality in 2010. Yet, in the next two years and before the start of the 
second adjustment programme in 2012, a sharp increase in inequality took place probably 
because of the sharp increase in unemployment and the lack of an adequate social safety net. 
The following year, the increasing trend persisted, but inequality declined in 2014 due to the 
improvement in macroeconomic conditions and the disbursement of the “social dividend”. The 
declining path was reversed in 2015 as a result of the unstable financial situation of the economy. 
Yet, in the next year, inequality recorded a substantial drop and started a declining path. In total, 
according to MLD index of inequality, inequality rose by almost 17.9% in the period 2007-2013 
and dropped 10.8% between 2013-2018, resulted in a total increase of 5.1% between 2007-2016.  
When partitioning the population according to the occupational status of the household head, 
the groups that faced the highest increases in inequality were the unemployed and self-employed 
(non-agriculture). As far as the age groups are concerned, the children were more severely hit 
followed by adults less than 65 years old, while those over 65 improved their relative position 
and presented a decreasing inequality trend. Inequality clearly increased much more for all types 
of families with children as compared to other household types. 
In total, inequality “within population groups” was far more important in shaping aggregate 
inequality than inequality “between population groups”. The contribution of disparities between 
educational groups to aggregate inequality declined while that of disparities between 
occupational groups rose. The multivariate analysis of “between groups” inequality verifies this 
remarkable change related to the educational groups. The finding could probably be explained 
by the fact that low skilled jobs located primarily to low–added value sectors of the economy 
were not severely hit by the crisis, while the demand for middle and high-skilled individuals 
decreased because of the disinvestment in the economy. This resulted in a diminishing 
protection offered by education with regards to unemployment and poverty and worked in 
inequality terms as an equivalizing effect. Finally, the trend decomposition analysis reveals that 
in some cases the effects of the changes in population shares and relative mean incomes, 
operated in opposite directions and were larger than the effects due to changes of inequality 
within groups.  
In terms of policy implications, the analysis in this chapter reveals that unemployment was the 
underlying factor of the increase in inequality during the first period of the crisis, in combination 
with the absence of a proper social safety net. As Keeley (2015) highlights work is key to reducing 
inequality and to ensuring that families do not get trapped in poverty, a serious concern in many 
OECD countries since the start of the financial crisis. To this end, it is important for governments 
to build the economic conditions for jobs creation, aiming to increasing participation rates, 




term unemployment by relinking individuals back to the labour market through reskilling, 
upskilling, profiling and matching programmes.  
The current analysis cannot disentangle the policy effect of reforms in each year from the general 
growth effect. In order to make clear conclusions on which reforms were regressive or 
progressive, microsimulation techniques should be employed. Nevertheless, given the general 
macroeconomic environment of the period under examination, some general conclusions can be 
drawn as far as the role of taxes and social transfers is concerned. Since 2013, when the system 
of benefits became more targeted, limiting allowances that disproportionately benefit high 
earners, we observe a gradual decrease in inequality. In particular, the restructuring of family 
benefits in 2013 and the means-tested social dividends, helped towards this direction. However, 
the introduction of a guaranteed minimum income scheme was implemented too late112, and 
much after the peak of the crisis. 
As Koutsogeorgopoulou et al. (2014) underline, the unemployment insurance benefit coverage 
remained low during the whole period of the crisis, with less than 50% of short-term unemployed 
receiving it in 2012, down from 65% in 2010, even as unemployment surged. Moreover, the 
reduction of the minimum wage in 2012 by 22% along with the introduction of the sub-minimum 
wage for youth113 resulted in a corresponding 22% reduction in unemployment insurance benefit. 
In 2012, the eligibility criteria for the unemployment assistance benefit for the long-term 
unemployed were expanded and the age coverage increased in 2014. Yet, these policy changes, 
resulted in a limited improvement, as the coverage remained low compared to the extent of the 
problem. According to Eurostat, 73.5% of the total unemployed were long-term unemployed in 
2014 and the figure has stabilized over 70% since then114. 
Complementary to the benefit system is the effect of taxation on inequality trends. In general, 
taxation changes during the economic adjustment programs were designed from the perspective 
of yielding the highest possible fiscal revenue and in very few cases their distributional effect was 
examined in advance. Yet, this does not mean that progressive reforms did not take place also 
with regards to taxation. A good example is the 2011 reform of personal income taxation that 
was designed to have the largest fiscal gains, but at the same time, ceteris paribus, achieved the 
highest decrease in income inequality. On the contrary, the 2013 reform did not yield the 
expected fiscal results while at the same time reduced the redistributive strength and the 
progressivity of the Greek tax system (Leventi and Picos 2019). 
It should be also highlighted that in the years of rising inequality, progressive reforms took place, 
but the overall impact of reforms in combination with the worsening macroeconomic conditions 
 
112 The national rollout of GMI took place in 2017. 
113 The reduction in minimum wage by 22% in 2012 resulted in applying two minimum wages according to the age 
of workers. On the one hand, the minimum wage was set at €510.95 for employees aged 25 or below and at 
€586.08 for employees aged above 25.  




- mainly the sharp rise in unemployment - led to the opposite than the intended direction. 
Further, many of the reforms in the benefit system undertaken in 2013 were progressive. Yet, 
despite this progressivity, inequality in 2013 rose either due to policies that moved in the 
opposite direction (e.g., the 2013 Personal Income Tax reform) or due to the general 
macroeconomic effects.  
Another issue to rethink about is the role of pensions in redistribution. It is often mentioned in 
the public discourse that pensioners were more severely hit during the crisis than the rest of the 
population, while our results show that pensioners improved their relative position despite the 
large pension cuts. Given that the calculation of pensions before the crisis was based on many 
different schemes, there is no clear evidence on the degree of reciprocity versus redistribution 
before the crisis. Giannitsis and Zografakis (2018) highlight that the growing deficits of the social 
security system were associated with growing inequalities such as, partial and preferential access 
to subsidized income, low age-related eligibility requirements, access to pensions with 
asymmetrically low contributions, and other similar phenomena. Yet, during the crisis the 
pension cuts took place in a progressive way, in the sense that larger pensions were cut 
proportionally more than smaller pensions, which improved income distribution within the group 
of pensioners, as indicated by the decreasing within group inequality for this group in our results.   
In total, addressing inequalities in a period of severe fiscal consolidation with fast diminishing 
incomes for the vast majority of the population does not seem an easy task for a government to 
perform. The limited fiscal space makes it more important to ensure that public spending delivers 
maximum benefits not only in terms of pecuniary transfers but also with regards to the provision 
of public services such as education and health care that are particularly important for improving 
social conditions for the low-income households.  
This chapter offers a detailed analysis of the evolution of the level and structure of inequality in 
the period of the Greek economic crisis. Yet, further analysis is needed in order to isolate the 
effect of policy measures from the effect of austerity on the economy and the general 
macroeconomic conditions. In most of the recent reports of International Organizations on the 
economic impacts of inequality, the discussion focuses on how to make growth more inclusive. 
From the Greek crisis, a question emerges on whether it is also possible to make fiscal 
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Chapter 10. Wage determination in Greece after the 
Economic Adjustment Programmes 
 




We examine aspects of flexibility in wage determination in Greece after the major labour 
market reforms of the first two Economic Adjustment Programmes of 2010-2015. We find no 
evidence of a wage curve; persistent sectoral wage premia and penalties; and only marginal 
improvements, towards marketisation, in regard to individual wage premia. Although not 
constituting a formal test of the impact of the labour market reforms on wage determination 
in the country, our results suggest that the reforms had limited effect in making wage 
determination in the labour market more flexible and more efficient from an economic point 
of view. We conjecture that further policy effort is needed to enhance labour market 
efficiency (and wage flexibility) in the country, possibly via avenues other than the continuing 
deregulation of employment relations – as past measures and reforms in this regard seem to 
have been of limited effect.  
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The Greek crisis, despite having its origins in fiscal and macroeconomic governance problems 
in the country (and in the Eurozone), was to a large degree propagated by existing structural 
problems in the Greek labour market. Indeed, a number of inefficiencies and regulatory 
problems, e.g. lack of flexibility, have long been highlighted by a variety of international 
organisations (OECD, 2020). The Economic Adjustment Programmes that began being 
implemented at the early 2010s tried to partly address those problems, most emphatically 
with the series of labour market reforms that were introduced in 2012, including a drastic  
decentralisation of collective bargaining, reduction (and statutorisation) of the National 
Minimum Wage, promotion of working time flexibility, weakening employment protection 
laws, deregulation of the occupational licensing system, etc.  
There is an emerging consensus in the literature (Kakoulidou et al., 2018; Karakitsios, 2018; 
Georgiadis et al., 2018 and 2020; Monastiriotis and Martelli, 2020; Gatopoulos et al., 2021) 
that the reforms facilitated some economic adjustment, albeit perhaps with important social 
costs and negative consequences on aggregate demand (thus propagating the crisis – 
Economides et al., 2020). In this chapter we examine the extent to which this presumed 
increase in labour market flexibility – and rationalisation of the labour market – has actually 
happened.  
To do so, we examine three aspects of the labour market which are often linked to a well -
functioning (efficient and/or flexible) labour market: (a) the so-called wage curve, which 
depicts the relationship between wages and unemployment; (b) the extend of industry wage 
premia, which reflect non-equilibrium labour-pricing in the economy (across sectors – often 
linked to efficiency wages); and (c) the shifts in the returns to education and in various socio-
demographic penalties (both showing the extent of sorting/marketisation in the labour 
market – competitive for education and non-competitive for the socio-demographic 
variables). We do so for selected years in the period since the start of the country’s third 
Economic Adjustment Programme and until 2019, the year before the eruption of the COVID-
19 pandemic – aiming to check if the changes that have occurred with the reforms under the 
first two Economic Adjustment Programmes produced a demonstrable and lasting effect on 






2. Literature on the Greek labour market and a discussion of the 2012/etc 
reforms  
Although 2012 is considered as the year when labour market regulation changed drastically 
in Greece under the Economic Adjustment Programme(s), it is worth noting that not all labour 
market reforms were applied at the same time in Greece. LABREF, a database maintained by 
the Employment Committee of the European Commission, provides information about the 
timing of those policies. There were 159 labour market-related reforms (Acts) implemented 
during 2010-2017. Figure 1 (Panel A) shows the legislation and implementation intensity by 
year. Nearly 67% and 80% of them had been applied by the end 2013 and 2015, respectively. 
Figure 1. Legislated and implemented labour market reforms in Greece, 2010-2017. 
Panel A: All labour market reforms 
 





Source: LABREF (European Commission). 
Notes: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Moreover, reforms in LABREF are classified into eight domains: (i) Active Labour Market 
Policies, (ii) Immigration/Mobility, (iii) Job Protection, (iv) Labour Taxation, (v) Welfare 
Benefits, (vi) Unemployment Benefits, (vii) Wage Setting, and (viii) Working Time. When the 
sample of reforms is restricted to the Wage Setting domain alone, the results are even more 
pronounced (Figure 1; Panel B). By the end of 2013, 80% of wage setting reforms had been 
legislated, and by the end of 2014, 77% of them had been implemented. For each one of those 
domains, Table 1 shows the legislation process by year. Overall, 86% of the reforms were 
legislated by 2015. Especially for the Wage Setting and Working Time domains, 89% and 92%, 
respectively, of the reforms were already legislated by 2014. At the same time, 
unemployment was adding up around 5 percentage points each year, exploding from 12% in 
2010 to 28% in 2013 (second quarters). 
 
Table 1. Cumulative share of legislated labour market reforms in Greece, 2010-2017. 
Policy Domain 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Active Labour Market 8.1 10.8 27.0 56.8 78.4 89.2 94.6 100.0 
Immigration/Mobility 0.00 0.0 80.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Job Protection 37.5 45.8 62.5 66.7 83.3 83.3 87.5 100.0 
Labour Taxation 3.1 31.3 34.4 62.5 71.9 71.9 96.9 100.0 
Welfare Benefits 14.3 42.9 42.9 42.9 57.2 71.4 85.7 100.0 
Unemployment Benefits 0.0 28.6 57.1 85.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Wage Setting 17.1 42.9 77.1 80.0 88.6 91.4 94.3 100.0 
Working Time 41.7 50.0 66.7 75.0 91.7 91.7 91.7 100.0 
Total 15.7 32.1 51.6 67.9 81.7 85.5 93.7 100.0 
Source: LABREF (European Commission). 
Notes: Authors’ calculations. The total number of reforms in all domains is 159.  
 
Given all this policy activism over a prolonged period of economic and political turbulence, it 
is of course difficult to determine empirically whether wage responses to local labour market 
conditions, and labour market adjustment/flexibility more generally, may have shifted due to 
particular policies that aimed at enhancing wage flexibility. This difficulty is also reflected in 
the existing empirical literature on the topic, which provides rather indirect – and largely 
inconclusive – evidence on this. Two studies have attempted to test the effectiveness of the 
implemented reforms in terms of delivering local wage flexibility, in the wage-curve tradition, 
providing evidence of a short-lived wage curve circa 2011 (Daouli et al., 2014; Cholezas and 
Kanellopoulos, 2015). Both studies attributed their findings to the wage setting reforms that 




the 2012 NMW cut. However, the strong recessionary trends of that period, the numerous 
reforms being concurrently implemented, and the time required for those reforms to bite did 
not allow for a clear answer to whether (a) those empirical observations were solely due to 
the promotion of a reform agenda, and (b) whether restructuring institutions did foster wage 
flexibility in subsequent periods. In Italy, for example, a wage curve re-emerged after 
implementing a policy that promoted flexible pay (Devicienti et al., 2008).  
In a separate line of research, Christopoulou and Monastiriotis (2018; 2019) have also 
documented evidence showing limited – if any – rationalisation (reduction of rigidities and 
inefficiencies) in the labour market: examining the size and sources of sectoral wage premia, 
they showed that such wage premia – typically associated with the presence of monopolistic 
rents either in the product market (monopolistic firms) or in the labour market (trade unions) 
– have not declined on the whole in the four years since the 2012 reforms and, if anything, 
they “appear to have increased in the least competitive sectors” (Christopoulou and 
Monastiriotis, 2018, p.1). On the other hand, Cholezas et al. (2013) and Christopoulou and 
Monastiriotis (2014 and 2016) have provided evidence showing that wage-setting in Greece 
became somewhat more competitive at the individual level in the period after the outbreak 
of the crisis and the 2012 reforms – with returns to education (the so-called ‘college 
premium’) rising and wage penalties associated to (quasi-)fixed socio-demographic 
characteristics (female, foreign-born, etc) declining – thus pointing to some evidence of 
rationalisation (reduced inefficiencies and thus higher flexibility) in the labour market.   
Building on this literature, in this chapter we aim to provide a more up-to-date assessment of 
the degree to which changes can be observed in the Greek labour market, towards increased 
rationalisation and flexibility, that could be associated to reforms implemented over the 
period of the Economic Adjustment Programmes. In doing this, our purpose is to provide a 
first assessment of whether the massive restructuring of the institutional framework during 
the early crisis years (2010-2014) delivered local wage flexibility – and to what extent – in the 
subsequent period (2015-2019), as well as how other aspects of wage determination (e.g., 
sectoral and educational premia) changed. We examine these issues sequentially in what 
follows.  
 
3. Data and methods 
Our data source is the Greek quarterly Labour Force Survey, which is the main data source 
used in the relevant literature. We use the quarterly data series covering 17 consecutive 




level, concerning the labour market status of individuals (including unemployment) as well as 
their wages (for those in salaried employment) and a range of individual (age, gender, place 
of birth, education, etc), job-related (e.g., firm-size, sector, occupation, etc) and area 
characteristics (e.g., region of residence). For our wage curve analysis, we use this data to also 
derive a measure of regional unemployment (consistent with the ILO definition used by the 
Hellenic Statistical Authority). For this analysis we make use of the longitudinal version of the 
LFS, which allows to (a) use a continuous wage measure, and (b) control effectively for 
composition bias and time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. The basic working sample 
consists of non-agricultural, private sector salaried workers, aged 15-64 years old and not 
currently enrolled in any educational programme. Estimated models are variants of the 
following specification: 
log 𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽 log 𝑈𝑟𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑟𝑡 + 𝜆𝑟 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑡 (1) 
where 𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑡 is a continuous measure of the net real hourly pay from main job of individual i 
observed in region r at period t.115 Regional unemployment rate is measured by 𝑈𝑟𝑡. The 𝑋𝑖𝑟𝑡  
vector contains individual determinants of pay, i.e. gender, a second order polynomial in age, 
nationality, marital status, education, urban status, and work-related characteristics, i.e. 
industry, occupation, part-time, temporary job and workplace size indicators. Terms 𝛼𝑖,  𝜆𝑟 
and 𝜆𝑡 capture individual, region and time fixed effects, respectively. Finally, 𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑡 is a 
disturbance term.  
For our analysis of wage premia and penalties, we use a more parsimonious version of 
Equation (1), where we set β=0 and estimate the model for specific periods without the 
inclusion of individual or region/time fixed effects. The full model is instead used for our wage 
curve analysis, where the focus is on deriving time-sensitive estimates regarding the 
magnitude of the wage curve, i.e. an indication of how individual wages responded differently 
over time to the prevailing local labour market conditions. In this case, the parameter of 
interest is 𝛽, which is also referred to as “the wage curve”. The existence of the wage curve 
has been one of the strongest empirical regularities in the international literature, depicting 
an inverse relationship between levels of individual pay and prevailing local unemployment 
rates (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994). According to it, wages will fall by 1% if the 
unemployment rate rises by 10%, ceteris paribus. Efficiency wages, bargaining, and efficient-
contract models have been used to explain this link. However, the degree of wage 
responsiveness also depends on labour market institutions (Freeman and Nickell, 1988). 
 
115 The national CPI series (2015=100) has been used to deflate net hourly wages. Ideally, regional prices should 
be used but such data are not available. In their study for Britain, Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) used regional 




Hence, the extent to which an institutional restructuring promotes wage flexibility remains 
an issue to be empirically tested. Given that the period after 2010 has been a reform-intense 
one for the Greek economy, Greece is a notable to case to examine whether those reforms 
resulted in increasing wage responsiveness to regional unemployment in a labour market that 
has been traditionally known to be a heavily regulated one.  
Apart from individual characteristics and fixed effects, Equation (1) is augmented with 
regional linear time trends in order to adequately control for regional wage pressure factors 
(migration, unobserved labour quality, amenities etc.). Alternatively, a two-step analysis can 
be used (Bell et al., 2002; Solon et al., 1994). In the first step, a valid wage measure that has 
been adjusted for individual composition effects is constructed. This is done by estimating a 
first-stage panel model for each region: 
log 𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖𝑟𝑡 + 𝜆𝑟𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑡  (2) 
where 𝛼𝑖  is the individual fixed-effect. In this case parameters are constant over time but vary 
with region.116 After estimating Equation (2), ?̂?𝑟𝑡 are used as dependent variables, i.e. the 
composition corrected regional wages, in the second stage: 
?̂?𝑟𝑡 = 𝛾 log𝑈𝑟𝑡 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜑𝑟 + 𝑡𝜑𝑟 + 𝜂𝑟𝑡 (3) 
 
In this case region-time cells become the units of analysis. Apart from the regional 
unemployment rate, models control for time and region fixed effects, regional population and 
regional linear time trends to capture unobserved time-varying heterogeneity. In Equations 
(1) and (3) regional unemployment can be considered as strictly exogenous or it can be 
instrumented using its own past realisations, i.e. one- and two-year lagged values. 
Instrumental variable techniques are also used in standard wage regressions implemented 
for the analysis of education premia (‘returns to education’) as well as other premia and  
penalties. However, instrumenting for key individual-level variables, such as education or 
sector of work, and especially doing so in a consistent way across years in repeated cross-
sections, is particularly challenging and can introduce a number of unintended biases (Ichino 
et al., 1999). In our analysis we derive estimates of individual and sectoral wage 
premia/penalties using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). As is now established in the literature 
(Card, 2001; Sajons, 2020), OLS estimates of wage premia can typically be interpreted as 
 
116 An alternative would be to estimate a cross-sectional model for each time period in the first step, pooling 
together individuals across regions and controlling for regional fixed effects. In this case, however, the estimated 





lower-bound estimates of the true returns and, as long as the bias introduced by unobserved 
confounding factors does not change significantly over time, they provide an accurate picture 
of change in temporal comparisons like the ones attempted here.  
 
4. Results 
a. Wage curve 
We first present results regarding the implications of regional unemployment on how 
individual wages are determined. Therefore, our results are based on Equation (1). It should 
be noticed that region refers to the 13 administrative regions identified under  the NUTS-2 
classification. These results are presented in panel A of Table 2. However, for robustness we 
use finer breakdowns by splitting two major conurbations in Attica and Northern Greece (15 
regions), and by distinguishing between urban and rural areas within each geographical entity 
(28 regions). These results are shown in panels B and C of Table 2, respectively. It should also 
be noted that in every case, regional unemployment has been calculated under the respective 
regional classification. Moreover, regional fixed effects, regional time trends, and clustered 
standard errors at the regional level also follow the adopted definition of region, i.e. 13, 15 
or 28 regions. Also, it should be noticed that all models control for a variety of individual 
characteristics, i.e. a second order polynomial in age, and controls for gender, marital status, 
nationality, education, part-time job, whether an individual works in small firm (less than 10 
employees), urban status, as well as for industry and occupation indicators. 
In general, the results do not favour the existence of a wage curve relationship in Greece after 
2015. Consistent with previous studies, individual wages do not seem to respond to changes 
in regional unemployment. The estimated coefficients of the logged regional unemployment 
rate are very close to zero and statistically not significant, e.g. in column 3 where we report 
results according to our richest model specification, or in column 4 where current regional 
unemployment is treated as endogenous and it is instrumented using its own 1- and 2-year 
lags. Wherever this is the case, the reported first-stage F-statistics (column 4) are particularly 
strong, reassuring that the obtained wage curve parameters are not biased due to weak 
instruments. Moreover, a wage curve relationship is not established under any definition of 







Table 2. The Greek wage curve: individual-level estimates. 
 OLS OLS OLS-FE 2SLS-FE 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
 Panel A: 13 regions 
(Log) regional unemployment .013 (.018) .003 (.014) -.004 (.005) -.010 (.009) 
First-stage F-statistic - - - 132.06 
 Panel B: 15 regions 
(Log) regional unemployment .016 (.020) -.004 (.016) -.005 (.007) -.011 (.008) 
First-stage F-statistic - - - 149.76 
 Panel C: 28 regions 
(Log) regional unemployment .012 (.014) .003 (.012) -.007 (.006) -.005 (.012) 
First-stage F-statistic - - - 17.22 
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional time trends No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 99,103 99,103 99,103 83,340 
Source: Labour Force Survey (LFS), 2015Q1-2019Q1; Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT). 
Notes: Log hourly real wage is the dependent variable. Individual characteristics include a second order 
polynomial in age, and controls for gender, marital status, nationality, education, part-time job, small firm, 
urban status, industry and occupation. Standard errors (in parentheses) are  clustered by region. Regional 
unemployment is instrumented using 1 and 2-year lags in 2SLS models (column 4). Asterisks ***, ** and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Next, we turn to the regional-level estimates based on the 2-step procedure described in 
Equations (2) and (3) in the previous section. In the first step, we estimate Equation (2) with 
and without including individual fixed effects. Therefore, we obtain regional-level wages that 
are corrected for all sorts of observable and unobservable individual heterogeneity (first stage 
panel estimates), and regional wages that are corrected only for observable heterogeneity at 
the individual level (first stage cross-sectional estimates). In the latter case, results in the 
second step could be biased due to correlation between unobserved heterogeneity and 
observable individual characteristics. As studies regarding the existence of a Greek wage 
curve have not addressed the issue of unobserved heterogeneity at the individual level, we 
report both types of regional-level wage curve estimates. 
Before presenting the results of those regressions, we start by plotting both of our corrected 
regional wage measures against regional unemployment, in order to have a first descriptive 
picture regarding their relationship. This is done in Figure 1. Each circle represents a NUTS-2 
region-quarter cell and it is weighted by the size of the respective population. There are a 
couple of things to notice here. First, there seems to be a negative relationship between 
wages and current unemployment at the regional level, especially for higher unemployment 
levels. However, as indicated by the individual-level analysis, this relationship is quite weak in 




conditions. Second, not controlling for time-invariant unobserved individual heterogeneity 
seems to have some implications regarding the magnitude of the negative relationship 
between wages and unemployment. When considering the first-stage panel estimates, the 
slope of the relationship remains unchanged, but it becomes much weaker – and very close 
to zero – compared to the one obtained using the first-stage cross-section wage measures. 
Figure 1. The wages-unemployment relationship at the regional level  
 
Source: Labour Force Survey (LFS), 2015Q1-2019Q1; Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT). 
Notes: Cross-section and panel estimates of regional wages have been obtained using variants of Equation 
(2). Dots are weighted by the size of the regional population. Regions follow the NUTS-2 classification (13 
regions). 
 
For a more formal assessment of this relationship we turn to our results based on Equation 
(3). Estimations are weighted by the size of the local population, and composition-corrected 
wages from the first step (either using panel or cross-sectional estimates) are regressed on 
sets of year fixed effects, quarter fixed effects, region dummies and regional linear time 
trends. In all our models we consider current regional unemployment as endogenous, hence 
we instrumented it using its own 1- and 2-year lags. Again, we use 13, 15 and 28 regions, 
where fixed effects and trends are accordingly defined. The results are shown in Table 2. The 
first columns report results using the first stage cross-section measure of regional wages. The 
last two columns report results using the first stage panel measure of regional wages. The 
findings confirm the descriptive evidence of Figure 1 and the individual-level results. Wages 
remain non-responsive to local labour market conditions; they are driven by aggregate 
factors. Especially when considering the first-stage panel corrected wage measures, the 
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Table 2. The Greek wage curve: Regional-level estimates 
 First stage cross-section First stage panel 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
 Panel A: 13 regions 
(Log) regional unemployment -.046 (.035) -.023 (.029) -.007 (.014) .001 (.014) 
First-stage F-statistic 28.51 27.62 28.51 27.62 
Observations 221 221 221 221 
 Panel B: 15 regions 
(Log) regional unemployment -.050 (.036) -.033 (.032) .006 (.014) .004 (.015) 
First-stage F-statistic 31.71 31.01 31.71 31.01 
Observations 255 255 255 255 
 Panel C: 28 regions 
(Log) regional unemployment -.048 (.035) -.064 (.057) .012 (.016) .005 (.023) 
First-stage F-statistic 15.49 6.50 15.49 6.50 
Observations 476 476 476 476 
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional time trends  No Yes No Yes 
Source: Labour Force Survey (LFS), 2015Q1-2019Q1; Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT). 
Notes: 2SLS estimates. Regional unemployment is instrumented using 1- and 2-year lags. Cross-section and 
panel estimates of regional wages have been obtained using variants of Equation (2). Asterisks ***, ** and 
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
All in all, it appears that a wage curve does not exist in Greece, not only historically (pre-crisis) 
but also deep into the period after the reforms that were implemented as part of the 
country’s Economic Adjustment Programmes during the crisis. In this sense, the ‘temporary’ 
appearance of a wage curve in Greece in 2011, documented in previous studies,  seems to be 
more of a statistical anomaly than evidence of a change in the functioning of – and the degree 
of flexibility in – the labour market, following the extensive programme of labour market 
reforms since 2011.  
 
b. Industry premia 
We turn our attention to the case of sectoral wage premia. As noted earlier, the existence of 
sectoral premia can be taken as evidence of non-competitive factors influencing wage 
determination. Given that the labour market reforms since 2011 aimed at improving 
competitive conditions in the labour market (and more broadly in the economy), evidence of 
declining sectoral wage premia can be interpreted as indicating that the reforms had had the 
desired effect of removing rigidities in the labour (and product) market and thus increasing 
flexibility.  
Our analysis indicates that there has been very little change in sectoral wage premia over 




the period 2010-2016, we find that sectoral premia varied sizeably at the time when all labour 
market reforms were in place (in 2015-16) and they have changed very little since then (up to 
the first quarter of 2019).  As is shown in Table 3117, there is some quite substantial variation 
in wage premia/penalties across the 13 NACE Rev. 2 broad domains, both at the beginning 
and at the end of our period of analysis. In both periods, sectors with high profit margins (e.g., 
Financial and insurance activities), high rates of unionisation / public sector employment (e.g., 
Education) and a tradition of high product-market regulation (e.g., Transport) offer sizeable 
wage premia – i.e., sizeably higher ceteris paribus wages compared to other sectors in the 
economy. In contrast, low-skill and high-competition sectors (Hospitality, Trade, 
Construction) or sectors with low regulation (Employment in households) offer significantly 
lower wages to otherwise comparable individuals (i.e., after controlling for a host of personal 
and other characteristics).  
 
Table 3. Industry wage premia/penalties by period 
 2015-16 premium 2018-19 premium % 
change  % €/h % €/h 
Industry (NACE Rev. 2) [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Manufacturing 3.50%  € 0.15  4.15%  € 0.18  19.0% 
Electricity, gas & water supply 4.17%  € 0.18  5.58%  € 0.24  34.9% 
Construction -3.31% -€ 0.14  -3.29% -€ 0.14  -0.6% 
Wholesale & retail trade -3.24% -€ 0.13  -4.70% -€ 0.19  44.1% 
Accommodation & food service activities -9.09% -€ 0.37  -7.25% -€ 0.30  -19.4% 
Transportation, storage & comms 11.49%  € 0.52  9.51%  € 0.42  -18.1% 
Financial & insurance activities 26.78%  € 1.30  25.61%  € 1.24  -4.9% 
Real estate & business activities -4.10% -€ 0.17  -3.74% -€ 0.16  -8.4% 
Education 20.09%  € 0.94  21.20%  € 1.00  6.2% 
Health & social work 0.59%  € 0.03  1.20%  € 0.05  103.3% 
Arts, recreation & other services -2.03% -€ 0.08  -5.68% -€ 0.23  175.3% 
Activities of households as employers -19.88% -€ 0.76  -22.56% -€ 0.85  12.0% 
Activities of extraterritorial organisations 35.68%  € 1.81  55.99%  € 3.18  75.1% 
Real hourly wage -  € 4.23  -  € 4.23  0.02% 
Source: Labour Force Survey (LFS); Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT). 
Notes: %premium/penalty calculated as the absolute difference between the estimated marginal effect per 
sector and the average marginal effect (predicted wage). 
 
At large, the relative position of sectors in terms of their premia/penalties has not changed 
over the 5-year period of our analysis. However, as is shown in the last column of Table 3, the 
size of these premia has in many cases changed notably. For example, the premium more 
 
117 For a visual presentation of the predicted marginal hourly log-wages underpinning the sectoral wage 
premia presented here and of the quarter-by-quarter evolution of these wage premia/penalties, see Figures 




than doubled in the Health and social work sector – which was not a sector of high wage 
premia – while the penalty in the Arts and entertainment sector almost tripled. Premia and 
penalties have also increased in Manufacturing, Trade and Energy – i.e., in sectors that one 
would expect would be most targeted by the reforms. Instead, premia declined only in the 
Transportation and Financial services sectors; while some penalties also declined (in 
Hospitality and in Real estate). All in all, the comparison of sectoral premia/penalties across 
the two periods verifies the results of Christopoulou and Monastiriotis (2018) – and extends 
them to 2019 – showing that non-competitive wage determination across the sectors of 
economic activity in Greece has not declined and thus that the reforms of the previous period 
have not contributed demonstrably to the rationalisation and flexibilization of the labour 
market in the country. Instead, sectoral differences in ceteris paribus wages remain – or have 
been amplified – indicating that the labour market is still characterised by frictions and 
rigidities that hinder flexibility and equilibrating adjustments. The stability over time in the 
ranking of sectors with regard to their wage premia/penalties is demonstrated visually in 
Figure 2, below.   
 
Figure 2. Industry wage premia in Greece, 2015/16 and 2018/19 
 
Source: Labour Force Survey (LFS); Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT). 
Notes: Authors’ elaboration from estimates depicted in Table 3.  
 
c. Individual premia/penalties  
Another angle to the question of rationalisation and flexibility in the labour market concerns 
the extent of ‘marketisation’ of the wage structure, i.e. the degree to which wage differentials 

































reflect differences across individuals in marketable characteristics. Perhaps the most 
important marketable characteristic in the labour market is education. From the perspective 
of a competitive market, education ought to be an important driver of wage differentials. In 
contrast, fixed (or quasi-fixed) socio-demographic characteristics, such as gender or the place 
of birth (which are not tradable), should not play an important role in determining individual 
wages – unless, that is, they reflect other unobservable characteristics which affect individual 
productivity.118 Assuming that, in the period under study, the underlying characteristics 
associated with these variables (education, gender, foreign-born) have not changed 
significantly, examining the returns (premia or penalties) associated to each of these 
characteristics should offer a measure of the extent to which marketisation intensified in the 
labour market, i.e., whether wages reflect increasingly the presumed productivity 
differentials among individuals.  
We examine this again with the help of the simplified version of Equation (1), which is 
modified to include the series of individual-level characteristics included in vector X (as 
described in Section 2) but this time it excludes controls for job (part-time, firm-size, 
occupation, sector) and area/demand characteristics (regional unemployment). The results, 
for the variables of our interest, are presented in Table 4.  
 
Table 4. Individual premia/penalties by period 
   2015-16 2018-19 % change 
Premium/penalty  [1] [2] [3] 
Female penalty (vs males) % -13.6% -12.5% -8.33% 
€/hr -0.57 -0.52 -8.34% 
Foreign-born penalty (vs natives) % -15.6% -10.6% -31.84% 
€/hr -0.62 -0.43 -30.71% 
College premium (vs secondary) % 20.8% 21.2% 2.10% 
€/hr 0.91 0.92 1.43% 
Source: Labour Force Survey (LFS); Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT). 
Notes: %premium/penalty calculated as the absolute difference between the estimated marginal effect per 
characteristic and the average marginal effect (predicted wage).  
 
As can be seen, in the period at the start of the country’s third Economic Adjustment 
Programme (2015-2016), some 3-4 years after the major labour market reforms, the Greek 
labour market was still characterised  by some notable wage penalties associated to non-
marketable characteristics such as being female or foreign-born. The so-called female wage 
penalty stood at 13.6% of the mean predicted wage or 57 cents of a euro for each hour 
 
118 For example, career interruptions in the case of the gender variable or command of the local language in the 




worked. The foreign-born wage penalty was even larger, standing at 15.6% or 62 cents of a 
euro for each hour worked. On the other hand, the so-called college premium (the extra 
hourly pay for an individual with university education vis-à-vis an identical individual with 
secondary education) was quite large, at 20.8%, representing a premium of €0.91 per hour 
(or about €150 per month for an individual working full-time).  
At the end of the period under analysis, all of these premia/penalties had moved in a direction 
consistent with the hypothesis of enhanced marketisation. Wage sorting on the basis of 
education intensified further, albeit rather marginally, producing an estimated college 
premium of 21.2% (€0.92 per hour). In turn, the female penalty declined, estimated at 12.5% 
in 2018-2019 (€0.52 per hour). The decline was sizeably bigger for the case of the foreign-
born penalty, which dropped by over 30% to an estimated value of 10.6% or 43 pence of the 
euro per hour worked. Thus, on the basis of these results, concerning wage sorting on the 
basis of marketable and non-marketable individual characteristics, it appears that some 
improvements have indeed occurred in the Greek labour market in the direction of 
rationalisation and flexibilisation. By the start of 2019, some 7 years since the major labour 
market reforms in the country, wage penalties associated to non-marketable characteristics 
had declined sizeably while wage premia associated to underlying differences in individual 




Our aim in this paper has been to examine various aspects of wage flexibility and competitive 
wage determination in the Greek labour market in the recent period, as a means for checking 
if the extensive programme of labour market reforms that took place during the period of the 
country’s Economic Adjustment Programmes has produced demonstrable and lasting effects 
on its labour market. We focused specifically on three aspects of this: wage flexibility (as 
captured by the so-called wage curve), sectoral wage premia (reflecting non-competitive 
wage-setting across sectors of the economy) and the returns to key individual (marketable 
and non-marketable) characteristics (the so-called college premium and female and foreign-
born penalties).  
Our results show very limited movement towards enhanced flexibility and rationalisation / 
marketisation in the Greek labour market. Consistent with previous studies, which have 
covered earlier years in the periods during and after the crisis, we found no evidence of a 




to respond to (regional) differences in unemployment. This is true for any sub-period within 
the 2015-2019 timeframe and for any level of geography (broad administrative regions or 
when introducing more detailed distinctions between urban and non-urban places). In all of 
our tests (estimated with OLS or Instrumental Variables, using the traditional approach or 
Bell’s two-step procedure), the wage curve coefficient remained statistically insignificant. 
Although in the most restrictive of our models we found wage curve coefficient values near 
the ones reported as an empirical regularity in the international literature (around 10%), 
statistically the estimates remained not different from zero. Our analysis of the evolution of 
sectoral wage premia also produced results pointing to limited (if any) moves towards a more 
rationalised competitive wage-setting across the economy. Consistent with earlier findings 
for earlier years (Christopoulou and Monastiriotis, 2018), we found that sectoral premia if 
anything increased in key sectors where policy was presumably targeted (Manufacturing, 
Energy, Trade) and declined only marginally, or even increased, in the main sectors wher e 
premia were originally very high (Transport, Finance, Education). The only area where some 
evidence was in fact found in the direction of enhanced rationalisation and more competitive 
wage-setting was in the case of the premia/penalties associated to individual characteristics. 
There, we documented a (marginal) increase in the so-called college premium, indicating that 
education became increasingly relevant for wage determination over time (in line with earlier 
evidence on this); while the penalties for females and foreign-born individuals declined rather 
substantially, indicating inversely that wage setting became less influenced by non-
competitive factors at the individual level.  
All in all, our evidence leads us to a rather disappointing de facto assessment of the impact of 
the earlier labour market reforms on the functioning of the labour market. Although we did 
not provide a direct test for the causal impact of these reforms, our pursuit and analysis of 
the circumstantial evidence clearly suggests that wages have not become significantly more 
flexible or driven significantly more by competitive forces in the (many) years since the 
reforms. In the advent of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Greek labour market seemed to 
continue to be characterised by non-competitive dynamics and aspects of rigidity which do 
not allow wages to respond flexibly to unemployment differentials or to equilibrate across 
sectors of the economy or across seemingly comparable individuals with (presumably) similar 
productivities. The consequences of this, for the functioning of the Greek labour market, for 
economic justice and socio-economic inequalities, and indeed for the health and resilience of 
the Greek economy at large, are difficult to measure or assess in a quantifiable way. However, 
the evidence of persistently absent flexibility and competitive wage determination suggests 
to us that the country still has a long way to go in order to achieve the degree of fluidity and 




more resilient economies in Europe and elsewhere. The nature of the required reforms may 
be different than that of the reforms implemented in the previous period: they may include 
changes also in the demand-side of the labour market (i.e., in the product markets) as well as 
in wider policy areas (e.g., in the housing market, on taxation and the portability of pensions) 
so as to increase aspects of flexibility that seem to be particularly missing, concerning 
specifically the mobility of capital across sectors (so as to dampen existing and persistent 
sectoral wage differentials) and the mobility of individuals across sectors, jobs and 
geographical areas (so as to increase the responsiveness of wages to unemployment 
differentials or to individual differences in productivity). Given the disturbance caused by the 
COVID-19 pandemic in the economy as a whole but also in the labour market in particular, it 
appears to us that in the period after the COVID-19 crisis policy should look again at the 
workings of the labour market in the country and examine anew the structural and other 
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Figure A1. Predicted marginal hourly log-wages (predictive margins) by industry and period  
 
2015-16    2018-19 
Source: Labour Force Survey (LFS); Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT). Notes: Author’s calculations. 
 
Figure A2. Evolution of industry wage premia/penalties  
 






Chapter 11. Populism, Party Politics and the Economic Crisis in 
Greece: a Comparison with the Case of Portugal  
Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos119 
 
Abstract 
Among all South European countries, Greece underwent the most severe economic crisis in 
the 2010s which gave rise to dormant populist reactions, which combined with diffuse 
political discourse and the political party system.  
In contrast to the comparable case of Portugal, populism in Greece was reflected in the 
emergence or strengthening of populist parties on the Left and the Right, the adoption of 
populism as political discourse by an otherwise radical left-wing party (Syriza), and its rise to 
power in 2015 on the wave of social reactions to austerity policies. Populism was also 
manifested in the adoption of populist governing policies during Syriza’s government rule, in 
coalition with the nationalist right-wing Anel party, in 2015-2019.  
The spread of populism and its rise to power in Greece are analyzed in the light of the opposite 
experience of Portugal and are attributed to following causes: legacies of democratic practice 
after the 1974 transition to democracy, traditions of political culture and the polarization of 
the party system, in addition to the gravity and long duration of the recent economic crisis 
which was a catalyst for the sea change in Greek politics in 2011-2019. 
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Populism in Greece has been nurtured by long term historical legacies of political exclusion, 
distrust of political institutions as well as acute polarization in a two-party system. It has been 
sparked by the harsh austerity measures which followed the eruption of the Greek crisis, the 
worst in Southern Europe, and the rejection of austerity by parties and social movements, 
couched in populist discourse terms. After the government turnover of 2015, through which 
a left-wing populist government came to power in Greece, populist government measures 
entailed pressure exerted on democratic institutions, including the justice system and the 
media, and the opening of public sector jobs to governing party supporters. In comparison to 
other crisis-ridden South European countries, such as Portugal where populism did not 
emerge or Spain where it was defeated politically, populism was strikingly successful in 
Greece.    
Populism became evident in the emergence and strengthening of populist parties on the Left 
and the Right, the adoption of populism as political discourse by an otherwise radical left-
wing party (Coalition of the Radical Left - Syriza), its rise to power in 2015 on the wave of 
populist reactions to austerity policies and the adoption of populist governing policies during 
Syriza’s government rule in 2015-2019, in coalition with the right-wing nationalist-populist 
party “Independent Greeks” (the Anel).   
It is notable that Portugal also underwent a severe economic crisis in the early 2010s. Portugal 
overcame the crisis more successfully than Greece, and also had a government turnover in 
2015, with the ascent of Antonio Costa, leader of the Socialist Party (PS), to government. 
However, in contrast to Portugal, Greece, after feeling the negative impact of a severe 
economic crisis and crisis mismanagement, also felt the negative impact of populist governing 
policies. 
In what follows I will first discuss theoretical approaches to populism, arguing that 
conceptualizations of populism should take into account how populists actually govern, after 
coming to power. I will then move to the concept of “practice of political exclusion” (Fishman 
2019: 221), as the first among several ways to understand populism in Greece. Political 
exclusion, in other words, will be shown to be a first contributing factor to the rise of populism 
in Greece, in contrast to Portugal (and less so, to Spain too). I will then present and interpret 
another contributing factor, namely legacies of state-society relations and political culture, 
which have provided a soil fertile for the growth of populism. The emphasis will be on the 
persistence of cultural patterns of resistance against the state and distrust towards political 
institutions, such as the government, the parliament and political parties. I will then proceed 
to present an argument familiar to observers of contemporary Greek politics, namely the 
extreme polarization of the political party system as a third contributing factor to the rise of 
populism.  
The next step will be a brief discussion of the post-2010 economic crisis, its mismanagement, 




acted as a catalyst to the rapid and multi-faceted growth of populism in Greece in the 2010s. 
I will then analyze the populist character of the Syriza party and government in contrast to 
the Portuguese socialist party which, like Syriza, ascended to government in 2015. I will 
illustrate my argument through a discussion of distinctly populist governing policies in Greece 
which Syriza and its nationalist populist coalition partner, Anel, followed in 2015-2019. These 
were policies aiming to fully control the mass media, control of the justice system and 
recruitment to the public sector. In the conclusions I will summarize the main argument about 
the three factors which have contributed to the rise of populism in Greece and highlight the 
point about the usefulness of including the practices of populist parties in government for a 
more comprehensive conceptualization of populism.  
 
 
2. Theoretical framework  
Among the various theoretical approaches to populism, four stand out (Rovira Kaltwasser et 
al. 2017). The first approach understands populism as a thin ideology, the second as a political 
style or discourse, the third as a political strategy and the fourth as a relationship between 
the leader(s) and the led. All these approaches are useful to understand populism whi le it is 
on the rise in a certain political system, but none of the them places enough emphasis on 
populism as a way to govern and to structure state-society relations. 
In detail, according to the first approach, populism is an ideology. It understands pol itics and 
society in dualistic terms; it pits the “people” against national and/or foreign “elites”; it claims 
that people have been deprived of their right to self-rule; and it recognizes the “people” as 
morally superior to its enemies. It is a “thin” ideology, i.e., it does not possess a full set of 
ideas and values about the world that surrounds us. It may thus be combined with other, 
more fully developed, ideologies, e.g., socialism, nationalism or right-wing extremism of 
various kinds (Mudde 2004 and 2017). 
According to the second approach, populism is a political style or political discourse. It takes 
different forms as a signifier. In order to put it metaphorically, it is an empty vessel. In populist 
discourse, different, originally diverging, demands by politically weak or socially excluded 
identities are linked together. Depending on the political context, such identities become 
equivalent of one another, as they rally behind a common cause, namely to resist power -
holders. For example, different groups converge to reject economic austerity (Laclau 2005, 
Panizza 2005). 
According to the third approach, populism is a political strategy. It involves political parties 
and social movements, led by a usually charismatic political leader who is not bound by his or 
her ideology. The leader implements a strategy of vote maximization, ascending to power and 




And according to the fourth approach, populism is a relationship between leaders and the 
people who are represented and led by those who lead them. Populist leaders perform (“act 
out”) a representation of the people “as is”. Populism is manifested in a rapport between the 
leaders and the led, while the latter offer their direct, “unmediated” support to the former 
(Ostiguy 2017). 
The first of the four approaches has become popular in academic research, probably because 
it justifiably stresses the malleability and adaptability of populism. These are features that 
contribute to understand how populism thrives in variable social settings (e.g., in postwar 
Argentina, Greece of the 1980s, and contemporary Hungary and Poland) and in symbiosis 
with different value systems (e.g., statist, nationalist or even neo-liberal value systems).  
However, there are limits to Mudde’s approach. Some ideologies may not be available to 
marry with populism. For example, political liberalism of the late twentieth century, 
emphasizing the balance among the three branches of state power (the executive, the  
legislative, and the judiciary) and the establishment of independent regulatory and 
administrative authorities (e.g., the Ombudsman) is not compatible with populism’s harsh 
and deep divisions of political forces (Mueller 2016). Contemporary political liberalism, 
stressing the need to balance the expression of popular will with the safeguarding of 
institutional checks and balances is probably not compatible with the naked, i.e., not 
institutionally mediated, expression of popular will, which populism advocates. 
Most of the above conceptualizations are better in interpreting populism before its ascent to 
power than after. Yet, today there is already a long record of populists in power around the 
world. The aforesaid approaches are perhaps not as useful for the analysis of populist 
government policies. 
For example, one can observe patterns of recurrent populist government policies in Europe 
today, such as the policies of FDZ government in Hungary, the PiS government in Poland, the 
SNS government in Serbia, and the Syriza-Anel government in Greece (2015-2019), which 
include several, if not all of the following government policy preferences: 
o distrust towards checks and balances in liberal democracies (distrust towards 
the justiciary, the media, the independent regulatory authorities) 
o colonization of the state 
o clientelism in public sector and welfare policies 
o economic nationalism, if not outright protectionism 
o skepticism or hostility towards the Euro 
If my claim that populism in power manifests a set of concrete populist policy choices is 
correct, then, after all, perhaps populism as ideology, is not so “thin” as asserted by Mudde’s 




larger extent, tend to adopt such policy preferences, may vary and depend on various factors. 
One factor may be a complementing political ideology to which populists also subscribe (e.g., 
socialism, nationalism). A second one may be the historical legacies of past policy 
arrangements in the national economy and state which populists steer from the 
government’s position; and a third factor may be the state-society relations which populists 
strive to build “from above” in order to buttress their political legitimacy and chances for re -
election. 
 
3. Case selection  
In order to substantiate this argument, a case study analysis would be useful. In this paper, 
an empirical case providing a difficult test for this argument is discussed. This is the case of 
the Greek crisis of 2010-2019, including the rise in popularity of the Syriza party in 2010-2014, 
its ascent to government in 2015, and Syriza’s performance in government in coalition with 
the Anel party in 2015-2019. The difficulty in treating this case and therefore its usefulness as 
a test of the aforementioned argument lies in the fact that throughout the period under study 
(2010-2019), including the period of Syriza-Anel rule, the policy discretion of the Greek 
government was very limited.  
During the crisis in Greece, a vast array of government policies, ranging from macroeconomic 
and fiscal policies to employment and other social policies, remained under the close scrutiny 
of external actors, namely foreign creditors, who constrained the policy options of Greek 
governments. In other words, if it is true that the populist government policies listed above 
are essential to populism and constitute an indispensable characteristic of populism, then 
these polices should also emerge in the most adverse political circumstances where there 
should be little, if any, room for populism. These would be circumstances in which a populist 
government has very little room for maneuver, a situation in which successive Greek 
governments, including the Syriza-Anel government, found themselves in the 2010s. 
In detail, after the start of the Greek crisis (2010), policy-making in Greece occurred in the 
context of three Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs), signed between Greek authorities 
and the country’s creditors in 2010, 2012 and 2015 and updated in 2016 and 2017. The MoUs 
laid out the Economic Adjustment Program which in the case of Greece lasted for almost nine 
years (May 2010-August 2018). This Program specified the conditions which Greece had to 
fulfil, if it was to continue to receive financial support to pay for its public debt. The fulfilment 
of conditions was made under the close supervision of representatives of the European 
Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). The representatives of these three external actors, known as “the Troika”, performed 
periodic reviews of progress accomplished in the Economic Adjustment Program, which 
included non-economic policy sectors, such as the public administration and justice. 
Evidently, little political inclusion in decision-making was allowed in that crisis-ridden 




4. Democratic practice and political inclusion: comparing Greece to Portugal 
and Spain 
The rise of populism may be accounted first through a new theoretical lens first suggested by 
Robert M. Fishman, which can be applied to the case of Greece (Fishman 2019: 221-223). 
Political inclusion is a set of “ways in which political actors…make use of the rights and 
possibilities for action provided by democracy and deal with others who similarly engaged” 
(Fishman 2019: 6). Actors may be not only office holders, but also citizens, groups, unions and 
movements engaging in political activities. 
In conjunction with Fishman’s analysis, it could be added that regarding state-society 
relations,  political inclusion is a crisp concept capturing the propensity of decision-makers to 
listen to and adapt to reasonable demands “from below” (unions, movements, associations) 
and to avoid the complete alienation of the governing elites from the people.  
Democratic practice differs by country because, although constitutionally provided 
institutions and individual and collective rights may be similar, in practice political actors 
express themselves and interact within, but also outside, formal political institutions in a 
variety of ways (Fishman 2019). Fishman has shown that, compared to Spain or Greece, 
Portugal before the crisis, but also during the evolution of the crisis, was characterized by 
patterns of broader political inclusion, not encountered in other crisis-ridden countries.  
Indeed, at least since 1974 in Greece democratic practice has been characterized by a 
confrontational style unmatched by corresponding practices in Portugal. Meanwhile, in 
Greece office holders after 1974, such as the center-right, single-majority party government 
of New Democracy (ND) in 1974-1981 and the left (later on, center-left) Panhellenic Socialist 
Movement (Pasok) in 1981-1989 were relatively unencumbered by institutional constraints, 
other than those placed by the Greek Constitution of 1975. If anything, this constitution 
offered to the executive a role overshadowing the roles of the legislature and the judiciary. 
Greek office holders did not face the constraints which Spanish office-holders encountered 
during and after the first transition period from Franco’s rule (Fishman 2019: 51-57). 
Constraints included the negotiations with the outgoing Francoist elite or the bitter memories 
of the Spanish civil war and the 40 year-long, horrifying oppression which followed that war.  
Political inclusion was not typical of the democratic practice in post-1974 Greece. Early on, 
the parliament became an arena of unrelenting political confrontation between government 
and opposition rather than a stage of political interaction opening up possibilities for inclusion 
in policy making. With regard to the first stages of formulating government policy, there was 
little consultation with social partners at least until the early 1990s (Zambarloukou 1996, 
Lavdas 2005, Sotiropoulos 2019). In 1980-2006, half of all general strikes which were called in 
Western Europe, were actually general strikes in Greece (Hamman, Johnston and Kelly 2013). 
Ιn Greece police used excessive force against demonstrators, while the latter tended to break 




schools, universities, headquarters of ministries and offices of state-owned enterprises. 
Violent political riots were common in Greece not only during the recent economic crisis, 
when they became the epitome of anti-systemic political action (Andronikidou and Kovras 
2012), but also throughout the preceding post-authoritarian period. Moreover, between 
1975 and 2002 the longest living left-wing terrorist organization in Western Europe, the “17th 
of November Revolutionary Organization”, bombed or assassinated members of governing 
and business elites as well as foreign diplomats. Less active left-wing terrorist organizations, 
such as the “Revolutionary Popular Struggle” (ELA), imitated its example.  
In brief, Greek political elites did not follow inclusionary political practices, while non-elites 
did not want to be included, even if invited to do so. They preferred direct anti-government 
mobilization to participative consultation, as the next section of the paper also shows. On the 
other hand, barriers to the political participation of non-governing political or social actors 
were quickly erected after 1974. And such actors used to pursue their interests not so much 
through existing institutional arrangements, but mostly against and outside such 
arrangements, which created a perfect environment for populism to appear and flourish.  
 
5. Populism, state-society relations and political culture in Greece  
A popular view of state-society relations in Greece is that there is a historical legacy of 
resistance of Greek society against the state and foreign occupying powers (Svoronos 1980). 
Resistance has ranged from the struggle of the nascent modern Greek nation against the 
Ottoman Empire in the early 19th century, during the Greek War of Independence (1821-
1827), to the resistance of Greek partisan guerrilla armies against the Axis armies occupying 
Greece during the Second World War (1941-1944). The accuracy of that view, which 
downplays Greece’s comparatively early integration into Western alliances (e.g., NATO, EU), 
is debatable. Still one may retain from that view a tendency of Greeks to be suspicious of 
authority that is also borne out of more recent surveys of trust towards political institutions, 
as shown further in this paper (Figures 1, 2 and 3, below). 
There are also other historical legacies of state-society relations such as political clientelism 
(or patronage) and populism. Citizens and social groups were integrated into Greece’s 
political system in 19th and 20th centuries through networks of political patronage and 
populist mobilization of the masses (Mouzelis 1986). A well-known recent instance of the 
latter was the rule of Pasok in 1981-1989 under the leadership of the charismatic populist 
leader Andreas Papandreou (Lyrintzis 1987 and 2005, Kalyvas 2015, Sotiropoulos 1996). 
It has been argued that Greek politics in the whole era between the rise of Pasok to power in 
1981 and today can be interpreted through the prism of populism (Pappas 2013). This is 
probably an exaggeration. However, it is true that particularly the 1980s and the early 1990s 




2013, Kalpadakis and Sotiropoulos 2007). In addition to the aforementioned near-absolute 
rejection of state authority and suspicion towards Western powers, one has to reckon that 
parties, mass media and a large share of the general population have subscribed to a 
conflictual, dichotomic, interpretative scheme of public policy choices and a xenophobic 
understanding of immigration and Greece’s place in the world.  
It has also been argued that in Greek political culture there has always been a cultural dualism 
(Diamandouros 1994), pitting “Westernising” political forces and social strata against 
“underdog” forces supporting traditional and parochial value. Indeed, one cannot help 
observe patterns of political values and behavior indicative of dualistic, Manichean discourse. 
Pasok’s outright rejection of the establishment, domestic and foreign monopolies, the USA, 
and even European social democracy in the early 1980 set the stage for the astonishingly 
popular conceptualization of the Greek crisis of the early 2010s by Syriza. The latter grew in 
terms of popularity, by continuously employing contrasts such a clash between “the people” 
vs. “Brussels”, the “new” vs. the “old” (political system), “us” vs. “them”.  
Similarly, in terms of the shallow pillars of liberal democracy in Greece, there was a tension 
between liberal and illiberal patterns (Pollis 1987, Diamandouros 1994). After transition from 
authoritarian rule in 1974, the post-authoritarian Greek democracy was only weakly anchored 
on liberal values and liberal principles of modern democratic regimes, such as checks and 
balances among democratic institutions. Individual human rights were constitutionally 
protected. However, they were a lesser priority compared to traditional collectivist values and 
institutions, such as the Greek nation. Even if plain illiberalism was never hegemonic, the 
liberal bases of Greek politics and society remained weak. 
With the benefit of hindsight, one may argue that - after the 1974 transition to democracy – 
a few time periods of political, economic and administrative modernization and national 
organizational successes, such as the impeccable organization of the Athens Olympic Games 
in 2004, were interspersed in a long period of hegemony of traditionalism and parochialism. 
The latter were cultural traits providing a soil fertile to the rise of populism. For example, 
throughout the last four decades, in some quarters of Greece’s state, such as schools and 
public administration, a culture of egalitarianism reigned supreme. It was a culture diffused 
by parties, media and unions of the Right and the Left. This culture made the differentiation 
of rewards on the basis of effort and achievement impossible, as both under-performance 
and over-achievement in education as well as both slack and commitment to work were 
equally compensated. It became customary to distribute the same educational credentials or 
material rewards to almost everybody. Moreover, populism was also diffused in and by 
religious institutions, namely the Greek Christian Orthodox Church (Stavrakakis 2002, 
Halikiopoulou 2012) and converged with untamed nationalism in the teaching of history in 




Such legacies of political culture which were full of contradictions, bore consequences in 
state-society relations and national economy. Despite some public policy successes in the 
areas of modern transport and communications infrastructure, there are long -standing 
systemic and public policy failures (Featherstone and Papadimitriou 2008). Failures include 
long-term instances of poor governance, corruption, and discrimination against political 
opponents and powerless groups of the population, e.g., women, the young, the outsiders of 
the labor market, and migrants (Lyrintzis 2011, Pappas 2013, Sotiropoulos 2019). Populism 
does not necessarily spring from governance failures and social inequalities. However, after 
being sparked by other stimuli such as a grave economic crisis, populism can flourish on the 
soil of a polarized political culture, systematic public policy failure and chronic inequalities.  
Primary among such failures has been the incompatibility between employment and 
education policies in Greece. There has been a long-term divergence between 
education/training and employment trends, dating back at least to the early or mid-1990s. At 
the time, a proliferation of establishing new higher education institutions was decided by 
successive governments, with an eye to appease patronage-based demands for new 
universities and university departments across the country. The proliferation of higher 
education opportunities took place without a corresponding care to intervene in the economy 
in order to stimulate the creation of new jobs and adapt education to labor market demands. 
Unavoidably, as time passed, larger shares of the younger-age groups experienced 
unemployment, underemployment and social status inconsistency, all of which also 
contributed to a culture amenable to exploitation by populists. 
Legacies of Low Political Trust  
All of the above historical tendencies of state-society relations and patterns of political culture 
fueled a negative stance towards political institutions. Political trust was on the decline in 
most EU countries and certainly in all South European countries before the economic crisis 
started, but there was a very sharp decline in trust towards the government, the parliament 
and political parties after 2009 (Figures 1, 2 and 3). The sharpest drop occurred in Greece, 











Figure 1. Trust in national government of countries of Southern Europe, 2001-2015: % of 
respondents who trust somewhat and trust a lot 
 
 















Figure 2. Trust in national parliament of countries of Southern Europe, 2001-2015: % of 
respondents who trust somewhat and trust a lot  
 
 





Figure 3. Trust in political parties of countries of Southern Europe, 2001-2015: % of 
respondents who trust somewhat and trust a lot 
 
 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer surveys 
 
 
6. Populism and party system polarization 
Non-inclusive patterns of democratic practice and distrust towards political institutions 
combine with and are reflected in the political party system. Populism does not only breed 
polarization in the party system, but also benefits from it. Populist discourse thrives on pre-
existing legacies of political party polarization, in terms of which Greece was far ahead, so to 
speak, compared to other countries. For example, even before the crisis started, compared 
to the Portuguese party system, the Greek party system was extremely polarized. In the pre-
crisis period (up to and including 2009) the Greek party system was an extreme case of two-
party system. For three decades the two largest Greek parties, ND and Pasok, obtained a very 
large share of the vote each (Table 1).  It is striking that in all parliamentary elections between 
1981 and 2009 the vote for ND ranged between 34 and 47 percent of total votes cast, while 




parties taken together, garnered a very large share of the vote in the pre-crisis elections (Table 
2). 
 
Table 1. Political party polarization in Greece: percentage share of the vote obtained by the 
two largest political parties in parliamentary elections, 1974-2012 
 












54.4 41.8 35.9 40.8 44.3 46.2 46.9 39.3 38.1 42.7 45.4 41.8 33.5 18.9 29.7 
Pasok 13.6 25.3 48.1 45.8 39.1 40.7 38.6 46.9 41.5 43.8 40.6 38.1 43.9 13.2 12.3 
Source: official results of parliamentary elections 
 
Table 2. Political party polarization in Greece and Portugal before the economic crisis: 
Combined percentage share of the total vote obtained by the two largest parties in national 
parliamentary elections prior to the start of the economic crisis 
 
National election preceding the 
prior- to – last election before 
the crisis (2004 in Greece, 2002 
in Portugal) 
Prior-to-last national   
election before the crisis 
(2007 in Greece, 2005 in 
Portugal) 
National election at 
the start of the crisis 
(2009 in both 
countries) 
Greece 86 80 77 
Portugal 78 74 66 
Source: official results of parliamentary elections 
 
 
Two-partyism in Greece has a long history, manifested in legacies which still impact Greek 
politics today. In the interwar period, there was a national schism between the pro-royalist 
party, supporting the King, and the liberal party, led by Eleftherios Venizelos. After the end of 
the Second World War, a civil war followed in 1946-1949 between the communist army and 
the government army supporting the post-war governments of the Center and the Right. A 
further division between the Right and the Center evolved in the 1950s and the 1960s, while 
the civil war-driven cleavage between anti-communists and communists remained deep, as 
the communist party (the KKE) had been outlawed and had sustained an underground fight 
against Greek governments in the 1950s. Gradually a front of the Anti-Right clashed with the 




during the transition to democracy (1974) may have closed this chapter in post-war Greek 
political history, but another basis for acute political party conflict emerged with the clash 
between the center-right New Democracy and the center-left Pasok in 1974-2009. The post-
1974 two-party system was also characterized by extreme polarization (Mavrogordatos 1984, 
Lyrintzis 2005, Nicolacopoulos 2005).  
Since the early 1990s the two-party system may have been marked by an increased 
convergence between ND and Pasok regarding many policy areas (Pappas 2013). Yet, the 
conflict between the two parties in parliamentary debates and over the control of labor and 
professional associations and the staffing of the public sector with party supporters remained 
extensive throughout the period up to 2011. In that year, owing to the parliamentary 
instability which the then government of Pasok faced while the country had not recovered 
from the crisis of 2010, ND and Pasok entered a coalition government together. The two 
coalition partners stayed in power until early 2015, when the anti-austerity Syriza party won 
a decisive electoral victory with 35 percent of the vote. In 2015 the ND party came second 
and formed the main parliamentary opposition to Syriza, but Pasok dwindled down to 
unprecedented low levels of electoral influence (4.6 percent). The economic crisis, very briefly 
discussed below, had a heavy impact on the party system, as drastic re-alignment took place 
(Tsirbas 2016, Tsatsanis and Teperoglou 2016). 
 
7. The Greek economic crisis as a catalyst for populism 
It was in this contradictory and inflammatory political, cultural and social environment that 
the economic crisis of the 2010s started and evolved in Greece. The causes of the crisis were 
not exclusively domestic, but were related to global economic developments and institutional 
arrangements of the Eurozone negatively affecting other countries of Southern Europe too 
(Featherstone 2011, Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis 2011, Lyrintzis 2011, Alogoskoufis 2019). 
The financial crisis, which had affected the US economy in 2008, combined with the 
asymmetries of the Eurozone after 2010 to provoke an economic shock to the EU and Greece. 
Briefly, from the start of the Eurozone (1999) there were large differences in competitiveness 
and export capacities between North and South Eurozone Members, which shared a common 
currency, but little else. The economic governance of the EU was neither designed nor 
prepared to mitigate the effects of divergence in economic performance between North and 
South European economies, let alone to balance the impact of a grave economic crisis. The 
long-term domestic problems of economy and governance in the four South European 
countries were exacerbated when Eurozone’s weakest link, namely the Greek economy, 
almost collapsed. 
The Greek public finances had been deteriorating since at least the mid-2000s, while the 




that decade, Greece was facing prohibitive interest rates and could not borrow on 
international markets. It became unable to service its soaring public debt (Table 3, below). 
The government of Pasok, which had won a landslide victory in the elections of late 2009 and 
enjoyed single-party majority rule, came close to stop paying out salaries and pensions and 
the country was at the brink of sovereign default in early 2010. 
As noted in the beginning of the chapter, the provision of financial support to Greece was 
accompanied by economic austerity packages, including strict conditions for reforms. The 
austerity packages included large scale cuts in public sector salaries and pensions; decreases 
in public spending in all policy sectors including welfare and education; and liberalization of 
employment protection in the private sector along with a freeze on hiring, followed by 
dismissals, of fixed-term and temporary public employees. The combined effect of these 
measures was dramatic for economic growth which suddenly dipped, while poverty and 
unemployment soared, reaching unprecedented high levels in 2013 (Table 3). 
 
Table 3. The impact of the economic crisis in Southern Europe: changing levels of fiscal and 






















Greece 113% 177% -55% -18% 27.5% 35.7% 
Italy 106% 127% -26% -5% 12.1% 28.5% 
Portugal 72% 119% -48% -13% 16.4% 27.5% 
Spain 40% 86% -58% -19% 26.1% 27.3% 
Source: Eurostat, various years 
 
8. The management of the economic crisis in Greece and social reactions to 
austerity 
In Greece, despite the obvious derailment of public finances, all parties of the opposition and 
unions completely rejected austerity from the start. In May 2010 George Papandreou, the 
then head of Pasok and Prime Minister, presented an austerity plan, agreed upon with 
Greece’s international lenders. No consensus was reached on the austerity plan. Even the 




to Pasok when the crisis hit, was adamant in opposing austerity, at least in the first phase of 
the crisis (2010-2011). The ND reversed its stance in November 2011, when it entered a short-
term coalition government under the technocrat Lucas Papademos. After winning the 
elections of 2012, ND – in government coalition with Pasok - pursued austerity throughout 
2012-2014, under constant fire by opposition parties of the left (Syriza) and the right (Anel, 
and the neo-nazi party Golden Dawn). It was only after the populist coalition between the 
radical left (Syriza) and Anel came to power (in 2015) that most Greek parties converged on 
the need for austerity measures. Convergence on austerity policies occurred in August 2015, 
after a misconceived referendum launched by the Syriza-Anel coalition government and 
under the threat of sovereign default.  
The reactions to austerity policies were fierce and the negative social impact of the economic 
crisis was large. Unions and associations, regardless of their links to Left or Right political 
parties, also mobilized against austerity. In 2010–2014, in the span of 5 years, 42 general 
strikes were launched in Greece, i.e., about 8 general strikes per year. Associations of 
professionals and other associations of self-employed Greeks organized sector-level strikes 
to preserve preferential treatment by the state (e.g., regarding closed access to their market 
niche, higher than average pensions, etc). Examples were strikes by small shop keepers, truck 
owners and taxi owners, as well as relatively well-to-do professions, such as pharmacists and 
lawyers. Demonstrations became massive in 2010-2014 and were fueled by new, social 
movements, such as the “indignant” people (aganaktismenoi, the Greek version of the 
Spanish indignados), the “won’t pay movement” (den plirono), and Greece’s own “Occupy” 
movement (occupations of schools, universities, and government buildings).   
In brief, while in the face of the crisis the government’s behavior was uniformly strict and the 
government policy measures did not differentiate between powerful and less powerful 
groups or between high-income and low-income earners, the reaction of opposition political 
parties and social interests was equally adamant and unrelenting. The stage for the rise of 
populism was set.  
 
9. Populism in Greece in the light of the Portuguese experience  
It is possible to better understand the case of Greece by contrasting it to the most similar 
among South European cases, namely Portugal, which also found itself unable to finance its 
own public debt. Portugal had made a successful transition to democracy in 1974, had joined 
the EU in 1986 and since then had more or less converged with the rest of EU democracies 
(Costa Pinto 2011, Texeira 2012). Divergence from the EU in economic performance had 
occurred in the early 2000s, but Portugal had started recuperating when it was hit by the 
global financial crisis of 2008 and also shaken by the Eurozone repercussions of the Greek 




In April-May 2011 the Portuguese government resorted to the same EU rescue mechanism as 
the Greek government had done a year earlier. Portugal was also offered a bailout-package,  
accompanied by austerity measures. The economic problem of Portugal was far from 
negligible, but was not as grave as Greece’s. More importantly, however, reactions to the 
economic crisis and externally imposed austerity policies in Portugal were starkly different 
from the aforementioned reactions in Greece.  
In Portugal the center right social democratic party (PSD) was in power in 2011-2015, while 
the main party of the opposition was the socialist party (PS). In the first phase of the crisis, 
2010-2012, there was an agreement between the major parties, PSD and PS, on fiscal 
consolidation. Austerity measures in the state budget were voted in 2011 and 2012 by the 
government party (PSD) with the tacit consent (abstention) of the main opposition party (the 
PS). In 2012, the government, the labor confederation UGT (associated with the PS and the 
PSD) and the employers’ organizations agreed on reforms of the Labor Code which went as 
far liberalizing employment protection (Razzuoli and Raimundo 2019). 
Initial acquiescence was followed by social protest, which peaked in September 2012 and in 
March 2013, with two large-scale demonstrations in Lisbon. In 2013 the UGT criticized the 
PSD government’s state budget, which it accused of ‘ultra-austerity’ (Razzuoli and Raimundo 
2019). Between 2010-2013 five general strikes took place, among which two were organized 
by the two larger trade-union confederations, the GGTP, associated with the Communist 
Party, and the UGT (Accornero and Pinto 2014, Costa, Dias and Soiero 2015). But social 





10. The impact of the crisis and the social reactions to the crisis on party 
systems 
Such differences in social reactions to the crisis itself and to the harsh austerity policies 
implemented to manage the crisis led to a different impact on the party systems of the two 
countries. In Greece, formerly existing parties, for example, Syriza and the Golden Dawn (GD), 
become much stronger. In February 2012 the Anel party sprang out of the parliamentary 
group of the ND party.  In other words, not one, but several populist parties became stronger 
or emerged in Greece in the wake of the economic crisis.  
Briefly, the GD party, emerged out of a former neo-nazi organization that had been 
established in 1985. In parliamentary elections up to the start of the economic crisis (2009), 
the party used to obtain a negligible percentage share of votes. Yet It became the 3d largest 




detail, the GD increased its share of the total vote from 0.3 percent in 2009 to 7 percent in 
the elections of 2012 and 2015. It elected 3 MEPs to the European Parliament in 2014 and 2 
MEPs in 2019. However, the party’s electoral influence declined in the parliamentary 
elections of 2019, as the GD party leadership had been implicated in a political assassination 
of a Greek radical left rap singer in 2013. (In 2019 the GD party was unable to obtain enough 
votes, i.e., 3 per cent of the total, to enter the Greek parliament.) The political discourse of 
GD was far right and populist. Typically, it was strongly illiberal, anti -elite, anti-semitic, and 
anti-EU discourse (Ellinas 2013, Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2015, Dinas, Georgiadou and 
Konstantinidis 2016, Tsatsanis, Andreadis and Teperoglou 2018).  
After splitting off from the ND in 2012, a group of nationalist MPs formed the Anel party which 
obtained 11 percent of the vote in parliamentary elections of 2012, but declined to 3 percent 
in the European Parliament elections of 2014 and to 4 percent in 2015. After staying in power 
in 2015-2019, as a junior coalition partner to Syriza, the Anel obtained less than 1 percent of 
the vote in the European Parliament elections of 2019 (with the result that the party 
suspended its participation in the national elections of July of the same year). The bridge 
which connected, so to speak, the radical left Syriza with the nationalist right Anel was a set 
of common populist themes in their discourse, such as anti-elite and Eurosceptic themes. 
Another major theme was fierce rejection of the austerity-informed MoUs of 2010-2014, 
which was reflected in the congruent anti-austerity and Eurosceptic opinions of MPs of the 
two political parties (Tsirbas and Sotiropoulos 2016) and in the relatively small distance of 
opinions of the voters of the two parties on economic policy issues (Andreadis and Stavrakakis 
2017).  
Moreover, the Greek party system underwent a dramatic change (Table 4, below). In the two, 
consecutive parliamentary elections of May and June 2012, the two largest Greek parties, 
witnessed a dramatic fall in their electoral performance. Between them, the ND and Pasok 
had obtained 77 percent of the vote in September 2009. Almost three years later, in the 
elections of May 2012, the vote share of the two parties taken together was just 33 percent.  
Meanwhile, Syriza, which in September 2009 had obtained less than 5 percent of the vote, 
rose to 17 percent in May 2012 and to 27 percent in June 2012. The ND party somewhat 
recovered in 2012-2015 and stabilized at the level of 28-30 percent. Pasok, on the other hand, 
which had reached 44 percent of the vote in September 2009, fell to just below 5 percent of 
the vote in the elections of January 2015, i.e., the elections which ushered in the rule of Syriza 
in government coalition with the Anel (2015-2019). The earlier polarization between ND and 














during the crisis 
(2011 - 2012) 
Second elections during the 
crisis (2015) (two elections in 
Greece, June and September 
2015) 
Greece, 
winner of elections 
Pasok New Democracy Syriza 
Parties who came 2n, 





Syriza, Pasok, Anel  New Democracy, Golden 
Dawn, Potami (Pasok came 4th 
in Sept. 2015) 
Portugal, winner of 
elections 
PS PSD PSD 
Parties who came 2n, 
3d and 4th in 
Portuguese elections 
PSD, CDS-PP PS, CDS, PP PS, BE, PCP 
Source: author’s own elaboration, based on electoral results 
 
By contrast, in Portugal party system change was not as dramatic (Table 4). While, as already 
noted above, in Greece there was the parallel rise of right-wing and left-wing populism, 
populism held no allure for Portuguese political parties. In Portugal there were no parties 
corresponding to Anel or GD. The rise of a strong radical left party (Syriza), which espoused 
left-wing populism was not paralled by a similar tendency in Portugal. In the latter country, 
the electoral performance of radical left party (Bloco - BE), which was not populist, was 
remarkable but not as spectacular as Syriza’s in Greece. The Bloco doubled its vote share from 
5 percent in the parliamentary elections of 2011 to 10 percent in the corresponding elections 
of 2015. The socialist party (PS), on the other hand, increased its electoral influence in 2015, 
by obtaining 32 percent of the vote (as contrasted to 28 percent four years earlier), but did 
not resort to left-wing populism (Fernandes, Magalhaes and Santana-Pereira 2018). 
In brief, throughout the economic crisis and its aftermath, populism rose in Greece, but not 
so in Portugal. The Greek party system imploded, whereas the Portuguese one remained 
more or less stable.  In the Greek case, there was change of the party system. By contrast, in 
the Portuguese case there was change within the party system. The reasons for this difference 





  . Τhe political profile of the parties in go ernment in Greece and ortugal in 
2015-2019  
Syriza, the major government coalition party in 2015-2019 in Greece, is a radical left-wing 
party with a definitely populist profile, albeit a left-wing one (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 
2014, Katsambekis 2016, Tsakatika 2017). The party had no government experience before 
ascending to power in 2015. While in opposition, the party had very few or no ties to 
traditional social interest groups, such as workers and farmers. It was strongly represented 
among the student movement, the anti-globalization movement and various human rights 
movements. After 2010 the party’s influence grew among the young, the unemployed, 
artisans and craftsmen and even liberal professions, as a result of Syriza’s strategy to 
indiscriminately support all anti-austerity protests. Syriza was also very influential among 
public sector employees, as it sought to fight salary and pension cuts and all public sector 
reforms of the 2010-2014 period.  
It was on the shoulders of such social groups, as well as through the support of a plethora of 
other small groups defending their market niches (pharmacists, taxi drivers, and others), that 
Syriza rose to government in 2015. In other words, the party became very influential among 
employees and pensioners of the public and private sectors and among small businessmen 
and professionals. Syriza had promised to the former a restoration of their pre-crisis salaries 
and pensions and to the latter a return to the pre-crisis production and market regulations, 
suitable to their business interests.  
However, in contrast to the Pasok and ND parties, Syriza never managed to have but only a 
minimal presence in Greece’s labor union confederations, namely the GSEE representing the 
employees of private sector companies and privatized state-owned enterprises, and the 
ADEDY representing the civil service unions (Sotiropoulos 2019). With the possible exception 
of two regions (Attica and Crete) and some municipalities, Syriza never managed to establish 
substantive roots in local government either. 
The contrast with the PS in Portugal could not be starker. The PS, which has led a coalition 
government since November 2015, is more or less a typical European socialist party (Magone 
1999, Costa Lobo and Magalhaes 2004), and still has ties with labor unions and municipal 
councils. More concretely, since the mid-1970s the PS has moved to the center space of the 
Portuguese party system and is supported by middle class voters (Lisi  2013: 309). The party 
has long-term experience in government in 1995-2002 and again in 2005-2011, heading 
majority or minority governments. Since the late 1970s the PS has relied on local party cells 
and shop-floor party cells and has retained close ties with the UGT labor confederation, which 
it and the PSD had helped establish. During the evolution of the crisis in Portugal the ties 
between the PS and PSD on the one hand and the UGT on the other became strained (Razzuoli 
and Raimundo 2018), but there was no direct clash between government and unions of the 





In the winter of 2018-2019 the PS faced a large wave of strikes in the public sector. It included 
protests by nurses, fire fighters and police officers demanding not only better salaries, but 
also improvement of public infrastructure which was decaying after the PS had curtailed 
expenditure on public investment.   
 
12. Populists in government and liberal democracy: the case of Greece 
It turns out that not only the political profile of the two left-wing parties, the PS in Portugal 
and the Syriza in Greece, was different, but their comportment in power diverged a lot, as – 
in contrast to the PS - Syriza talked and acted in a populist manner.  As it is well known, 
populist discourse thrives on pitting the people, represented by a populist party or leader, 
against an economic oligarchy or a political establishment (Mudde 2004 and 2017). For 
example, in September 2013, three years after the imposition of austerity measures, the 
Syriza leader, Alexis Tsipras, couched his opposition against the then coalition government of 
ND-Pasok in terms of the motto “either us or them” (speech of Alexis Tsipras in Thessaloniki, 
07.09.2013, He Avgi newspaper). Tsipras won the elections of January 2015, called snap 
elections in August 2015 and in the electoral campaign of September 2015, he attacked the 
oligarchy and told his supporters that “either we finish them off or they finish us off” (speech 
of the then PM Tsipras in Syriza’s rally on 13.09.2015 in Keratsini, Pireaus). 
During electoral campaigns populists make promises to popular strata which they falsely 
believe that they can hold or make such promises even though they know that they cannot 
keep them. Syriza, for example, was a typical example of a populist party diffusing false 
promises, as the party overpromised, but seldom delivered (Mudde 2017).  
While these are well-known traits of populism, they do not cover the behavior of populists 
after their ascent to power. Once in government, populists employ the same inflammatory 
political discourse against institutions, such as the judiciary, civic associations and mass 
media. Actually, a sometimes neglected, but major, trait of populism is anti-pluralism (Mueller 
2016). For populists, a plurality of non-controllable institutions is an unacceptable situation 
to be fixed. Populists in power may attempt to overturn the delicate balance of powers among 
the executive, the legislature and the judiciary, as they adopt a plebiscitarian rather than a 
liberal concept of democracy.  
For example, the Syriza-Anel government launched a national referendum on the European 
Commission-drafted bail-out package under negotiation with Greece in July 2015. It also 
passed a new law on local government in 2018 which provided for referenda at the municipal 
level. Through this new law the Syriza-Anel government also wanted to weaken the decision-
making powers of mayors and to make them hostage to shifting coalitions of elected 
members of municipal councils. This strategy was partly fruitful in the local government 
elections of May 2019 in Greece when, because of the new law, mayors were elected in a 




proportional representation electoral system. As result, in many cities elected mayors did not 
command the majority of votes in municipal councils. Syriza considered these institutional 
changes in local government as expressions of its own understanding of democracy. 
A populist party in government may claim that above all, if not exclusively, democracy 
signifies popular sovereignty; and that this party has been elected to represent and lead the 
people on its own. If democratic institutions and constitutionally guaranteed principles lie in 
its way, the populist party may attempt to brush them aside, starting with the media and the 
justice system.  
 
Populist control of the mass media  
The mass media is a usual target at which populists aim. Other non-populist governing parties 
may of course do the same, to the extent they can control the state-owned media. In post-
authoritarian Greece (1974-2014), before the rise of Syriza to power in 2015, the public 
broadcaster (ERT) was targeted by successive governments, regardless of their center-right 
or center-left profile, as control of the state media was considered necessary for government 
propaganda. In 2013 the ERT had been abruptly closed down by the ND-Pasok coalition 
government. One of the first moves of Syriza, after it had arrived in power in 2015, was to re-
open the public broadcaster and transform into a government mouthpiece. Where Syriza 
differed from previous parties in power, was in the treatment of the private media. 
Throughout the post-1974 period, different newspapers and private TV and radio channels 
were heavily involved in party politics and took the side of various political parties in Greece. 
In the summer of 2016, the Syriza-Anel government decided by fiat to allow for the existence 
of only four private nationwide TV channels.  Eventually it backed down from this typically 
populist government policy in late 2016, when Greece’s supreme administrative law court, 
the Council of the State, declared the measure to be unconstitutional. In 2017-2019 Syriza 
continued to exert pressure on private media critical to its government, by openly targeting 
the harshest anti-government critics among journalists and by allowing government ministers 
to sue unfriendly newspapers on various defamation charges, with the help of pro-
government prosecutors.  
 
Populist control of the judiciary  
In Greece the Cabinet selects and appoints the Presidents and Vice Presidents of the supreme 
courts and highest prosecuting authorities from a list of higher-ranking judges. Before the rule 
of the Syriza-Anel coalition government, governments of the center-right and center-left used 
to appoint government-friendly judges, but the aforesaid populist government coalition went 
a step further. It appointed pro-government judges and prosecutors at the highest ranks of 
the judiciary and used them to prosecute unfriendly private media and the parliamentary 




pro-government judges as heads of the General Inspectorate of Public Administration in 
February 2017 and the Financial Crime Unit in May 2017. 
It is noteworthy that even the government-appointed President of the supreme civil and 
criminal court (the Areios Pagos court) sued a constitutional law professor the opinions of 
whom she had found insulting. Government-appointed judges put through trial the former 
head of Greece’s statistical service (the ELSTAT) who had helped consolidate the collection 
and presentation of statistical data on the country’s economy, after the first Memorandum 
of Understanding (MoU) of 2010 was rolled out. (He was falsely accused of having inflated 
the statistical figures indicating the size of Greek public debt and budget deficit – which were 
the already checked and Eurostat-approved figures).  
In 2015, after the Syriza-Anel coalition government was formed, anti-corruption competences 
were taken away from an earlier established “anti-corruption coordinator” and assigned to 
the new General Secretariat of Anti-corruption (the GEGKAD). Anti-corruption mechanisms 
were thus placed under the supervision of a government Alternate Minister of Justice. Under 
his guidance, the Ministry of Justice and the government-controlled prosecuting authorities 
launched in February 2018 a criminal investigation against two former prime ministers and 
eight ministers, who were either MPs of the opposition parties (ND and Pasok) or members 
of previous governments before Syriza’s ascent to power in 2015. Eventually, owing to 
shallow evidence and haphazard legal preparation of the case by the government, the 
investigation fell through. The alleged involvement of various ND and Pasok officials in 
corruption notwithstanding, it is telling that in 2015-2019 anti-corruption investigations were 
limited to government officials of the pre-2015 period. 
 
Populist control of the public sector  
In Greece, political patronage has been rampant for many decades, while center -left and 
center-right governments used to appoint governing party officials at the highest-ranks of the 
public bureaucracy and party supporters at entry-level jobs of the public sector, usually on 
fixed-term or temporary posts. Patronage was typical of previous populist governments in 
power, such as Pasok in the 1980s, as well as other, center-right and center-left governments 
(Sotiropoulos 1996). In other words, non-populist parties had used patronage in the past, but 
patronage appointments were curbed in the first-half of the 2010s under pressure from 
foreign creditors. However, upon coming to power, the Syriza-Anel government expanded on 
patronage practices of the past (Tables 5 and 6 below), in a probably misguided effort to 
decrease unemployment and poverty through staffing the public sector. This policy choice 
was combined with very high tax increases imposed in 2015-2019 om middle- and upper-
income groups, in order to raise government revenue. Such revenue was primarily used to 
pay for the cost of social assistance programs and new public sector jobs. Under Syriza-Anel 
rule, unemployment indeed fell to 18 percent in May 2019, after having reached a peak of 28 




approximately half a million high-skilled Greeks, who did not find any decent employment or 
did not have the necessary political connections to obtain employment in the public sector, 
had left the country, seeking employment elsewhere (the phenomenon of “brain drain”).  
Regarding patronage, there is official data showing that since 2013 there has been an 
increasing trend in the hiring of political appointees (with a drop in 2015 when two 
parliamentary elections took place and the government was not stable, Table 5). During the 
time of Syriza-Anel in government (2015-2019) the number of political appointees rose by 55 
percent (Table 5). The absolute numbers of appointees look small (in the order of very few 
thousands), but such appointees populate a relatively small set of 19 central services of 
ministries and the state-agencies supervised by the ministries.   
 
Table 5. Change in the Number of Political Appointees at Higher Levels of Ministries in in 
Greece, 2013-2018 
 
Month Year Political party (or 
coalition of parties) in 
government 
Number of political 
appointees in central 
services of ministries 
and state agencies  
Annual percentage 
change over the 
previous year 
April 2013 ND-Pasok-Dimar 
coalition 
1764 (not available) 
April 2014 ND-Pasok coalition 1923 + 8.3% 
April 2015 Syriza-Anel coalition 1233 -56.0% 
April 2016 Syriza-Anel coalition 2046 + 39.7% 
April 2017 Syriza-Anel coalition 2186 +6.4% 
April 2018 Syriza-Anel coalition 2501 + 12.6% 
April 2019 Syriza-Anel coalition 2739 +9.5% 
% change 2019/2015   +55% 
Source: http://interops.ydmed.gov.gr/month/monthly.php (official site of the Greek government on public 
employment). No equally reliable data exists before 2013. “Dimar”, in the first row of data, was a small, left-
wing party. It was in government coalition, along with Pasok and ND, in 2012-2013, but is now dissolved.    
 
Similar phenomena occurred in 2013-2019 in fixed-term or temporary, i.e., non-permanent 
public sector jobs in the same period (Table 6, below). This is the kind of public sector jobs 




competitive entrance examinations or other transparent channels of recruitment. Compared 
to 2015, in 2019 the size of such personnel had increased by 34 percent.  
 
Table 6. Change in non-tenured Public Employment in Greece, 2013-2018 




in central and local 
government 
Annual percentage 
change over the 
previous year 
April 2013 ND-Pasok-Dimar 
coalition 
58,390 (not available) 
April 2014 ND-Pasok coalition 61,897 +5.7% 
April 2015 Syriza-Anel coalition 65,959 +6.2% 
April 2016 Syriza-Anel coalition 72,460 +9.0% 
April 2017 Syriza-Anel coalition 75,385 +3.9% 
April 2018 Syriza-Anel coalition 83,636 +9.9% 
April 2019 Syriza-Anel coalition 100,186 + 19.8% 
% change 2019/2015   +34.2% 
Source: http://interops.ydmed.gov.gr/month/monthly.php (official site of the Greek government on public 
employment). Data includes all contract-based, short-term and hourly-paid public employees. No equally 
reliable data exists for the period before 2013. “Dimar”, in the first row of data, was a small, left-wing party. It 
was in government coalition, along with Pasok and ND, in 2012-2013, but is now dissolved.    
 
Owing to the austerity policies followed after 2010, the hiring of permanent personnel was 
curtailed in order to help consolidate Greece’s public finances. However, successive 
governments, but also regional governors and mayors, continued to hire non-permanent 
personnel, sidestepping the ASEP authority (an independent public authority established in 
1994 to oversee recruitment to the public sector). Under Syriza-Anel government, this 
clientelist practice reached new heights, as shown in Table 6. By April 2019 (two months 
before the elections of June 2019) there over 100,000 fixed-term or temporary public 
employees.  
To sum up this section, the parties of Syriza and Anel, which were in coalition government in 
2015-2019 in Greece, have followed center-left social and employment policies and have 
contributed to the relative decrease of unemployment rate, for the first time since the 
eruption of the economic crisis. However, the Syriza-Anel government coalition primarily 




institutions and more specifically the treatment of the mass media, the judiciary and 




Τhis chapter has addressed the question of the rise and rule of populism in Greece in the wake 
of the economic crisis in the comparative perspective of the Portuguese experience. The 
chapter first discussed different theoretical approaches to populism. The theoretical 
argument was that although Mudde’s conceptualization of populism as “thin” ideology is 
perhaps most useful for empirical research purposes, the content of government policies, 
once populists ascend to power, should also be taken into account. 
The question why populism emerged, thrived and eventually ruled in Greece in the 2010s, but 
not in Portugal, was answered through three different contributing factors. First, compared 
to Portugal, in post-authoritarian Greece (1974-today) there was much less political inclusion. 
Democratic practice in Greece was replete of excluding political and social actors. Second, 
compared to Portugal, in Greece there has been a very long tradition of political culture of 
resistance against the state and a much lower trust in democratic political institutions, such 
as the government, the parliament and political parties. And, again compared to Portugal, 
since 1974 in Greece there has been more acute and persistent party system polarization. 
Even during the economic crisis which had a heavy impact on the party system, in Portugal 
change occurred within the party system. By contrast in Greece there was party system 
collapse, i.e., change of the party system.  
To recap, in Greece there have been long-term legacies of populism, dating back to the 1980s. 
Legacies of political culture and state-society relations have also been conducive to the rise 
of populism, once the economic crisis erupted in 2010. The causes of the economic crisis in 
Greece (2010-2018) should be searched in a combination of external factors, such as the 
global economic crisis of the 2008 and the built-in asymmetries of the Eurozone, with 
domestic factors, such as long-term mismanagement of the country’s public finances.  
The economic crisis proved to be a critical juncture, a catalyst which sparked the rise of 
populism in Greece, but not in Portugal. While the crisis in Greece was more severe than that 
in Portugal and international lenders monitored Greek decision-makers much more closely 
than their Portuguese counterparts, in the two countries there was a reform convergence, 
based on strict austerity policies. However, the cases of Greece and Portugal became visibly 
different. 
In contrast to Portugal, from the beginning there was an outright rejection of austerity in 
Greece, and there was a rise of left and right populist parties in 2010-2014 in the Greek party 




competition between the Pasok and ND parties until the break out of the crisis was replaced 
by an equally or more acute competition between Syriza and ND in the wake of the crisis. In 
2012 the party system in Greece collapsed, leaving very little room for convergence, let alone 
consensus, over the management of the crisis. By contrast, in Portugal the party system 
changed without undergoing a complete overhaul.  
In both countries, as in the rest of Southern Europe, political trust was in decline before the 
onset of the crisis. However, in Greece trust towards the parliament, the government and the 
political parties dipped much more dramatically in 2010-2015.  
Moreover, the political profile of the governing parties, the Syriza and Anel parties, which 
ruled in Greece in 2015-2019, was very different than the party, the PS, which governed in 
Portugal after 2015. In contrast to Portugal, where the PS party followed a mix of economic 
growth-friendly policies and respected checks and balances among institutions, in Greece the 
governing coalition of Syriza-Anel may have countered some of the negative social effects of 
the economic crisis, but primarily proceeded with typical populist policies. Such policies 
included attempting to control the mass media, to intervene and constrain the justice system, 
to recruit groups of political supporters into the public sector and to populate the public 
administration and state agencies with its own political appointees.  
In view of the above, regarding the theoretical study of populism in today’s Europe, open 
questions requiring further research remain. Two such questions are, first, to what extent 
populism in power, by implementing concrete policies of control over liberal democratic 
institutions, becomes something thicker than what the concept of “thin” ideology would 
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Chapter 12. Fiscal Institutions and the Monitoring of Public 





The lack of effective fiscal institutions and the weak monitoring of public finance 
developments in Greece has been a major cause of the fiscal crisis that broke out nine years 
ago. This paper explores aspects of the weak institutional framework that did not prevent 
fiscal derailment even within the context of EU fiscal rules. As a result, the efforts to build up 
institutional capacity on the fiscal front in recent years is one of the main challenges ahead. 
A deeper understanding of the Greek case against valuable experience on the quality of fiscal 
institutions and monitoring, particularly in the European Union, is crucial in order not only to 
prevent unsustainable fiscal deficits in the future, but also to support a more efficient 






























The recent global financial crisis has brought forward in the most vivid way the multiple aims 
that fiscal policy has to reconcile. During the crisis, fiscal policy emerged more forcefully as a 
key instrument of macroeconomic management, with major stimulus packages being 
adopted by several advanced countries in order to avert a prolonged depression in economic 
activity. At the same time, a fiscal framework has to ensure the long-term sustainability of 
public finances and, therefore, should not accommodate ever increasing levels of public debt. 
Finally, such a framework has to reflect political priorities being shaped by democratically 
elected governments accountable to citizens and tax-payers. 
Τhe European Union fiscal framework has even further challenges to meet,  since one of its 
primary additional aims has been to serve as a means of avoiding spillover effects from policy 
actions in one country to another in the context of the supranational currency union. 
Adherence to sound fiscal policy was thus given top priority and the Stability and Growth Pact 
included a range of fiscal rules which were meant to be respected by the members of the 
currency union. However, neither the preventive nor the corrective arm of the Pact seem to 
have been effective in preventing serious fiscal imbalances in many member states especially 
during the crisis. Against this background, the European fiscal governance framework has 
been successively reformed since 2008, but is still heavily criticized on several grounds. 
Researchers, analysts and policy-makers gradually realize the limits of tools once central to 
the European fiscal governance architecture. The design and implementation of national and 
supranational fiscal rules, of medium-term fiscal frameworks and fiscal institutions are all 
under scrutiny, while the debate on how best to monitor public finances in the EMU context 
is center-stage and far from conclusive. 
The record of Greece in monitoring public finances over the last few decades has not been 
successful. In the 1990s, in an effort to join the European and Monetary Union, Greece made 
a major effort to reduce fiscal deficits and control the rise of public debt. Once entrance in 
the EMU was secured, this effort lost momentum. The fiscal outlook of the country rapidly 
deteriorated after the outbreak of the 2007/8 global financial crisis. The financial markets’ 
reaction to the perceived threat of sustainability brought the cost of financing to prohibitive 
levels and the government resorted to financial assistance jointly provided by the 
International Monetary Fund and the European Union. In exchange, the Greek governments 
undertook a number of commitments, including among others, major cuts in public 
expenditure, considerable increases in tax rates and a broad range of structural reforms. 
Some of these reforms meant to address the weak domestic fiscal governance framework, 
which underwent a complete overhaul. 
Despite the fact the last bailout program followed by Greece officially ended in August 2018, 
the efforts to build up institutional capacity on the fiscal front in the years to come is one of 
the main challenges ahead. The country is now being integrated in the European Semester 




program surveillance and conditionality, whereby among others, Greece is committed to run 
sizeable primary surpluses for many years to come. 
Against this background, fiscal monitoring in Greece has to foster reforms that strengthen the 
domestic fiscal governance framework, since the weak institutional framework has been one 
of the root causes that did not prevent fiscal derailment in the past (Kaplanoglou and 
Rapanos, 2013). As a result of external pressure, Greece has already begun reforming almost 
every aspect of its fiscal governance framework, but policy making can still benefit from good 
practices accumulated by international experience. A deeper understanding of the Greek case 
against valuable experience on the quality of fiscal institutions and monitoring, particularly in 
the European Union, is crucial in order not only to prevent unsustainable fiscal deficits in the 
future, but also to support a more efficient allocation of resources in the public sector and to 
enhance accountability and democratic control. At the same time, the European fiscal  
governance framework is itself under severe criticism and constantly evolving. Therefore, the 
domestic policy dialogue should be informed of the relevant issues at stake. 
The present paper addresses the main challenges of fiscal monitoring both at the domestic 
and the European level and is structured as follows. The next section briefly reviews the 
literature on effective fiscal monitoring, drawing on international  experience and the 
rationale of rules governing the European fiscal framework until  the 2007/8 global crisis. The 
third section highlights the weaknesses of the Greek institutional framework that paved the 
way for the 2009 fiscal crisis and the main reforms already or pending to be introduced in this 
framework as a result of external conditionality. Section 4 focuses on the multiple reforms 
introduced in the EMU fiscal monitoring framework in the aftermath of the global financial 
crisis and rescue programs to various member states. Section 5 summarizes the main points 
of criticism of this framework and offers a review of the current debate on proposals for 




2. Tools of effective fiscal monitoring and the rationale of the European fiscal 
governance framework  
 
The need for enhancing fiscal monitoring mechanisms in advanced economies governed by 
democratic regimes has essentially been brought about by the stylized fact that fiscal deficits 
are emerging in a persistent manner over long periods of time leading to high and occasionally 
unsustainable levels of public debt. An extensive literature has tried to address the key 
question of why governments exhibit such a tendency to create fiscal deficits (the “deficit 
bias” problem) and what mechanisms could deter this behavior. Most reasons that have been 
proposed lie in the public choice literature and include the “common pool” problem, the 
tendency of governments to depart from the long-run interests of the society for short-term 
gain, electoral popularity and sectional interest, or the information asymmetry between the 




Tabellini and Alesina, 1990, von Hagen and Harden, 1995, Schick, 2002, Krogstrup and 
Wyplosz 2006, Krogstrup and Wyplosz, 2010, Wren-Lewis, 2010, Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010 
and Rogoff and Bertelsmann, 2010). The rapid rise of public debt levels in many advanced 
countries during the 2007/8 global financial crisis was perceived as one more manifestation 
of the deficit bias phenomenon, whereby governments had not taken advantage of the long 
economic upturn that had preceded the crisis to improve their countries’ fiscal position. On 
the contrary, as Hagemann (2011) notes ‘the overall fiscal balance of OECD economies, as 
well as in the large majority of its member countries, was in deficit throughout virtually the 
entire three decades to 2007’. 
Moral hazard considerations are thought to aggravate the deficit bias problem in the case of 
monetary unions, like the EMU. Assigning the right of monetary policy conduct to a 
supranational body reduces governments’ incentives to exercise fiscal  discipline (Beetsma 
and Bovenberd, 1999). At the same time, the elimination of exchange rate risk implied by a 
monetary union renders government bond markets close to perfect substitutes. The high 
degree of bond yield convergence, of the type observed in the initial stage of the euro area, 
means that interest rates rise less in response to a single government’s expansionary fiscal 
policy than this country’s domestic interest rate would have responded in the case of autarky. 
With reduced marginal long-run costs of profligate fiscal policy, each government has an 
additional incentive to expand its domestic fiscal policy in the monetary union. This brings 
about the need of some form of coordination that would limit spillover effects (Detken et al, 
2004).  
In response to the “deficit bias” problem, an expanding literature has emerged on how to 
design a framework for fiscal governance that helps contain the tendency of policy makers 
for excessive deficits. The main mechanism implemented in most OECD countries is the 
imposition of various forms of fiscal rules, such as numerical  limits to the level of public 
expenditure, the debt-to-GDP ratio, ceilings or floors to public revenues or the overall level 
of deficit (for a comprehensive review, see IMF, 2009). Medium term budgetary frameworks 
(MTFBs) have been proposed as another element of effective fiscal governance. Such a 
framework allows the government to delineate its policy in a medium-term horizon, under 
the premise that in each year’s annual budget many adopted measures have budgetary 
implications for the budgets of the following years. MTBFs are usually based on a 
macroeconomic scenario, like projections for GDP growth, which describe the available 
government resources in the medium-term to finance policies. Although the objectives 
included in the MTBF are a weaker form of commitment than a numerical rule, they are 
considered useful in making more apparent the impact of current policies in the future. In 
recent years, the idea of establishing non-partisan public bodies acting as “national 
watchdogs” in the field of budgetary policy is fastly gaining ground as a way of institutionally 
strengthening domestic fiscal frameworks (see van Riet, 2010 and European Commission, 
2009b). The mandate of independent fiscal councils can be indeed broad, ranging from 
assessing government forecasts on macroeconomic aggregates, motoring adherence to 




the budget to assessing the long-term sustainability of public finances, and especially public 
debt. Finally, attention is given to the broader political and administrative framework in terms 
of domestic budgetary procedures that cover the planning, approval and execution of the 
government budget process. According to e.g. the European Commission (2009a), basic 
features of a system of sound budgetary procedures are transparency in data and accounting  
practices, top-down budgeting realistic economic assumptions, performance budgeting and 
so on. 
The architecture of the fiscal framework in the European Union included right from its 
inception elements of the effective fiscal governance toolkit described above. Numerical fiscal 
rules were first introduced for EU countries with the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 (European 
Communities 1992, 92/C 191/01, Treaty on European Union) imposing the 3 percent deficit 
rule and the 60 percent debt-to-GDP ratio. In 1997, these rules were embedded into the 
newly established Stability and Growth Pact (SPG), whose provisions included both 
monitoring fiscal developments (through its preventive arm) and correcting excessive deficits 
(through its corrective arm). 
The 3% deficit rule had the clear advantage of being simple and transparent, which was widely 
believed to help enforcement via market discipline and public oversight (Kopits and 
Symansky, 1998). In view, however, of its pro-cyclical nature, the SGP was reformed already 
in 2005, when the nominal deficit target was changed to a cyclically-adjusted one and a 
medium-term budgetary objectives framework was introduced (European Union 2005, 
Council Regulation 1055/2005). At the same time, budgetary procedures were being 
evaluated by the European Commission in a comparable fashion across member states 
(European Commission, 2007). It is true that the European Union’s rules-based fiscal 
framework worked rather well in incentivizing countries to bring fiscal imbalances under 
control in view of the common aspiration to participate in the euro-area, as manifested in 
Figure 1. 
 
Despite making an impressive start in containing public deficits, the European fiscal 
framework does not seem to have worked equally effectively after  2000, once countries 
secured their entrance into the Eurozone. The SGP envisaged that member states were 
expected to have budgets that were “close to balance” or in surplus over the medium term, 
meaning that surpluses were to be run when the economy was doing well, in order for deficits 
to be allowed in bad times. In practice, fiscal buffers were not being built in good times and 
the Pact was prone to procyclicality. Before the crisis, during downturns many euro area 
countries appear to have responded to the 3% limit imposed by the SPG by offering over-
optimistic macroeconomic forecasts when they were most in danger of breaching the limit.  
Interestingly, what the literature has also established is that the bias in fiscal forecasts was 
less among Eurozone countries that had adopted certain rules at the national level (Frankel 






Figure 1. General government deficit as a % of GDP, selected countries of the Euroarea 
 
 
Source: European Commission, Statistical Annex of European Economy, Autumn 2018. 
 
 
At the same time, the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact provisions even in 
cases of clear breaches of its rules was rather lax. Baerg and Hallerberg (2016) criticize the  
failure of the SGP to prevent the euro fiscal crisis in terms of the ability of the Member States 
to undermine its operation. Following a political economy perspective, the authors focus on 
the “preventive” arm of the Pact and measure the variation between the European 
Commission’s assessments of Member States and final ECOFIN’s (Council of Economic and 
Finance Ministers) opinions of the Stability and Growth Programs. The rationale is that 
although the Commission acts as a “watchdog” to monitor fiscal performance, it is the 
Council’s recommendations that leave governments open to criticism in the public sphere. 
The authors examine various versions of Member States’ assessment, from the original  text 
written by the European Commission to the final text approved by the Council, to detect 
political factors that facilitated the editing and weakening of the Commission’s original 
recommendations. They conclude that politically powerful Member States (at least as 
measured by votes in the Council) and Member States with euroskeptic populations were 
more likely to weaken the Commission’s recommendations against them, while small, euro-
friendly states (like Greece) also had the Commission’s text weakened when the big states 
were receiving milder EU–level surveillance. The breakout of the 2007/8 financial crisis found 
most Member States fiscally unprepared. States that adopted fiscal stimulus packages were 
soon faced with escalating public deficits and debt, other states didn’t have enough fiscal 
space to run counter-cyclical policies, while several states found themselves in need for 
financial aid. Greece not only belongs to the last group of countries, but it is also a complete 




surveillance architecture impacted on Greece’s fiscal performance, the size and accumulation 





3. Greece’s domestic fiscal monitoring capacity before the crisis and 
subsequent reforms  
 
In Greece, the system of budget surveillance and fiscal rules imposed by the 1992 Maastricht 
Treaty and the 1997 Stability and Growth Pact acted as a catalyst in reducing deficits with the 
primary aim of becoming a member of the Eurozone. However, the underlying economic, 
political and institutional factors did not underpin the credibility of fiscal plans. Despite the 
fact that the Greek economy attained high growth rates throughout the decade preceding 
the fiscal crisis in 2009, fiscal imbalances were never effectively brought under control. Many 
explanations can be put forward to explain high deficits, but the most fundamental reasons 
lie within the weak domestic institutional framework of fiscal governance. A detailed analysis 
is beyond the scope of the present paper121, but it is worth highlighting the basic weaknesses 
of this framework. 
Perhaps the most important weakness of the Greek fiscal system, even within the EU rules-
based framework, has been the poor mechanism of setting up the budget and the lack of any 
systematic monitoring of its implementation. Regarding legislative control, the Parliament has 
a very powerful constitutional role in voting the state (central government) budget, but it did 
not have any kind of mechanism to follow up on budget execution, and to monitor 
developments in public expenditures and revenues. Data on budget execution were available 
with long delays, while the fiscal aggregates monitored within the European fiscal framework 
(general government data) were disjoint from those approved by the Parliament (central 
government data). The lack of effective legislative control over the budget is also manifested 
in a study by Wehner (2008), who constructs a composite index of legislative budget  
institutions, aimed at assessing the budgetary power of national legislatures. The index is 
based on the institutional arrangements that give the legislature power to scrutinize and 
influence budget policy and to ensure its implementation. The value of the index depends, 
among others, on the formal powers of the legislature granted to amend the budget, the 
flexibility of the executive to alter spending choices following the approval of the budget by 
the legislature, the time available for meaningful legislative scrutiny, the existence of a well-
developed committee system and the access to comprehensive, accurate and timely 
budgetary information. Greece nonsurprisingly ranks 26th among the 27 OECD countries 
covered in the study, which suggests that legislator control was a constitutional artefact. 
 
121 For such an analysis, see, for example, IMF (2006), Rapanos (2007), OECD (2008), Vraniali (2010), 




Despite the drafting of medium-term programs in order to comply with the requirements of 
the Stability and Growth Pact, the quality of the medium-term budgetary framework at the 
national level before the fiscal crisis was exceptionally low, at least as judged by the criteria 
adopted by the European Commission, see Figure 2. The assessment criteria include the 
existence of such a framework, the connectedness between multiannual and annual targets, 
the involvement of national parliaments or the monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. 
The drafting of the medium term Stability and Growth Program apparently did not guarantee 




Figure 2. Index on the quality of medium-term budgetary framework in EU Member States, 
2008 and 2017 
 
 
Source: European Commission, Database on Medium-term budgetary frameworks 




Figure 3 presents another index developed by the European Commission to evaluate the 
quality of budgetary procedures identified in the previous section which cover the planning,  
approval and execution of the government budget process. This overall index incorporates a 
number of sub-indices that refer to: budget transparency, multi-annual planning horizon, 
centralization of the budget process, top-down budgeting, prudent economic assumptions 
and performance budgeting. The scores of the index for a number of EU countries are 




Transparency in the budget would require systematic and timely releases of budget proposals 
and budget reports, comprehensive and accessible budget documentation, economic 
assumptions on forecasts being made explicit and an active role of the legislature and other 
stakeholders in scrutinizing the budget. Centralization of the budget process and top-down 
budgeting both aim at containing the “common pool” problem leading to deficit bias. The 
idea is that a fragmented budget involving autonomous decisions made by a large number of 
participants can lead to excessive spending. Centralizing the budget process by delegating 
budgetary power to e.g. the Finance Minister and to start the budget planning procedure with 
a binding decision on the total amount of the budget (top-down budgeting) can reduce 
upward pressure on spending. Once hard ceilings on the total budget are set, the detailed 
allocation of resources within sub-areas is to be left to the line ministers, so that the 
ownership and more efficient use of funds is strengthened. Making prudent macroeconomic 
assumptions to build budgetary projections is also considered a critical factor in the budget 
process, so as not to justify a higher level of spending. Finally, performance budgeting is 
meant to strengthen the link between resources used and the output achieved, as a way of 
improving the effectiveness and efficiency of public expenditure. 
 
 
Figure 3. Overall index of budgetary procedures, 2006 
 
Source: European Commission (2007). 
 
 
Greece’s low ranking in the index of budgetary procedures is easily reconciled. Transparency 
of fiscal data was hardly possible given the organizational weaknesses of public sector 
accounting and information systems. Many public entities simply lacked standardized 
accounting systems, while the General Accounting Office had no coherent on-line information 
system that would enable it to have an overview of total public revenues and expenditures at 
any point in time. Furthermore, the budgeting system followed a bottom-up approach, 




spending ceilings or financial restraints. The Ministry of Finance intervened at all stages of the 
budget process at a very detailed level, eliminating any sense of ownership of the line 
ministries budget and weakening their accountability in the management of public funds. 
Regarding performance budgeting, the control and accountability framework of public  
expenditure was characterised by a lack of policy objectives, which would assess the quality 
of expenditure and address money-for-value issues. It rather focused on excessive and 
overlapping ex ante controls, while ex post controls inclined towards compliance with the 
legality of procedures (Vraniali, 2010). 
Combined with the instability of global financial markets, poor domestic fiscal governance 
finally led Greece to the brink of financial collapse. As documented in Kaplanoglou and 
Rapanos (2013), budget balance targets were being missed by a wide margin throughout the 
decade preceding the outbreak of the fiscal crisis in 2009. There is a growing literature aimed 
at identifying the sources of deviations from fiscal plans, which identifies the strategic use by 
governments of optimistic growth assumptions as the most frequent economic determinant 
of fiscal forecast errors (e.g. Jonung and Larch 2006, Von Hagen et al. 2009, Pina and Venes 
2011, Frankel 2011, Cimadomo, 2011). For countries operating within the EU rules-based 
fiscal framework, weaker than expected growth rates often served as a good argument for 
fiscal outcomes turning worse than planned. This pattern does not fit the Greek case. Despite 
the fact that the economy did appear to grow in line with what the government (and other 
international organizations) had assumed, budgeted revenues did not find their way into the 
public purse, while expenditures (especially primary expenditures) were not kept under 
planned control. This feature was systematically not being picked up either by the Greek 
government or by the Commission or by the other two international organizations (the IMF 
and the OECD) that were monitoring the Greek economy. While the inadequate surveillance 
within the EU fiscal governance framework is also partly to blame, the primary reason for the 
fiscal derailment from a fiscal monitoring perspective has been weak domestic fiscal  
institutions. 
The bailout program agreed with Greece’s EU partners and the IMF in May 2010 imposed 
heavy front-loaded austerity policies, which were complemented by broad-ranging structural 
reforms. The latter included a complete overhaul of the domestic fiscal governance 
framework with the aim of aligning it with what was described above as international best 
practice (see, for example, Rapanos and Kaplanoglou, forthcoming). Numerous reforms in the 
budgeting framework were introduced by two broad amendments of the Greek Organic 
Budget Law in 2010 (Law 3871/2010) and 2014 (Law 4270/2014). The two laws, combined, 
describe a raw model of procedures and institutions that ensure efficient fiscal monitoring 
and effective implementation of sound fiscal policies of the type analyzed in the previous 
section. Although it is hardly possible to go through all the provisions of the laws, their 
declared aim is to promote sound fiscal governance, namely ensuring  the principles of 
economy, effectiveness, efficiency and accountability.  
According to Law 9871/2010, the medium-term horizon of fiscal plans was strengthened 




Parliament. The medium term framework sets targets for the fiscal balance and the level of 
debt of the general government, and for spending ceilings for the state and balanced targets 
for the budgets of local governments, social security funds and other general government 
entities. The assumptions underlying macroeconomic and other projections have to be clearly 
spelled out and be accompanied by sensitivity analysis of upside risks. Top-down budgeting 
has been introduced, with spending limits being set for State entities. Accountability and 
budget ownership is thus strengthened, while the oversight role of the Ministry of Finance 
has been expanded and made more effective. Fiscal reporting is also strengthened, since all 
government entities are required to set monthly and quarterly targets for budget execution, 
reports are produced regularly. Finally, a Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) is set up, with 
the task of monitoring the implementation of the budget and of producing reports to assist 
the work of two parliament committees regarding the compliance to the targets set in the 
Medium-term Fiscal Strategy framework. The PBO thus performs part of the role of an 
independent fiscal institution, as analysed in e.g. van Riet (2010). 
Law 4270/2014 enshrines in law all requirements for budgetary frameworks included in the 
Council Directive 2011/85/EU, which was adopted in order to strengthen national ownership 
and have uniform requirements as regards rules and procedures forming the budgetary 
frameworks of Member States. The Directive and the Greek law among others foresee the 
introduction of complete and reliable accounting practices for all sub-sectors of the general 
government, the publication of timely and reliable fiscal data, transparency, the production 
of realistic macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts, the adoption of strong numerical fiscal 
rules for deficit and debt equipped with well-specified target definitions together with 
mechanisms for effective and timely monitoring. Finally, law 4270/2014 establishes the 
Hellenic Fiscal Council, entrusted with the role of providing an independent opinion on the 
budget proposal and execution, and monitoring compliance with EU fiscal rules and lays down 
in great detail its responsibilities, its relations with other government entities, the rules for 
selecting the members of its Board of Directors, etc.  
The legal fiscal governance framework in Greece now incorporates both many elements of 
what is considered best practice worldwide and the requirements of the EU fiscal framework. 
A full evaluation of the implementation of what is foreseen in law is perhaps too early to make 
and the evidence is yet sparse. Nonetheless, the quality of the medium-term budgetary 
framework, as judged by the European Commission, has impressively improved, with Greece 
being outperformed just by the UK among 27 EU Member States (see Figure 2). The 
Commission also evaluates the design strength of fiscal rules, in the sense that fiscal rules 
need to be equipped with the appropriate characteristics within the institutional framework 
of budgetary policy in order to be effective in containing fiscal imbalances. Characteristics like 
the legal base, the binding character, the monitoring bodies or correction mechanisms are 
institutional features that determine whether the fiscal rule will be respected or not.  
According to the Commission’s numerical indicators, Greece ranks very high in terms  of the 
rule covering the primary deficit, but its overall rank among EU countries is low in view of the 




expenditure. Data availability has also drastically improved, enhancing  government 




Figure 4. Fiscal Rules Index, by Member State 
 




Nevertheless, it is true that institutions and procedures are not easy to reform. To give a few 
examples, reliable fiscal data rely on the implementation of a comprehensive accounting 
system for the entire general government. A new single Chart of Accounts is planned to be 
introduced in the entire public sector (Miliakou et al, 2017), but implementation is not easy 
and takes time to materialize. In terms of transparency, data based on the extent and quality 
of public accessibility of the executive’s budget proposal presented in Figure 5 show that 














Figure 5. Index of Budget Transparency in EU countries, 2017 
 
 




Regarding the operation of the independent fiscal council, the existence of two such councils 
is perhaps redundant. The Hellenic Fiscal Council does not seem to have gained much visibility 
despite the fact it receives rather adequate funding, compared to corresponding fiscal 
councils in the EU (see OECD, 2018). The Parliamentary Budget Office is more active in the 
public debate, although it is bipartisan (since its members are appointed on the basis of party 
affiliation) instead of non-partisan (not affiliated to any party) and this partly undermines its 
presumably impartial role and authority (Anderson, 2009). Nevertheless, the Greek PBO is 
ranked around the middle among independent fiscal institutions in EU countries according to 
a set of OECD principles like breath of mandate, access to information, public awareness and 
relationship with Parliament (Horvath, 2018). 
Having officially exited the European Stability Mechanism stability support program on 21 
August 2018, Greece is now included in the European Semester for economic policy 
coordination, while being subject to the enhanced surveillance procedure. The first country 
report in the context of the 2019 European Semester was published at the end of February 
2019 and itself acknowledges that “deep institutional and structural reforms initiated in 
recent years to modernize the economy and the State require many years of sustained 
implementation for their impact to fully unfold” (European Commission, 2019). The current 
EU fiscal governance framework as it emerged from several reforms after the 2007/8 financial 
and economic crisis sets the boundaries of the supranational fiscal monitoring framework 




the EU level regarding its effectiveness and limits are crucial to understand and perhaps have 
not attracted the attention of Greek policy makers and the public at large. These issues are 
discussed in the next section. 
 
 
4. The evolving European fiscal governance framework 
 
The fact that the SGP as was reformed in 2005 did not prevent 14 out of 17 euro area countries 
from violating the deficit rule by 2011, while at the same time the crisis had pushed debt to 
historic heights, led to successive reforms of the EU fiscal governance framework. The SGP 
was thus amended in December 2011 with five new EU regulations and one EU directive (the 
“Six-Pack”) designed to strengthen the SGP by including new rules, new and earlier sanctions 
and additional escape clauses. In 2013 fiscal governance was again strengthened when 
agreement was reached on the “Two Pack” which added two new EU regulations to reinforce 
surveillance and coordination for the euro area, reflecting the higher risk of spillovers within 
the single currency area. Additional commitments were taken by member states through the 
intergovernmental Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the EMU, whose fiscal 
provisions (known as the “Fiscal Compact”) transpose elements of the  reformed SGP into 
national legislations. As noted by the European Fiscal Board (EFB) (2018), the current EU fiscal 
framework is the result of successive legislative reforms coupled with a series of agreements 
on how to interpret existing provisions.  
In order to enhance the clarity of the revised fiscal governance toolbox, the European 
Commission issues since 2013 a 200-page long yearly document (the Vade Mecum on the 
Stability and Growth Pact), with the aim of improving transparency about the way the 
Commission applies the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact. As explained in the latest 
edition of this document (European Commission, 2018), the amendments aimed at increasing 
the economic credibility and the flexibility within the rules of the Pact, while at the same time 
increasing national ownership which seemed to be missing in the provisions of the original 
SGP. The main reforms include the following: 
- Revised fiscal rules in order to better align fiscal targets with the fiscal  sustainability objective 
and to make the rules more flexible. According to the Fiscal Compact, national legislation 
should include a structural budget balance rule, an automatic correction mechanism to be 
triggered in the event of deviations from the rule and escape clauses for exceptional economic 
circumstances. The structural budget balance rule must limit annual structural  deficits to a 
maximum of 0.5 percent of nominal GDP and ensure convergence towards the country’s 
medium-term budgetary objective (MTO) assessed by the European Commission. The Pact 
also puts renewed focus on public debt, requiring from countries with debt above the 60 
percent of GDP limit to continuously reduce their debt levels by at least 1/20th of the distance 
between the current level and 60 percent of GDP until the latter is reached. Not respecting 
the debt reduction benchmark becomes a possible trigger of the Excessive Deficit Procedure. 




regarding just public deficit proved insufficient in preventing debt from escalating and raised 
serious concerned about debt sustainability. Finally, an expenditure benchmark is also 
introduced, whereby countries which have reached their MTO are required to keep annual 
growth of primary expenditure (excluding unemployment benefits) at or below long-term 
nominal GDP growth. The Fiscal Compact also tries to deal with the problem of past 
experience that too rigid rules are often disputed or quickly suspended. It thus extends the 
scope of escape clauses and allows deviations from targets when structural reforms are 
adopted or investment expenditures are undertaken, provided that these entail short-term 
budgetary costs in exchange for long-term gains. 
- National budgetary frameworks are reformed. The Fiscal Compact requires improvements 
in the domestic budget institutions, including making medium-term budgetary frameworks 
more binding (by translating the MTO concept into national law through provisions of binding 
force and permanent character), preparing budgets in a more top-down sequence and 
producing frequent, timely and comprehensive reporting on general government fiscal  data 
and risks. 
- Surveillance and monitoring are improved. Official macroeconomic forecasts should be 
either produced or endorsed by a national independent institution which will also monitor 
compliance with the fiscal rules and the automatic correction mechanisms in case of 
significant deviations at a national level. More effective surveillance requires not only 
increasing the intensity of monitoring of budget plans, but also ensuring coordination among 
member states before these plans are put to national parliaments. All euro area countries 
must therefore submit their draft budgets to the European Commission to ensure appropriate 
integration of euro area policy recommendations. If the Commission assesses that the draft 
budget is not compliant with the SGP, it will issue an opinion to inform the national debate 
and possibly ask for revisions before it is enacted.  
- Enforcement is enhanced. In case of non-compliance with a euro area country with the 
deficit rule, a recommendation by the Commission is approved by the Council unless a 
qualified majority of member states votes against it. In this way, sanctions become more 
automatic, since it is more difficult for the Council to go against the Commission’s advice, as 
has repeatedly happened in the past. Finally, the European Court of Justice can impose a 
financial penalty up to 0.1 percent of GDP if a country fails to properly implement the 
legislative changes required by the Fiscal Compact. 
Among the many reforms introduced in the European fiscal monitoring framework, one can 
identify the emphasis placed upon two core elements; the quality of fiscal  reporting and the 
role of national independent fiscal institutions. Regarding the former, improving the quality 
of the upstream data sources (the accounts of public entities) has been a long-standing issue 
amidst fears that fiscal monitoring was being ineffective122. Good fiscal reporting is a key 
element of fiscal transparency, without which the Fiscal Compact will not bring about the 
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budgetary discipline sought by its designers. In this context, in recent years there has been a 
growing effort to promote the convergence of accounting standards with the aim of 
enhancing the international comparability of general government financial statements 
(Christiaens et al, 2015). 
The International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) are being promoted as a tool 
that will complement government accounting systems by focusing on accruals accounting. In 
the EU, harmonizing public sector accounting at micro level is envisaged to bolster the quality 
of macro fiscal reporting under the Excessive Deficit Procedure. One of the elements of the 
Six Pack thus calls for the European Commission to carry out an assessment of the suitability 
of the IPSAS for EU Member States. The idea is to convert IPSAS into EU regulation to form 
harmonized European Public Sector Accounting Standards (EPSAS), based on the principles of 
accrual budgeting and accounting. 
Regarding the latter, the literature on the possible role of national independent fiscal 
institutions (NFIs) is becoming voluminous123, while there is increasing empirical evidence 
that one of the factors explaining when countries stick to their fiscal plans is independent 
monitoring and enforcement bodies (issuing real-time alerts) primarily at a national level (e.g. 
Beetsma, et al, 2018, Reuter, 2019). Independent fiscal institutions are thought to address 
some of the presumed causes of deficit bias, including information asymmetry (both between 
voters and politicians and between the legislature and the executive), economic forecasting 
bias (of the type identified in Section 2) and time inconsistency produced by the electoral 
cycle (Viney and Poole, 2018, Debrun and Kinda, 2017). The IMF also places increasing 
emphasis on the watchdog role of IFIs which are expected to “raise the reputational and 
political costs of financially irresponsible choices” (Beetsma, et al, 2018). At the supranational 
level, the advisory European Fiscal Board (EFB) was established with the primal goal of  
offering a comprehensive and independent assessment of the implementation of the Stability 
and Growth Pact from an economic perspective. The EFB can make specific recommendations 
under the rules of the SGP if it sees risks to the proper functioning of the EMU. The EFB 
together with the newly created horizontal network of national fiscal councils exchange best 




5. The new EU fiscal governance framework: criticisms and proposals for 
reform 
 
Despite the fact that the new EU fiscal governance framework has been the outcome of a long 
procedure which sought to internalize the lessons learned from the financial  and economic 
crisis, it is still subject to harsh criticism, which can be grouped along  two major strands. The 
 
123 See, for example, Rapanos and Kaplanoglou (2010), Wruuck, P. and Wiemer, K. (2016), Beetsma and Debrun 




first strand is more of a technocratic nature. The design of fiscal rules is inherently 
problematic, since the three basic properties of “good” fiscal  rules, namely simplicity, 
flexibility and enforceability, cannot be easily reconciled (Debrun and Jonung, 2017). Making 
the rule flexible (i.e. contingent on a broader set of circumstances), compromises its simplicity 
and makes it harder to enforce. The more refined the rule, the harder it is to determine 
whether deviations are justified and the more the rule becomes subject to political 
manipulations. 
As already mentioned, in order to make the rules of the game clear, the European Commission 
produces an annual document, the Vade Mecum on the Stability and Growth Pact, which 
specifies various aspects of the implementation of the EU fiscal rules. Although formally 
strengthened, enforcement remains challenging. The Vade Mecum extends to over 200 
pages, clarifying in detail how compliance to numerous potentially inconsistent caps and 
benchmarks can be assessed. Subsequently, a deviation from the adjustment path towards 
the medium-term objective may be excused by referring to one or more exceptions, whose 
number is increasing over time. For example, structural reforms and investment expenditure 
can be taken into account under certain circumstances, with the aim of faci litating structural 
reforms that increase long-term growth potential and therefore enhance sustainability in 
public finances. A positive impact on sustainability is, however, difficult to verify, especially 
when reforms are in the planning stage and the granting of an exception inevitably comes 
with considerable discretionary scope. The 2018 Annual Report of the European Fiscal Board 
itself recognizes that the quest to adjust EU fiscal rules to a complex economic reality has 
resulted to both rules and processes being made increasingly detailed at the cost of 
transparency and credibility. The overly complex new EU governance framework may indeed 
be flexible, but suffers from weak compliance. Darvas and Leandro (2015), for example, show 
that the implementation of the European Semester recommendations was poor at the 
beginning of the Semester in 2011 and has deteriorated since. 
Furthermore, the problem of pro-cyclicality seems to have remained in the new framework 
(Darvas et al, 2018). According to Määttänen and Alcidi (2018), at the heart of this problem 
lies the difficulty to distinguish between cyclical and structural components in economic 
growth in real time. Although the structural budget balance is a valid theoretical concept, it 
suffers from large measurement problems. Key variables like the output gap and the 
structural deficit cannot be accurately measured in real time. 
Critics of the technocratic side put forward proposals for further reforming the new EU fiscal 
governance framework in order to address the main shortcomings of the existing structure. 
In general, they call for some form of simplification of existing  rules in order to enhance 
implementation. Darvas et al (2018) for example, argue in favor of substituting all existing 
rules with a rule on public expenditures, which should not grow faster than long term nominal 
growth, and at an even slower pace in countries with excessive levels of debt. Putting more 
emphasis on public expenditure rather than the budget balance is a view also shared by the 
European Fiscal Board (2018), which proposes a ceiling on the growth of primary expenditure 




of an expenditure rule supplemented by a debt-correction factor. Finally, Debrun and Jonung 
(2018) put forward the idea of imposing a fiscal Taylor rule, where the only costs of deviating 
would be strictly reputational. 
Some of the proposals additionally argue for further depoliticizing fiscal  surveillance, by e.g. 
transferring the surveillance of budgets and of compliance with the rules away from the 
Commission to a new specialized independent institution (of the European Stability 
Mechanism type), so that political influence on budget adjustment requirements is avoided 
(Deutsche Bundesbank, 2017, European Fiscal Board, 2018). Another proposal along similar 
lines is to delegate the stabilization function of fiscal policy to national independent fiscal 
councils, which would set a ceiling for the budget deficit and would be accountable to 
parliament. Even in the current settings, empowering national IFCs through delegating to 
them the role of implementing existing fiscal rules, while being coordinated by the European 
Commission, is a common theme of proposed reforms (Larch and Braendle, 2018). In general, 
the idea of strengthening national IFCs is attractive among several thinkers, who see these 
institutions as means of implementing the EU fiscal framework without compromising 
national sovereignty. These institutions would therefore minimize tensions between fiscal 
policies at the national level and the joint fiscal governance framework by e.g. raising alarm, 
encouraging reactions from parliament and educating the voting public and market 
participants on what constitutes “good fiscal behavior”. 
The second strand of criticism of the prevailing EU fiscal governance framework belongs to 
the political sphere. Many political scientists are pointing out that especially after the crisis 
numerous decisions of lasting consequence are being taken undercutting public debate. 
Faced with exceptional circumstances, the idea has been implemented that decision making 
can no longer be exercised within existing legal frameworks and institutional procedures. This 
is the case of “emergency politics” in crisis Europe, in which actions departing from 
conventional practice are rationalized as necessary responses to exceptional and urgent 
threats, “rescue packages” being their most clear manifestation (White, 2015). Τo take this 
point even further, the whole deficit-bias theory in effect asserts that politicians cannot be 
trusted with making the “right” decisions about the economy and that their choices lead to 
sub-optimal outcomes for the society. In a world where politicians are perceived to be moved 
by self-interest, those who can claim non-political status can present their judgement as 
impartial. However, this claim is not necessarily a valid one. As admitted by the Director-
General for Economic and Financial Affairs of the European Commission “the coordination (of 
national fiscal entities) can hardly be organized without some elaborate underpinning 
framework. And one must also recognize, as a political reality, the attachment within 
influential constituencies to ordo-liberal settings.” (Buti, 2016). Ordo-liberal economics 
precisely rest on the idea that electoral democracy must be tamed and constrained by the 
law and through independent and non-majoritarian institutions that will safeguard “sound 
policies” (Ferrera, 2018). 
Transparency International has very recently released a report assessing Eurogroup’s 




Eurogroup is just a consensus-building organ, in practice decisions pre-agreed by the 
Eurogroup are adopted by the Council without further debate and therefore it emerges as 
the executive headquarters of euro area governance. Its role in coordinating fiscal and 
economic policy among member states has been strengthened by reforms of the EU fiscal 
governance framework since the crisis, but no proportionate increase of democratic 
accountability has been ensured. As a result, the EU’s “democratic deficit” is widening and so 
is the gap between populations and leaders at the EU or the national level. This has led some 
authors to claim that the EU has moved to a stage of post-democracy, whereby the 
supranational decisions to institutionalize austerity, enforced by budgetary oversight by the  
Commission, removes alternative policy options at the domestic level (Glencross, 2018). The 
repercussions on democratic legitimacy and responsiveness are serious. Ruiz-Rufino and 
Alonso (2018) find evidence that the growing gap in the levels of satisfaction with democracy 
between bailed-out economies and the rest of the countries in the Eurozone is linked to 
citizens’ perceptions on whether external constrains reduce their government’s autonomy 
and, therefore, democratic choice. Häusermann et al (2018) study electoral turnout in 28 
European countries before and after the crisis by education level and show that electoral 
turnout among highly educated citizens in crisis countries has strongly declined during the 
crisis. The authors claim that when these citizens see that governments are severely 
constrained, they anticipate that the hands of future governments will be tied and abstain 
from elections. A more general impact is the rise of the appeal of anti-system parties. 
This problem has been particularly acute in the Greek case. The adjustment programs were 
an opportunity to push through hard constrains, since even recently adopted EU directives 
were immediately included as conditionalities in the programs, no matter their relation with 
the crisis challenges (Spanou, 2018). Hard austerity policies and reforms which gravely 
affected people’s lives were imposed with the Parliament being side-lined, eliminating any 
sense of legitimacy or national ownership of policies. The political consequences have been a 
sharp decline in voter turnout (from 74 per cent in the elections of September 2007 to 56 per 
cent in the elections of September 2015), five parliamentary elections only in the 2009-2015 
period and the rise of political radicalism (Sotiropoulos, 2019). If we accept that stronger EU 
fiscal governance has not been accompanied by concomitant increase in accountability, there 
is an apparent problem of democratic legitimacy and a need to reform the framework in order 
to enhance democratic oversight. Thus, according to this view, further empowering 
institutions like the European Fiscal Board, would create further legitimation challenges on 
normative grounds (Begg, 2016). However, enhancing democratic control is a knotty issue 
since the elected bodies, namely the European Parliament and the national parliaments,  
appear to have a rather limited role in the process. Ultimately the question becomes one of 
the kind of balance between risk control and risk-sharing within the EU. Hard rules and 
depoliticized fiscal monitoring are backed by those who believe that risk must be reduced in 
a stable monetary union. Promoting democratic oversight and perhaps more active fiscal 
policies supported by additional fiscal capacity at the EU level is backed by those who believe 










Ineffective fiscal monitoring due to weak domestic fiscal institutions has been among  the root 
causes of Greece’s severe fiscal derailment of 2009. Expenditure overruns and revenue 
shortfalls were being built up for more than a decade before the outbreak of the fiscal crisis, 
with no effective alerting mechanism in place. Since 2010 and as a result of external 
conditionality, on top of severe front-loaded fiscal consolidation measures, Greece proceeded 
with a complete overhaul of its domestic fiscal governance framework, enshrining in law both 
what is perceived as best practice in institutions and procedures and what is envisaged in the 
evolving EU fiscal governance framework. In this respect, the domestic legal framework 
promotes effective fiscal monitoring, not only in terms of avoiding “fiscal surprises” in the  
future, but also even more importantly in terms of improving transparency and supporting a 
more efficient allocation of resources in the public sector. Having the legal framework in place 
does not guarantee automatic results. It therefore remains an ongoing challenge to further 
improve the institutional capacity of implementing beneficial policies. 
Furthermore, since Greece is now included in the European Semester for  economic policy 
coordination, Greek policy makers have a lot to gain from closely following the European 
debate on further reforming this framework, which is being under attack from several fronts. 
Advocates of institutionalized fiscal discipline argue mainly in favor of further depoliticizing 
fiscal monitoring and assigning more power to non-political domestic or supranational fiscal 
institutions. However, it is becoming increasingly clear that credible commitment by 
governments at the international level presupposes political legitimacy at the domestic level. 
In democratic regimes, the latter presupposes that commitments may be modified or altered 
through political processes (Bellamy, 2015). During the crisis and in order to satisfy the 
European policy making agenda, several European governments (with Greece being an 
extreme example) have endorsed policies that were seen by the public as being imposed by 
unaccountable bodies. This has weakened trust in government. Not surprisingly, according to 
Eurobarometer data, the percent of citizens who trust their national  government in Greece 
has plummeted to almost one-digit levels since 2010, while the respective EU-average has 
never returned to pre-crisis levels. This is no good news even for the advocates of strict fiscal 
discipline, since there is evidence that a rules-based fiscal framework aimed to anchoring 
expectations of responsible fiscal policies may have a greater chance to emerge and survive 
in countries with public trust in governments and the rules (Debrun and Jonung, 2019). And, 
unlike policies, trust cannot be externally imposed; it is the gradual outcome of the proper 
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Abstract 
This chapter investigates the role of Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs) in Greece. It 
suggests that the debt crisis that erupted in 2009 has been a forceful factor for reforming 
IRAs, but the performance has been uneven. With a focus on network industries we outline 
the similarities and differences of IRAs regarding their status, powers and operation. The 
creation and strengthening of IRAs are linked with the policy context of market reform, 
discerning the liberalisation-oriented IRAs (pre-crisis) and the privatisation-oriented ones 
(post-crisis). The performance of the Greek IRAs is evaluated based on the indicators of the 
OECD Performance Assessment Framework for Economic Regulators (PAFER). While similar 
problems were observed in all IRAs under study, the findings suggest significant variation in 
their role, powers and performance across sectors. The explanatory factors accounting for 
these problems are analysed with reference to the interplay between the external pressure 
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Since the outbreak of the debt crisis and in the course of the three economic adjustment 
programmes of Greece (2010-2018), sweeping reform programmes were initiated in major 
economic sectors.  The impact of the crisis on the Greek economy and the legacy of the fiscal 
consolidation programmes have left the country with a broad middle- and long-term reform 
agenda, still underway, aiming at improving competitiveness and support growth. The goal of 
economic recovery required a series of structural reforms in key-economic sectors, including 
the opening up of network industries to competition. These reforms were critical not only for 
market performance, but also because they were directly linked with other policy 
programmes such as the restructuring, management and privatization of state assets. The 
latter was a main pillar of the loan agreements, but its impact would affect the Greek 
economy beyond the conclusion of the Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs).  
For the success of these reforms, the role of regulatory authorities in the governance of the 
restructured and / or privatized parts of the economy became a matter of great importance. 
In view of the privatization and / or liberalization of utilities markets, a critical prerequisite 
has been the existence of strong regulators. The three Memoranda of Understanding (2010, 
2012, 2015) and the Economic Adjustment Programmes included several provisions for the 
strengthening of existing Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs), such as the 
communications and energy regulators, and the creation of new ones, for instance in the 
transport and water sectors.  
This chapter provides a mapping of the current landscape of the domestic IRAs and assesses 
their role and performance as market regulators. We aim to address three key questions: first, 
what was the impact of the debt crisis on IRAs? Second, what is the current role of IRAs in 
privatised and / or liberalised markets? Third, how do they perform as economic-market 
regulators? These questions are analysed within the framework of policy conditionality. A 
critical explanatory factor of the empirical findings is the interplay between the external 
pressure for IRAs reform and the characteristics of the domestic political-administrative 
system. 
The analysis draws on existing theory of agencification but mainly adopts an empirical 
approach. Along with existing literature, empirical evidence is based on the findings of semi-
structured personal interviews with IRAs’ heads, members and / or staff that were conducted 
from March 2019 to March 2020. For the assessment of IRAs’ performance we use the OECD 
Performance Assessment Framework for Economic Regulators and available market 
indicators. The chapter is structured as follows: in section 2 the theoretical background of 
regulatory agencies is introduced in relation to the effect of the Eurozone crisis. Section 3 
describes the evolution of IRAs in Greece from the pre-crisis to the post-crisis period. In 
Section 4 we assess the role and performance of IRAs as market regulators. Section 5 provides 
an explanatory framework for the observed weaknesses of IRAs. The concluding section 




2. Αgencification, market regulation and the Eurozone crisis 
The devolution of regulatory powers from central ministerial departments to independent 
agencies is a form of structural and functional decentralisation that falls within the wave of 
‘agencification’ in public administration. Agencification has been a key trend of administrative 
reforms that have spread at a global scale (Christensen & Lægreid, 2006) and affected 
European countries since the 1980s (Gualmini, 2008: 77-80). The rationale for the creation of 
independent agencies focuses on the advantages of the delegation of powers for overcoming 
(or by-passing) the weaknesses of traditional, centralized and vertically-integrated 
bureaucracies. Αccordingly, agencification has been directly linked with the emergence and 
growth of the regulatory state (Majone, 1994; Norton, 2004; Christensen & Lægreid, 2005; 
Scott, 2014). At the policy level, liberalization, privatization and (re)regulation brought about 
large-scale transformations and called for new reform and regulatory instruments (Levi-Faur, 
2004; Gilardi, 2008; Florio, 2017).  
The creation of IRAs came largely as a response to policy issues that derived from the 
privatisation and liberalisation of state monopolies (Córdova-Novion & Hanlon, 2002: 71-72): 
In a privatised industry, an independent regulator is needed in order to protect the consumer 
against the abuse of monopoly power and to prevent economic inefficiencies of monopoly 
operations; In a liberalised market the regulator must be distinct from the state, as the latter 
may act in favour of a state-owned or state-controlled enterprise, in order to ensure the equal 
treatment of the incumbent firms and new entrants. IRAs were a key requirement of this new 
policy environment. Other reasons point out the need for specialized technical and scientific 
knowledge in complex policy areas that cannot be managed by traditional ministerial 
bureaucracies (Schick, 2002: 14). In addition, legal obligations deriving from EU membership 
has been a key factor for the creation of independent regulatory entities in member states 
(Norton, 2004: 787; CIRIEC, 2020). In Greece, the creation of IRAs largely came in response to 
all the above factors.  
In the EU, most IRAs in network industries were created after the abolition of state 
monopolies and / or in order to meet the obligations deriving from the sectoral Directives 
since the late 1980s. Greek IRAs have often invoked interventions or recommendations from 
the EU level due to delays in the transposition of the EU directives into national law, 
particularly regarding the energy sector126 (Berglund et al. 2006; Nabitz and Hirzelb, 2019). At 
this time, the creation and operation of IRAs was mainly associated with the acceleration of 
the EU driven liberalisation process and the opening of markets to competition. Both market 
reforms and agencification were accelerated and intensified after the outbreak of the 
Eurozone crisis in late 2009. Similar patterns were adopted across other southern European 
periphery countries that were hit by the crisis, aiming at the strengthening of IRAs’ role, 
 
126 See for instance European Commission - Press release “Commission refers Greece to Court and gives 




autonomy and powers127. In the crisis context, the broader rationale for reform was the 
(expected) contribution of IRAs in boosting competition and economic growth, and 
supporting the fiscal – economic recovery.   
 
3. The landscape of IRAs in Greece 
3.1. The pre-crisis IRAs  
Domestic IRAs were created in response to the requirements of the single market and the EU-
driven liberalization of network industries. In the EU, IRAs for market competition were 
strengthened during the 1980s and the 1990s, signifying a critical change of the traditional 
regulation paradigm of which the dominant actors were governments and regulatees 
(Thatcher, 2005: 347). Greek independent authorities were created and evolved in line with 
the European trends and external commitments (Georgantas, 2003); however, the landscape 
of the domestic IRAs is characterized by a certain diversity (Galanis, 2018). Their status, type 
and powers vary across sectors and no uniform market regulation agency pattern exists. 
In a historical perspective, the authority for the protection of competition was the first quasi-
autonomous authority that was established in 1977128. Since the mid-1990s, its independence 
and competences were gradually strengthened129 and the Hellenic Competition Commission 
(HCC) took the typical form of an independent authority. Sectoral regulatory agencies were 
created during the 1990s in parallel with the privatization and liberalization of utilities sectors 
and the harmonization of the domestic regulatory framework with the EU legislation. The 
regulatory authority for telecommunications and posts130 (EETT) was established in 1992131 
and its competences were reinforced and expanded in the following decades132. The national 
regulator for energy (RAE) was established at the end of the 1990s133, as a result of the 
adjustments required by the EU market liberalization Directives. By the end of the 2000s these 
new entities had become an integral part of the domestic administrative system and a 
potential factor for its Europeanization and modernization. 
3.2. The crisis effect on IRAs 
Since the outbreak of the Greek crisis in late 2009, the role of IRAs was notably upgraded. 
IRAs’ powers and competences were expanded and their role in policy-making and 
 
127 For Portugal, see Portugal - Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality: 34 -
35 and European Commission, 2014: 66-67; for Spain see Xifré, 2014: 1, 11; Espín and Sitges, 2017. 
128 Law 703/1977. 
129 Laws 2296/1995, 2837/2000 and 3373/2005.  
130 Initially named Hellenic Telecommunications Committee (EET, 1992) and since 1998 Hellenic 
Telecommunications and Post Commission (EETT). 
131 Law 2075/1992. 
132 Law 2668/1998, Act 2867/2000 and Law 3431/2006. 




implementation was strengthened. Along with existing IRAs, new ones were created, namely 
the Regulatory Authority for Railways (RAS, 2010), the Regulatory Authority for Passenger 
Transport (RAEM, 2013) and the Regulatory Authority for Ports (RAL, 2013 / 2016). In 
addition, the Special Secretariat for Water was planned to be transformed to a semi-
independent structure134 within the Ministry of Environment and Energy.  
The provisions and obligations that were included in the MoUs and the domestic reform 
programmes cover a range of measures targeting both markets and IRAs: 
During the 1st programme (2010) emphasis was placed on the strengthening of the role, 
competences and independence of the Hellenic Competition Commission (HCC). In line with 
the Memorandum135 obligations, domestic legislation provided for the empowerment of HCC 
and a new institutional framework was adopted136, ensuring its independence, effectiveness, 
accountability and the continuity of its board137. Detailed measures were also set out for the 
reform of the energy and transport sectors, including the gradual liberalization of markets 
and the strengthening of the regulators138. Among them, the reinforcement of the 
independence of the Regulatory Authority for Energy (RAE), with reference to the nomination 
of board, budget and personnel, was a key action139. In light of these requirements, new 
legislation was passed that changed and empowered the role of RAE140. 
The 2nd programme (2012) included deeper and more detailed provisions for IRAs. An 
upgrading of HCC’s role in certain ongoing reforms was observed, such as in regulated 
professions, fuel sector and product markets141. Regarding sectoral regulators, in the 2nd MoU 
a critical change was the shift of the reform focus from liberalization to privatization. The role 
of IRAs was more directly linked with the use and management of state assets142, along with 
the opening of markets to competition. IRAs were a necessary precondition for the proper 
regulation of markets and the management of assets under privatisation, for instance 
regarding ports and gas sectors143. The agreed measures covered sectors with limited scope 
for competition, such as ports, water, airports and motorways, and differed from the case of 
telecommunications and energy market reforms that were mainly driven by the liberalization 
process. The establishment and the strengthening of the effectiveness and autonomy of port, 
rail and water regulatory authorities were actions of major importance144. In the e-
 
134 A provision for a separate budget was included in the Supplemental Memorandum of Understanding (June 
2016). 
135 Greece: Memorandum of Understanding on specific economic policy conditionality (May 2010), pp. 11, 26.  
136 Law 3959/2011 (amended by Laws 4013/2011, 4072/2012, 4364/2016 and 4389/2016).  
137 Law 3845/2010, p. 1368; The Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece, Fourth review (July 2011), p. 67.  
138 Law 3845/2010, p. 1347. 
139 Greece: Memorandum of Understanding on specific economic policy conditionality (May 2010), p. 12, 26; 
Law 3845/2010, p. 1369; The Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece, Fourth review (July 2011), p. 71.  
140 Laws 3851/2010 & 4001/2011. 
141 The Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece, Fourth review (July 2011). 
142 Greece: Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (March 2012), ch. D, par. 24; Law 4046/2012, p. 
762. 
143 The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece. Fourth Review (Apr il 2014), p. 3. 




communications sector the MoU II extended the role of the Hellenic Telecommunications and 
Post Commission (EETT) as a one-stop shop for the licensing of antennae and base stations145. 
In the 3rd programme (2015) the above reforms progressed and were further specified. The 
need to strengthen the institutional, financial and functional independence and effectiveness 
of existing IRAs such as the HCC and RAE was stressed, along with measures aiming at 
enhancing the role, functionality and powers of the newly established regulatory structures 
for water and ports146. Special emphasis was placed on the operation, competences and 
autonomy of the Special Secretariat for Water147. A critical new element was that for the first 
time a unified approach on independent agencies was introduced. In light of the relevant 
provisions, the Supplemental MoU (2017) emphasized the need to review and simplify the 
existing legislative framework and to define a common set of rules that would apply 
horizontally to all independent agencies148. In line with the envisaged horizontal legislation, 
the main principles for HCC, RAE and RAEM are expected to be further defined149. Up to date, 
a revised partial version of the draft law has been submitted by the Greek authorities and was 
under consultation with the EU institutions, leading to a revised report on June 2018150. After 
the conclusion of the adjustment programmes in August 2018, the continuity and completion 
of these reforms was agreed and their progress has been monitored.  
3.3. The post-crisis landscape of IRAs 
The current landscape of IRAs is characterized by a notable increase in their number, role and 
powers. Table 1 summarizes the existing regulatory institutions in network industries and the 
type / regime of the respective markets and sectors. 
 
Table 1. IRAs & markets 
Sector Market Regulator 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
& POSTS 
Liberalized Hellenic Telecommunications and Post 
Commission (EETT / EETT) 
Telecommunications Oligopoly: 4 fixed and 4 
mobile tel. providers151 
 
Posts Oligopoly: 10 providers152  
 
145 Greece: Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality (March 2012) (Growth -
Enhancing Structural Reforms). 
146 Greece - Memorandum of Understanding for a three-year ESM programme (August 2015), pp. 24, 27; Law 
4336, p. 1027; Greece - Supplemental Memorandum of Understanding (June 2016), p. 41. 
147 Greece - Supplemental Memorandum of Understanding (June 2016), p. 32; Compliance Report - ESM 
Stability Support Programme for Greece - Fourth Review (July 2018), pp. 29, 61-62. 
148 Greece - Supplemental Memorandum of Understanding (June 2016) pp. 2, 40-41. 
149 Compliance Report - ESM Stability Support Programme for Greece - Fourth Review (July 2018), pp. 72-73. 
150 Compliance Report - ESM Stability Support Programme for Greece - Fourth Review (July 2018), pp. 72-73. 
151 Source: Interviews and EETT, Market Review of Electronic Communications & Postal Services 2017. 




ENERGY Liberalized (ongoing) Regulatory Authority for Energy (RAE / 
ΡΑΕ) 
Electricity  Oligopoly: 25 providers153  
Gas Oligopoly: 21 providers154  
TRANSPORT   
Railways Liberalized  
Oligopoly: 5 companies 
Regulatory Authority for Railways (RAS / 
ΡΑΣ) 
Urban transportation 
(Athens & Thessaloniki)  
Μonopoly [Athens Public Transport Organization 
(OASA / ΟΑΣΑ) 
Transport Authority of Thessaloniki S.A. 
(OSΕTH / ΟΣΕΘ)]155 
Inter-city transport Quasi-liberalized 
[monopoly/ line (62 KTEL)] 
Regulatory Authority for Passenger 
Transport (RAEM / ΡΑΕΜ) 
Marines/ports  Quasi-liberalized 
(Concessions156 and / or 
privatization157)  
Regulatory Authority for Ports (RAL / ΡΑΛ) 
Airports Quasi-liberalized 
(Concessions) 
Civil Aviation Authority (APA / ΑΠΑ) 




Special Secretariat for Water (SSW / 
ΕΓΥ)158 




(various regimes) Hellenic Competition Committee (HCC / 
ΕΑ) 
Source: Lampropoulou & Ladi, 2020. 
 
From this overview, a set of common features as well as certain differences can be traced 
among existing IRAs, as presented in Table 2. Regarding the similarities, the creation of IRAs 
in all cases has been the result of external pressures and came in response to the single 
market requirements and the adjustment of the domestic framework to EU legislation 
(sectoral Directives). In most cases, especially in the early stages of their operation, IRAs faced 
several problems of limited powers, inadequate resources, political interferences and 
understaffing. IRAs are characterized by several differences with reference to their powers, 
institutional features, resources and degree of independence (see section 4). The type and 
the degree of competition of the respective markets vary as well. 
 
153 Source: DEDDIE data (Dec. 2018). 
154 Source: data from Natural Gas Distribution Companies – EDAs (Attica, Thess, DEDA) (Nov. 2018). 
155 These entities are not IRAs according to our definition; however, they are responsible for the monitoring of 
the respective sectors and are supervised by the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport. 
156 Regional ports. 
157 Piraeus Port Authority S.A. (OLP) and Thessaloniki Port Authority S.A. (OLTH). 




Table 2. Similarities and differences among IRAs 
Similarities Differences 
Rationale:  adjustment 
to external 
requirements 
• single market  
• debt crisis 







• Degree of 
independence 
• Resources 





Source: Compiled by the authors 
 
During the economic adjustment programmes of Greece (2010-2018) IRAs were part (and 
prerequisite) of key reforms in the network industries. The strengthening of existing IRAs and 
the creation of new ones was the combined effect of the acceleration of pending (delayed) 
reforms and new commitments were undertaken under the Memoranda in the energy, 
telecoms, transport and other sectors. The pre-crisis IRAs have been mostly oriented towards 
the liberalization of the markets, while the post crisis (new) IRAs seem to have been more 
closely linked with the privatization programme. 
4.    s’ performance and market regulation 
4 1  Meas rin  IRAs’ per ormance 
The meaning, tools and evaluation criteria of IRAs’ performance vary significantly as well as 
the type, methods and unit / levels of analysis, depending on the approach adopted (Brown 
et al., 2006). In some studies, performance is directly linked with the goals and mission of IRAs 
(Pollitt & Talbot, 2004: 14-18). Other scholars focus on market, sector or industry 
performance and the quality of the regulatory environment (Joskow, 2005) or, generally, the 
regulatory system (Brown et al., 2006). Indicators assessing the effectiveness of market 
regulation include market performance, price and quality of services / products and market 
competition (Pollitt & Talbot, 2004; Verhoest et al., 2009). Further measurements place 
emphasis on the quality of services and service delivery (European Commission, 2007; CERRE, 
2014) or assess the quality of regulation in relation to market performance and consumer’s 
satisfaction (Clifton and Diaz-Fuentes, 2010).  
Our analysis is based on a synthesis of existing market indicators, reports and data collected 
through interviews with heads, members and officials of IRAs. For the assessment of IRAs’ 




Regulators (PAFER)159, which includes the following indicators: (i) strategic objectives, (ii) 
input, (iii) process, and (iv) output and outcome.  
4.2. Quality of regulation: Τhe insi ers’ vie  
This section makes an assessment of IRAs’ performance based on existing legislation and the 
views of the regulators and the industry. The information was gathered via 11 semi-structured 
interviews with heads, members and officials of IRAs. We also used data from the Annual 
Reports and other official publications of IRAs. The data is classified in line with the OECD-
PAFER indicators160 and listed on a Likert-type scale from very low to very high161, according 
to the estimated performance of IRAs. The different scores respectively show the degree (low 
/ moderate / high) to which each IRA meets the OECD performance standards, namely: Clearly 
identified role and objectives, Efficiency and effectiveness of Input (funding, staffing, 
resources’ management), Quality of process for regulatory activity and Systematic 
assessment of outputs and outcomes from regulatory activity. Findings are summarized in 
Table 4.  
 




























































159 See OECD 2018: 6 and http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/driving-performance-of-regulators.htm. 
160 We mainly focus on sectoral regulators in competitive markets; thus HCC, SSW and APA have been excluded 
from this assessment. 




Evidence suggests that IRAs’ performance significantly varies. In short, bigger, older and 
established agencies, such as EETT, perform better than smaller and most recently created 
ones, a trend which is also confirmed by the IRAs’ literature (Maggetti and Verhoest, 2014: 
247). RAE faced several problems in the first stages of its operation, for instance regarding 
the ‘input’ indicator (vague / weak powers, understaffing issues, etc.), but in the past years  
notable improvement has been recorded, as the institutional framework has changed162 and 
its role has been empowered. The performance of post-crisis IRAs such as RAS and RAL is 
adequate regarding the existence of a clear institutional mission (objectives, targets, goals) in 
line with the IRA’s functions and powers however they are still in the process of establishing 
their role as market regulators. The shortage of (specialized) staff and other resources is a 
major weakness and further institutional and organizational strengthening will be needed as 
the respective markets continue to develop. RAEM is a rather problematic case as it has not 
(yet) operated and no action has been taken in order to issue the required decisions163. 
Overall, it should be noted that while in the course of the economic adjustment programmes 
the independence and powers of existing IRAs were reinforced, their role in decision-making 
remains weak. 
Regarding the performance criteria, the strategic goals of most IRAs are clearly defined in the 
legislative framework. However, its implementation and update are not always consistent. A 
major problem regarding IRAs’ inputs is the lack of personnel, especially concerning staff with 
specialized skills / knowledge. Remarkably, all IRAs under study are understaffed. Their 
autonomy and effectiveness in the management of their resources is mostly moderate, 
particularly due to the restrictions in the use of own-source revenues. Quality of processes is 
adequate but moderate, as the existing (heavy) bureaucratic procedures often slow down 
their regulatory and administrative activities. As regards the outputs, most IRAs perform well, 
as their decisions are generally accepted by the market and only a small percentage of them 
are challenged in (but rarely been overturned by) courts. Finally, IRAs outcomes suggest 
moderate performance levels: Telecoms sector corresponds to higher degree of competition 
and a relatively stable market environment, while RAE, RAS and RAL are sti ll in the process of 
adjusting to the ongoing reforms of the relevant markets. 
4.3. Market indicators 
An additional external source for the evaluation of IRAs’ outcomes is the view of the 
consumers in network industries. Consumer Markets Scoreboard can be used as an indicator 
reflecting (among others) the quality of regulation in utilities markets. The components of the 
Market Performance Indicator index (MPI) include the respondents’ estimations and ratings 
 
162 Law 4001/2011. 
163 The members of RAEM took office in September 2014. However, shortly after their appointment, one 
member resigned, and the authority could not operate. In addition, the necessary decisions for its funding and 
staffing have not been issued by the competent Minister. More than five years after the creation of RAEM the 
term of office of its members has expired without any contact or collaboration between them and the 




with regard to: Comparability, Trust, Problems & Detriment, Expectations and Choice. Their 
average scores since the beginning of the crisis are presented in Table 5. 
 




















76.6 -3.9* -4.4* -0.4 +3.1* +1.0 -0.6 -0.6 
Postal Services 81.6 +1.6 +1.5 +0.3 +2.1* -0.5 +0.7 +2.1* 
Internet provision 75.2 -2.1* -3.3* -1.5 +0.9 +1.5 +3.7* -1.6* 
Train services 78.2 +1.9* +4.0* +2.1* +4.5* -0.1 -2.6* +1.4* 
Water supply 72.2 -1.3 +2.0 +2.8* +2.6* -2.2 -1.9 -4.9* 
Mobile telephone 
services 
75.9 +2.9* -2.7* -5.8* +3.4* -0.1 +1.0 -1.2 
Electricity services 68.8 -0.8 +4.1* +5.5* +4.2* -6.8* -3.1* -7.5* 
Gas services 81.4 +3.9* +4.7* +0.3 +1.9 +2.9* -2.0* +2.1* 
Source: EU - Consumer Markets Scoreboard 2018. 
 
The data shows that during the crisis there have been some improvements but most 
indicators have deteriorated. In the area of RAE, electricity services are among the three 
worst-performing markets and score below the EU-28 average. The same goes for Water 
supply. Internet provision and fixed telephone services have been deteriorating since 2013 
and are below the EU-28 average, suggesting the underperformance of the e-communications 
market. Postal services, Gas services and Train services have improved and score above the 
EU-28 average. These findings are partly controversial, to the extent that sectors that fall 
within the responsibility of the same regulator record both positive and negative scores, i.e. 
electricity and gas for RAE and fixed-telephone and postal services for EETT. Thus, these 
indicators have certain limitations and do not clearly reflect the relationship between market 
and regulatory performance, as the latter depends on a variety of factors and not solely on 
the regulators. 
 
5. Discussion: Domestic resistance vs external pressure for reform   
The process of establishing IRAs’ role in the domestic political-administrative system has 
encountered strong resistances and still has a long way to go. Existing political and 
bureaucratic structures initially faced new agencies with scepticism and were reluctant to 
delegate powers and responsibilities, especially regarding decision-making. Most agencies 
during the early stages of their operation faced problems regarding their powers, 




undermined their regulatory capacity and performance. These weaknesses were well 
recognized before the eruption of the crisis and were further aggravated due to the delayed 
adjustment of the markets and the regulatory framework. While the need to complete the 
required market reforms and to strengthen the role of the regulatory authorities had been 
stressed by the EU, it was the economic adjustment programmes that triggered more drastic 
and radical measures to moved forward with the implementation of pending or delayed 
reforms.  
Along with the requirements of the EU single market and the liberalization process, a critical 
factor underlying the empowerment of IRAs in the course of the economic adjustment 
programmes was the policy conditionality linking the required reforms with the loan’s 
disbursements (Featherstone, 2015; Spanou, 2020). This new policy environment created a 
strong external pressure to de-politicise several functions of the domestic administrative 
system, especially in MoU-related areas, due to the low trust of the country’s creditors vis-a-
vis Greek governments. Thus, external demands enabled and supported the creation of 
independent entities that operate ‘at arm’s length’ from the state. The attempted de-
politicisation through agencification was observed not only at the area of IRAs, but also to 
other central administrative structures, implying a tendency for a clearer division between 
the political and the administrative spheres (Dimitrakopoulos & Passas, 2020; Lampropoulou 
& Oikonomou, 2020).  
In this respect, a critical question concerns the interplay between the cultural norms and 
practices of the domestic political-administrative system and the new, externally imposed 
standards of the regulatory institutions. The fact that most domestic IRAs were not created 
on national governments’ own initiative but the latter were forced to do so by the EU and / 
or the crisis pressure implies a prior (negative) reflex towards the delegation of powers from 
the central Ministries to semi-autonomous institutions. While IRAs’ independence was 
seemingly strengthened during the crisis, government interference in their operation remains 
a serious challenge, especially regarding informal political involvements. Central government 
is still reluctant to strengthen IRAs’, especially regarding decision-making competences. To 
the degree that IRAs’ performance is associated with their independence (Cambini and Rondi, 
2011; Hanretty et al., 2012), the above weaknesses largely explain the above described cases 
of low or moderate performance. 
Overall, the delegation of powers to IRAs poses a broader challenge for the traditional 
organizational patterns of the domestic bureaucracy. Given that the Greek administrative 
system has been characterized by a high degree of centralization and concentration, the 
empowerment of independent, functionally decentralized entities signified a critical aspect 
of the broader modernization process of public administration (Spanou, 2008: 161; Ladi, 
2014: 190). However, changes have been incremental and pre-existing bureaucratic patterns 





6. Conclusions  
This chapter provided a mapping of the Greek IRAs in the network industries and attempted 
a first assessment of their performance as market regulators. The debt crisis that erupted in 
2009 has triggered a wave of market reforms that led to the strengthening of existing IRAs 
and the creation of new ones. Findings suggest that the status of IRAs varies substantially 
regarding their institutional features, size, powers, resources, independence and 
performance. Several differences were further observed between the pre-crisis 
(liberalization-oriented) and the post-crisis IRAs (privatization-oriented).  
Regarding IRAs’ performance, the results based on OECD PAFER indicators show that older 
and established agencies, such as EETT, seem to perform better than newly created ones that 
still lack powers and resources. RAE has encountered several problems since its creation but 
in the course of the debt crisis its powers have been reinforced and progress has been 
recorded. RAS and RAL are in the process of establishing their role and show good prospects; 
however, they need further institutional strengthening. A rather problematic case is RAEM, 
which actually remains a ’ghost’ IRA, as it was only legally established but has not (yet) 
operated in practice.  
The main trigger for IRAs’ reform has been an external pressure, namely the compliance with 
the EU Directives (1990s-2000s) and / or the Memorandum prerequisites (2010s). The 
observed tension between external obligations and internal resistances explains several 
weaknesses of the domestic IRAs. This imbalance is further reflected in the weak 
synchronisation between the formal-legislative and the actual adjustment in the sectors 
under study. Beyond the adjustment of the regulatory framework, the competences, means 
and resources that were delegated to the regulators in order to exercise their powers in many 
cases have been inadequate. This lack of powers and resources has been a main reason for 
IRAs’ problems and suboptimal performance.  
Notwithstanding the observed weaknesses, the creation of IRAs has strengthened and 
modernised the regulatory function and has supported market reforms in major  economic 
sectors. While IRAs have not strongly challenged the dominant organisational pattern of the 
domestic administrative system, which mainly remains a heavy traditional bureaucracy, traits 
of change can be traced, for instance regarding the flexibility and transparency of regulation, 
as well as the strengthening of the technocratic standards of administration.  IRAs have 
changed the way of government intervention in the economy, as their features match better 
with the prerequisites of competitive markets. Hence, the existence of strong regulators is 
expected to support the long-term reform of critical parts of the domestic economy, such as 
communications, energy, transport and other infrastructure, and to have a positive effect on 
investments and growth. However, beyond market and regulatory performance, issues of 
democratic control and accountability should not be overlooked. Finally, a critical question is 
whether IRAs will support the long-term viability of the recent structural and market reforms 
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Chapter 14. Macro Policy Interdependence in a Unifying Framework 
for a Monetary and Fiscal Union 




This paper is a qualitative presentation of issues associated with macroeconomic policy 
interdependence with an emphasis on the institutional setting of the European Union and of 
the Euro zone area. It identifies the importance of fiscal multipliers and the resulting policy 
spillovers, and discusses some of the evidence by drawing on recent studies. It then turns to 
a qualitative discussion of the key analytical components of a model characterizing economies 
which can exercise their own national fiscal policy while engaging in free trade and 
maintaining their own currencies or, alternatively, sharing a currency. To appreciate these 
issues, the   paper benchmarks the different scenaria to the absence of trade, strictly speaking 
autarky, while allowing progressively fiscal and monetary policy under a monetary union as 
well as a fiscal union. The model emphasizes the importance of differences in population sizes 
in a general international equilibrium model of a monetary union under alternative scenaria 
of monetary, fiscal, and debt policy coordination. It considers, in particular, conditions for 
participating in a fiscal union within a monetary union, a hitherto unexplored question. The 
analysis allows for inefficiencies in tax collection that serve as another difference across 
countries and examines how union-wide coordination of tax and spending policy, typically a 
nation-specific competence, may improve welfare. This is intended to explore the contrast 
between monetary policy decisions that may be determined by deliberations and voting in 
the central bank, given the fiscal policy stance, and national fiscal policy interdependence, 
given union-wide monetary policy. It examines the implications of different sizes of the 
members of the union. 
 
Keywords: monetary union, fiscal union, international interaction of monetary and fiscal 
policy; game-theoretic models of international monetary policy coordination. Debt finance 
vs. tax finance vs. monetary policy. Technological change vs. debt reform.  
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The agony increasingly associated with the outcome of numerous recent European Councils 
is not just due to stress, fatigue, anxiety, and even a modicum of despair due to the Covid-19 
pandemic. Reconciling differing viewpoints in economic policy coordination among nation 
states that differ so much with respect to culture and level of administrative sophistication as 
the members of the European Union (EU, from now on) and the Eurozone (EZ from now on) 
is a daunting task in the best of circumstances. The present paper probes the dimensions of 
interdependence by means of a simple, but not too simple, macroeconomic framework for 
studying reforms, deficits, and debt in fiscal and currency unions with an emphasis on the EU 
and the EZ. In the course of doing so the paper examines benefits and costs associated with 
participation in the EU and the EZ with an emphasis on the perspective of the smaller vs. 
larger countries, like Greece, which was the focus of the Fletcher–LSE Conference, April 12, 
2019. 
The Eurozone (EZ) is at a crossroads. The global financial crisis revealed the importance of the 
dearth of macro policy tools available to EZ members. This is in stark contrast to the US. A 
critical issue is the limits to monetary policy tools in the absence of a fiscal union. The paper 
reviews the broader issues associated with economic policy interdependence in a unifying 
framework by relying on the literature that has emerged since the aftermath of the EZ 
sovereign debt crisis. It also draws analytical lessons from a stylized model with two countries, 
differing in size, which accommodates autarky versus a variety of modes of economic 
integration while allowing for a fiscal union within a monetary union. The model allows 
examination of broad policy options and advantages that adding a fiscal union confers on 
those available to a monetary union. The full technical details of the model are provided in a 
technical appendix [Ioannides (2021), Appendix]. 
One of the most important considerations that confronts students of the design of European 
integration is heterogeneity of the constituent parts. Heterogeneity is expressed in many 
dimensions, such as political, cultural, economic and of course magnitudes in terms of the 
population and economic size. Newer theories of comparative advantage, such as those 
associated with product differentiation that new trade theory and new economic geography 
have utilized, have emphasized that due to the advantages of agglomerations and path 
dependence advancing economic integration may make constituent states even more 
heterogeneous. As a consequence, suboptimalities in the currency area they make up may 
thus be further exacerbated.  
This paper emphasizes the importance of differences in population sizes. Population size 
directly affects real economic outcomes. It also underlies perceptions of relative importance 
in international economic governance and thus state actions. Therefore, it affects notions of 
democratic legitimacy both within and across countries. In the EU, size is critically enshrined 
in numerous decision making structures, which range from unanimity or consensus to various 
qualified majority rules to simple majority rule. At the same time, EU member states are 




up of a single national from each member state. This parallels the US parliamentary structure, 
where states are equally represented in the US Senate but in proportion to their populations 
in the US House of Representatives. 
The analytical backbone of the model of this paper, available in a Ioannides (2021), Appendix, 
borrows Casella (1992)’s framework and examines a number of scenaria above and beyond 
hers. In particular, it allows for coexistence of fiscal policy, national as well as union-wide, 
along with monetary policy. The model also allows [ c.f. Sibert (1992)] for inefficiencies in tax 
collection that add another difference across countries. It allows for the possibility that tax 
and spending policy in the union are decided by means of different procedures. This is 
intended to express the contrast between monetary policy outcomes determined by 
deliberations and voting in the ECB, given the fiscal policy stance, and national fiscal policy 
stance, given monetary policy. What options does this logic confer on smaller versus larger 
members of a currency union? How a small country’s fundamentals affects its bargaining 
power, especially over a full range of fiscal policy, like taxes on different aspects of activity, is 
an important question. It goes beyond Casella (1992) in examining the impact of market 
reforms and of various types of technological progress and explores their consequences for 
the sustainability of debt.  
 





1.1 Greece at the Aftermath of the EZ Debt Crisis 
 
Greece with its singularly weak fiscal and competitiveness performance, and indeed huge 
overall institutional weaknesses posed some very challenging questions to EU/EZ decision 






















makers. Its somewhat unique geographic and cultural isolation and atrophied economic 
complexity are all jointly at fault. It is important to remember how special Greece’s 
performance has been during the EZ crisis, which started in 2010. Figure 1 plots the evolution 
of GDP in EZ crisis countries, namely Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, and compares with 
Finland, 1990-1996, and with the US, 1929-1938. Comparison with Finland is interesting be- 
cause Finland’s experience following the breakup of the Soviet Union was a severe downturn, 
the so-called Finnish Great Depression, which was purely due to real, that is non-monetary 
shocks. Comparison with the US Great Depression during the 1929–1938 provides important 
contrast in understanding the unprecedent severity of the Greek crisis during the EZ debt 
crisis. 
In the context of experiences like those documented in Figure 1, it is understandable that 
membership in the EZ — and in view of the British experience with the Brexit debate, in the 
EU, too — it is reasonable that governments and publics might have questioned whether the 
EU or the EZ pay off. It is therefore interesting to consider some quantitative aspects of the 
benefits to individual nation states of the membership to the EU and to the EZ. Twenty years 
since its introduction, the euro does remain controversial in some member countr ies. 
Moreover, we do know from the Brexit experience for the UK that EU membership itself, in 
spite of the inadequacies of the associated political campaigns can be a deeply divisive 
question. However, it does not appear to be generally so across the other EU nations. 
 
 Figure 2. 20 Years of Euro Winners and Losers; Source: Gasparotti and Matthias (2019) 
 
Eurozone country 
Impact of euro-introduction on 
prosperity 1999-2017 per inhabitant 
Impact of euro-introduction on 
prosperity 1999-2017 overall 
Germany + 23,116 euro  + 1,893 billion  euro  
Netherlands + 21,003 euro  + 346 billion euro 
Greece + 190 euro  + 2 billion euro 
Spain – 5,031 euro  – 224 billion euro 
Belgium – 6,370 euro  – 69 billion euro 
Portugal – 40,604 euro  – 424 billion euro 
France – 55,996 euro  – 3,591 billion euro 
Italy – 73,605 euro  – 4,325 billion euro 
 
 
Consider the following comparison, at the outset a “straw man.” Gasparotti and Matthias 
(2017) have used a “synthetic control” method to analyse which EZ countries have gained 
from the euro and which ones have out. Specifically, their synthetic method involves matching 
countries with control groups. In the case of Greece the group is Bahrain, Israel, Barbados, 
New Zealand, Gabon, and Singapore! This underscores the characterization as a straw man. 
Still, the numbers in Figure 2 are quite telling. Germany and the Netherlands are big winners, 
Greece is a marginal one, but France is a big loser, and so are Portugal and Spain. Political 




findings of Gasparotti and Matthias (2017), summarized in Figure 2 might amount to more 
than a straw man after all. 
However, it is the position of this paper that a full analysis of the impact of accession to either 
the EU or EZ must account for interconnectedness via trade and financial flows and for 
institutional arrangements regarding joint policy determination. It cannot be done 
independently of how the political process operates, which ultimately must reflect tradeoffs 
and compromises arrived at during policy discussions. The model in Ioannides (2021), 
Appendix, would facilitate that, albeit in a very stylized fashion, but there exist s huge set of 
details to be taken into consideration. 
 
 
2. National Policy Options 
 
In the absence of fiscal union, which of course does require at least a modicum of political 
integration, the EZ must contend with mutual oversight of policies. The EZ crisis has 
demonstrated that its members cannot be too loose about that oversight. Yet, its scope is 
limited, because only a limited set of tools is truly national. E.g., in spite of numerous EU-
based programs and incentives, structural reforms improving productivity and external 
competitiveness are the responsibility of national governments. Inefficiencies and institu- 
tional inflexibilities have serious adverse consequences for national as well as union-wide 
economic performance. E.g., the modern literature on markets with frictions imply that 
inflexible labor market institutions, which fall entirely under national control, are associated 
with higher permanent levels of unemployment [c.f. Draghi (2014)]. 
While national fiscal policy is to this day essentially under national control, its exercise by 
countries that are interconnected through trade and a common currency is up against explicit 
and implicit constraints. An instance of explicit constraints is the mandated inter- 
governmental consultations on budgetary matters. Implicit constraints are created by the fact 
that national fiscal policy generates cross-country spillovers, which in the context of the EU/EZ 
cannot be ignored. 
Regarding monetary policy interconnectedness, the sensitivity of aggregate policy objectives 
to country size is a key factor in the attractiveness to currency union to countries of different 
sizes. Fiscal policy interconnectedness, too, has a similar effect, which often neglected or even 
ignored, in the absence of a union-wide fiscal-policy making body that would serve as a 
counterpart to the monetary policy making mechanism associated with the ECB. For similar 
reasons, it is hard to imagine a perfect fiscal union. Whereas the qualified majority rules that 
are employed by the EU are to a large extent sensitive to relative populations, they have not 
been successful in heeding the criticism of democratic deficit. 
Furthermore, fiscal policy coordination, let alone fiscal union, depends critically on knowl- 




to estimate. E.g., an 1% increase in German government spending, has an impact that ranges 
from a 0.05% increase in Greek GDP to 0.4% in Belgian GDP. A somewhat over- looked aspect 
of interdependence is that benefits to a country from another country’s fiscal policy looks like 
free lunch, to the recipient, but may cost the source economy. The extent in which spillovers 
are important in discussion over policy coordination has not been as well researched, but the 
attractiveness of macro policy coordination during the Great Recession and during the EZ debt 
crisis renewed interest in improving our understanding. 
Let’s take a look at the numbers and charts from Dabla-Norris et al.  (2017).  Figure  3 plots 
national domestic multipliers against trade openness. The latter is conventionally defined a 
the sum of a country’s exports and imports over GDP. Domestic fiscal  multipliers, provided 
for 10 EZ countries correspond to the ones reported along the main diagonal of Table 1, Dabla-
Norris et al. (2017), p. 29, reproduced here as Figure 3. Multipliers and spillovers are defined 
as the ratio of the cumulative change of output over the cumulative change of government 
spending. Not surprisingly, the matrix of spillovers on Table 1 is asymmetric, further 
complicating matters of policy coordination. Figure 4 provide additional information. The 
diameter of each bubble on Figure 4 is proportional to the size of the respective country’s 
GDP. If one were to ignore country size, it is well known that more trade openness is 
associated with lower domestic multipliers, which applies to the many very open economies 
in the EU. However, for the EU as an entity, trade openness at = .19, is smaller smaller than 
most people think165. 
 
  
Figure 3. Openness to Trade and Fiscal Multipliers; Source: Dabla-Norris et al. (2017) 
 
 

















3. Multipliers and Spillovers 
 
Generally, fiscal spillovers vary substantially, depend on mutual trade and financial flows. 
However, an inverse relationship between the size of domestic fiscal multipliers and trade 
openness is discernible from Figure 3. Fiscal spillovers are larger when the source economy is 
large, when countries are highly integrated through trade or financial  linkages, and when the 
spillover-receiving economy is small and has a narrow export base. 
A particular instance where these facts can be helpful in assessing policy recommendations is 
the following argument by Blanchard et al. (2015). Under liquidity trap conditions, these 
authors show that a fiscal expansion by the core EZ economies would have a large and positive 
impact on periphery GDP assuming that policy rates remain low for a prolonged period. 
Specifically, an expansion of core government spending equal to one percent of euro area 
GDP would boost periphery GDP by over 1 percent in a liquidity trap lasting three years, which 
would have been nearly half as large as the effect on core GDP. Accordingly, under a standard 
ad hoc loss function involving output and inflation gaps, increasing core spending would 
generate substantial welfare improvements, especially in the periphery. The benefits are 
considerably smaller under a utility-based welfare measure, reflecting in part that higher net 
exports play a material role in raising periphery GDP. Bluntly put, German fiscal expansion 
should have been procyclical. However, the EZ members that were caught in the crisis were 
not in liquidity trap: hints of spending increases would have increased the interest rates. Uhlig 
(2016), however, dismisses these arguments as politically irrelevant. That said, a modicum of 
fiscal expansion did take place due to refugee crisis.  
 
 

















Figure 5 plots the evolution of fiscal spillovers from Germany to the same other nine other EZ 
countries as in the earlier analysis. The spillover is calculated in response to a 1 percent 
increase  in government spending in Germany. Notably and not surprisingly, Austria is an 
outlier as a recipient of spillovers from Germany. The remaining eight countries are 
distributed roughly within the range of 0.01 to 0.2, with practically all those countries peaking 
over the 1999–2012 subsample. Finally, from the viewpoint of assessing the scope for 
recognizing spillovers in discussions of international policy coordination, Figure 5 offers good 
news: within country variation over time is quite limited. 
 
 
Figure 5. Fiscal Spillovers in the Euro Area; source: Dabla-Norris et al. (2017) 
 
All in all, in the absence of a federal budget, spillovers must be recognized as a tool. And to 
some extent, this does happen: Germany acknowledges benefits from keeping company with 
countries like Greece; it helps holding down the exchange rate! 
 
 
4. A Qualitative Assessment within a Unified Framework for Studying 
Reforms, Deficits, and Debt in Fiscal and Currency Unions 
 
A separately available Appendix to this chapter [Ioannides (2021), proposes a unified 
framework within which market integration, deficits, debt and market reforms may be 
studied in the context of monetary and fiscal unions. This framework may be summarized as 
follows.  
Consider a world economy that consists of two countries (but the model can accommodate 
many countries, at the cost of analytical complexity) of different sizes but populated by 
















which may be produced using a range of intermediates. Each intermediate may be produced 
by means of increasing returns to scale technologies using only labor as an input. With free 
entry into the production of intermediates a natural link is created for the significance of 
country size. A  larger  population  allows the production of a greater variety of intermediates 
and thus increasing the typical individual’s welfare. For a country with a given population, 
welfare may be increased by adopting technological improvements that improve labor 
productivity. Alternatively, one could think of market reforms, that are aimed at improving 
market entry, when it is impeded. Improving entry of firms producing intermediates readily 
increases welfare.  
Allowing for international trade has a similar effect over conditions of autarky. Access to a 
greater range of intermediates improves welfare. However, international trade requires a 
means of payment. Each country can issue its own currency, which may be used in inter - 
national trade. Demand for a greater variety of intermediates by both countries establishes 
an exchange rate when countries use different currencies. When countries are integrated 
through trade, exercise of national monetary policy creates intercountry spillovers. Such 
spillovers may be a way to motivate monetary union, that is the adoption of a single currency 
which is administered by a single authority, the common central bank. The design of monetary 
policy must take into consideration the differing impact of monetary policy in the two 
countries. An important analytical result that may be obtained when national currencies are 
strategic substitutes is that the weight of the smaller country’s welfare on the design of the 
common monetary policy must be sufficiently greater than its population, so as to make it 
attractive for the smaller country to participate in the union.  
Returning to each country, the provision of the public good may be financed by a mix of taxes, 
money issuance and debt. When countries are economically integrated through international 
trade, national taxes create issues of spillovers which are similar to those when each country 
pursues its national monetary policy. It is thus easy to see the need for a fiscal union. A second 
analytical result is the following. When considering a fiscal union within a monetary union, 
one wonders whether fiscal policy, as defined in this paper, might make participation in the 
fiscal union by a smaller country attractive or unattractive. Interestingly, fiscal policy decisions 
might in fact, depending on parameters, be strategic complements. This in turn suggests that 
the welfare weights associated with union-wide fiscal policy might not have to be sensitive to 
size, in the sense that they must be in the case of monetary policy. Finally, when debt is jointly 
issued, interesting questions regarding the role of structural reforms may be posed. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
In numerous ways  that  have been documented widely, the EZ is made up of very diverse 
countries. E.g, in a stunning calculation, reported by J. P. Morgan (2012), the major countries 
of the EZ are more diverse than the East Asian Tigers, the UK and its Eng lish speaking off-
shoots, and even countries whose names begin with the letter “M”! In spite of such diversity, 




conflicts over the last few years, have been prevented. Given this political success, there 
ought to be vast scope for coming to terms with the international coordination that is 
necessary to carry out fiscal policy that operated along with monetary policy and is designed 
to optimize outcomes over the entire union. In addition to the conventional differences 
among countries that have been identified by the literature, this paper introduces two more: 
differences in the efficiency of fiscal systems and on the terms of sovereign borrowing.  
The discussion here and its analytical backbone provide a simple deterministic framework for 
understanding the role of differences, proxied by size, in the interdependence of broad 
macroeconomic aggregates. The mechanism for setting country-specific fiscal policy is not 
independent from the conduct of monetary policy. The paper goes beyond Ioannides (2016; 
2017) in allowing for debt finance under the different scenaria of international equilibrium, 
that is, international economic integration with national currencies and with a common 
currency, both in the presence of national fiscal systems. It allows us to examine in detail the 
setting similar to where Greece and the EZ found themselves since 2010, that is, given 
economic integration with a currency union, how willing should the union be (in our case, the 
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Chapter 15. Economic and Financial Asymmetries in the Euro Area 





This paper provides a perspective on the euro area (EA), focusing on macroeconomic and 
financial asymmetries among its member states and the need for major and fundamental 
reforms. After surveying the evolution of EU macroeconomic and monetary cooperation and 
developments since the creation of the euro, and particularly the euro area crisis, we argue 
that the euro area is in need of fundamental fiscal, financial and labor market reforms. In 
addition to reforms currently discussed, a common EA budget of moderate size would help 
smooth out the asymmetric impact of macroeconomic shocks through the operation of 
automatic fiscal stabilizers. It would also help countries in recession face smaller national 
fiscal and financial consequences of such recessions, and would also partly address labor 
market fragmentation as it could be targeted to euro area wide unemployment insurance. It 
would also help in the avoidance of future crises if the scope of the ECB to act as a lender of 
last resort in times of crisis was expanded and officially recognized.  
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This paper provides a perspective on the Euro Area (EA), focusing on macroeconomic and 
financial asymmetries and the need for major and fundamental reforms. 
We start by briefly surveying the evolution of monetary cooperation in the European Union 
(EU) since the collapse of the Bretton Woods System, the snake and the creation of the 
European Monetary System (EMS), the adoption of the euro and the post-2010 crisis. This 
survey is suggestive of the deepening of monetary integration in Europe, but also hints at a 
number of macroeconomic and financial asymmetries within the group of the original 12 Euro 
area (EA12) members from the 1970s, if not before, until the creation of the euro. 
We identify four sub-periods in the evolution of monetary cooperation in the European 
Union. First, the period from the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed parities in 
1973, to the emergence of the EMS in 1979. Second,  the period of operation of the EMS, until  
the creation of the euro in 1999. Third, the first ten years of the euro area, before the crisis 
of 2009-2010. Finally, we survey the period since 2010, when the euro crisis broke out, and 
discuss the response to the crisis. 
In each successive sub-period monetary integration was becoming gradually deeper, evolving 
from the “snake” of the 1970s, to the EMS of the 1980s, the tighter EMS of the 1990s, with 
infrequent realignments, and, eventually with the creation of the euro. 
We then focus on documenting the main macroeconomic and financial asymmetries in the 
euro area. For this purpose, the three largest euro area economies of Germany, France and 
Italy, which jointly comprise about two thirds of the euro area, are treated individually. The 
rest of the EA-12 economies are aggregated within two groups. The smaller economies in 
central and northern Europe, consisting of the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and Finland, 
which we label the ‘core’, and the economies of the ‘periphery’, comprising Spain, Greece, 
Portugal and Ireland. It turns out that the economies of the ‘core’ have similar characteristics 
to Germany, while France and Italy share both ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ characteristics, with 
France being closer to the ‘core’, including Germany, and Italy closer to the ‘periphery’.166  
All periods were characterized by significant macroeconomic and financial asymmetries 
among member states in the core and the periphery, but also by different degrees of 
monetary integration. 
We document these asymmetries, focusing on the evolution of macroeconomic aggregates 
such as GDP per capita, its growth rate, unemployment rates, inflation rates and current 
account balances. We also document financial asymmetries by focussing on the evolution of 
 
166 We list the countries in each group in descending order of economic size, as measured by their PPP adjusted 
real GDP in 2001. This is the year for which we calculate the weights that go into the construction of the group 
aggregates. These weights are the ones used in the Area Wide Model (AWM) database of the European Central 




short and long term interest rates, nominal and real exchange rates, fiscal balances a nd 
government debt. 
With the deepening of monetary cooperation, in the evolution from the snake to the euro, 
some of these asymmetries were addressed, while others were not. When the euro was 
created, very little was done to address the remaining asymmetries, essentially shifting the 
burden of adjustment to individual euro area members and their fiscal systems. As a result, 
while asymmetries in inflation rates, and nominal interest rates and exchange rates were 
addressed by the creation of the euro, real, financial and external asymmetries widened after 
the creation of the euro, both before and after the euro area crisis.  
In the first ten years of the euro, the remaining asymmetries resulted in the build up of 
significant external imbalances, and, eventually contributed to the eruption of the euro area 
crisis. The main financial asymmetric shock appears to have been the creation of the euro 
itself, which initially brought about the convergence of nominal and real interest rates 
between the periphery and the core. This convergence resulted in a widening of savings and 
investment imbalances in the periphery, which up until then had relatively high nominal and 
real interest rates, the widening of external imbalances, the buildup of external debt by the 
countries of the periphery, and eventually a euro area financial crisis. This process was 
exacerbated by the ‘home’ bias of banks in the countries of the euro area.  
The euro area crisis was essentially an external debt crisis in an economic and monetary union 
with a single currency, but major economic and governance problem areas, such as major 
differences in the product mix, fragmented national labor markets, different fiscal systems, 
imperfect financial integration, lack of effective cross border financial regula tion, an 
extremely low federal budget and lack of a lender of last resort to banks and sovereign 
governments. In this respect, the euro area crisis of the 2010s was at the end of the day no 
different than other regional financial crises involving indebted economies, such as the Latin 
American crisis of the 1980s and the Asian crisis of the 1990s. 
A result of the major asymmetries and other economic and governance problems of the euro 
area is the fact that adjustment efforts since the crisis have shifted the burden exclusively 
towards the weaker economies in the periphery of the euro area, which suffered deep 
recessions, a significant rise in unemployment, continuous tax rises and exorbitant social costs 
for young workers and old age pensioners.167    
Although financial market integration and effective regulation of financial markets have taken 
a priority since the 2010 crisis, the euro area remains a single currency area with significant 
real and financial asymmetries, segregated national fiscal systems, weak coordination of fiscal 
policies and a virtually non-existent federal budget. At the same time, the European Central 
 
167 The rise in current account deficits as a result of the lower real interest rates that followed euro area entry 
occurred in almost all of the economies of the periphery of the euro area. See Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002). 
Almost all of these economies faced a serious external debt crisis after 2010. The literature that focuses on the 
euro area crisis and its aftermath has expanded exponentially. See, among others, Lane (2012), O’Rourke and 
Taylor (2013), Baldwin and Giavazzi (2015, 2016), Orphanides (2015, 2017a,b), Brunnermeier et al. (2016), Kang 
and Shambaugh (2016), Papademos (2016), Stiglitz (2016), Wyplosz (2016), Benassy-Quere et al. (2018), De 




Bank (ECB) remains the only major central bank in the industrialized world which cannot 
function properly as a lender of last resort to governments and commercial banks. In addition, 
labor markets in the euro area remain fragmented, contributing to major differences in 
unemployment rates, which are exacerbated by the notoriously low degree of labor mobility 
in Europe. 
Hence, not only does the euro area not satisfy the main criterion suggested by optimum 
currency area considerations, namely the absence of asymmetries and asymmetric shocks, it 
furthermore lacks the other two main criteria for macroeconomic stabilization, namely 
integrated labor markets and a federal budget that would act as an automatic stabilizer in the 
case of asymmetric macroeconomic developments. Furthermore, its response to major 
financial crises the Euro area is hampered by the lack of an effective lender of last resort, the 
creation of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) notwithstanding. 
In the final section of the paper we propose a number of reforms at the level of the euro area, 
which in conjunction with reform efforts at the national level in the countries of the periphery, 
would help address the main fault lines of the single European currency, and allow the euro 
area to become a area of prosperity for all its members. 
We argue that the euro area is in urgent need of significant fiscal, financial and labor market 
reforms. In this we agree with among others Benassy-Quere et al. (2018). However, we also 
argue for the introduction of a moderate common EA budget, focused on a EA system of 
unemployment insurance. This would help smooth out the asymmetric impact of 
macroeconomic shocks through the operation of automatic fiscal stabilizers. It would also 
help countries in recession face smaller national fiscal and financial consequences of such 
recessions, and would also partly address labor market fragmentation. A significant part of 
the fragmentation of labor markets in Europe is the result of the lack of a cross border system 
of unemployment and health insurance. This could be addressed in a reform that would allow 
for a moderate EA budget as we propose.  
This proposal goes against the arguments of those opposing a transfer union, chiefly the 
countries that are net contributors to the EU budget. We feel that these objections are 
misplaced. The EU and, in particular, the EA are already transfer unions, through the 
operation of the single market and the monetary union. They encourage significant economic 
transfers from weaker and less competitive economies, to stronger and more competitive 
ones, as suggested by the macroeconomic performance of the core and the periphery 
following the creation of the Euro area. A fiscal transfer union, which would partly correct the 
effects of such transfers through a fiscal redistribution is a logical counterpart of the single 
market and the monetary union. The transfers we suggest are modest, but certainly higher 
than the current EU ceiling of 1% of GDP. They would be concentrated in one cyclically 
sensitive key area which is unemployment insurance.168 
 
168 The current EU budget remains capped at below 1% of EU GDP, versus a federal budget of more that 20% of 
GDP in the other major single currency area of the industrialised world, the USA. The EA budget we have in 





The objections of net contributors to a moderate increase in the EU budget could in principle 
be overcome by an appropriate rules based fiscal reform that would address moral hazard 
and other coordination problems.  
The rest of the paper is thus as follows: In section 2 we survey the evolution of post war 
monetary cooperation in Europe, and document the gradual deepening of monetary 
cooperation among member states. In section 3 we survey the evolution of the euro from the 
period of euphoria between 1999 and 2007, to the post-2008 period of crisis. In section 4 we 
discuss optimum currency area considerations for the euro area. In section 5 we document 
the main macroeconomic and financial asymmetries between the ‘core’ and the ‘periphery’ 
countries of the euro area. Until the mid-1980s these asymmetries related to different levels 
of GDP per capita and growth rates, different inflation rates, different fiscal and  external 
positions and differences in financial markets. Since the evolution of the European Monetary 
System to a greater DM area, with the abandonment of frequent realignments, and especially 
since the creation of the euro, some asymmetries, such as inflation asymmetries were 
addressed, but most of the others were not. In fact, external asymmetries became much 
worse as the creation of the euro resulted in a widening of external imbalances between the 
periphery and the core. This became the proximate cause of the euro area crisis. Since the 
euro area crisis external imbalances have been partly addressed, but this was at the expense 
of growth and employment mainly in the periphery, but also the rest of the EA, with the 
exception of Germany and some of the small core economies. We attribute these imbalances 
to the macroeconomic policy mix after the crisis, the absence of automatic fiscal stabilisers at 
the EA level and the inadequacies of the ECB’s program of quantitative easing. In section 6 we 
put forward our proposals for reform, compare them with some of the proposals already 
being discussed and argue that muddling through is not a credible option. The final section 




2. The Evolution of Post War Monetary Cooperation in Europe 
 
In this section we survey the evolution of monetary cooperation in Europe. The countries of 
the European Union were key members of the Bretton Woods system of fixed but adjustable 
exchange rates that emerged in the aftermath of World War II.  
Since the abandonment of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s, one can identify four 
stages in the evolution of monetary cooperation in the European Union. First, the period from 
the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed parities in 1973, to the emergence of the 
European Monetary System in 1979. Second,  the period of operation of the European 








2.1. From Bretton Woods to the European Monetary System 
The countries of the European Union were key members of the Bretton Woods system of 
fixed but adjustable exchange rates that emerged in the aftermath of World War II. 
The Bretton Woods system departed from the interwar gold exchange standard in at least 
three respects: First, it provided for pegged exchange rates, which were however adjustable 
in cases of a “fundamental disequilibrium”. Second, it permitted controls to limit international 
capital flows. Third, a new institution, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was created, to 
monitor national economic policies and extend balance of payments financing to countries 
that required it.    
The system was meant to address the three main weaknesses of the interwar monetary 
system, such as the high volatility of exchange rates, disruptive capital flows and the absence 
of an effective mechanism of international adjustment. 
The Bretton Woods system became fully operational in 1958, with the removal of exchange 
controls for current-account transactions. Although the United States continued to run 
current-account surpluses, foreign direct investment by U.S. multinationals in Europe, as well 
as other capital outflows, produced an overall deficit in the U.S. balance of payments. As a 
result, dollar and gold outflows intensified. 
Starting from 1960, efforts to address perceived deficiencies in the operation of the system 
assumed the form of perfecting interventions in the private gold market through the 
organization of the Gold Pool and the establishment of various formal liquidity-increasing 
techniques, such as the General Arrangements to Borrow (GAB), currency swaps among 
central banks, and special drawing rights (SDRs). 
However, the U.S. focus on national economic priorities, the ineffectiveness of capital 
controls after the restoration of convertibility for current account transactions and the 
inadequacy of measures to contain the dollar glut marked the beginnings of the end of the 
Bretton Woods system. 
As speculative pressures were mounting, in 1968 central banks stopped buying or selling gold 
in the open market and the Gold Pool was dissolved. Only foreign central banks could then 
buy gold from the U.S. Treasury. This effectively changed the Bretton Woods system from a 
de facto gold standard anchored through a fixed dollar price of gold into a dollar standard. 
With a dollar standard, the inflation rates of the other countries in the Bretton Woods system 
had to move in line with the inflation rate in the United States. Given the fixed exchange rate 
to the dollar, and the overall expansionary monetary policy in the United States that started 





Speculative pressures against the dollar gradually increased, and despite efforts of save the 
system, when confronted with monetizing further massive dollar inflows in March 1973, the 
other industrial economies decided to let their currencies float, effectively ending the Bretton 
Woods system. 
Soon, the economies of the European Economic Community (EEC) realized that floating 
exchange rates implied major problems for intra-European trade and the operation of their 
evolving common community policies. Since the late 1960s, even before the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system, and following the completion of the Customs Union ahead of 
schedule, they had been seeking to create an institutional framework within which they could 
stabilize their currencies against one another.169 
In 1970, a study group of high level officials, chaired by the prime minister of Luxembourg 
Pierre Werner, was formed in order to study further steps towards monetary integration in 
Europe. The Werner report, which resulted from this group, described a process through 
which monetary union could be created by 1980. It recommended creating a central authority 
to guide and harmonize national economic policies, concentrating fiscal functions at the 
Community level and accelerating the integration of factor and commodity markets. Instead 
of a central bank and a common currency it proposed a ‘European System of National Central 
Banks’, and a progressive hardening of exchange rate commitments.170 
Although the Werner Report was officially adopted, subsequent events precluded its 
application. Yet it provided the basis for the response of the EEC to the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system in 1973. Since the Smithsonian agreement of 1971, EEC countries had sought 
to limit the fluctuations of their bilateral exchange rates in a range of ±4 1/2% in an 
arrangement known as the snake. They maintained this arrangement even after 1973. 
Denmark, Ireland and the UK, soon to be members of the EEC, also participated in the snake.  
However, due to divergent monetary policies and inflation rates between the core economies 
of Germany, France and Italy, the snake was soon under pressure, despite the fact that it 
provided for short-term and very short-term financing facilities for weaker currencies. 
Inflation rates in the three “Core Large” EU economies are depicted in Figure 1. Both France 
and Italy experienced much higher inflation rates than Germany in the 1970s.171 
Italy withdrew from the snake in early 1973. In January 1974 France was forced out, and 
adopted floating until July 1975, when it rejoined. It left the snake again in March 1976, due 
to the incompatibility of the German and French response to the oil crisis. In October 1976 
there was an agreement on exchange rate changes, the so-called “Frankfurt realignment”. 
Further realignments followed. Sweden withdrew in 1977. 
 
169 In this paper, when we refer to the countries of the European Union (EU), we use the term European 
Community (EC) for the period before 1992, as this was the official name of the current EU. 
170 See Werner et al (1970). 
171 Figure 1 depicts annual inflation rates (% per year), based on monthly data for the Consumer Price Index. 





In the end the snake failed to provide the hoped for exchange rate stability, with the exception 
of short periods. Part of the reason was the first oil shock and its asymmetric financial 
consequences in Europe. A second asymmetry was related to the differing approaches within 
the EEC, with regard to the appropriate policy response to the oil shock.     
 
Figure 1. Inflation in Germany, France and Italy, 1956-2017 
 
 
2.2. From the European Monetary System to the Euro 
The European Monetary System (EMS) was created in 1978 as a replacement for the snake, 
some years after the demise of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates. The 
objective was the same as the snake: to ensure relatively stable exchange rates in the EC. This 




especially with reference to free intra-Community trade, the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP), and other common policies.172 
The initiative for the creation of the EMS belonged to France, was agreed upon by Germany, 
and arrangements were concluded in two European Councils in Bremen in July 1978 and in 
Brussels in December of the same year.  
 
2.2.1 The Structure of the European Monetary System 
 
The European Monetary System was designed as a symmetric system, unlike the Bretton 
Woods system which was explicitly based on the US dollar. Its structure was defined by four 
elements: 
 
First, a common unit of account, the European Currency Unit (ECU). The ECU was defined as 
a weighted average of the Community’s national currencies. For each national currency a 
central rate was set against the ECU. For any two currencies, the ratio of their central rates 
against the ECU provided their central bilateral exchange rate, and the total of bilateral 
central rates defined the parity grid of the system.  
 
Second, a mechanism was created for limiting fluctuations in nominal ex- change rates among 
the participating currencies, the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). For currencies 
participating in the ERM, national central banks undertook to maintain market rates against 
any other currency in the system within predetermined limits relative to the bilateral central 
rates. These limits, until 1993, were ± 2.25%. For some currencies, wider limits were allowed, 
i.e., a range of ± 6% for the italian lira. Exchange market interventions had to take place when 
a bilateral rate reached the band limit. These were called marginal interventions. Marginal 
interventions had to take place through the central bank of the depreciating currency, but the 
central bank of the appreciating currency undertook to provide the central bank of the 
depreciating currency with unlimited credit, after the latter had used all of its foreign 
exchange reserves in that currency. Intra-marginal interventions also took place, by the 
central bank of the depreciating currency. These were not compulsory, and required the 
approval of the central bank whose currency was used in the interventions. Many central 
banks engaged in intra-marginal interventions, in order to stop their currency from reaching 
the lower limit of the exchange rate band. There was also a divergence indicator, which did 
not play an essential role in the operation of the system.  
 
Third, a mechanism was foreseen for financing the required foreign exchange market 
interventions and current account deficits, the financing facilities. These were divided into 
three types: 1.The Very Short Term Financing Facility, 2. The Short Term Monetary Support, 
and, 3. The Medium Term Financial Assistance. The management of the first two belonged to 
the juris- diction of national central banks, while the third was under the jurisdiction of the 
Council of Ministers. The Short Term Monetary Support provided short-term credits for 
 
172 The Treaty of Rome had already acknowledged that the exchange rate of member countries was a matter of 
“common interest”. Furthermore, even before the collapse of the Bretton Woods, and in view of the incipient 
instability of the dollar in the late 1960s, the European Council had authorized the Werner report on moving 




financing deficits in the balance of payments, while the Very Short Term Financing Facility was 
aimed at financing interventions within the Exchange Rate Mechanism.  
 
Finally, the system allowed for devaluations through the policy of exchange rate 
realignments. Initially the decision to realign the central parities was unilateral, but later, after 
1981, collective decisions were required within the Community’s Monetary Committee and 
the ECOFIN Council. After 1981, collectively agreed realignments did not cover the full 
inflation differential between the currency being devalued and the other currencies.  
 
Those four elements were based on the experience of the post-war Bretton Woods system of 
fixed, but adjustable, exchange rates, which collapsed in the early 1970s, the Werner et al. 
(1970) report, and the European experience between 1973 and 1978, when the European 
Economic Community experimented with both flexible exchange rates and systems for 
limiting exchange rate flexibility, such as the ‘snake’.  
 
2.2.2 EMS Asymmetries 
 
The EMS reduced fluctuations in nominal and real exchange rates in Europe, thus contributing  
to exchange rate stability. However, despite its explicitly symmetrical design, the EMS ended 
up operating asymmetrically. 
 
Asymmetries emerged because German monetary policy was systematically more restrictive 
than the monetary policy of the other economies participating in the system and because the 
DM was an international reserve currency to a much greater extent than the other currencies 
of the EC.  
 
The more restrictive monetary policy of the German Bundesbank led to the need for intra-
marginal interventions by other central banks. Thus, monetary policy became more restrictive 
in all the countries that participated in the system. Otherwise, the pressure on weaker 
currencies became too strong and resulted in the need for downward realignments of their 
exchange rates (devaluations).  
 
The more restrictive monetary policy of Germany can be seen when one compares German 
inflation to that of France and Italy, as in Figure 1 below. Even before the abandonment of 
the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, French and Italia inflation was slightly 
higher than German inflation. After the abandonment of the system in 1973, French and 
Italian inflation shot up, as both countries loosened their monetary policy, whereas German 
inflation went down as Germany tightened its own monetary policy. The inflation differentials 
remained high until the late 1980s.  
 
Because of collective decisions about realignments, devaluations in countries with more 
expansionary monetary policies and higher inflation than Germany were never equal to the 
cumulative inflation differential between these economies and Germany. This was especially 
true for Italy. As a result of the limited realignments the real exchange rate of the Italian lira 
(IL), shown in Figure 2, appreciated by 36.4% in the first ten years of the EMS, between 1979 
and 1988. The real exchange rate of the French franc (FF) appreciated by much less in the 




Germany and the higher nominal realignments secured by France. Thus, through the EMS, 
Germany was becoming more and more competitive vis-a-vis the EU economies with higher 
inflation.173 
 
The second asymmetry of the system resulted from the international position of the German 
mark, which was an international reserve currency, unlike other currencies in the EMS. This 
meant that when there were disturbances in international financial markets affecting the 
exchange rate of the dollar or the yen versus the DM, there were pressures for realignments 
in the ERM. This happened because such international financial disturbances caused changes 
in the DM demand and supply in relation to other European currencies, resulting in significant 
pressure on the bilateral exchange rates of other ERM currencies against the DM. 
 
The ERM faced considerable pressures in periods of significant dollar appreciations or 
depreciations, such as 1981-1983, or in 1986. These pressures lead to realignments of central 
parities. 
 
Between 1986 and 1992, as a result of a tightening of monetary policy in France, Italy and 
other weaker currency economies, realignments virtually ceased. The EMS eventually became 
a broad DM zone, where monetary policy was determined effectively by the Bundesbank. The 
rest of the participating countries had to adapt to this policy in order to avoid real exchange 
rate appreciations and politically damaging devaluations. Thus, they ended up adapting to the 
monetary policy of the Bundesbank and ‘borrowing’ its anti-inflationary reputation. As a 
result, all EMS countries eventually achieved lower inflation. Figure 1 displays this trend for 
France and Italy. At the same time, as shown in figure 2, Germany was consolidating its gains 
in competitiveness, as it continued to have lower inflation than the rest.  
 
All things considered, all countries came out with something out of this asymmetric system, 
with France and Italy achieving lower inflation and Germany gaining in competitiveness.174 
 
The initiative for the creation of the single currency also belonged to France, which, early in 
1988, with a memorandum of the Minister of Finance to his EEC colleagues, proposed the 
march towards the single currency. Italy agreed immediately and Germany had no option but 
to agree as well. 
 
The European Council in Hanover in June 1988 set up an eight-member committee, chaired 
by Jacques Delors, then President of the European Commission, which would study the 
matter. The Committee, in April 1989, submitted a report to the Council of Finance Ministers 





173 In figure 2, the real DM exchange rates versus the French Franc and the Italian Lira are based on relative 
consumer price indexes. They are set equal to 100 in January 1979. Source: OECD, Main Economic Indicators. 
174 See Eichengreen (2008) for a historical account of the operation of the EMS within the context of the 
international monetary system. Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989) contain a detailed analytical treatment of the 
EMS. James (2012) traces monetary cooperation in Europe in the post-war period until the creation of the euro. 




Figure 2. The Real DM-FF and DM-IL Exchange Rates, 1979-1989  
 
 
2.2.3 The Planned Path towards the Euro 
 
 
The first stage envisaged capital account liberalization for the countries participating in the 
EMS. This was to take place until July 1990. No country would be allowed to maintain capital 
controls. 
 
The second stage, which began on January 1, 1994, aimed at the greatest possible 
convergence of fiscal and monetary conditions and policies of EU member states, as 
enshrined in the subsequent Maastricht Treaty of 1992, in order to achieve fiscal convergence 
and price stability, which were deemed necessary and sufficient conditions for monetary 
integration. 
 
The third stage was the monetary union itself, which would transfer all monetary policy 
decisions to an independent European Central Bank (ECB). 
 
In late 1991, after an intergovernmental conference (IGC), all EEC member states signed 
the Treaty on European Union, in Maastricht, The Netherlands.  
 
Under this treaty, the EEC was renamed the European Union (EU), and in addition to the 
Single Market program, EEC members agreed on a detailed timetable and conditions for 
adopting the single currency. The deadlines for the introduction of the new currency were 
adopted by the Madrid European Council in December 1995. This Council also decided that 





The timetable stipulated that until January 1, 1994, the EU would complete the single 
market and all national parliaments would have ratified the Maastricht Treaty. It also 
provided for the prohibition of monetary financing of budget deficits, the lifting of all 
restrictions on the movement of capital and preparation for participation in the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System for the countries that were not part of 
it, as well as the political independence of central banks. When these conditions were 
satisfied, the second stage of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) would begin. 
 
The Maastricht Treaty on the European Union also provided for the adoption the so called 
convergence criteria. These consisted of targets for,  
 
1. reducing budget deficits below 3% of GDP  
2. reducing public debt below 60% of GDP  
3. reducing inflation sufficiently close to the average of the three countries with the 
lowest inflation rates 
4. reducing reducing short term nominal interest rates sufficiently close to the average of 
the three countries with the lowest nominal interest rates 
5. participation in the  ERM of the EMS for at least two years 
 
Achieving these objectives was considered as a prerequisite for a country to participate in 
the third stage of EMU. The European Commission and the European Central Bank would 
report, in special Convergence Reports, whether a country did or did not satisfy these 
criteria. 
 
2.2.4 The 1992-93 ERM Crisis 
 
The complete abolition of capital controls since the early 1990s made the ERM extremely 
vulnerable, as demonstrated by the speculative attacks of September 1992 and August 
1993. The proximate cause was again related to the main macroeconomic and fiscal 
asymmetries among the EU economies. 
 
A series of adverse shocks broke down the defense mechanisms of the system, such as the 
mechanism for coordinating macroeconomic policies and the realignment of exchange 
rates. 
In September 1992, the credibility of the ERM was tested and the system could not 
withstand the pressures. Both the Italian lira and the British pound sterling, which had 
joined only recently, were ejected from the ERM. 
 
After a year of realignments and periodic crises until late July 1993, and following further 
pressure on the exchange rates of weaker currencies, the ECOFIN decided to extend the 
fluctuation margins to ± 15%, in order to defuse further pressures on central parities. 
 
There were a number of shocks and imbalances that contributed to the 1992-93 ERM crisis, 





Firstly, German unification, which transformed Germany from a net creditor to net 
borrower in the global economy. This also caused an increase in German inflation and led 
the Bundesbank to tighten monetary policy by raising interest rates. 
 
Second, asymmetries between US and EU monetary policy. In 1992, due to the elections 
and the recession in the US, the monetary policy of the Fed was relaxed, and the dollar 
entered into a depreciation path against the DM that caused increased pressures on the 
ERM. 
 
Thirdly, the political crisis in Italy. This took place at a time when there was a large increase 
in the fiscal deficit and public debt, which caused a crisis of confidence and speculative 
pressures on the Italian lira. 
 
Fourth, the negative result of the referendum in Denmark on the ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty, the prospect of the French referendum and the ambiguous attitude of 
politicians in Great Britain. These caused a more general crisis of confidence in the system 
and in the process of Economic and Monetary Union. 
 
However, following the exit of the lira and sterling from the ERM and the widening of the 
fluctuation margins for the rest of the participants, the crisis was defused and was 
gradually contained. The march towards Economic and Monetary Union gathered pace. 
 
2.2.5 The Final Stage of EMU 
 
The third stage of EMU  began on January 1, 1999, by irrevocably fixing the bilateral 
exchange rates of the currencies of the participating countries and the single currency, the 
euro. In May 1998 it was decided which countries would participate in the third stage of 
EMU. The selection of the 11 countries was based on the five fiscal and monetary 
convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty and convergence reports by the European 
Commission and the European Central Bank. 
 
As can be seen in Figures 3 and 4, convergence on the government deficit front had been 
achieved since 1998, but was anything but sufficient. The average deficit of the original 12 
was below the 3% threshold, but some countries were marginally close to that threshold. 
In addition, government debt as a percentage of GDP was much higher than the 60% target 
envisaged in the Maastricht treaty, and was not converging sufficiently quickly towards 
that target. Nevertheless, in the haste to include as many countries as possible among the 
initial group, the criteria were interpreted somewhat generously. 
 
The third phase was completed on January 1, 2001 with the introduction of the euro in 
accounting form. From January 1, 2002 the euro became legal tender, with the 
introduction of cash in everyday transactions. On this day, the circulation of banknotes and 
coins and the swift (within two months) withdrawal of national currencies began 
throughout the euro area.176 
 
 
















3. The Euro area Economy: From Euphoria to Crisis 
 
From January 1, 2001 there is a single currency in the euro area economy and, therefore, 
a single monetary policy for all member states. This is decided upon and implemented by 
the European Central Bank which aims to ensure price stability. 
 
A central pillar of macroeconomic policy coordination was supposed to be the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP). The pact required all economies in the euro area and the EU to maintain 
fiscal deficits below 3% of GDP, to pursue budgetary balance over the medium term and 
to ensure that public debt does not exceed 60% of GDP, or that it tends towards this 
objective. 
 
The original Stability and Growth Pact provided for remedial action for those economies 
that did not meet their fiscal targets. The SGP was revised in 2005, after several economies, 
including Germany and France, failed to promptly correct their excessive deficits. 
 
The revised Pact was more flexible regarding the time available for the correction of 
excessive deficits, but at the same time more demanding in terms of maintaining fiscal 
balance in so called ‘good times’. 
 
Countries were required to tend towards fiscal balance (zero budget deficits) during so 
called ‘good times’, by reducing their deficits by at least 0.5% of GDP annually. As this 
provision was not implemented strictly by all countries, the Eurogroup and the ECOFIN 
Council decided in 2007 to aim for fiscal balance for all countries by 2010. However, 
following the international financial crisis of 2008, the European Commission proposed and 
the ECOFIN Council decided to apply the pact in a more flexible way, as the EA economy 
entered a recession and the subsequently the euro area crisis threatened the very 
existence of the euro.  
 
The first ten years of the euro saw new asymmetries develop in Europe as a result of the 
introduction of the single currency and the convergence of inflation rates and nominal 
interest rates. The new asymmetries appeared in the form of the development of current 
account imbalances between the “core” countries of the euro area and the countries in 
the periphery. 
 
3.1. Macroeconomic Euphoria and External Imbalances 
 
The first nine years of the euro constituted a period of macroeconomic euphoria 
throughout the EA. In most respects, the creation of the euro area appeared an 
unmitigated economic success.177  
 
Growth rates remained high throughout the area, with countries in the periphery growing 
faster than Germany, France, Italy, and the smaller economies of the core. Inflation rates 
in the periphery converged further towards the low inflation rates of the core and 
 
177 In the remainder of this paper we shall concentrate on three groups of countries. First, the euro area of 12 
(EA-12), which represents mainly the behavior of the three largest euro area economies (Germany, France and 




unemployment rates were on a downward path, especially in the periphery. However, 
these first nine years of the euro saw new asymmetries develop as a result of the 
introduction of the single currency and the convergence of inflation rates and real interest 
rates. The new asymmetries appeared in the form of significant current account 
imbalances between, on the one hand, Germany and the smaller core economies and, on 
the other hand, Italy and the economies of the periphery. France remained somewhere in 
between.  
 
Figure 5. Real GDP per capita in the Euro Area, the USA and Japan (1999=100): 1999-2007  
  
 
3.1.1 Macroeconomic Euphoria  
 
The evolution of real per capita GDP in the euro area of 12 (EA-12) is depicted in figure 5. 
Between 1999 and 2007, the first nine pre-crisis years of the euro area, real GDP per capita 
was growing at an average annual rate of about 1.7%. This was the same as in the USA and 
significantly higher than the average growth rate of 1.4% in Japan.  
 
GDP per capita in the economies of the periphery was rising faster than the EA-12 average, 
about 2.6% per year. The same applied to the small economies of the core which also 
experienced higher than average growth rates at 2.0% per year. However, the average 
annual growth rates in the three largest economies were lower than the EA-12. (Germany, 
1.7%, France 1.4%, Italy 1.1%). 
 
Unemployment rates also fell significantly. For the EA-12, the average unemployment rate 
fell from 9.8% in the 1990s to 8.5% in 2000-2007. Average unemployment rates in the 




smaller economies of the core average unemployment rates fell from 7.1% in the 1990s to 
5.9% in 2000-2007.  
 
The periphery also experienced the largest benefits in terms of further reductions of 
inflation. Average annual inflation rates in the economies of the periphery fell from 5.3% 
in the 1990s to 3.3% in 2000-2007.  
 
There is no doubt that the first nine pre-crisis years of the euro area were a period of 
macroeconomic euphoria, especially for the economies of the periphery.  
 
The proximate cause of the economic boom in the countries of the periphery of the euro 
area was the precipitous fall in their real interest rates, as, following the elimination of the 
devaluation premium, these interest rates converged with those of Germany and the 
smaller core economies.  
 
3.1.2 Current Account Imbalances between the Periphery and the Core 
 
However, not all was well. One of the main characteristics of the 1999-2007 period was 
the development of significant external imbalances between the economies of the 
periphery and Italy on one hand, and the core and Germany on the other. These external 
imbalances, resulted in the fast and excessive rise in international indebtedness of the 
countries of the periphery of the euro area, which made them extremely vulnerable in the 
aftermath of the international financial crisis.  
 






Figure 6 depicts the evolution of the average current account balances of Germany, France, 
Italy and the groups of smaller economies of the core and the periphery. The participation 
of the economies of the periphery in the euro area was associated with a significant 
widening of their current account deficits. On average, following the creation of the euro 
area, the current account of the EA-12 remained in a small surplus. The surplus rose from 
0.1% of GDP in the 1990s to 0.4% of GDP in 2000-2007. However, the economies of the 
periphery saw their average current account deficit rise from 2.5% of GDP in the 1990s to 
6.8% of GDP in 2000-2007. Furthermore the rise was almost continuous throughout the 
first nine years after the creation of the euro and reached almost 10% of their GDP in 2007. 
Italy also saw its current account surplus gradually move into deficit. These rising deficits 
were associated with current account surpluses in the rest of the euro area. The average 
current account surplus of the small core economies of the north rose from 2.4% of GDP 
in the 1990s to 4.8% of GDP in 2000-2007, but did not display a further significant trend in 
the 1999-2007 period. Germany moved from a small current account deficit of 0.6% of GDP 
in the 1990s to a surplus of 2.9% of GDP in 2000-2007. Italy displayed a similar if less 
pronounced pattern as the economies of the periphery. From a surplus of 0.6% of GDP in 
the 1990s it gradually moved to current account deficit averaging 0.7% of GDP in 2007. 
France displayed a positive but shrinking current account surplus. Thus, the first nine years 
of the euro area were characterized by widening current account deficits in the periphery 
and, to a smaller extent, Italy, and significant and rising current account surpluses in 
Germany and the smaller economies of the core.  
 
The proximate cause of the external imbalances was the same as the proximate cause of 
the stronger post-euro boom in the periphery. The precipitous fall of real interest rates in 
the countries of the periphery which converged with those of the core countries. 
 
A sharp drop in real interest rates is expected to lead to an increase in international 
borrowing, as private savings fall and investment rises. This is exactly what happened in 
the euro area. In addition, governments found it more attractive and easier to borrow at 
the lower interest rates that they faced.  
 
For a long time the risks of low interest rates and the consequent widening of external 
imbalances were underestimated. Many even considered the fall in interest rates as highly 
beneficial and an indication of a successful financial integration between the periphery and 
the core.178  
 
A significant problem was that much of the additional investment in the periphery was 
directed to non-tradable sectors, such as public investment and real estate, including 
housing. Hence, the increase in external indebtedness was not associated with an increase 
of the export capacity of the economies of the periphery. 
 
Worse still, capital flows contributed to house price bubbles that eventually would 
inevitably burst, leading to losses for lenders, chiefly domestic banks, who had extended 
the loans. Due to the doom-loop between domestic banks and governments, which made 
governments eventually responsible for bailing out banks, the bursting of these house 
 




price bubbles eventually led to a rise in government deficits and debts in countries such as 
in Ireland and Spain.  
 
The inflows also contributed to the increase of wages and costs, which resulted in 
continuous losses of competitiveness that further contributed to the widening deficits in 
the current account. All the economies of the periphery - Greece, Ireland, Portugal and 
Spain - had inflation rates above the euro area average. Instead, all of the core economies, 
except the Netherlands and Luxembourg, had inflation rates below the average of the euro 
area. 
 
Hence, the economies of the periphery were not investing sufficiently in sectors which 
would in the longer run help service their growing external debt. In addition, they were 
continuously losing international competitiveness, which undermined even their existing 
export capacity. 
 
The influx of foreign capital also contributed to the smooth financing of budget deficits, 
which, especially in Greece and Portugal, rose again after these economies joined the euro 
area. However, the large accumulated deficits in the current account in Spain were not 
accompanied by higher corresponding public deficits. 
 
It also has to be noted that adverse fiscal developments were not simply a problem of the 
periphery in the early years of the euro area. Even Germany and France experienced public 
debt accumulation of around 20 percentage points of GDP over this period. Italy’s public 
debt accumulation was higher but of a similar order of magnitude. None of these countries, 
however, experienced major imbalances in the current account. On the other hand, 
Finland and Luxembourg had unusually large fiscal surpluses. 
 
We shall examine the current account imbalances between the core and the periphery of 
the euro area in more detail in the sections that follow, as they are the key to 
understanding the causes of the euro area crisis.  
 
3.1.3 Financial Imbalances  
 
The cumulation of current account imbalances resulted in a corresponding cumulation of 
financial imbalances. These were transmitted to the economies of the core who were 
financing the current account deficits of the periphery, but also higher investment in the 
core countries. 
 
The cumulative additional lending of Irish banks amounted to almost four times the 
country’s GDP. For banks in Austria it amounted to 2.5 times GDP. For banks in Spain, 
Belgium and France cumulative new bank lending was over 100% of GDP. 
 
By 2007, many euro area banks were not only too big to fail, they were also too big to 
saved. As the euro area was not a banking union, bailing out the banks remained a national 
responsibility. Banks in Ireland had liabilities equivalent to seven times Irish GDP. Banks in 
the economies of the euro area core were not in a much better position, with banks having 




times GDP in Germany, France and the Netherlands. For Luxembourg, the multiple was 
astronomical. 
 
In retrospect, it is surprising that these imbalances went virtually unnoticed. In a sense, 
this was the equivalent to the non-realization by the US authorities of the toxic nature of 
securities based on the soaring subprime mortgage loans. 
 
By 2007, at around its tenth anniversary, the course of the euro area was assessed very 
positively. However, the euphoria gradually gave its way to anxiety during 2008, and deep 
anxiety following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Yet, before the 
eruption of the euro crisis, the mood was one of confidence and the risks were generally 
underestimated.179 
 
3.2 The Euro area Crisis 
 
Slowing growth and a growing realization of the risks in store reinforced each other for 
everyone, but especially for countries that had accumulated large stocks of public and 
private external debt due to the cumulation of large deficits in the current account. 
 
In late 2008, interest rate spreads (risk premia), which were measured in a few basis points 
for years, began to climb, and reach up to two or three percentage points for Greece, 
Ireland, Italy and Portugal. 
 
However, when it became clear in the summer of 2009, that the Lehman shock would not 
create a second Great Depression, spreads in the euro area fell significantly. Yet, this was 
not to last. 
 
3.2.1 The Outbreak of the Crisis in the Periphery of the Euro area 
 
Every crisis requires a trigger. For the euro area crisis this was the announcement of the 
significant widening of the fiscal deficit of Greece in October 2009. 
 
 
179 It is worth quoting from a short article from the Director General of Economic and Monetary Affairs of the 
European Commission and the Director of Fiscal Affairs of the IMF in December 2008. They concluded that, 
‘Most observers deem the euro a resounding success. However, in doing so, they often forget the magnitude of 
the original challenge. In this short article, we tried to look at the first decade of the euro area going back to its 
beginnings. The story is not over. Significant challenges lie ahead. As we write the world is living a financial and 
economic crisis of truly global proportions. For the euro area, the global crisis brings into sharp focus the 
challenges of maintaining macroeconomic stability and financial stabil ity. ... Participation in the euro area also 
contributed to insulating participating countries from some adverse effects that the crisis might otherwise have 
had on their economies.’ (Buti and Gaspar (2008)). The closing remarks of a speech given by the Pr esident of the 
ECB, in February 2009, were in the same wave length: ‘When we look back over the first ten years of the euro, 
then we can do this with satisfaction. The sceptical forecasts before its birth have not materialised. The euro is a 
historic achievement. Its first ten years have been a success. ... We have many challenges to cope with in the 
years to come. Some are shared with the other important central banks in the world, like responding to the 
present economic and financial global situation and drawing all the lessons from the present turmoil.’ (Trichet 




This announcement set in motion a spiral of increases in interest rates, unsuccessful  
budget fiscal balancing efforts by Greece itself, the deterioration of Greece’s credit rating, 
further interest rate increases, culminating in the ‘Greek bailout’ of May 2010. 
 
The leaders of the EA decided it was unthinkable for a member country to default and 
opted for bailing out Greece. In this case, the ‘lender of last resort’ was not the ECB but the 
governments of the euro area and the International Monetary Fund, through an ad hoc 
financial instrument, the European Economic Stability Fund (EFSF). This eventually evolved 
into the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).  
 
The bailout did not work well and proved insufficient. Markets reacted negatively as 
analysts concluded that Greece was not a clear path to debt sustainability. The constrained 
and politically charged design and implementation of the program did nothing to boost 
confidence in the ability of the euro area ability to handle the crisis. The risk premium on 
Greek bonds continued to rise. 
 
Since early 2010, financial markets began to wonder if the failure of Greece to tackle the 
crisis could apply to other countries. These doubts - combined with the relentless logic of 
the debt interest rate vortex - was enough to raise the risk premium for other euro area 
members apart from Greece. 
 
What proved decisive was whether a state’s fiscal problems were combined with balance 
of payments problems. Only countries that borrowed primarily from international markets 
experienced problems. The borrowing costs of Portugal and Ireland rose sharply when the 
Greek bailout was announced. 
 
This was the beginning of a ‘sudden stop’ of lending from international financial markets, 
which affected all countries with significant deficits in the current account. Ireland, 
Portugal, Spain and Italy. As it turned out, because of the ‘home-bias’ of European banks, 
euro area investors were much more wary about lending to other euro area governments 
than about lending to their own government. 
 
The increase in the risk premium led to the adoption of rescue plans both for Ireland and 
Portugal, although with very different characteristics than Greece. In the case of Ireland, 
the imbalance that proved decisive was the situation of Irish banks. 
 
3.2.2 The Doom Loop: From the Periphery to the Core 
 
Both banks and sovereigns are subject to the possibility of a debt vortex. Banks borrow 
money short term to lend long term. For every euro borrowed short term, the bank makes 
long-term loans of twelve or more euros - this is the nature of leverage. 
 
Leverage increases profitability but it also increases risks. Such risks materialize in bad 
times. The Irish banks had loans in 2008 approximately 7.8 times Irish GDP. The banking 
crisis led Ireland to a bailout in November 2010, which significantly increased its public 





The Irish bailout exacerbated the crisis. It was followed by Portugal in May 2011 and the 
second Greek bailout in July 2011. 
 
In July 2011, the second Greek package was agreed in principle, but one of its elements 
inflamed the overall situation. As part of the EA leaders’ new view that the private sector 
should bear part of the cost of the bailout, private holders of Greek government debt 
would see about half the face value of their holdings disappear, in what was 
euphemistically called the Private Sector Involvement (PSI).  
 
This was a wake-up call for investors who still found the Maastricht Treaty’s no-default 
clause credible. The markets began to demand higher yields on the government bonds of 
Belgium, Spain and Italy. Italy in particular, was a deadly threat to the euro area, given the 
size of its economy and its huge debt. The doom-loop was moving from the periphery 
towards the core. 
 
3.2.3 Fiscal Adjustment, Recession and Contagion 
Budget cuts in the periphery, in the aftermath of the 2010 crisis, exacerbated the problem, 
as countries in rescue programs or those involved in the debt vortex had no other option 
but to cut their budget deficits. 
 
The euro area as a whole saw a primary deficit of about €350 billion in 2010 to be reduced 
to only €10 billion in 2014. This was a massive recessionary shock - equal to four percentage 
points of the EA economy. 
 
Budget cuts came from both the countries of the periphery and from the core countries 
that had not faced a debt crisis. This was because the 2009 recession had pushed many 
other countries over the 3% threshold for the deficit of the general government envisaged 
in the stability and growth path. 
 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain accounted for about 48% of the budget cuts, 
although they represent only one third of the GDP of the euro area. However, budget cuts 
in Germany accounted for 32% of the total, and those in France 13% of the total budget 
cuts in the euro area. 
 
Because budget cuts were mainly tax increases, and to a lesser extent primary expenditure 
reductions, the negative repercussions on economic activity were even greater. Hence, in 
2011, the euro area was again in recession.180 
 
Things were plainly going from bad to worse. Each attempt to end the crisis seemed to 
make matters worse.  
 
By this time, the contagion spread all the way to France. Its debt was downgraded and 
market yields rose substantially above those of other core EA nations like Germany and the 
smaller economies of the core. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown unhelpfully suggested 
that Italy and France might need a bailout.  
 
180 Alesina et al (2015) and Callegari et al (2017) have investigated the impact of this contractionary fiscal mix on 





The Belgian problem – domestic banks in trouble due to Greek lending – spread to Cyprus. 
Its banks were severely affected by the Greek debt write down, so the nation asked for a 
bailout in June 2012 (granted in March 2013).  
 
Needless to say, a crisis that threatened Italy and France was a crisis of global dimensions. 
This was no longer an issue of Greece and the other smaller economies of the periphery. 
This had the potential of blowing up the euro area and the EU itself. The world economy 
was looking at another Lehman-sized shock. With EA leaders manifestly incapable of 
mastering events, something had to be done. 
 
3.2.4 “Whatever it Takes” 
 
That something was a forceful intervention by ECB President Mario Draghi, in his now 
famous July 2012 speech. He told markets that the ECB would do “whatever it takes” to 
keep the euro area together.  
 
That did the trick. It switched expectations from 2011 and 2012’s ‘doom-is-inevitable’ back 
to the old ‘we-will-get-through-this-thing’ expectations of 2009 and 2010. As the ECB 
backed that statement with its quantitative easing program, borrowing costs for the 
affected countries gradually returned to pre-crisis levels 
 
The basic switching mechanism that Draghi triggered is a a direct corollary of the debt-
vortex logic. The rush to unload debt is driven by fear. The fear is driven by the suspicion 
that everyone else will sell a nation’s debt, thus driving borrowing costs up to the point 
where the nation actually faces such fiscal difficulties that it is threatened with default. But 
if there is a debt buyer-of-last- resort – someone who can buy unlimited amounts of debt 
– the suspicion dissolves and investors are happy to hold the debt. This is what Mario 
Draghi did in the summer of 2012. It worked.181  
 
3.2.5 Proximate Causes of the Euro area Crisis 
 
The proximate cause of the EA crisis was the rapid unwinding of intra-EA borrowing 
imbalances between the periphery and the core. The built up of these imbalances occurred 
in the 2000s, prior to the crisis. Some of this was to private borrowers (especially in Ireland 
and Spain) and some of it to public borrowers (especially in Greece and Portugal), but in 
every case the difficult debt mostly ended up as government debt. Often private over-
indebtedness ends up on governments balance sheets, so that the rise in public debt is 
more a consequence than a cause of a financial crisis. 
 
The sudden stop became a crisis rather than a temporary problem since EA members could 




181 A detailed analysis of the euro area crisis, focusing on external and financial imbalances can be found in 




A confidence crisis ensued, first about the countries of the periphery, but later also about 
some of the core countries, regarding their ability to service their public and private 
external debts. This was exacerbated by the unsuccessful efforts to address the debt 
problem.  
 
The proximate causes of the crisis, external imbalances and lack of crisis management 
mechanisms, suggest three sorts of underlying causes: 1. Macroeconomic and financial 
asymmetries and policy failures, 2. Lack of institutions to absorb shocks at the EA level, 3. 
Crisis mismanagement. 
 
Some of these failures involved unanticipated events. Others were a failure to implement 
the provisions agreed in the Maastricht Treaty. Others, such as the inability of the ECB to 
act as a lender of last resort in the initial phases of the crisis, or the lack of appropriate 
institutions to tackle the asymmetric impact of major shocks are more fundamental, and 
call for major euro area reforms.  
 
4. Optimum Currency Area Considerations for the Euro Area 
 
The politically-motivated launch of the euro in 1999 never met the acid-test of what 
economists have come to call an optimum currency area. Nevertheless, the considerations 
relating to optimum currency areas can prove extremely useful in thinking about reforming 
the euro area in order to address its main fault lines revealed by the crisis. 
 
What are these considerations? The optimum currency area literature poses a seemingly 
simple question. If we forget about national boundaries and focus purely on economic 
relations, which is the best constellation of countries that can share a single currency. In 
answering this question, it considers the benefits and costs from giving up national 
currencies, whose exchange rates can potentially change, and substituting them by a single 
currency.182  
 
The literature stresses four potential benefits from the adoption of a single currency. First, 
the reduction of cross border transaction costs, from the elimination of the need to 
exchange different currencies, second, the increase in transparency, that makes prices in 
different countries easily comparable, third, the elimination of currency risk, associated 
with changes in exchange rates, and fourth, applicable to countries with inflationary 
monetary policies, the switch to a low inflation monetary policy.183 
 
The potential costs from the adoption of a single currency is the cost of the loss of the 
ability of each country to use monetary and exchange rate policy to tackle the undesirable 
macroeconomic consequences of shocks that impact the various economies 
asymmetrically, and, potentially, the loss of the ability of each country to use its monetary 
 
182 This question was first posed, and partially answered, by Mundell (1961) who is rightly considered as the 
originator of this literature. McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969) were early major contributors to this literature. 
The literature was revived in the 1980s, as additional considerations were added. A survey of the so called ‘new’ 
theory of optimum currency areas can be found in Tavlas (1993). 
183 This last argument presupposes that the central bank administering the single currency is politically 




policy in choosing the appropriate inflation tax, and/or combination of inflation and 
unemployment, according to its own preferences.184   
 
Assuming that the marginal benefit of adding a country to a currency area is positive and 
declining, and that the marginal cost is rising as additional countries are added, the number 
of countries that constitute an optimal currency area can be theoretically determined as in 












The higher the position of the marginal benefit curve and the lower the position of the 
marginal cost curve in Figure 7, the larger is an optimum currency area, in the sense that 
more countries are included. What determines the position of the marginal benefit and 
marginal cost curves? 
 
With regard to the position of the marginal benefit curve, a high potential trading volume 
among the participating countries would result in higher marginal benefits from the 
 
184 Given that most macroeconomists accept the Friedman (1968) doctrine that there is no long-run tradeoff 




reduction of transaction costs and exchange rate uncertainty. This was an argument put 
forward by both Mundell (1961) and McKinnon (1963), who gave emphasis to the degree 
of economic integration and openness. Hence, countries that are more economically open, 
geographically close and economically integrated, will have significant trading volumes 
among themselves and, therefore, higher marginal benefits from sharing a common 
currency.185  
 
The inflation criterion, also emphasized first by McKinnon (1963) and later by Mundell 
(1973), is more questionable. Whereas it may be a benefit of a high inflation country to 
participate in a low inflation monetary union, and adopt its anti-inflationary credibility, it 
may be a cost for the other participating countries to accept a high inflation economy in a 
monetary union.186  
 
With regard to the position of the marginal cost curve, the original considerations 
proposed by Mundell (1961) emphasized the degree of cross border factor and, especially, 
labor mobility. If cross border labor mobility is high, then a country hit asymmetrically by 
an adverse employment shock will not suffer from persistent unemployment, because the 
unemployed will migrate to high employment countries in the monetary union. Hence, 
increased labor mobility can reduce the marginal costs of joining a monetary union from 
the loss of the domestic monetary policy instruments, such as the interest rates and the 
exchange rate.187  
 
Kenen (1969) gave emphasis to the degree of product diversification. His argument was 
that countries with a relatively diversified product mix were less likely to suffer from the 
impact of industry specific shocks. Hence, an increased diversification of the average 
product mix of participating countries will tend to shift the marginal cost curve of joining a 
monetary union downwards. 
 
Another important criterion which was first emphasized by Kenen (1969) is the existence 
of a significant federal budget, that results in automatic transfers towards countries that 
are hit by an adverse asymmetric shock, from countries that have not been hit by the shock. 
The higher the fiscal transfers from a high federal budget, the lower the costs of joining a 
monetary union in the presence of asymmetric shocks. The fact that the EU federal budget 
is extremely low, around 1% of EU GDP, is a factor that keeps the marginal cost curve at a 
 
185 This is a criterion that is obviously satisfied by the EU countries, which are all geographically located in 
Europe, have eliminated trade barriers and created a single market and have high trading volumes among 
themselves. Obviously this criterion is stronger for the economies of the core than the periphery, which are 
geographically more detached. 
186 This may be one of the reasons why the Maastricht treaty envisages convergence of inflation rates and 
nominal interest rates as a prerequisite for acceptance into the euro area. The inflation tax argument is also a 
justification for the fiscal criteria, of budget deficits lower than 3% of GDP and government debts tending to 
60% of GDP of an applicant. 
187 This also applied in principle to the EU, as the free movement of people is one of the four fundamental 
freedoms of the Treaties, along with the free movement of goods, services and capital. In practice however, 





higher level, suggesting that due to the small size of the EU federal budget, the optimal 
euro area is probably on the low rather than the high side.188 
 
Finally other criteria that affect the position of both the marginal benefit and the marginal 
cost curve include the homogeneity of national preferences and the existence or not of 
political solidarity among member states in a monetary union. 
 
One cannot, and in any case would not want to use these optimum currency area 
considerations to determine in an absolute fashion whether the current euro area is an 
optimum currency area or not. In all probability no single currency area is an optimum 
currency area, including the United States. However, on prima facie grounds, admitting the 
countries of the periphery into the EA may have been premature, as they did not satisfy 
some of the important optimum currency area criteria suggested by the literature.  
 
In any case, as O’ Rourke and Taylor (2013), among others, have recently argued, the 
United States is much closer to the optimum currency area criteria than the euro area.  
 
First and foremost, US markets are much more closely integrated that EA markets, as cross 
border inter-state trade amounts to 66% of US GDP, whereas cross border inter-country 
trade amounts to only 17% of EA GDP. 
 
Second, with regard to the asymmetric impact of shocks, there do not seem to major 
differences between the US and the EA. The average correlation coefficient of GDP growth 
rates across US states in 0.46 and across EA countries it is 0.50. Macroeconomic 
asymmetries seem to impact the EA and the US in roughly the same degree. 
 
However, the US is far ahead of the EA with regard to the labor mobility criterion. The 
average share of people in a US state born outside that state is 42%, while the equivalent 
share in a EA country is only 14%. On the basis of this criterion, labor mobility is four times 
larger in the USA than in the EA. 
 
In addition, the US is far ahead on the fiscal federalism criterion, which is related to fiscal 
transfers and the effectiveness of automatic stabilizers in the presence of shocks that affect 
states and countries asymmetrically. In the US about 30% of a state income shock is offset 
through federal fiscal transfers. In the EA, the relevant percentage is only 0.5%. Thus, the 
low level of the EA federal budget relative to the US has major implications for the ability 
of the EA to address shocks with an asymmetric impact through transfers from countries 
not affected by the relevant shock. 
 
 
188 This so-called fiscal federalism criterion was investigated by Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1991), who pointed to 
the large automatic transfers across US states, due to the large US federal budget of more than 20% of GDP, 
and the federal tax benefit system. In effect a federal budget acts as an automatic stabilizer in the presence of 
shocks that have asymmetric effects, mitigating their impact. A small federal budget, of the order of 1% of GDP, 
such as the EU budget, is clearly an ineffective automatic stabilizer. Darby and Melitz (2008) have documented 
the positive impact of automatic stabilizers in the OECD economies,  while Bargain et al (2013) demonstrate that 
a bigger EU federal budget would have mitigated the adverse effects of the euro area crisis for the economies of 




Given that macroeconomic and financial asymmetries seem to have increased following 
the creation of the euro, as we shall show below, these considerations suggest the 
direction of the reforms that would take the euro area closer to an optimum currency area. 
 
 
5. Macroeconomic and Financial Asymmetries in the Euro area 
 
In our narrative of both the evolution of monetary cooperation in Europe, and the 
operation of the euro area, both before and after the crisis, we have kept alluding to 
macroeconomic and financial asymmetries as a root cause of the problems of all 
cooperative monetary regimes before the creation of the euro, and the operation of the 
euro area itself. Economic and financial asymmetries play a key role in the optimum 
currency area literature as well. In this section we concentrate on taking a closer look at 
the nature of these asymmetries in the case of the euro area. 
 
We concentrate on the original euro area of 12. We consider asymmetries between the 
large economies of the euro area, which were also founding members of the EEC, the 
smaller core economies of central and northern Europe, and the smaller economies of the 
European periphery. The three large euro area economies of Germany, France and Italy 
account for about two thirds of the GDP of the euro area. Hence, the aggregates for the 
euro area of 12 (EA-12) mainly reflect these three largest economies. The smaller core 
economies (The Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and Finland), account for about 15%, and 
the economies of the periphery (Spain, Greece, Portugal and Ireland) account for 17.5% of 
the GDP of the EA-12, and are treated as the core and the periphery respective.189 
 
5.1. Macroeconomic Performance in the Euro Area 
 
Before we focus on euro area asymmetries it is worth examining the overall 
macroeconomic performance of the euro area. To put it in perspective, we shall compare 
it to the macroeconomic performance of the USA, the dollar area, which is roughly the 
same size as the euro area. 
 
A comparison of macroeconomic performance in the euro area of the original twelve 
members (EA-12) and the USA suggests that he countries of the EA-12 had higher growth 
rates of GDP per capita in the 1960s and the 1970s. Since the beginning of the 1980s the 
US growth rate overtook that of the EA-12. Thus, during the two decades of deepening 
monetary integration, that resulted in the eventual creation of the euro, the EA-12 was 
lagging behind the US in terms of growth of real per capita GDP. For the first 8 years, since 
the creation of the euro, the EA-12 was growing as fast as the USA, albeit at a slightly lower 
rate than in the previous two decades. Since the financial crisis of 2008-09 the growth 
performance of the EU12 has been significantly worse than that of the USA. The EA-12 real 
GDP per capita essentially stagnated, as it grew only at 0.1% on average between 2008 and 
2016. Since 2008, the growth rate of real GDP per capita in the USA was 0.5% per year, 
much higher than in the EA-12.  
 
189 These weights are based on the Area Wide Model (AWM) database of the European Central Bank. They are 
GDP based, adjusted for PPP, and reflect the PPP adjusted real GDP of each particular economy as a share of the 





This worsening of the EA12 relative macroeconomic performance is also reflected in 
unemployment rates. Whereas the countries of the EA12 had significantly lower 
unemployment rates in the 1960s and 1970s, unemployment rates have remained 
persistently higher than in the US since the early 1980s. This is a well documented fact, and 
has not been reversed by the creation of the Euro area. In fact, EA-12 unemployment rates 
rose significantly after the 2008-09 financial crisis, as also happened in the USA.190 
 
Where the euro area seems to have outperformed the USA is in the evolution of inflation 
and the current account. Whereas average inflation rates in the countries of the EA-12 
were higher than in the USA from the 1960s to the end of the 1990s, the creation of the 
euro area has resulted in a significant improvement in inflation performance, both in 
absolute terms and in relation to the USA. Average inflation in the EA-12 was about 2% in 
the 2000-2007 period, versus 2.8% for the USA. Inflation fell even further in the post crisis 
years of 2010-2016, to 1.3% in the EA-12 and 1.6% in the USA.  
 
The divergence in current account balances is even more in the EA’s favor. While the USA 
has been running significant current account deficits since at least the early 1970s, 
amounting to more than 3% of GDP in the last 15 years, the EA12 has been running 
surpluses, which have risen to 1.6% of GDP on average in the years since the crisis, 
 
However, the macroeconomic performance of the EA has been extremely uneven. It is 
characterized by significant macroeconomic asymmetries between the core and the 
periphery. It is to such asymmetries that we now turn.   
 
5.2. Macroeconomic Asymmetries 
 









190 See Blanchard (2006) for a survey of the evolution of European unemployment and alternative explanations.  
191 The weights used for constructing the group aggregates are the ones used in the Area Wide Model (AWM) 
database of the European Central Bank. They are GDP based, adjusted for PPP, and reflect the PPP adjusted real 
GDP of each particular economy as a share of the Euro area economy GDP in 2001. See Fagan et al. (2005) for 
more details. The weights for the different countries are as follows: Germany (DE) 28.3%, France (FR) 20.1%, 
Italy (IT) 19.5%, Spain (ES) 11.1%, Netherlands (NL) 6%, Belgium (BE) 3.6%, Austria (AT) 3.0%, Greece (EL) 2.5%, 
Portugal (PT) 2.4%, Finland (FI) 1.7%, Ireland (IE) 1.5%, Luxembourg (LX) 0.3%. The source for the original data 
used and depicted in figures 8 to 15 is the November 2018 Annual Macroeconomic Data Bank (AMECO) of the 
European Commission. In the figures, we do not present the three largest euro area economies (Germany (DE), 
France (FR) and Italy (IT)) separately, as the aggregates for the EA-12 mainly reflect the characteristics of these 
three economies, which constitute more than two thirds of the EA-12. We thus present the evolution of 
aggregates for the EA-12, the ‘core’ small economies (Netherlands (NL), Belgium (BE), Austria (AT) and Finland 








The real GDP per capita and growth asymmetries between the core and the periphery of 
the EA are striking. Whereas the economies of the core, large and small, have roughly 
similar levels of GDP per capita and rates of economic growth, the economies of the 
periphery have much lower GDP per capita than the rest, with very weak and temporary 
tendencies for convergence. The average real GDP per capita of the economies of the 
periphery had reached 71.2% of the EA-12 average during the 1990s. During 2000-2007 
there was relatively rapid convergence, as it rose to 78.6% of the EA-12 average. However, 
since 2008 in has fallen back to 76.6% of the EA-12 average. Thus, although the creation of 
the euro area originally resulted in conver- gence of real GDP per capita between the core 
and the periphery, after the euro crisis the gap widened again. In addition, the coefficient 
of variation of growth rates among the original 12 EA members tripled from 55% in 2000-
2007 to 162% in 2008-2016, indicating a significant worsening of growth asymmetries after 
the crisis.192   
 
The economies of the periphery have also experienced significantly higher unemployment 
rates, especially since the 1980s. The evolution of unemployment rates is depicted in figure 
9. Unemployment rates in the periphery converged towards the unemployment rates of 
the core economies in the pre- crisis years since the creation of the euro, but 
unemployment rates in the periphery have more than doubled since the crisis. They rose 
from 9.3% of the labor force in 2000-2007 to 18.7% in 2008-2016. For the EA-12 the post-
 
192 The coefficient of variation is the standard deviation over the mean of a variable, and is probably the most 




crisis rise of unemployment has been much smaller, from 8.5% of the labor force in 2000-
2007 to 10.3% in 2008-2016. The coefficient of variation of unemployment rates in the EA-
12 has risen four times, from 21.9% in 2000-2007 to 86.6% in 2008-2016, indicating a 
significant worsening of unemployment asymmetries.  
 
 
Figure 9. Unemployment Rates in the Euro Area (% of civilian labor force): 1960-2017  
 
Figure 10 depicts the evolution of consumer price inflation. Inflation rates in the periphery 
were much higher than the core before the creation of the euro. However, they converged 
quickly towards the lower inflation rates of the core around the time of the creation of the 
euro and converged even further during the crisis. Furthermore, the coefficient of variation 
of inflation rates in the EA of 12 has fallen since the crisis, from 47.0% in 2000-2007 to 
31.0% in 2008-2016. The convergence of inflation rates can certainly be counted as 
















Figure 11 depicts the evolution of current account balances. External imbalances between 
the periphery and the core worsened significantly since the creation of the euro. As we 
have already discussed, the economies of the periphery have had much higher current 
account deficits, both historically, and especially during the first nine years since the 
creation of the euro. This was a major destabilizing factor and a serious contributor to the 
euro area crisis of 2010. The standard deviation of current account deficits in the EA of 12, 
relative to GDP, almost doubled to 5.6% in the 2000-2007 period, and has only fallen 
slightly since the crisis, to 4.2% in the 2008-2016 period.  
 
Macroeconomic asymmetries also exist within the various groups, but their common 






193 Probably the most important development that does not conform with our classification is the divergence of 
the GDP per capita of Italy since the euro area crisis. In this, the behavior of Italy is more similar to that of the 
countries of the periphery than the core. On the other hand, Ireland is recently demonstrating features that 










5.3. Financial Asymmetries 
 
We next turn to financial asymmetries, focusing on the evolution of long-term interest rates, 
real exchange rates, general government balances and general government debt.  
The euro area has been a monetary union among sovereign states with national budgets, 
national banking systems and financial markets and national labor markets. The EU budget, 
with a upper limit of 1% of EU GDP cannot function as an effective automatic stabilizer, and 
labor mobility is low. This has resulted in significant financial asymmetries, which were 
papered over before the euro area crisis but have since taken centre stage. 




194 Real long term interest rates have been calculated as the difference of annual yields of 10 year government 
bonds from current annual rates of consumer price inflation. Sour ce: EU Commission, Annual Macroeconomic 




As can be seen from the figure, the creation of the euro resulted in a much more significant 
reduction of real interest rates in the periphery than in the core. Real long-term interest rates 
on government bonds in the periphery fell from 5.2% in the 1990s, to 1.1% in 2000-2007. This 
was mainly the result of the convergence of nominal interest rates following the elimination 
of the risk of currency devaluation for the economies of the periphery. Real interest rates in 
the core economies fell much less in the relevant period. Savings thus fell and investment 
rose much more in the periphery during the 2000-2007 period, contributing to the significant 
widening of current account deficits. Since the crisis, interest rates have again moved 
asymmetrically. Long term interest rates also continued falling in the core EA economies, but 
they rose significantly in the periphery. External imbalances have been partly corrected, but 
at the cost of much deeper recessions in the periphery than in the core. 
 





External imbalances have also worsened due to the behavior of real exchange rates. Real 
effective exchange rates rose by almost 16% in the periphery in the twenty years before the 
creation of the euro, while those in the core fell by almost 7% in the case of the large core 
economies, and 4% in the case of the smaller ones. Furthermore, real effective exchange rates 




competitiveness of the economies of the periphery is another major asymmetry induced by 
the process of monetary integration in Europe, that has been strengthened since the early 
1980s, and appears to be a significant determinant of the external imbalances that led to the 
euro area crisis. Since the crisis, real exchange rates in the periphery have depreciated and 
are back to the levels of the mid-1990s.195  
Real effective exchange rates, based on unit labor costs, for the 1995-2017 period, are 
depicted in figure 13.196 
 




Figure 14 depicts the evolution of general government balances, while figure 15 depicts the 
evolution of general government gross debt.197 
 
195 Chen et al (2013) analyze how changes in competitiveness affected current account imbalances in the euro 
area. 
196 Real effective exchange rates are based on unit labour costs (total economy) and are measured relative to 24 
industrial economies, using double export weights. They are presented as an index set to 100 in 1995. Source: 
EU Commission, Annual Macroeconomic Data Bank (AMECO), November 2018. 






Fiscal asymmetries between the periphery and the core are less significant than usually 
thought. The behavior of current government balances, or government debt was not that 
much different between the periphery and the core before the euro area crisis. In fact, before 
the 2008 international financial crisis, as a percent of GDP, both government deficits and 
debts were lower on average in the periphery than the EA average and the small economies 
of the core. However, fiscal imbalances in the periphery widened significantly after the crisis, 
despite their fiscal consolidation efforts, due to the deeper and longer recessions that these 
countries had to go through.198  
 








198 The exception to this pattern is Greece, which was characterized by significant fiscal imbalances for a number 
of years before the euro area crisis. For a detailed analysis of the Greek crisis along the lines suggested in this 








The main financial asymmetries between the periphery and the core of the euro area seem 
to be due to the segmentation of financial markets and differences in their anti -inflationary 
credibility before the creation of the euro area. These factors determined the evolution of 
real interest rates, savings- investment imbalances and current accounts in an asymmetric 
fashion. Differences in wage and price setting institutions, and the different inflation 
experiences in the periphery also seem to have affected the evolution of real exchange rates 
and current account positions. With the exception of Greece, fiscal asymmetries seem to have 
been a much less significant source of financial asymmetries before the international financial 
crisis of 2008. 
 
 
6. Reforming the Euro Area  
 
Although financial market integration and effective regulation of financial markets have taken 
a priority since the 2010 crisis, the euro area remains a single currency area with significant 




policies and a virtually non-existent common budget. At the same time, the European Central 
Bank (ECB) remains the only major central bank in the industrialized world which cannot 
function properly as a lender of last resort to governments and commercial banks. In addition, 
labor markets in the euro area remain fragmented, contributing to major differences in 
unemployment rates, which are exacerbated by the notoriously low degree of labor mobility 
in Europe. 
Hence, not only does the euro area not satisfy the main criterion suggested by optimum 
currency area considerations, namely the absence of asymmetries and asymmetric shocks, it 
furthermore lacks the other two main criteria for macroeconomic stabilization, namely 
integrated financial and labor markets and a federal budget that would act as an automatic 
stabilizer in the case of asymmetric macroeconomic developments. Furthermore, in its 
response to major financial crises the Euro area is hampered by the lack of an effective lender 
of last resort, the creation of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) notwithstanding. The 
euro area is in urgent need for additional fiscal, financial and labor market reforms. 
Since the crisis, there have been scores of proposals for reforming the euro area. However, 
there has been very little progress towards actual reform. The heads of the European 
institutions issued a blueprint for the future, the Four Presidents’ Report in June 2012 (Van 
Rompuy et al. (2012)). In a statement on 29 June 2012 the euro area heads of state agreed 
on breaking the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns by establishing a banking union. 
The agenda, which was endorsed by the European Council, has not been completed and the 
roadmap for the future remains a matter of fierce controversy. At the June 2018 summit, 
despite the prior Franco-German rapprochement and the joint ‘Meseberg Declaration’ by 
President Macron and Chancellor Merkel, the euro area heads of state could only agree to 
call for further work on a series of still-divisive issues. Why is it that it remains so difficult to 
reform the euro area? 
As suggested by Pisani-Ferry (2018), p. 1, “There are essentially two possible theories for this 
enduring state of controversy: the ‘battle of interests’ and the ‘battle of ideas’. The first posits 
that problems are fundamentally distributional ? decisions are controversial because they pit 
creditors against debtors, high-debt against low-debt states, stable against crisis-prone coun- 
tries, or global banks against local banks. The second emphasises cognitive issues. According 
to this reading, a major factor behind disagreements is that actors do not share the same 
representation of reality, but rather work with different implicit or explicit models of it.”  
An attempt to reach a consensus in the battle of ideas was made recently by a group of 14 
French and German economists, in Benassy-Quere et al. (2018). They suggest that the euro 
area ‘remains vulnerable, underperforming and divided’. (p. 2). They highlight three main 
weaknesses for the euro area: ‘First, the euro area continues to face significant financial 
fragility and limited institutional capacity to deal with a new crisis. Stabilisation and recovery 
have relied mainly on monetary easing by the ECB. ... Second, the euro area lacks adequate 
institutional conditions and incentives for long-term prosperity. Incomplete banking union 
and fragmented capital markets pre- vent it from achieving full monetary and financial 
integration, which would boost both growth and stability. ... Third, and perhaps most 




problems. This has to do partly with the poor design and complexity of the EU’s fiscal rules 
and partly with the euro area’s inability to deal with insolvent countries other than through 
crisis loans conditioned on harsh fiscal adjustment.’  
Our analysis of economic and financial asymmetries in the euro area broadly supports the 
proposals for reforming the euro area put forward by Benassy-Quere et al. (2018) in their 
attempt to provide a resolution to the battle of ideas within Europe.199  
The Benassy-Quere et al. (2018) proposals aim to reconcile risk sharing with market discipline, 
and concentrate on four main areas:  
1. Reform of fiscal rules, including of the enforcement device: Introduction of a debt-
corrected expenditure rule (acyclical discretionary spending), the ditching of EU sanctions, 
and the assignment of more individual respon- sibility to countries. 
2. More and better risk sharing: Reduction of home bias in bank sovereign portfolios through 
concentration charges, introduction of common deposit insurance with national 
compartments, the promotion of a ‘safe asset’ based on diversified sovereign debt 
portfolio (e.g. ESBies), the creation of low- conditionality access to ESM liquidity for pre-
qualified countries, and the creation of an unemployment/employment reinsurance fund.  
3. A targeted role for market discipline: They suggest the enforcement of the fiscal rule via 
mandating the issuance of subordinated (junior) bonds for the financing of excess 
spending, and making sovereign debt restructuring a credible last resort when debt is 
clearly unsustainable.  
4. Clarify role of institutions: Separation of the roles of ‘prosecutor’ (watchdog) and ‘judge’ 
(political), the upgrade of the ESM to an IMF-like institution, the introduction of political 
accountability and the strengthening of national fiscal councils.  
 
However, we would go beyond those proposals in two directions. First the need for a common 
euro area budget, and, second, the need to strengthen the role of the ECB as a lender of last 
resort in times of crisis.  
We would argue for the introduction of a moderate and appropriately targeted common EA 
budget that would help smooth out the asymmetric impact of macroeconomic shocks 
through the operation of automatic fiscal stabilizers. It would also help countries in recession 
face smaller national fiscal and financial consequences of such recessions, and would also 
partly address labor market fragmentation. A significant part of the fragmentation of labor 
markets in Europe is the result of the lack of a cross border system of unemployment and 
health insurance. This could be addressed in a reform that would allow for a separate EA 
budget, targeted to unemployment in- surance. A EA unemployment insurance scheme would 
have common rules, such as common replacement ratio and eligibility rules, and would 
reduce the divergence the national fiscal balances in the case of asymmetric cyclical shocks.  
 
 
199 The battle of ideas that emerged after the euro area crisis was first analyzed and highlighted by 




We would also argue for an explicit recognition of the responsibility of the ECB to act as lender 
of last resort to banks and sovereigns in times of crisis. This would help avert ‘sudden stops’ 
and the market disruptions associated with sovereign debt crises much better that an upgrade 
of the ESM to an IMF-like institution, due to the higher capacity of central banks to create 
liquidity.  
At the same time, the banking union should proceed as planned and national reform efforts 
that enhance international competitiveness should be strengthened, especially in the 
periphery.  
All proposals for a common EA budget go against the arguments of those opposing a transfer 
union, chiefly the countries that are net contributors to the EU budget. We feel that these 
objections are misplaced. The EU and, in particular, the EA are already transfer unions, 
through the operation of the single market and the monetary union. They encourage 
significant economic transfers from weaker and less competitive sectors and economies in 
the periphery, to stronger and more competitive ones, as suggested by the disparate 
macroeconomic performance of the core and the periphery following the creation of the Euro 
area.  
A fiscal transfer union, which would partly correct the effects of such transfers through fiscal 
redistribution is a logical counterpart of the single market and the monetary union. The 
transfers we suggest are modest, but certainly higher than the current EU ceiling of 1% of 
GDP. They could be concentrated in key cyclically sensitive areas such as unemployment 
insurance.  
The objections of net contributors to a moderate increase in the EU budget could in principle 
be overcome by an appropriate rules based fiscal reform that would address moral hazard 
and other coordination problems and ensure an appropriate balance between risk sharing 
and market discipline, as is also the case with the Benassy-Quere et al. (2018) proposals. 
 
7. The Covid-19 Crisis and the Recovery and Resilience Fund 
 
The pandemic and the restrictive measures it has demanded after the crisis of early 2020 have 
deeply disturbed the world economy and of course the economy of the EU. As a result of 
restrictive measures to address the pandemic, global demand, global supply chains, labor 
supply, industrial production, commodity prices, foreign trade and capital flows have shrunk 
significantly. The pandemic hit the European economies hard at a time when they were still 
vulnerable to new disruptions.  
The consequences across EA states will depend not only on the severity of the pandemic and 
the duration and severity of the measures to contain it, but also on the specific economic side 
effects and the initial conditions of the various Member States, as well as the flexibility of 




Once again, as in 2010, the EU and the Euro area are proving relatively unprepared to deal 
effectively with a major international economic crisis. The necessary reforms in the 
functioning of the euro area after the international financial crisis of 2010 had proceeded too 
slowly. However, unlike in 2010, when the cost of adjustment was passed on to the 
economies of the periphery, in 2020 the EU countries finally agreed to set up a significant new 
temporary crisis management mechanism. The agreement on the Recovery and Resilience 
Facility (RRF) and other initiatives totalling 750 billion euros creates a temporary mechanism 





This paper has provided a perspective on the Euro Area (EA), focusing on macroeconomic and 
financial asymmetries among its member states, and in particular between the core and the 
periphery. This perspective highlights the need for major and fundamental EA reforms. 
After surveying the evolution of EU macroeconomic and monetary co- operation and 
developments since the creation of the euro, and particularly the euro area crisis, we argue 
that the euro area needs fundamental fiscal, financial and labor market reforms. 
In addition to the banking union and other reforms currently contemplated, and the proposals 
of Benassy-Quere et al. (2018), which we support, we stress the need for two additional major 
reforms, so as to deal with the asymmetries of the EA and deal with potential future crises.  
First, a common EA budget of moderate size, focused on a EA system of unemployment 
insurance. This would shift the EA nearer to being an optimal currency area. It would help 
smooth out the asymmetric impact of macroeconomic shocks through the operation of 
automatic fiscal stabilizers and would thus help countries in recession face smaller national 
fiscal and financial consequences of such recessions. The reform we propose would also partly 
address labor market fragmentation. A significant part of the fragmentation of labor markets 
in the EA is the result of the lack of a cross border system of unemployment insurance. This 
could be addressed as the EA budget that we propose is targeted to euro area wide 
unemployment insurance.  
Second, it would also help in the avoidance of future crises if the scope for the ECB to act as 
a lender of last resort in times of crisis was expanded and officially recognized, as the limited 
scope of the ESM would not suffice in a future crisis, especially if it involved one of the larger 
EA economies. 
Finally, the establishment of the Recovery and Resilience Fund, following the Covid-19 crisis 
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Chapter 16. The Return of Geopolitics in US-Greece Relations 
Katerina Sokou200  
 
1. Introduction 
Accounting for the significant deepening in U.S.-Greece of recent years, this paper argues that 
the Greek debt crisis played a key role in America’s re-engagement in Greece. Even as it 
focused on the economic aspects of the crisis, the Obama administration was driven by the 
geopolitical imperative of keeping Greece in the Eurozone to prevent destabilizing the country 
amid a devastating drop in Greek GDP. A confluence of geopolitical threats in the region 
during the later stages of the crisis, from Russia’s annexation of Crimea to Syria’s civil war and 
the refugee crisis it caused, further underlined that imperative for the U.S. administration. At 
the same time, Turkey’s authoritarian turn after the failed 2016 coup was complemented by 
a revisionist foreign policy that undermined the security interests of the U.S. in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and challenged Greek sovereign rights, leading the U.S. and Greece to seek a 
closer security and defense cooperation, both bilaterally and with other U.S. allies in the 
region.  
 
After the fall of the military junta in 1974, an era of wide-sweeping change started for Greece. 
The direction of the country shifted from the Cold-War era dependence on the US to 
integration in the European Economic Communities. At the time, close association with 
Western Europe was considered necessary to secure the Greek democracy and its place in 
the West and was supported by the US. During the three decades of European Union 
membership that followed until the financial debt crisis, successive Greek governments linked 
their aspirations of modernizing the country to the process of Europeanization. For Greek 
foreign policy, participation in the EU symbolized a transition from dependence on the U.S. 
to the assertiveness of a new-found foreign policy independence. Greece discovered the 
geopolitical benefits of being an EU member: it used its power within the powerful Euro-
Atlantic institutions to block Turkey’s candidacy to the EU and threatened to do so in the case 
of FYROM’s NATO membership, frustrating American priorities in the region. But in the 
process of Europeanization of its foreign policy, the instances of Greek dissent gradually gave 
way to consensus building, notably when Greece supported Turkey’s EU application in 
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1999.201 And after EU enlargement, U.S. attention shifted elsewhere, as Greece lost the 
strategic significance it held during the Cold War.  
 
In 2010, the debt crisis forced the U.S. to shift its attention back to Greece in a different 
context, to address the economic concerns of a potential meltdown in the Eurozone. 
American officials considered the crisis a European problem, but the lacking EU response 
concerned them about its potential effect on the markets and the global economy. Hence, 
U.S. engagement in Greece was an exercise in crisis management, rather than a strategic 
priority for the Obama administration. In 2015, as the crisis reached its peak at a time when 
regional challenges amassed, the stabilization of Greece became a geopolitical priority for the 
US. The country was seen to be at the heart of a “triangle of turbulence”, from Ukraine in the 
North to Libya and Syria in the South. The U.S. administration focused its effort in avoiding a 
break with Europe that would lead Greece out of the Eurozone.  
 
As we will show, American diplomacy has since capitalized on the goodwill it built during the 
crisis to promote U.S. interests in the region, from regional energy diversification to expanded 
defense cooperation and the resolution of the Macedonian name dispute. Officials in both 
countries characterize US-Greece relations as the best they have ever experienced, noting an 
“unprecedented alignment of interests”. Yet while Greece has invested in regional 
partnerships with the support of the U.S., Turkey has weighed in the various conflicts in the 
region by sending its own or proxy troops, has taken a hard line on the Cyprus issue and 
exerted maritime claims that challenge Greek sovereign rights. The U.S. response to Turkey’s 
revisionism will test bilateral relations, and the past experience of Cyprus shows that it may 
shape them for decades to come. This time, however, the stakes are higher as Turkey also 
undermines NATO’s security and the balance of power in the region with its acquisition of the 
Russian S-400 missile systems. And as more U.S. allies in Europe and the Middle East feel the 
heat of Turkey’s interventionist foreign policy, it threatens to destabilize its Southern Flank to 
the benefit of Russia, Iran, and China.    
    
 
 
2. Historical context: Overcoming dependence 
“Our interest in Greece is by no means restricted to humanitarian or friendly impulses… if 
Greece should dissolve into civil war it is altogether probable that it would emerge as a 
communist state under Soviet control… It is not alarmist to say that we are faced with the first 
crisis of a series which might extend Soviet domination to Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.”  
 




Secretary of State George C. Marshall, February 27, 1947 
 
U.S. engagement in Greece is not new. The Cold War shaped American relations with Greece 
in the second half of the 20th century, when Greece was considered one of the front-line 
states of the West. Indeed, it was the concern that Greece and Turkey would fall to the Soviet 
sphere of influence that drove the U.S. to devise the Marshall Plan to provide aid for European 
reconstruction. President Harry Truman recognized that the aid plan symbolized a turning 
point in America’s foreign policy: “It means”, he said, “the United States is going into 
European politics.”  
Military support to Greece and Turkey was the cornerstone of U.S. policy to prevent Soviet 
influence from spreading South, in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Sixth Fleet was the 
force projecting U.S. hegemony in the region.202 In his presentation to President Truman on 
February 27, Secretary of State George Marshall laid down the geopolitical argument: “Our 
interest in Greece is by no means restricted to humanitarian or friendly impulses… if Greece 
should dissolve into civil war it is altogether probable that it would emerge as a communist 
state under Soviet control… It is not alarmist to say that we are faced with the first crisis of a 
series which might extend Soviet domination to Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.”203  
Hence began the period of American support to the Greek economy, but also of Greek 
political dependence on the U.S. Dependence on foreign powers was not a new phenomenon 
in the history of modern Greece. According to Couloumbis, “in the area of Greek-Great Power 
relations, political scientists classified Greece among those states with penetrated 
(dependent) political systems.”204 This dependency continued after the colonels’ coup of 1967 
and broke with the implosion of the Greek junta following Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus in 1974. 
Amid the Greek public, American engagement with the junta undermined the former’s ethical 
authority and gave rise to anti-Americanism. As historian Eirini Karamouzi notes, “the 
dependence of Greece on the USA, or at least the Greek public’s perception of this, is 
important in explaining the wave of vehement anti-Americanism that dominated the Greek 
domestic scene during, and especially after, the military dictatorship and the Cyprus debacle 
that followed.”205  
After the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, Greece reassessed its strategic dogma.206 As far as it was 
concerned, the imminent threat no longer came from the Communist North but from the 
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East. NATO and the US had failed to protect Greek interests in Cyprus, so after the restoration 
of democracy Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis turned to Europe in his effort to secure 
democratic governance and to seek a more effective security provider vis-à-vis Turkey. Even 
as the main reason behind Prime Minister Karamanlis’ determination that Greece needed to 
join the EEC was “to render the establishment of a liberal democratic model irreversible,”207 
strengthening external security was also a consideration. Greece was still in search for an 
external guarantor of interests and provider of security, and as Spyros Economides argues 
since 1974 Greece gradually shifted away from American tutelage to that of the European 
Union.208  
At the same time, EU membership helped detach Greece from the great dependence it had 
on the US during the Cold War and towards a more independent foreign policy, sometimes 
conflicting to America’s goals. Still, whenever tensions with Turkey rose to a boiling point it 
was the US and not the EU that prevented the crisis from escalating to war. During the Imia 
crisis of January 1996, the US played “the role of fire-fighter” and was actively engaged to 
diffuse the crisis, while European institutions were slower to respond. As the U.S. ambassador 
to Greece put it in a wire from Athens, “we are all somewhat frustrated by the extraordinary 
tardiness of the Italian presidency as regards the resolution of this dispute.”209 
The Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis publicly thanked the US for its role in diffusing the 
crisis in the Greek parliament – and was viewed as a leader “with a more realistic approach 
towards Turkey and the US”.210 Later that year, he was reelected to power and kickstarted a 
new approach towards Turkey. In 1999, the effort to normalize relations with Turkey led to a 
major change of policy at the Helsinki Summit, where Greece dropped its veto on the prospect 
of Turkey joining the EU.  
Other thorny issues continued to complicate US-Greece relations. Among the problematic 
legacies of the 70s, domestic terrorism continued to stain bilateral relations until a major 
security operation ahead of the 2004 Athens Olympic Games led to the dismantling of the 
terrorist group November 17. And the Greek dispute with FYROM over the latter’s name, 
which the US recognized as “Republic of Macedonia” in 2004, delayed for more than 10 years 
the U.S. goal of bringing the country into NATO as the threat of a Greek veto stopped short a 
NATO invitation to the former Yugoslav Republic in 2008. Still, before the Greek debt crisis, 
disagreements with the EU over foreign policy had eased. In fact, as soon as the late 1990s, 
“Europe was hardly a divisive issue in Greek politics”.211 In the case of the two major parties, 
PASOK and New Democracy, which ruled the country in turns from the fall of the junta until  
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2015, working with the US on defense, and increasingly on counterterrorism, was also taken 
as a given.  
However, due to the Cold-War history of dependence, the junta and the Cyprus fallout, there 
was no public opinion consensus on the benefits of U.S. engagement in Greece. The left 
maintained a fiercely anti-American rhetoric and routinely condemned NATO and the EU, 
limiting the potential for a more active Greek role within the North Atlantic alliance. This 
changed when SYRIZA came into power with the promise of tearing down the austerity 
memoranda. When the Greek government’s effort to avoid a new bailout program failed and 
Greece was faced with economic disaster, the Obama administration helped Prime Minister 
Alexis Tsipras reverse course and leveraged its influence to secure a deal with Greece’s 
creditors that would keep Greece in the Eurozone. As a result of this mediation, and for the 
first time in Greece, a leftist party became, in both its rhetoric and its policies, pro-American. 
For bilateral relations, this was as important a break from the past as the fall of the junta. 
Since then, the US and Greece have expanded and deepened their partnership in all aspects 
of the bilateral relationship. 
 
 
3.  he Greek debt crisis: “ s se ere a test” as its ci il war 
“The United States has a national interest in Greece emerging from its extended economic 
crisis stronger, stable and playing a stabilizing role in its region. That is the current job of US 
diplomacy”.  
Ambassador of the U.S. to the Hellenic Republic David Pearce, Fall 2014 
 
In their effort to avoid Grexit, senior U.S. officials who were involved in the management of 
the Greek crisis say they were acting on the tradition of post-World War II American 
engagement in Europe. As the former Treasury Secretary Jack Lew put it, “every step towards 
European integration has been supported by the US, from setting up the EEC to the euro and 
EU enlargement.”212 This was especially true in the case of Greece, when the U.S. effort to 
keep it in the Eurozone was also aimed at safeguarding its place amid European institutions. 
The irony was not lost to pundits of modern Greek history: a Greek diplomat noted the 
paradox that the US, which had supported Greece’s participation in the EU as a way for the 
country to graduate from a “badly managed” American security concern, should have to 
 




“return” to Greece as a result of the problematic management of the Greek crisis by the 
Eurozone.213 
As Secretary Lew explained, “What I think motivated our involvement in Greece, really drew 
on this tradition of caring deeply about the success of the European project - concern for the 
European project as a matter of principle, both as a security alliance and as an economic 
entity. From our perspective it was important as it had direct bearings on U.S. interests but 
was more important directly in Europe. So, it was not without self-interest but there’s always 
a mix of self-interest and interest in the European project.”214  
The U.S. reading of the political situation in Greece was more alarmed of the perils of Grexit 
than the European take on the issue. Since the Cold War, American engagement in Europe 
has had both a security and an economic dimension, and the security element had been 
particularly prominent in its relations with Greece. So even as the Greek debt crisis was 
predominantly a financial concern, with the Treasury heading the response to avoid 
contagion, there was an understanding that a Greek default and a breakup of the Eurozone 
would have important geopolitical consequences for the region. The U.S. stance was different 
to that of Europe in that it stressed the need for a quick move to stabilize the situation and 
provide the financial support necessary, crashing any doubt that some country would leave 
the euro. According to a former U.S. Treasury official, “we believed that robust intervention 
was needed and that their half-measures invited speculation that they would need to do 
more, and that in the process some people can make money.”215 When it was clear that the 
Eurozone was reluctant to provide enough support to stop the speculation, the Americans 
deemed that the IMF would be critical to the stabilization process, and hence supported the 
biggest IMF program until then. In a wire back to Athens, a Greek diplomat at the Embassy of 
Greece in Washington noted that a Treasury official encouraged him to ask the IMF for as 
large an amount as needed.216 
The Europeans were worried about contagion too, but their approach was to make an 
example of Greece to other struggling European nations by insisting on excessive austerity as 
the only way to avoid default. In his book “Stress Test”, former Treasury Secretary Timothy 
Geithner characterizes this attitude as “old testament punishment,” while in the leaked 
transcripts of his interviews for the book, he remembers a G20 Summit in Iqaluit Canada, 
where he conceded to the Europeans: “You can put your foot on the neck of those guys if 
that’s what you want to do. But you’ve got to make sure that you send a countervailing signal 
of reassurance to Europe and the world that you’re going to hold the thing together and not 
let it go. [You’re] going to protect the rest of the place.” He was asking for credible 
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reassurance that they would not allow the crisis to spread, even as they were “teaching the 
Greeks a lesson…”217 
So, it was not for punishment purposes that Secretary Geithner did not support a haircut in 
Greece’s debt at the beginning of the crisis. Despite arguments within the U.S. administration 
that the Greek debt was not sustainable, he believed that the banking sector was still very 
vulnerable on both sides of the Atlantic for an upfront Greek haircut. As a result, in 2010 the 
U.S. government ended up sharing the European position, of the ECB but also of France and 
Germany, whose banks had the biggest exposure to Greek debt, of no haircut for Greece 
before or soon after the IMF program. The U.S. position started shifting as Europe built its 
policy and institutional defenses, limiting the risk of financial contagion. Secretary Lew, in 
particular, supported the case for Greek debt relief, as the cost of the unprecedented 
austerity became evident beyond the economy. In the fall of 2014, the U.S. ambassador to 
Athens David Pearce even compared the crisis to the Greek civil war. Even as he noted signs 
that things were “finally starting to look up”, Ambassador Pearce noted that the economic 
crisis had been “Greece’s most severe test since its civil war”, and would have “profound, long 
term effects on politics, economics, and society”. Writing for the Council of American 
Ambassadors, he stressed that “the US has a stake in the outcome of Greece’s six-year crisis”.  
His analysis described the sources of domestic instability that the State Department had 
identified early in the crisis: a deep disenchantment with the political establishment which 
had weakened traditional parties and strengthened parties of the far-left and far-right, and a 
need for reforms to put the country on a stable path while creating growth and jobs. He 
warned that “Greece is in transition and only the next few years will tell, to what” and noted 
that “the outcome matters for the United States, because it matters for the stability of not 
just Greece, but the Eastern Mediterranean region, and our largest trading partner, the 
European Union. Our military priorities in Europe have been shifting north to south and west 
to east. Our defense and security relationship is more important than ever. And Greece is an 
essential counterterrorism and law enforcement partner. We have a stake.”218 
The stakes rose further in January 2015, when SYRIZA was elected to power with a pledge to 
get rid of the Greek bailout. Some early efforts by the newly elected government to find 
alternative sources of financing from China and Russia fell through, but not before creating 
unease in Washington. State Department officials were worried about the future direction of 
Greece and its standing in the West. In the White House, President Obama’s National Security 
Advisors were also concerned, and geopolitical arguments were increasingly weighing in in 








“really thought that the geopolitical trajectory of the country was at stake, as Russia was 
trying to increase its influence in the region”.219 
 
At the same time, the regional security situation had deteriorated. In the aftermath of Islamic 
terrorism attacks in Europe and the refugee crisis, the importance of domestic security in 
Greece became evident, making it easier for the US to argue for the geopolitical importance 
of a stable Greece within the Eurozone. It was a point in time when most Europeans were 
persuaded that a Greek exit from the Eurozone would have no economic repercussions for 
the rest of the block, as private creditors had reduced their exposure to Greece to minimal 
levels and Europe had built its defenses to avoid contagion. The U.S. administration did not 
share this hypothesis, and the Treasury made the argument that the risk of contagion, even 
if reduced, was still there. It also made a point of increasingly stressing the geopolitical 
implications of the crisis and the security risks of a Greek exit from the Eurozone.220  
 
Most importantly, however, Secretary Lew was in frequent, direct contact with the Greek 
Prime Minister. In the first six months of 2015, they talked so many times that he developed 
a personal bond of trust with Prime Minister Tsipras. So much so, that before the July 12 
negotiations in Brussels that would define the fate of Greece, the Greek Prime Minister was 
on the phone with Secretary Lew, who urged him not to leave the room until he had secured 
a new bailout, keeping Greece in the Eurozone, warning him that this was his last chance.221 
As he put it, the US was an indispensable, interested and trusted outsider in European 
conversations during the crisis.222 European officials are keen to stress the “outsider” and not 
the “indispensable” part, noting that the US did not put its own money on the table. But when 
talking to Greek officials of successive governments, the trusted part stands out.223 This was 
particularly evident in 2015, as the Obama administration was a valuable diplomatic arbiter 
who advised the Greek government and played a mediating role between Greece and its 
creditors.  
 
Even in the last hour, in the summer of 2016, with just a few more months in power for the 
Obama administration and the Greek government well into the third bailout, Secretary Lew 
was using the failed Turkish coup to make the argument for Greek debt relief, reverting to a 
geopolitical argument. As he told the Financial Times on July 20, “I would hope [the recent 
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regional upheaval] would change the climate in which discussions of debt relief happen, just 
because it’s the right thing to do on its own, and at a time when Greece is in a position [of] 
geopolitical significance that’s a good time to reinforce their fiscal future.” 224 However, he 
was not able to persuade his European counterparts to offer further debt relief, as the Greek 
government was no longer actively pushing the case.  
 
Recognizing his role, Prime Minister Tsipras publicly thanked President Obama for his 
government’s support when the latter visited Athens in November 2016. As he said at the 
time, “With this opportunity, I want to recognize publicly the role and the contribution of 
President Obama, during those difficult moments when as a young government, we were 
asked to take very difficult decision, to recognize his moral and political support (that) he 
gave to my government in the effort to find a political solution.” The trip took place during 
the transition to the Trump administration, but the diplomatic preparations for President 
Obama’s trip helped provide some valuable continuity in US-Greece relations. Jeffrey Pyatt, 
the newly arrived U.S. Ambassador to Greece, used the momentum and built on the success 
of the trip to both expand and strengthen bilateral ties.  
 
As a presidential candidate, Donald Trump had expressed the view that the Greek crisis should 
be left to the Germans to deal with, or even the Russians, but as President he did not question 
the role of the IMF in the Greek program. While President, in June 2017, his chief economic 
advisor Gary Cohn noted that the IMF was very helpful in stabilizing the Greek financial crisis 
and working with Europe, at a time when its supervision of the Greek financial program was 
still considered critical for Greece’s European creditors. Meanwhile, amid a policy drive to 
reduce U.S. expenditures for international organizations, the former Treasury Secretary 
Steven Mnuchin explained that the IMF last commitment to Greece was quite small, “more 
like a stamp of approval”, and may not be used – which turned out to be the case.225 And 
when Prime Minister Tsipras visited the White House in October 2017, President Trump 
publicly supported “a responsible debt relief” for Greece. To be sure, he also praised Greece’s 
2% of GDP contribution to NATO and announced a defense sale: “a possible purchase at an 
estimated cost of $2.4 billion for the upgrade of Greek F-16 aircrafts”, a deal that he presented 
as serving his pledge to create more American jobs.226 
Even though it was not the primary intention of the U.S. administration, the mediating role of 
the US during the Greek debt crisis helped improve bilateral relations, opening the way for 
deeper cooperation on a wide range of issues, most notably in defense and security. American 
and Greek diplomats and politicians all confirm that US-Greece relations improved during the 









government when his policy of breaking with Europe was not followed through, agree that 
the US played a positive role in mediating between Greece and its creditors.227 Public opinion 
data also support this assessment, although admittedly the starting point is low: According to 
Kapa Research, positive views of the US increased to 57.5% in 2016, from 28% in 2005. As a 
notable comparison, if not too surprising given the blame-game among European countries 
during the crisis, positive views of Germany followed the opposite trend, falling from 78.5% 
to 44.5% in the same period.  
U.S. popularity is largely due to its well reported stabilizing role it played during the summer 
of 2015, even as many other incidents of American support for Greece during its decade-long 
crisis have not been fully assessed yet.228 When asked to evaluate the role of foreign 
governments in the crisis, about one in three Greeks believe that the U.S. showed solidarity. 
As Kapa Research puts it, “the traditional anti-Americanism in Greek society throughout the 
biggest part of the post war era seems to have burst with the 2010 financial crisis and the 
advent of Germany as the most unpopular country in Greece.”229  
 
The financial crisis monopolized the Greek public and government’s attention for the better 
part of a decade, and the U.S. position that Greece should remain in the Eurozone, reform its 
economy, and reach an agreement that will support its recovery through debt relief was 
popular in Greece, facilitating its constructive role in the crisis. On the contrary, in Germany 
and its fiscally conservative allies in Northern Europe, public opinion limited policy options 
like debt easing with its tough stance on Greece, hardening their ideological insistence on 
fiscal consolidation. According to the testimony of an American official posted in Germany at 
the time, the negative public opinion towards Greece was a disincentive for the German 
government to agree to a resolution of the crisis, straining relations with Greece.230 
On the contrary, the U.S. administration was not constrained by public opinion in its 
engagement. This allowed it to approach the Greek debt crisis with a sense of pragmatism, 
with the goal of reaching a sustainable solution that would keep the country in the Eurozone, 
which would require both reforms and debt relief. The most powerful Finance Minister in the 
Eurozone, Germany’s Wolfgang Schaeuble, tried to fend off the U.S. calls for debt relief by 
noting that it was easy for Americans to ask for it, as they had no money on the table. Yet 
exactly because they were a third party to the Eurozone debt crisis, U.S. officials were able to 
mediate between the sides and help avoid a catastrophic Grexit. Given that staying in the 
Euro was the strong preference of most Greeks and, at the end of the day, of the Greek 
government, it also created valuable goodwill towards America in Greece. By contributing to 
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a resolution of the crisis within the Eurozone, the U.S. was able to safeguard its interests in 
Greece and the region, providing a case study of how constructive engagement in Europe can 
work to the benefit of transatlantic relations. 
 
 
4. Current State of US-Greece relations: Defining a strategic alliance 
“We are constructing a long-term strategy to bolster the U.S. presence in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. We are cultivating Greece as an anchor of stability in the Mediterranean and 
Western Balkans and working to systematically strengthen security and energy cooperation 
with Cyprus.”   
Assistant Secretary of State A. Wess Mitchell, Senate Foreign Relations testimony, June 26, 
2018 
 
When Greece secured a third international program -and with it its future in the Eurozone- 
U.S. engagement gradually shifted from international crisis diplomacy to the various aspects 
of the bilateral relationship. Once stabilization had been achieved, both the US and Greece 
were able to focus on expanding their cooperation to strengthen their ties and pursue their 
common interests of prosperity and security in the Western Balkans and the Eastern 
Mediterranean. While Greek defense capabilities, including commitments to NATO, remained 
a priority during the years of the crisis, the long-held argument of successive governments 
that Greece is a “beacon” or “pillar” of stability in a troubled region became more persuasive 
once the crisis subsided.  
The Eastern Mediterranean in particular has gained attention as a separate geographical 
entity in the context of strategic competition, even as the Trump administration has taken 
steps to disengage from Syria.231 In its National Defense Strategy, the US identifies interstate 
strategic competition, not terrorism, as the primary concern of U.S. national security.232 In it, 
Russia features highly on the list of American adversaries, and so does Iran. Both peripheral 
powers are threatening the balance of power in the region, against which the US has a 
strategic interest in strengthening its own allies, including by supporting collaboration among 
them. Stabilizing NATO’s periphery is key to containing not only Russia’s, but in the longer-
term also China’s, influence in the area.  
 





Tensions in the wider area have upgraded the strategic significance of Greece. As the U.S. 
Ambassador to Greece Jeffrey Pyatt has put it, “We see Greece’s position as critical and 
unique in the world, and particularly along Europe’s Southern Flank. Greece exists at the 
nexus of three separate strategic problem sets which come together over Greece. On the one 
hand there is the ongoing Syrian conflict, the threat of Iran and asymmetric threats from the 
eastern Mediterranean. To the south the instability and emergence of refugees, and other 
problems emerging from a yet-to-be united Libya, and to the north, the malign influence of 
Russia exercised through its illegal annexation of Crimea and increased militarization of the 
Black Sea. Greece is a critical ally in dealing with all three of these problems.”233 
At his testimony in Congress in July 2018, Assistant Secretary for Europe and Eurasian affairs 
Wess Mitchell provided a picture of how Greece fits into this picture for U.S. policy in the 
region. As he noted, “we are constructing a long-term strategy to bolster the U.S. presence in 
the Eastern Mediterranean. We are cultivating Greece as an anchor of stability in the 
Mediterranean and Western Balkans and working to systematically strengthen security and 
energy cooperation with Cyprus. We are also increasing U.S. engagement in the Western 
Balkans. Through active U.S. diplomacy and close coordination with the EU, we supported the 
visionary leaders Prime Minister Tsipras and Prime Minister Zaev in achieving a potentially 
historic breakthrough in the Greece-Macedonia name dispute.”234  
 
From its part, Greece readjusted its priorities in the aftermath of the debt crisis to deal with 
increased domestic and external security challenges, by focusing on border security, 
deepening its regional alliances, and building its defenses. Faced with a difficult economic 
reality, an aggressive neighbor in Turkey and a dangerous neighborhood, Greece sought to 
build constructive relations with key states in the region such as Israel, Egypt, and Jordan, and 
further stabilize its relations with traditional allies such as the United States.235 The former 
Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras publicly shared his government’s strategic judgment that 
Greece should work closely with the Americans. “The strategic partnership between Greece 
and the US is the best foundation for a new potential for our country and the wider region. A 
potential of security, growth, peace and stability,” he tweeted from the Thessaloniki Trade 
Fair in September 2018, when the US was the honored country.  
 
Diplomats from both countries note that the bilateral relationship is the strongest they 
remember, something that they attribute to a strategic alignment of interests.236 During a 
visit to Athens in October 2019, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo shared with his Greek 
audience that the relationship is the best it has ever been as “you are beginning to see the 
world just as we do… You’ve secured the Prespa agreement. It’s a step towards stability in the 
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Balkans. You’ve upheld sanctions on Russia for its invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine. 
You’ve refused an Iranian ship filled with oil, oil for the Assad [regime] dock in Greek harbors. 
And you’re taking a hard look at the risks of allowing China to build sensitive 5G networks. 
You’ve made good decisions. You’ve grown ties with Israel to secure energy supplies.”  
 
Greece dramatically improved its standing in Washington earlier that year by ratifying the 
Prespa Agreement. In what then White House National Security Advisor John Bolton called “a 
remarkable achievement,” the agreement renamed the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia to Republic of Northern Macedonia and opened the way for its NATO 
membership, initiating a change of attitude towards Greece in Washington from a potential 
source of instability during the financial crisis to a country that is leading geopol itical 
stabilization efforts in its neighborhood. American diplomacy encouraged the initiative to 
resolve the Macedonian name dispute as the catalyst to reinvigorate the Euro-Atlantic 
process for the Western Balkans, and NATO membership for North Macedonia was seen as a 
key step to countering Russian influence in the Western Balkans.   
 
The State Department applauded “this historic opportunity to advance stability, security, and 
prosperity in the region,” while former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense M ichael 
Carpenter -and foreign policy advisor to former Vice President Joe Biden- called it a “huge 
win” on Twitter. Carpenter called the agreement “historic” and “a win against ethnic 
nationalism and demagoguery”, while he noted that “it is impressive how Prime Ministers 
Zaev & Tsipras got this over the line despite Russian meddling”. The New York Times even 
called the agreement “a rare victory for the EU and NATO” -the “West”- over Moscow.237  
 
American and Greek officials agree that the Prespa agreement, together with Greece’s 
decision to diversify its energy sources and its bold response in the face of Russia’s “malign 
activities” in Greece when it expelled two Russian diplomats accused of spying, have done 
much to change the image of Greece – according to a State Department official, they have 
reaffirmed “the sovereignty of the Greek nation” and signaled a change in the nature and 
importance of US-Greece relations for both countries”. And even though US officials steer 
clear of linking the bilateral improvement to their increasingly thorny relations with Turkey, 
Greek officials note that the US focus on Greece also reflected its troubled relations with 
Turkey and the need for the US to strengthen cooperation with its reliable allies in the 
region.238 
 
Security was at the heart of the US-Greece strategic dialogue inaugurated in 2018 as a symbol 
of the new era in bilateral relations, when the two countries agreed to tackle common 
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security concerns, such as international terrorism and the instability in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. A year later, this led to a new defense and security cooperation agreement 
that expanded U.S. access to military bases in Greece from the ever-important Souda Bay in 
Crete to two more locations in mainland Greece. The new agreement is already bearing fruit 
in easing the move of U.S. personnel and equipment in and out of theater.  
 
Closer military cooperation is particularly important for NATO’s Southern Flank. As 
Ambassador Philip Reeker, at the time the highest-ranking civilian at the U.S. European 
Command (EUCOM), put it, “consistent high-level cooperation has brought the level of US-
Greece defense cooperation to its highest point in the modern era - through the alliance, but 
also bilaterally... It is in a regional context that the US supports Greece taking the initiative to 
build bridges and to be an ever-broadening group of regional partners with a mutual interest 
in security, stability and prosperity.” He also noted that the leadership that Athens plays in 
the neighborhood is “of utmost importance:  Greece exists at the nexus of three separate 
strategic problem sets that we face in 2018 and going forward. Its position is therefore critical 
and unique in the world and particularly along Europe’s southern flank.”239  
 
A potential area for further collaboration is maritime security, as strategy analysts note that 
Greece could play a key role within a Euro-Atlantic maritime security strategy in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. A country with extensive sea borders, Greece is a traditional naval power, 
with one of the largest merchant fleets in the world. Due to its location, political instability in 
the region heavily affects it, as the possibility of diffusion of terrorism and migration flows 
through the Aegean Sea are threatening Greek interests such as tourism and security of sea-
lanes. NATO and the EU are in a process of developing a strategy on maritime security, while 
the US has set collective maritime security as a major goal, in order to address common 
threats and safeguard mutual interests.240 Within this context, Greece has a comparative 
advantage at sea, which makes it a valuable asset – this is already evident in the numerous 
navy exercises with its allies in the region, and it may lead to Athens assuming an enhanced 
role for the protection of its own as well as the broader Euro-Atlantic interests.241  
 
This is all the more important as Western interests are increasingly challenged by Turkey. 
After the failed coup of 2016, President Erdogan has become more authoritarian while 
pursuing a revisionist foreign policy. Issues such as the detention of U.S. citizens, its military 
operations in Syria and its business dealings with Iran are all thorny issues for bilateral 
relations. Despite being as old a NATO member as Greece, Turkey’s decision to purchase and 
deploy the Russian S-400 missile system has undermined NATO interoperability and led the 
U.S. Pentagon to halt Turkey’s participation in the F-35 fighter jet production program due to 
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security concerns. Furthermore, as President Trump’s National Security Council advisor for 
Europe Fiona Hill put it, Turkey’s decision shifted the strategic balance in the region, 
contributing to U.S. efforts to form a strategic partnership with Greece – something that she 
predicted would continue under the Biden administration as it is not ideological.242  
 
In his testimony to Congress, Assistant Secretary Mitchell underlined that Turkey has a vested 
strategic interest in checking the spread of Russian and especially Iranian influence and in 
having a safe and stable border with Syria. However, he noted Turkey’s increased engagement 
with Russia and Iran and warned that Ankara “should be mindful of the risks in making 
strategic concessions to Moscow in order to achieve its tactical objectives in Syria.” Since 
then, Ankara has further facilitated Moscow’s strategic objectives in Syria as, “by obtaining 
the withdrawal of U.S. forces from northern-eastern Syria, Turkey has facilitated a takeover 
of their bases by Russia”.243 Turkey also provoked the strong objection of the State 
Department -and the dismay of Israel- when President Erdogan met with two leaders of 
Hamas, which is designated a terrorist organization by the US and the European Union.244 As 
a result, there is a growing consensus amid American foreign policy experts that the US needs 
a strategic hedge in the region, and Greece has filled part of this role bilaterally as well as with 
its partnerships with other U.S. allies in the Eastern Mediterranean.245  
 
A major driving force for those partnerships is hydrocarbon development in the Eastern 
Mediterranean, while energy more broadly is also a strategic focus in bilateral relations, as 
U.S. policy aims to reinforce European energy security by reducing Europe’s dependence on 
Russian gas. During his presidency, Donald Trump also pushed for increased exports of 
American LNG to Europe to support the U.S. energy sector. Greece has been at the forefront 
of this trend, with LNG supplies from the US nearly quadrupling since the first half of 2019 
and accounting for nearly half of Greece’s imported gas in the first half of 2020.  
 
In light of the recent energy discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean, the US has encouraged 
increased cooperation among countries in the region. Greece’s trilateral partnership with 
Cyprus and Israel has had strong bipartisan support from the U.S. Congress, whose Eastern 
Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act was signed into law by President Trump 
in late 2019. Indeed, trilateral cooperation has had both a security and an energy component, 
with the US adding its weight in an energy working group aptly called 3+1. The State 
Department has also encouraged regional cooperation on energy and security through the 
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Palestinian Authority, among others. Improving U.S. relations with Cyprus recently led to the 
partial lifting of the U.S. arms embargo, and the US supports its right to exploit its oil and gas 
resources.246 
 
These developments provoked the ire of Turkey, which does not recognize the Republic of 
Cyprus and has strained relations with both Egypt and Israel. In response, it proceeded to a 
delimitation agreement with the Government of National Accord of civil war-torn Libya, 
asserting gas exploration rights in waters off the coast of Crete that ignore the sovereign rights 
of Greece. The same area is claimed in the intergovernmental agreement signed by the 
leaders of Israel, Greece, and Cyprus for the construction of the East Med Pipeline, an 
ambitious project that would bring natural gas from Israel to Europe via Cyprus, Greece, and 
Italy. Greece has signed Exclusive Economic Zone agreements with Italy and Egypt, while it 
has agreed with Albania to refer their maritime differences to the International Court of 
Justice, as it aims to settling its maritime zones diplomatically, in accordance with 
international law. But as Turkey does not recognize the rights of Greek islands to a continental 
shelf but instead promotes the claims of its own Blue Homeland dogma, an EEZ agreement 
with Turkey is still nowhere on the horizon. Turkey has also ignored a Greek invitation to let 
an international mediating court settle their maritime claims in accordance with international 
law.247  
 
Turkey’s aspirations in the Eastern Mediterranean have also raised alarms in the US, causing 
the State Department to break with its own tradition of not taking sides in the two nations’ 
maritime disputes. As Ambassador Pyatt first put it, based on U.S. legal analysis, Turkey’s 
claim that inhabited Greek islands do not have continental shelves “is contrary to customary 
international law”.248 U.S. diplomats routinely encourage dialogue between Athens and 
Ankara, but as a Turkish ship engaged in seismic research in the Greek continental shelf 
accompanied by warships for a whole month last summer, hopes for dialogue gave way to a 
military mobilization that raised the danger of an accident between the two NATO allies. 
President Erdogan defied U.S. calls to stop these activities and work for a peaceful resolution, 
including a call by President Trump to both leaders at the height of tensions on August 10th. 
It was only after the European Union threatened sanctions against Turkey late last year that 
he decided to pause its exploratory activities in contested waters and restart exploratory talks 
with Greece.  
 
During the same time, a less contentious energy development was the completion of the 
Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which started bringing non-Russian gas to Europe in early 2021. 
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The US supported TAP as part of a backbone of infrastructure to diversify routes and energy 
supplies to Europe and particularly Southeast Europe. An interconnector to transport such 
gas to Bulgaria broke ground in 2020, while Greece and North Macedonia are negotiating a 
second pipeline. As a matter of U.S. national security interest, the U.S. International 
Development Finance Corporation has indicated its intent to support U.S. investments that 
promote Greece as an energy hub that helps diversify the supply sources available to 
Southern Europe. To that end, it may also fund Black Summit’s bid for the development of the 
Alexandroupolis and Kavala ports, as well as committing to support ONEX’ bid for the 
privatization of the Elefsis Shipyards. The US is also “keeping a close eye” on opportunities 
such as the privatization of Hellenic Petroleum, which together with ExxonMobil and Total 
have been granted two of the exploration licenses to develop Greek energy resources off the 
Western coast of Crete.  
 
The US and Greece also formed a trade and investment working group since former 
Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross led a team of American business executives in Greece 
during the 2018 Thessaloniki Trade Fair. There, the two countries committed to boosting 
bilateral trade and investment, including in key sectors such as energy, defense, IT, 
entertainment, and infrastructure. Even as the US supported Greek aspirations to become a 
regional hub, in the past investor interest lagged behind public statements. Since his election 
in 2019, the New Democracy government of Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis has focused 
on bridging the gap through a wide-sweeping effort to attract investment and boost recovery 
efforts. One of the biggest investment projects is the Elliniko real estate development in 
Athens, where U.S.-based Mohegan won the bid to build an integrated resort casino. Investor 
interest has also expanded on high tech sectors and value-added functions, including research 
and innovation. For instance, drug-maker Pfizer is developing one of its Global Digital 
Technology Centers in Thessaloniki, Cisco has invested in a technology center, while software 
giant Microsoft acquired Greek IT firm Softomotive and Applied Materials invested in yet 
another innovating Greek firm, Think Silicon.  
 
Perhaps not surprisingly given tensions with Turkey, the Greek Prime Minister has also 
supported defense cooperation with the US, suggesting during his visit at the White House 
that Greece is interested in joining the production program for the F-35 fighter jets in the 
future.249 So, even as U.S. investment in Greece is still relatively small, the trend supports 
further collaboration on some of the most strategically important sectors, including on 
defense, infrastructure, research and energy. If anything, his visit at the White House in 
January 2020 was a testament to the momentum of the U.S.-Greece alliance. For President 







interests in enhancing stability, prosperity, and cooperation throughout the Balkans and 
eastern Mediterranean.”250 
This is a sentiment shared by the Biden administration. During his Senate confirmation, 
Secretary of State Antony Blinken noted that the bilateral security relationship between the 
United States and Greece has grown significantly and is important to U.S. interests in the 
Eastern Mediterranean.251 With its foreign policy emphasis on values, multilateralism, and 
safeguarding democracy, the Biden administration adds another factor of strength to 
bilateral relations – and yet more opportunities for cooperation with Greece. In a joint 
paper for ELIAMEP and the Atlantic Council with George Pagoulatos, we argued that as 
President Biden aims to reinvigorate the transatlantic partnership, he will find a key ally in 
Greece as a member of the European Union with strong democratic credentials, unwavering 
commitment to NATO, a constructive engagement with multilateral organizations and an 
increasing nexus of regional partnerships.252 Bilateral relations have come a long way to 
overcoming a complicated history that was defined by Cold War considerations, withstand 
dramatic political change in both countries and even managed to defy the Trump-era 






In the context of the Cold War, Greece and Turkey were geopolitically important for the US 
as a backstop to Soviet expansion. Despite their historic ties, US-Greece relations were 
strained post-1974 due to perceived U.S. support to the Greek military junta and tolerance of 
Turkey’s invasion in Cyprus. The two countries also developed diverting priorities after Greece 
joined the European Union, even as the US remained the fire-fighter in Greece’s relations with 
Turkey.  
 
The Greek debt crisis acted as a catalyst for closer bilateral relations. Geopolitical 
considerations started becoming relevant again in 2010, when the Greek debt crisis 
threatened the foundations of the Eurozone, prompting the US to support the biggest until  
then IMF bailout in the history of the international financial organization. Even as Europe built 











austerity took a toll in Greek institutions and people alike. Combined with the growing axis of 
instability in the region, from Ukraine to Syria and Libya, the resulting political unrest in 
Greece awakened the geopolitical reflexes of U.S. foreign policy to help secure Greece’s place 
in the West.  
 
In 2015, the Obama administration played a mediating role between Greece’s leftist 
government and its creditors with the goal of keeping Greece in the Eurozone. Successive 
Greek governments also benefited from U.S. efforts to ease the prescribed austerity and the 
Greek debt burden. This stance helped improve perceptions of the US amid the Greek public, 
as American policy on Greece was politically non-controversial for the first time in the postwar 
era.  
 
After the financial crisis, Greece also played a positive role in regional stability. The SYRIZA 
government reached a compromise that resolved the Macedonian name dispute, opening the 
way for the renamed Republic of North Macedonia to join NATO. Under the New Democracy 
government of Kyriakos Mitsotakis, Greece has honored this agreement, deepened its 
alliances in the region and expanded its ties with the US, including in the critical for security 
purposes sectors of mobile technology, energy, and defense. By all accounts, bilateral 
relations are at their best state as the strategic interests of the two countries aligned more 
closely.   
 
Yet the future breeds significant uncertainties. Sustained American support on the strategic 
and operational level is required for Greece to continue to be a stabilizing force in the wider 
region. Even as U.S. diplomacy has reset its sight on Greece after decades of geopolitical 
neglect, Turkey’s challenge to Greek sovereign rights and its unilateral actions to force the 
maritime claims of its Blue Homeland dogma in the Eastern Mediterranean are threatening 
security in the region – and are bound to test not only bilateral relations but also NATO’s 
cohesion and relevance.    
 
Sustaining American engagement with its allies on the ground will shape future developments 
in the region. So will the U.S. stance towards Turkey, and whether it follows a values-based 
approach based on international law while securing its interests and NATO’s Southern Flank.  
The first indications from the Biden administration are positive. As Secretary Blinken put it in 
his first testimony to Congress, “it is very important that the U.S. stands up and engages in 
advancing stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of all parties in [the] Eastern 
Mediterranean and insists that any disputes that arise will be resolved peacefully, 








If the past provides any guidance, a potential military confrontation with Turkey that the US 
does not take a swift and active role in averting may see public opinion in Greece shift against 
the US, a move that may further destabilize the region. That would be a missed opportunity 
of historic significance in the context of great power competition, especially as the 
groundwork for a mutually beneficial partnership that stabilizes the Eastern Mediterranean 
is already laid. Even more so as, in a break from the past, this time the concern over 
geopolitics is not tilted to the U.S. side. As a country bordering a turbulent region, Greece has 
an existential interest in containing the instability on its doorstep, especially given its 
exposure to refugee and immigration flows. It also has a comparative advantage in its 
maritime power, EU membership and regional partnerships to play that role. This time, the 
return of geopolitics does not translate as much to Greek dependence on the US as to 
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